R. v. J.J., Judicial Discretion and the Charter

Authors

Lisa Dufraimont, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Abstract

In R. v. J.J., the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the new Criminal Code admissibility rules for the complainant’s private records held by the accused and the new procedural regime governing admissibility of private records and evidence of the complainant’s other sexual activity. The Court considered claims that these provisions violated section 7 and section 11(c) and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, and a six-member majority rejected all these claims. This paper analyzes a key theme in the majority judgment: discretion. The majority emphasized that one reason the new regime complies with the Charter is that it grants judges the evidentiary discretion to admit significant defence evidence and the procedural discretion to adjust procedures to ensure fairness on a case-by-case basis. This analysis highlights the majority’s reliance on judicial discretion and reveals some troubling features of that reliance. The majority’s appeal to evidentiary discretion worryingly downplays the Charter-based requirement that the balancing of prejudicial effect against probative value be weighted in favour of admitting relevant defence evidence. On the procedural side, the majority problematically grants trial judges broad discretion over procedures without providing a principled framework for its exercise.

Citation Information

Dufraimont, Lisa. "R. v. J.J., Judicial Discretion and the Charter." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 115. (2024).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1455
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol115/iss1/13

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

References

1 An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act, S.C. 2018, c. 29 [hereinafter "Bill C-51"].

2 See, e.g., R. v. Kruk, [2024] S.C.J. No. 7 at paras. 32-40, 2024 SCC 7 (S.C.C.);R. v. J. (J.), [2022] S.C.J. No. 28 at paras. 1-2, 2022 SCC 28 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "J.J."]; R. v. Barton, [2019] S.C.J. No. 33 at para. 1, 2019 SCC 33 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68 at paras. 17-21, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.). And see, generally, R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] S.C.J. No. 10, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.), per L'Heureux-Dubé J., concurring; R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Seaboyer"]; Elaine Craig, Putting Trials on Trial: Sexual Assault and the Failure of the Legal Profession (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2018).

3 Among other changes, the offences of rape and indecent assault were repealed and replaced with the offence of sexual assault by An Act to amend the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences against the person and to amend certain other Acts in relation thereto or in consequence thereof, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 125.

4 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C. 1992, c. 38.

5 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (production of records in sexual offence proceedings), S.C. 1997, c. 30.

6 See ss. 278.92-278.97 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter "Code"].

7 See R. v. Shearing, [2002] S.C.J. No. 59, 2002 SCC 58 (S.C.C.), permitting defence cross-examination of a sexual assault complainant on the contents of her private diary, and holding that the rules governing admissibility were relevance and the trial judge's general discretion to exclude evidence after weighing probative value against prejudicial effect.

8 Code, ss. 278.94(2), 278.94(3).

9 E.g., R. v. Reddick, [2020] O.J. No. 5412, 2020 ONSC 7156 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. S. (J.), [2019] A.J. No. 1639 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Anderson, [2019] S.J. No. 502, 2019 SKQB 304 (Sask. Q.B.).

10 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter "Charter"].

11 R. v. J. (J.), [2022] S.C.J. No. 28, 2022 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

12 These key arguments were reviewed in J.J. at paras. 10, 12, 112.

13 J.J. at paras. 27, 84, 86, 90, 93, 96-98, 103, 105, 143, 190.

14 J.J., noting that "whether to admit the evidence is a discretionary decision made by the judge" (at para. 108).

15 See, e.g., R. v. Morris, [1983] S.C.J. No. 72, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 190 at 201 (S.C.C.); R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40 at para. 98, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.); Seaboyer at paras. 40-43.

16 On the historical movement from rigid rules to flexible principles in the law of hearsay, see R. v. Mapara, [2005] S.C.J. No. 23 at paras. 13-15, 2005 SCC 23 (S.C.C.). For an example of the use of the term "discretion" to refer to flexibility within an exclusionary rule, see White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., [2015] S.C.J. No. 23, 2015 SCC 23 (S.C.C.), outlining the test for admissibility of expert evidence and describing the second step of the admissibility analysis as a "discretionary gatekeeping step" in which "the judge balances the potential risks and benefits of admitting the evidence" (at para. 24).

17 R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46 at paras. 27, 36, 46, 71, 2000 SCC 46 (S.C.C.). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-1305.2000.tb01170.x

18 See Code, ss. 278.92(1), 278.92(2).

19 See Code, s. 278.92(2)(b). Where the private record evidence is also evidence of other sexual activity, the applicable admissibility criteria are those laid out in s. 276 of the Code.

20 Code, s. 278.92(3).

21 The requirements of relevance and the weighted balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect are common to both regimes, but the s. 276 regime has two further admissibility requirements: that the evidence is not being admitted to support twin myths reasoning (Code, s. 276(2)(a)) and that it is evidence of "specific instances of sexual activity" (Code, s. 276(2)(c)). The factors to be considered under ss. 276(3) and 278.92(3) are identical except that the factor related to "encouraging . . . treatment" (s. 278.92(3)(c)) appears only in the private records admissibility regime and not in the s. 276 regime.

22 Code, s. 276(2)(d).

23 J.J. at paras. 198, 201, 218, 220, 249, 308.

24 "Twin myths" reasoning was identified as such and prohibited in Seaboyer at paras. 23, 91, and is expressly forbidden under s. 276(1) and 276(2)(a) of the Code.

25 The various forms of prejudice recognized in Seaboyer at para. 40, include evidence that invites prohibited reasoning, generates delay, arouses emotions, creates side issues and unfairly surprises the opposing party.

26 J.J. at para. 130.

27 Both the s. 276 regime and the private records admissibility regime require the complainant's "right of privacy" to be considered in this way: Code, ss. 276(3)(f), 278.92(3)(g).

28 Code, s. 278.1.

29 The uncertainty in the law on myths and stereotypes was discussed and the law was restated in R. v. Kruk, [2024] S.C.J. No. 7, 2024 SCC 7 (S.C.C.).

30 J.J. at para. 126.

31 J.J. at paras. 129, 133.

32 R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.).

33 J.J. at para. 134.

34 J.J. at para. 139.

35 The private records admissibility regime applies to "any form of record that contains personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy" (Code, s. 278.1). This definition contains a non-exhaustive list of types of records that will be covered, including medical, therapeutic and social services records and personal diaries. Any record of a type enumerated in this list will automatically be subject to the private records admissibility regime (J.J. at para. 39), while "a non-enumerated record will fall within the definition of s. 278.1 if it contains information of an intimate and highly personal nature that is integral to the complainant's overall physical, psychological or emotional well-being. Such information will have implications for the complainant's dignity" (J.J. at para. 54). Thus, all evidence covered by private records admissibility regime has the potential to affect the complainant's privacy and dignity.

36 J.J. at para. 142.

37 J.J. at para. 141.

38 R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Corbett"]. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19158-1_1

39 Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.

40 Corbett at paras. 22-24.

41 Corbett at paras. 50, 117, 122-133.

42 These are the words of La Forest J. in his dissenting judgment in Corbett at para. 115. In his plurality judgment, Dickson C.J.C. wrote, "I agree with La Forest J. that the trial judge has a discretion to exclude prejudicial evidence of previous convictions in an appropriate case": at para. 52. These two judgments represent the view of the majority on this point.

43 Corbett at paras. 38, 166-167, 173.

44 R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.).

45 Seaboyer at para. 48.

46 The three stipulated exceptions covered (1) rebuttal evidence; (2) evidence going to the identity of the partner; and (3) evidence of sexual activity on the same occasion going to the defence of mistaken belief: Seaboyer at para. 12.

47 Seaboyer at paras. 48-54.

48 Seaboyer at para. 54.

49 Seaboyer at para. 41 (emphasis added). On the foundation for this rule in the Charter, see Seaboyer at paras. 42-45.

50 See R. v. Grant, [2015] S.C.J. No. 9 at para. 19, 2015 SCC 9 (S.C.C.): "The presumption of the accused's innocence leads us to strike a different balance where defence-led evidence is concerned. As this Court explained in Seaboyer, 'the prejudice must substantially outweigh the value of the evidence before a judge can exclude evidence relevant to a defence allowed by law'". See also R. v. Shearing, [2002] S.C.J. No. 59, 2002 SCC 58 (S.C.C.); R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135 at para. 169, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.).

51 Some amendments to s. 276 of the Code were made in 2018 with the passage of Bill C-51. However, these amendments do not change the requirements for admissibility reviewed here.

52 See Seaboyer at paras. 23, 91; Code, s. 276(1), 276(2)(a).

53 Code, s. 276(2)(b).

54 Code, s. 276(2)(c). The purpose of this admissibility requirement is to "avoid unnecessary incursions into the sexual life of the complainant . . . and protect against the misuse of general reputation evidence to discredit the complainant and distort the trial process": R. v. V. (R.), [2019] S.C.J. No. 41 at paras. 47-48, 2019 SCC 41 (S.C.C.).

55 Code, s. 276(2)(d).

56 R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, 2000 SCC 46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Darrach"].

57 Darrach at para. 27.

58 Darrach at paras. 3, 21, 36, 43.

59 J.J. at para. 131.

60 Code, ss. 276(2)(b), 278.92(2)(b).

61 Code, ss. 276(2)(d), 278.92(2)(b) (emphasis added).

62 This statutory requirement excludes evidence the probative value of which is "so trifling as to be incapable, in the context of all the evidence, of raising a reasonable doubt": Darrach at para. 39, quoted in J.J. at para. 131.

63 R. v. Goldfinch, [2019] S.C.J. No. 38, 2019 SCC 38 (S.C.C.).

64 R. v. Goldfinch, [2019] S.C.J. No. 38 at paras. 107, 131, 2019 SCC 38 (S.C.C.).

65 R. v. V. (R.), [2019] S.C.J. No. 41, 2019 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "R.V."].

66 At the time R.V. was decided, this section was numbered s. 276(2)(c).

67 R.V. at para. 45.

68 J.J. at para. 15.

69 J.J. at para. 133.

70 J.J. at para. 291.

71 The majority and the dissent agreed that, ordinarily, this application should be brought before trial: J.J. at paras. 86, 248.

72 Code, s. 278.93(2).

73 Code, s. 278.94(2).

74 Code, s. 278.94(3).

75 Code, s. 278.93(4).

76 J.J. at para. 86.

77 J.J. at para. 86.

78 J.J. at para. 27.

79 J.J. at para. 104.

80 J.J. at para. 103.

81 J.J. at para. 105.

82 J.J. at para. 98.

83 J.J. at para. 93.

84 J.J. at para 96.

85 J.J. at para. 97.

86 R. v. Samaniego, [2022] S.C.J. No. 9 at para. 20, 2022 SCC 9 (S.C.C.).

87 R. v. Samaniego, [2022] S.C.J. No. 9 at para. 21, 2022 SCC 9 (S.C.C.).

88 J.J. at para. 143.

89 J.J. at para. 190.

90 As Rand J. wrote in Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.J. No. 1, [1959] S.C.R. 121 (S.C.C.), there can be "no such thing as absolute and untrammelled 'discretion'" (at 140).

91 J.J. at para. 86.

92 J.J. at para. 310.

93 J.J. at para. 187.

94 J.J. at para. 190.

95 In dissent, Brown J. argued that the majority reasons dismissed serious concerns about the legislation "as if these concerns were unworthy of taking seriously": J.J. at para. 261.