Author ORCID Identifier
Dan Priel: 0000-0002-8648-5760
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-10-2020
Keywords
Ronald Dworkin, legal positivism, jurisprudence, common law theory, legal realism
Abstract
Did Ronald Dworkin think morality is timeless? He did not. But he did think it was universal, right? No to that as well. Turning to jurisprudence, did he think that morality is a criterion of legal validity? No. But he thought morality is part of the law, didn’t he? Not quite. How can you say this? Is it not obvious that Dworkin was not a legal positivist? In that case, he must have been a natural lawyer. Actually, he was neither. So you’re saying that Dworkin invented a new theory of law? No, his views are a version of a theory with centuries of history. Any other thoughts about Dworkin? Yes, he was a legal realist. Is this a joke? I assure you it’s not. This paper explains why, and why it matters.
Repository Citation
Priel, Dan, "Making Sense of Nonsense Jurisprudence" (2020). All Papers. 418.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/all_papers/418