Abstract
Exclusion under section 24(2) of the Charter is an important part of every criminal judge’s remedial toolkit. But in Beaver, the Supreme Court significantly constrained access to section 24(2) by endorsing the “fresh start” doctrine. Evidence will not be “obtained in a manner” that infringed the Charter — and thus will be put beyond the remedial reach of section 24(2) — where police conduct following a breach “severs” its temporal, contextual or causal connection to the evidence sought to be excluded. In my view, this doctrine will deprive worthy claimants of proportionate remedies. In this paper, I explore whether claimants and concerned trial judges can turn to section 24(1) for help. Mining a rich jurisprudential vein extending back to the earliest days of the Charter, I argue that trial judges retain a discretion to exclude evidence under section 24(1), even where it was not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter, where necessary to preserve the integrity of the justice system. My hope is that this discretionary power helps to fill the remedial gaps left after Beaver.
Citation Information
Rudnicki, Chris.
"After Beaver: Reviving a Unified Test for Section 24 Charter Exclusion."
The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference
115.
(2024).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1453
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol115/iss1/11
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