Platform Capital and the City: Governing Uber in Buenos Aires and Manchester

Authors

Mathew Johnson, Alliance Manchester Business School, U.K.
Angel Martin-Caballero, Alliance Manchester Business School, U.K.

Abstract

Recent literature has drawn attention to the various regulatory battles and flashpoints triggered by the entry of platform Transportation network Companies such as Uber and Lyft into cities around the world. Drawing on original case study analysis of Uber in Buenos Aires and Greater Manchester, we explore the increasingly complex and dynamic nature of local regulatory responses to platforms, and how they evolve over time. We develop a three-fold analytical framework that illustrates the important interactions between the competencies of local regulatory actors, the power of different interest groups, and the legitimacy of institutional rules. Our findings suggest that balancing these three components is crucial to counteract the increasingly embedded nature of platforms within local transportation markets. Looking beyond platforms, limited enforcement capacities within the local state and weak mechanisms of collective voice remain significant obstacles to the articulation of decent minimum standards within local economies.

Recommended Citation

Johnson, Mathew and Martin-Caballero, Angel (2025) "Platform Capital and the City: Governing Uber in Buenos Aires and Manchester," Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal: Vol. 45: Iss. 1, Article 11.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2819-2567.1028
Available at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cllpj/vol45/iss1/11

References

A pesar de que se venció el plazo dispuesto por la Justicia para su bloqueo, Uber sigue funcionando. (2016, May 10). La Nacion. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/buenos-aires/apesar-de-que-se-vencio-el-plazo-dispuesto-por-la-justicia-para-su-bloqueo-uber-siguefuncionando-nid1897446/

Adams, Z. (2023). Legal mobilisations, trade unions and radical social change: A case study of the IWGB. Industrial Law Journal, 52(3), 560–594. https://doi.org/10.1093/indlaw/dwac031

Adler, L. (2021). Framing disruption: How a regulatory capture frame legitimized the deregulation of Boston’s ride-for-hire industry. Socio-Economic Review, 19(4), 1421–1450. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwab020

Alconada Mon, H., Jastreblansky, M., & Brom, R. (2022, July 10). La historia secreta de Uber en Argentina: Lobby, presiones y una guerra por los impuestos. La Nacion. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/the-uber-files-la-historia-secreta-de-uber-en-argentina-lobbypresiones-y-una-guerra-por-los-nid10072022/

Aloisi, A., & De Stefano, V. (2020). Regulation and the future of work: The employment relationship as an innovation facilitator. International Labour Review, 159(1), 47–69. https://doi.org/10.1111/ilr.12160

Amengual, M. (2016). Politicized enforcement in Argentina: Labor and environmental regulation (1^st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316476901

Bellan, R. (2019, May 20). The Dangerous Standoff Between Uber and Buenos Aires. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-20/inside-the-battlebetween-uber-and-buenos-aires

Benli-Trichet, M. C., & Kübler, D. (2022). The political origins of platform economy regulations. Understanding variations in governing Airbnb and Uber across cities in Switzerland. Policy & Internet, 14(4), 736–754. https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.312

Bensusán, G. (2006). La distancia entre normas y hechos: Instituciones laborales en América Latina. Revista de Trabahjo, 115–132.

Berg, J., Rani, U., Furrer, M., Ellie, H., & Silberman, M. S. (2018). Digital labour platforms and the future of work: Towards decent work in the online world. International Labour Organization (ILO).

Bertolini, A., & Dukes, R. (2021). Trade Unions and Platform Workers in the UK: Worker Representation in the Shadow of the Law. Industrial Law Journal, 50(4), 662–688. https://doi.org/10.1093/indlaw/dwab022

Calo, R., & Rosenblat, A. (2017). The taking economy: Uber, information, and power. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2929643

Cohen, J. E. (2019). Between truth and power: The legal constructions of informational capitalism. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246693.001.0001

Collier, R. B., Dubal, V. B., & Carter, C. L. (2018). Disrupting regulation, regulating disruption: The politics of Uber in the United States. Perspectives on Politics, 16(4), 919–937. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592718001093

Comunicaciones Argentina. (2020, September 29). El Tribunal Superior de Buenos Aires confirm la legalidad de Uber y cerró la disputa judicial. Uber Newsroom. https://www.uber.com/es-AR/newsroom/el-tribunal-superior-de-buenos-aires-confirmo-la-legalidad-de-uber/

Culpepper, P. D., & Thelen, K. (2020). Are we all Amazon primed? Consumers and the politics of platform power. Comparative Political Studies, 53(2), 288–318. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019852687

De Stefano, V. (2016). The rise of the “just-in-time workforce”: On-demand work, crowd work and labour protection in the “gig-economy” (ILO Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 71). International Labour Organization (ILO). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2682602

del Nido, J. M. (2022). Taxis vs. Uber: Courts, markets, and technology in Buenos Aires. Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503629684

Distelmans, M., & Scheerlinck, I. (2024). Incumbents’ institutional work in ride-hailing: An analysis of the Brussels taxi industry against Uber. Cities, 146, 104764. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2023.104764

El gobierno porteño asegura que Uber ‘no tiene autos autorizados y opera al margen de la ley’. (2016, April 12). La Nacion. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/buenos-aires/el-gobierno-portenoasegura-que-uber-no-tiene-autos-autorizados-y-opera-al-margen-de-la-ley-nid1888651/

El Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Ciudad revocó el intento de bloqueo a Uber. (2018, June 22). Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/sociedad/2018/06/21/el-tribunal-superior-de-justiciade-la-ciudad-revoco-el-intento-de-bloqueo-a-uber/

Fleming, P., Rhodes, C., & Yu, K.-H. (2019). On why Uber has not taken over the world. Economy and Society, 48(4), 488–509. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2019.1685744

Gillespie, T. (2018). Regulation of and by platforms. In J. Burgess, A. Marwick, & T. Poell (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of social media (pp. 254–278). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473984066.n15

Gorwa, R. (2019). What is platform governance? Information, Communication & Society, 22(6), 854–871. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2019.1573914

Helberger, N., Pierson, J., & Poell, T. (2018). Governing online platforms: From contested to cooperative responsibility. The Information Society, 34(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2017.1391913

Howcroft, D., & Leaver, A. (2024). Unstable platforms: Uber’s business model and the challenge of organisational legitimacy. Accounting Forum, 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/01559982.2024.2309018

Ilsøe, A., & Larsen, T. P. (2023). Why do labour platforms negotiate? Platform strategies in tax-based welfare states. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 44(1), 6-24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X211056974

Inversi, C., Dundon, T., & Buckley, L.-A. (2023). Work in the gig-economy: The role of the state and non-state actors ceding and seizing regulatory space. Work, Employment and Society, 37(5), 1279–1298. https://doi.org/10.1177/09500170221080387

Jacobs, K., Smith, R., & McBride, J. (2021). State and Local Policies and Sectoral Labor Standards: From Individual Rights to Collective Power. ILR Review, 74(5), 1132–1154. https://doi.org/10.1177/00197939211020706

Jessop, B. (1995). The regulation approach, governance and post-Fordism: Alternative perspectives on economic and political change? Economy and Society, 24(3), 307–333. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085149500000013

Jessop, B. (2004). Multi-level Governance and Multi-level Metagovernance: Changes in the European Union as Integral Moments in the Transformation and Reorientation of Contemporary Statehood. In Multi-level Governance (pp. 49–74). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199259259.003.0004

Johnson, M., & Herman, E. (2024). Out with the old, in with the new? Institutional experimentation and decent work in the UK. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 45(4), 1137–1157. https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X231220528

Johnson, M., Martinez Lucio, M., Mustchin, S., Grimshaw, D., Cartwright, J., Rodriguez, J. K., & Dundon, T. (2023). City regions and decent work: Politics, pluralism and policy making in Greater Manchester. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 41(3), 504-522. https://doi.org/10.1177/23996544221141844

Johnston, H. (2018). Workplace gains beyond the Wagner Act: The New York Taxi Workers Alliance and participation in administrative rulemaking. Labor Studies Journal, 43(2), 141–165. https://doi.org/10.1177/0160449X17747397

Johnston, H. (2020). Labour geographies of the platform economy: Understanding collective organizing strategies in the context of digitally mediated work. International Labour Review, 159(1), 25–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/ilr.12154

Johnston, H. (2021). Behind the wheel and in the streets: Technological transformation, exit, and voice in the New York City taxi industry. In B. Dolber, M. Rodino-Colocino, C. Kumanyika, & T. Wolfson (Eds.), The gig economy: Workers and media in the age of convergence (pp. 19–33). Routledge.

Koutsimpogiorgos, N., Frenken, K., & Herrmann, A. M. (2023). Platform adaptation to regulation: The case of domestic cleaning in Europe. Journal of Industrial Relations, 65(2), 156–184. https://doi.org/10.1177/00221856221146833

La Justicia allana las oficinas de Uber en Buenos Aires. (2016, April 15). La Nacion. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/buenos-aires/la-justicia-allano-las-oficinas-de-uber-en-buenosaires-nid1889784/

La Justicia porteña ordenó el bloqueo a nivel nacional del sitio y la app de Uber. (2018, February 10). La Nacion. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/sociedad/la-justicia-portena-ordeno-elbloqueo-a-nivel-nacional-del-sitio-y-la-app-de-uber-nid2108247/

Lehdonvirta, V. (2022). Cloud empires: How digital platforms are overtaking the state and how we can regain control. The MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/14219.001.0001

Los peligros de un CEO suelto. (2017, November 23). Pagina12. https://www.pagina12.com.ar/77723-los-peligros-de-un-ceo-suelto

Los taxis de la Ciudad suman tecnología y nuevas formas de pago para competir con Uber. (2018, August 27). Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/sociedad/2018/08/27/los-taxis-de-la-ciudadsuman-tecnologia-y-nuevas-formas-de-pago-para-competir-con-uber/

Maffie, M. D. (2022). The Perils of Laundering Control through Customers: A Study of Control and Resistance in the Ride-hail Industry. ILR Review, 75(2), 348–372. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793920972679

Mazur, J., & Serafin, M. (2023). Stalling the state: How digital platforms contribute to and profit from delays in the enforcement and adoption of regulations. Comparative Political Studies, 56(1), 101–130. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221089651

Niebler, V., Pirina, G., Secchi, M., & Tomassoni, F. (2023). Towards “bogus employment?” The contradictory outcomes of ride-hailing regulation in Berlin, Lisbon and Paris. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 16(2), 289–301. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsad007

Ottaviano, J. M., O’Farrell, J., & Maito, M. (2019). Organización sindical de trabajadores de plataformas digitales y criterios para el diseño de políticas públicas. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/argentinien/15913.pdf

Pelzer, P., Frenken, K., & Boon, W. (2019). Institutional entrepreneurship in the platform economy: How Uber tried (and failed) to change the Dutch taxi law. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 33, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2019.02.003

Pérez Chiconi, S. (2022, October 20). El drama del gremio que brillaba en los ’90 con 25 mil afiliados y hoy le quedan menos de 5 mil. Gestión Sindical. https://gestionsindical.com/drama-del-gremio-que-brillaba-los-90-25-mil-afiliados-hoy-le-quedan-menos-5-mil/

Piore, M. J., & Schrank, A. (2018). Root-cause regulation: Protecting work and workers in the twenty-first century. Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674986244

Popan, C. (2021). Embodied Precariat and Digital Control in the “Gig Economy”: The Mobile Labor of Food Delivery Workers. Journal of Urban Technology, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/10630732.2021.2001714

Racabi, G. (2021). Effects of city-state relations on labor relations: The case of Uber. ILR Review, 74(5), 1155–1178. https://doi.org/10.1177/00197939211036445

Rahman, K. S., & Thelen, K. (2019). The rise of the platform business model and the transformation of twenty-first-century capitalism. Politics & Society, 47(2), 177–204. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329219838932

Riesgo Gómez, V. (2023). Worker resistance strategies and union action in platform work: The case of Uber in Spain. Employee Relations: The International Journal, 45(4), 823–839. https://doi.org/10.1108/ER-11-2021-0510

Ruth, C. (2021, October 12). En la Ciudad de Buenos Aires circula el 28% menos de taxis que hace 6 años, pero no sólo por el auge de las Apps. Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/sociedad/2021/10/12/en-la-ciudad-de-buenos-aires-circula-la-mitad-de-los-taxis-que-hace-6-anos-pero-no-solo-por-el-auge-de-las-apps/

Sáenz-Leandro, R. (2023). Platforms, politics, and policy change: Framing a governance approach to TNCs in the gig economy. RIPS: Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas, 22(2). https://doi.org/10.15304/rips.22.1.9463

Schwartz, L., Weber, N., & Brown, E. M. (2023). Deactivation with and Without Representation: The Role of Dispute Arbitration for Seattle Rideshare Drivers. https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/w6z8e/download. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/w6z8e

Seidl, T. (2022). The politics of platform capitalism: A case study on the regulation of Uber in New York. Regulation & Governance, 16(2), 357–374. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12353

Stewart, A., & Stanford, J. (2017). Regulating work in the gig economy: What are the options? The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 28(3), 420–437. https://doi.org/10.1177/1035304617722461

Taxis y Uber: Una alianza que se consolida. (2023, March 17). El Clarín. https://www.clarin.com/brandstudio/taxis-uber-alianza-consolida_0_5XMmCTW7e9.html

Thelen, K. (2018). Regulating Uber: The politics of the platform economy in Europe and the United States. Perspectives on Politics, 16(4), 938–953. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592718001081

Todolí-Signes, A. (2017). The “gig economy”: Employee, self-employed or the need for a special employment regulation? Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 23(2), 193–205. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024258917701381

Tomoyose, G. (2016, March 30). Uber desafía al gobierno porteño y no detiene su llegada a Buenos Aires. La Nacion. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/buenos-aires/uber-desafia-algobierno-porteno-y-no-detiene-su-llegada-a-buenos-aires-nid1884243/

Tusk, B. (2018). The fixer: My adventures saving startups from death by politics. Penguin Random House.

Tzur, A. (2019). Uber Über regulation? Regulatory change following the emergence of new technologies in the taxi market. Regulation & Governance, 13(3), 340–361. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12170

Uber Argentina. (2022, April 25). Uber en Argentina: 6 años y 6 hitos. Uber Newsroom. https://www.uber.com/es-AR/newsroom/uber-en-argentina-6-anos-y-6-hitos/

Uber dice que la medida cautelar de la Justicia ‘no tiene efectos’ sobre la empresa. (2016, April 14). La Nacion. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/buenos-aires/uber-dice-que-la-medida-cautelarde-la-justicia-no-tiene-efectos-sobre-la-empresa-nid1889268/

Uber: Macri defendió a taxistas y dijo que son “un símbolo.” (2016, April 14). https:// www.perfil.com/noticias/politica/uber-macri-defendio-a-los-taxistas-dijo-que-son-unsimbolo-20160414-0026.phtml

Umney, C., Stuart, M., Bessa, I., Joyce, S., Neumann, D., & Trappmann, V. (2024). Platform labour unrest in a global perspective: How, where and why do platform workers protest? Work, Employment and Society, 38(1), 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/09500170231209676

Valdez, J. (2023). The politics of Uber: Infrastructural power in the United States and Europe. Regulation & Governance, 17(1), 177–194. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12456

van Dijck, J., Poell, T., & de Waal, M. (2018). The platform society : public values in a connective world. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190889760.001.0001

van Doorn, N., Ferrari, F., & Graham, M. (2022). Migration and migrant labour in the gig economy: An intervention. Work, Employment and Society, 37(4), 1099–1111. https://doi.org/10.1177/09500170221096581

van Doorn, N., Mos, E., & Bosma, J. (2021). Actually existing platformization: Embedding platforms in urban spaces through partnerships. South Atlantic Quarterly, 120(4), 715–731. https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-9443280

Voytenko Palgan, Y., Mont, O., & Sulkakoski, S. (2021). Governing the sharing economy: Towards a comprehensive analytical framework of municipal governance. Cities, 108, 102994. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2020.102994

Wolf, A. (2022). City power in the age of Silicon Valley: Evaluating municipal regulatory response to the entry of Uber to the American city. City & Community, 21(4), 290–313. https://doi.org/10.1177/15356841211066931

Wood, A. J., Graham, M., Lehdonvirta, V., & Hjorth, I. (2019). Networked but commodified: The (dis)embeddedness of digital labour in the gig economy. Sociology, 53(5), 931–950. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038519828906