The Scientific Model of Jurisprudence

Author ORCID Identifier

Dan Priel: 0000-0002-8648-5760

Document Type

Book Chapter

Publication Date

1-1-2013

Source Publication

In: Ferrer Beltrán, J., Moreso, J., Papayannis, D. (eds) Neutrality and Theory of Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 106. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6067-7_12

Keywords

Evaluative Judgment; Legal Philosopher; Legal Positivist; Secondary Rule; Natural Lawyer

Abstract

I argue in this essay that the popular “descriptive” approach to jurisprudence can be modeled after attempts at explaining natural phenomena by scientists. I present four assumptions that underlie this approach to jurisprudence, which are similar to those made by natural scientists. I then argue that in the case of jurisprudence (and unlike the natural sciences) these assumptions contradict each other. After presenting my case I respond to several potential objections to my argument. If my argument is correct, this shows that jurisprudential descriptivism is not just, as some have argued, unimportant, but rather that it is impossible. The paper suggests that those who claim to offer an account of the “nature” of law are in fact doing something else.

Link to Full Text

Request a copy that is accessible using assistive technology (link opens in a new window)

Catalogue Record

Click here to access the catalogue record for this item.

Share

COinS