In Loyola High School, et al. v. Attorney General of Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the government of Quebec could not require a Catholic high school to teach Catholic religion and ethics from a non-Catholic perspective. The government could, however, require the school to teach other religions from a “neutral” perspective. This article takes Loyola as an opportunity to examine two ways that courts have justified limits on religious freedom. First, I interrogate an under-examined aspect of the law of religious freedom: the requirement that claimants prove the interference with their religious freedom is “more than trivial or insubstantial”. Second, I examine how the majority and minority decisions articulate broader visions of religious freedom. I argue that religious freedom has been interpreted through the value of tolerance, understood in Loyola as giving rise to a state obligation to educate students in the skills of non-exclusionary dialogue.
"Loyola High School v. Attorney General of Quebec: On Non-triviality and the Charter Value of Religious Freedom."
The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference
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