Document Type
Article
English Abstract
The amendment mechanisms contained within the Australian and United States Constitutions, being Section 128 and Article V respectively, have many structural similarities. Both amendment mechanisms are purposed towards protecting federalism insofar as they require the achievement of more than just a simple constituent majority before a referendum proposal will succeed. In fact, the entrenchment of the Australian and United States ‘double’ and ‘super’ majority requirements respectively were specifically included as a protection for the federal distribution of power originally mandated within the Constitutions of each. Building upon that framework, if the Australian and American constitutional amendment mechanisms are purposed towards protecting federalism, what happens if neither can achieve their purpose and, thus, are ‘hyper-rigid’? The consequence of hyper-rigidity within an amendment mechanism itself often is that Courts will step in to make decisions about fundamental constitutional matters, such as those with respect to the division of federal power, which would otherwise be put to the people of a constituency. This article explores claims about amendment mechanism hyper-rigidity before addressing the issue of how the Australian and United States amendment mechanisms can be reformed to afford these Constitutions the degree of amendability necessary for the respective countries to act within an increasingly centralised world, without altering the nature and distribution of federal power allocated within each.
Citation Information
Buckley, Amy.
"Federalism and Constitutional Hyper-Rigidity: A Comparative Analysis of the Federalist Amendment Mechanisms Within the Australian and United States Constitutions."
The Transnational Human Rights Review
9. (2022)
: 69-92.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-4631.1101
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/thr/vol9/iss1/3
References
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7 Ibid.
8 Albert, supra note 1.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, Section 128.
12 Robert Garran, The Coming Commonwealth: An Australian Handbook of Federal Government (Angus & Robertson, 1897) 13.
13 Ibid.
14 Nicholas Aroney, "Imagining a Federal Commonwealth: Australian Conceptions of Federalism, 1890-1901" (2002) 30(2) Fed. Law Rev 265 at 270. https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X0203000203
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16 Ibid at 275.
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18 Ibid.
19 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) HCA 54.
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27 Taylor, supra note 24.
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29 Commonwealth v Tasmania [1983] HCA 21.
30 Victoria v Commonwealth [1957] HCA 54.
31 Taylor, supra note 24 at 178-179.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Scott Bennett, "The Politics of Constitutional Amendment" (Research Paper No 11, Politics and Public Administration Group, 23 June 2003) at 12.
36 Ibid.
37 William Ross, "The Constitutional Law of Federalism in the United States and Australia" (1943) 29(7) Va Law Rev 881 at 883-884. https://doi.org/10.2307/1068951
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39 Ibid at 2.
40 Ibid at 2.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid; Douglas Laycock, "Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law" (1992) 92 Columbia Law Rev 249. https://doi.org/10.2307/1123086
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44 Ibid.
45 Ross, supra note 35.
46 Greve, supra note 36.
47 Ibid at 5.
48 Ibid.
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50 Ibid.
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52 Ibid.
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54 Ibid.
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57 United States v. Alfonso D. Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
58 Scott Bennett, "The Politics of Constitutional Amendment" (Research Paper No 11, Politics and Public Administration Group, 23 June 2003) at 12.
59 Ibid.
60 Robert Garran, The Coming Commonwealth: An Australian Handbook of Federal Government (Angus & Robertson, 1897) at 13.
61 Ibid.
62 Brian Galligan, "The Referendum Process" in Brian Galligan (ed), A Federal Republic: Australia's Constitutional System of Government (Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 115. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139084932
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73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
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79 Ibid at 1032.
80 Ibid at 1048; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, "Constitutional Cultures, Democracy, and Unwritten Principles" (2012) 2012(3) University of Illinois Law Review 683.
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83 Ibid.
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