Abstract
Three recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada signal a departure from the broad and generous manner in which the Court has previously interpreted and applied section 24(1) of the Charter. In each of R. v. Bjelland, Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr and R. v. Nasogaluak, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge’s finding of a breach of Charter rights but overturned the trial judge’s choice of remedy under section 24(1) in order to grant a more limited remedy in its place. In doing so, the Court shifted the analytical focus away from the promotion of remedial efficacy and toward the minimization of the burdens imposed by the remedy on government. This article reviews each of these judgments and examines the extent to which they are consistent with previous section 24(1) jurisprudence and the purpose of the Charter’s broadest remedial provision.
Citation Information
Chan, Gerald.
"Remedial Minimalism under Section 24(1) of the Charter: Bjelland, Khadr and Nasogaluak."
The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference
51.
(2010).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1199
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol51/iss1/14
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