After Beaver: Reviving a Unified Test for Section 24 Charter Exclusion

Authors

Chris Rudnicki

Abstract

Exclusion under section 24(2) of the Charter is an important part of every criminal judge’s remedial toolkit. But in Beaver, the Supreme Court significantly constrained access to section 24(2) by endorsing the “fresh start” doctrine. Evidence will not be “obtained in a manner” that infringed the Charter — and thus will be put beyond the remedial reach of section 24(2) — where police conduct following a breach “severs” its temporal, contextual or causal connection to the evidence sought to be excluded. In my view, this doctrine will deprive worthy claimants of proportionate remedies. In this paper, I explore whether claimants and concerned trial judges can turn to section 24(1) for help. Mining a rich jurisprudential vein extending back to the earliest days of the Charter, I argue that trial judges retain a discretion to exclude evidence under section 24(1), even where it was not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter, where necessary to preserve the integrity of the justice system. My hope is that this discretionary power helps to fill the remedial gaps left after Beaver.

Citation Information

Rudnicki, Chris. "After Beaver: Reviving a Unified Test for Section 24 Charter Exclusion." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 115. (2024).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1453
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol115/iss1/11

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

References

1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter "Charter"].

2 R. v. Therens, [1982] S.J. No. 1162, 70 C.C.C. (2d) 468 (Sask. Prov. Ct.). The Charter came into force on April 17, 1982. The trial was heard on June 11, 1982.

3 R. v. Therens, [1982] S.J. No. 1162 at paras. 19-21, 70 C.C.C. (2d) 468 (Sask. Prov. Ct.).

4 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). https://doi.org/10.1016/0013-4686(85)80102-X

5 R. v. Strachan, [1988] S.C.J. No. 94, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pino, [2016] O.J. No. 2656 at paras. 56, 72, 2016 ONCA 389 (Ont. C.A.); David M. Paciocco, Palma Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 8th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020) at 483-485.

6 R. v. Strachan, [1988] S.C.J. No. 94 at para. 47, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.).

7 R. v. Beaver, [2022] S.C.J. No. 54, 2022 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Beaver"].

8 R. v. Bjelland, [2009] S.C.J. No. 38, 2009 SCC 38 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Bjelland"].

9 R. v. Babos, [2014] S.C.J. No. 16, 2014 SCC 16 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Babos"].

10 Beaver at para. 8.

11 Beaver at paras. 121, 211.

12 Beaver at para. 11.

13 Beaver at para. 13.

14 Beaver at para. 224.

15 Beaver at para. 17.

16 Beaver at para. 23.

17 Beaver at para. 24.

18 Beaver at para. 158.

19 Beaver at para. 25.

20 Beaver at para. 159.

21 Beaver at para. 28.

22 Beaver at para. 29.

23 R. v. Beaver, [2019] A.J. No. 257 at para. 191, 2019 ABQB 125 (Alta. C.A.).

24 R. v. Beaver, [2020] A.J. No. 581 at paras. 12-16, 2020 ABCA 203 (Alta. C.A.).

25 Beaver also challenged the voluntariness of his confession, and both appellants challenged the grounds for their formal arrest for murder: R. v. Beaver, [2022] S.C.J. No. 54 at para. 1, 2022 SCC 54 (S.C.C.). I express no opinion on either of these issues in my paper.

26 Beaver at para. 94, citing Doherty J.A.'s coining of the two terms in R. v. Plaha, [2004] O.J. No. 3484 at para. 44, 189 O.A.C. 376 (Ont. C.A.).

27 Beaver at para. 94.

28 Beaver at para. 116, citing R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.J. No. 32 at para. 71, 2009 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Grant"].

29 Beaver at para. 97.

30 Beaver at paras. 97-99.

31 Beaver at para. 99.

32 Beaver at para. 100, citing R. v. Wittwer, [2008] S.C.J. No. 33 at paras. 21-22, 2008 SCC 3 (S.C.C.).

33 Beaver at para. 95, citing Watt J.A.'s language in R. v. Manchulenko, [2013] O.J. No. 3977 at para. 71, 2013 ONCA 543 (Ont. C.A.).

34 Beaver at paras. 105-107. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnt.2004.01.008

35 Beaver at paras. 116-135.

36 Beaver at para. 194.

37 Beaver at para. 192.

38 Beaver at para. 198.

39 See R. v. Strachan, [1988] S.C.J. No. 94, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.); R. v. Goldhart, [1996] S.C.J. No. 76, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 463 (S.C.C.); R. v. Wittwer, [2008] S.C.J. No. 33, 2008 SCC 33 (S.C.C.). See also David M. Paciocco, Palma Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 8th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020) at 495.

40 Examples include: R. v. Manchulenko, [2013] O.J. No. 3977, 2013 ONCA 543 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Simon, [2008] O.J. No. 3072, 2008 ONCA 578 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Plaha, [2004] O.J. No. 3484, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), and of course the Alberta Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Beaver, [2020] A.J. No. 581, 2020 ABCA 203 (Alta. C.A.).

41 Veenu Goswami, "Breaking the Purposive Barrier: Embracing Non-Repetition as a Guiding Principle for Subsection 24(2) of the Charter" (2018) 51:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 289 at 294.

42 This claim is largely influenced by two papers: Veenu Goswami, "Breaking the Purposive Barrier: Embracing Non-Repetition as a Guiding Principle for Subsection 24(2) of the Charter" (2018) 51:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 289 and David M. Paciocco, "Section 24(2): Lottery or Law - The Appreciable Limits of Purposive Reasoning" (2011) 58:1 Crim. L.Q. 15. Paciocco uses the label "condonation theory" instead of "dissociation", and Goswami uses the label "balancing competing interests" instead of "proportionality". In my view, the two authors are getting at the same thing and these labels are interchangeable. I have used the ones I prefer.

43 Grant at paras. 72-73; Veenu Goswami, "Breaking the Purposive Barrier: Embracing Non-Repetition as a Guiding Principle for Subsection 24(2) of the Charter" (2018) 51:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 289 at 296; David M. Paciocco, "Section 24(2): Lottery or Law - The Appreciable Limits of Purposive Reasoning" (2011) 58:1 Crim. L.Q. 15 at 23, though Paciocco uses the label "condonation theory" to describe this remedial purpose.

44 Grant at para. 72.

45 Veenu Goswami, "Breaking the Purposive Barrier: Embracing Non-Repetition as a Guiding Principle for Subsection 24(2) of the Charter" (2018) 51:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 289 at 296.

46 Grant at para. 76.

47 Grant at para. 76.

48 Veenu Goswami, "Breaking the Purposive Barrier: Embracing Non-Repetition as a Guiding Principle for Subsection 24(2) of the Charter" (2018) 51:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 289 at 297-298; David M. Paciocco, "Section 24(2): Lottery or Law - The Appreciable Limits of Purposive Reasoning" (2011) 58:1 Crim L.Q. 15 at 27-28.

49 Grant at para. 82.

50 Grant at para. 82.

51 This scenario is loosely based on the facts of R. v. Dudhi, [2019] O.J. No. 4333, 2019 ONCA 665 (Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Barreau, [2021] O.J. No. 7089, 2021 ONSC 5694 (Ont. S.C.J.).

52 Beverley McLachlin, "The Charter: A New Role for the Judiciary?" (1991) 29 Alta L. Rev. 540 at 548. https://doi.org/10.29173/alr1544

53 R. v. Therens, [1982] S.J. No. 1162, 70 C.C.C. (2d) 468 (Sask. Prov. Ct.).

54 R. v. Therens, [1982] S.J. No. 1162 at para. 26, 70 C.C.C. (2d) 468 (Sask. Prov. Ct.).

55 R. v. Therens, [1982] S.J. No. 1162 at paras. 20-21, 70 C.C.C. (2d) 468 (Sask. Prov. Ct.).

56 R. v. Therens, [1983] S.J. No. 325 at para. 17, 5 C.C.C. (3d) 409 (Sask. C.A.).

57 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30 at para. 64, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). Justices Beetz, Estey, Chouinard and Wilson expressed their agreement with this reasoning at para. 11.

58 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30 at para. 64, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).

59 R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30 at para. 64, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).

60 See R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15 at para. 19, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Strachan, [1988] S.C.J. No. 94 at para. 36, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.).

61 R. v. Strachan, [1988] S.C.J. No. 94 at para. 36, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.).

62 R. v. Harrer, [1995] S.C.J. No. 81, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 (S.C.C.). She was in fact arrested because she was illegally in the country. At the time of the arrest, there were no grounds to believe she had assisted in the escape: paras. 3-4.

63 R. v. Harrer, [1995] S.C.J. No. 81 at paras. 21-24, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 (S.C.C.).

64 R. v. Harrer, [1995] S.C.J. No. 81 at paras. 42-43, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 (S.C.C.).

65 R. v. White, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007026001189

66 R. v. White, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28 at para. 85, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.) (emphasis in original).

67 R. v. White, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28 at para. 85, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.).

68 I draw this language from Babos, discussed below.

69 Bjelland.

70 Bjelland at paras. 37-38.

71 Bjelland at para. 55, per Fish J.'s dissent describing the majority's test (emphasis added).

72 Babos.

73 Babos at paras. 7-8.

74 Babos at paras. 12-13.

75 Babos at para. 14.

76 Babos at para. 23.

77 Babos at para. 31.

78 Babos at para. 32. This formulation of the test is taken from Watt J.A.'s decision in R. v. Ke, [2021] O.J. No. 1431 at para. 77, 2021 ONCA 179 (Ont. C.A.).

79 Babos at para. 31.

80 Babos at para. 35.

81 Babos at para. 39.

82 Babos at para. 41.

83 Babos at para. 44.

84 Babos at para. 57.

85 Nor am I the first to observe it, though others have proposed different tests. Adrian Iafrate argues that s. 24(1) exclusion should flow wherever evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2): "Unleashing the paper tiger: How the abuse of process doctrine can overcome Charter limitations" (2017) 64:1 Crim L.Q. 147 at 163. So does David M. Paciocco, "Section 24(2): Lottery or Law - The Appreciable Limits of Purposive Reasoning" (2011) 58:1 Crim. L.Q. 15 at 57.

86 R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] S.C.J. No. 79 at para. 18, 2001 SCC 81 (S.C.C.).

87 See, e.g., R. v. Mills, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39 at para. 278, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 (S.C.C.); R. v. Regan, [2002] S.C.J. No. 14 at paras. 117-118, 2002 SCC 12 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Bellusci, [2012] S.C.J. No. 44 at paras. 6-7, 17-18, 2012 SCC 44 (S.C.C.).

88 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] S.C.J. No. 82 at para. 87, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.); see also R. v. Regan, [2002] S.C.J. No. 14 at paras. 117-118, 2002 SCC 12 (S.C.C.).

89 Bjelland at para. 15; Babos at para. 48.

90 R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15 at para. 40, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.); see also R. v. Genest, [1989] S.C.J. No. 5, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59 at 82-83 (S.C.C.).

91 Kent Roach, "Reclaiming Prima Facie Exclusionary Rules in Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United States: The Importance of Compensation, Proportionality, and Non-Repetition" (2020) 43:3 Man. L.J. 1 at 3. https://doi.org/10.29173/mlj1200

92 I am indebted to Benjamin L. Berger for this argument.

93 R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, 2010 SCC 6 (S.C.C.).

94 Kent Roach, "Reclaiming Prima Facie Exclusionary Rules in Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United States: The Importance of Compensation, Proportionality, and Non-Repetition" (2020) 43:3 Man. L.J. 1 at 30-31. Veenu Goswami similarly argues that the Crown should bear the burden of establishing that this kind of breach would not likely happen again ("non-repetition"): Veenu Goswami, "Breaking the Purposive Barrier: Embracing Non-Repetition as a Guiding Principle for Subsection 24 (2) of the Charter" (2018) 51:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 289 at 294, footnote 149. https://doi.org/10.29173/mlj1200 , https://doi.org/10.5406/dialjmormthou.51.2.0289

95 See, e.g., R. v. Capay, [2019] O.J. No. 1025, 2019 ONSC 535 (Ont. S.C.J.).