Equality before the Charter: Reflections on Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General)

Authors

Carissima Mathen, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa

Abstract

Since Andrews v. Law Society of BC, the Supreme Court’s section 15 jurisprudence has been marked by inconsistency, judicial disagreement, and scholarly criticism. In Fraser v. Canada, female RCMP offıcers challenged a policy that prevented access to full-time pension benefits. Refining the concept of adverse impact discrimination and drawing on evidence of women’s economic disadvantage, the majority found that the policy constituted sex discrimination. While Justice Abella’s majority judgment has been hailed as a major victory, Justices Brown and Rowe’s dissent sharply criticized the concept of ‘substantive equality’, confirming longstanding divisions. This paper uses Fraser to reflect on the narrative of substantive equality. First, it re-examines the oft-maligned cases decided under the Canadian Bill of Rights. The prevailing story – that the Bill of Rights jurisprudence relied on a narrow, ‘formal equality’ model which was then remedied by the Charter’s section 15 – is incomplete. A closer examination reveals a complex conceptualization of ‘equality before the law’ in pre-Charter jurisprudence. Second, the paper proposes that the principle of ‘equality before the law’, with its focus on identical standards and equal treatment, remains a powerful and necessary concept. Unsettling the strict dichotomy between substantive and formal equality, the paper concludes, can help to reveal the true nature of the Court’s continuing division on how to apply section 15’s guarantee of equality.

Citation Information

Mathen, Carissima. "Equality before the Charter: Reflections on Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General)." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 104. (2022).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1428
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol104/iss1/6

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

References

1 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Andrews"]. See, especially, the discussion per McIntyre J., at 168-172.

2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 ("the Charter").

3 See Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349 (S.C.C.) and Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General), [1978] S.C.J. No. 81, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 (S.C.C.).

4 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.).

5 Carissima Mathen, "What Religious Freedom Jurisprudence Reveals About Equality" (2009) 6:2 JL & Equality 163, at 167.

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1545958

6 See, e.g., David M. Beatty, "Canadian Constitutional Law in a Nutshell" (1998) 36:3 Alta. L. Rev. 605; "The Supreme Court, deaf to reason" The Globe and Mail (October 14, 1997), at Al6.

7 Diana Majury, "Equality and Discrimination According to the Supreme Court of Canada" (1990-1991) 4 C.J.W.L. 407; Margot Young, "Unequal to the Task: 'Kapp'ing the Substantive Potential of Section 15" (2010) 50 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 183.

8 Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, "Meaningless Mantra: Substantive Equality after Withler" (2011) 16 Rev. Const. Stud. 31 [hereinafter "Meaningless Mantra"]; Patricia Hughes, "Supreme Court of Canada Equality Jurisprudence and 'Everyday Life'" (2012) 58 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 245; Diana Majury, "Equality and Discrimination According to the Supreme Court of Canada" (1990-1991) 4 C.J.W.L. 407.

9 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Fraser"]

see, e.g., the special issue of (2021) 30:2 Const. Forum Const.

10 Jennifer Koshan & Johnette Watson Hamilton, "Tugging at the Strands: Adverse Effects Discrimination and the Supreme Court Decision in Fraser" (November 9, 2020), online: https://ablawg.ca/2020/11/09/tugging-at-the-strands-adverse-effects-discriminationand-the-supreme-court-decision-in-fraser/ [hereinafter Koshan & Hamilton, "Tugging at the Strands"].

11 Brown and Rowe JJ.'s opinion is discussed extensively below. Justice Côté's wrote separately. Similar to her dissent in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17 (S.C.C.), she did not recognize any sex-based discrimination in the program. In her view, the most relevant distinction in Fraser concerned family/parental status, which is not a prohibited ground under s. 15. Given space constraints, I will not further engage with her analysis.

12 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

13 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 [hereinafter "Bill of Rights"].

14 Keyword analysis of Supreme Court jurisprudence shows that "formal equality" and "substantive equality" are highly complementary terms.

15 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) itself featured division, albeit about the justification, under s. 1, of a prima facie breach. For further discussion, see Carissima Mathen, "The Upside of Dissent in Equality Jurisprudence" (2013) 63 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 111, at 124.

16 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017] F.C.J. No. 609, 2017 FC 557 (F.C.).

17 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

18 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2018] F.C.J. No. 1228, 2018 FCA 223 (F.C.A.).

19 Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 42, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.); Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Public and Private Employees (N.A.P.E.), [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, 2004 SCC 66 (S.C.C.); Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.).

20 Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 (S.C.C.).

21 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 49, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

22 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 50, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

23 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 55, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

24 For a useful summary of the evolution of the s. 15 test, see Jonnette Watson Hamilton, "Cautious Optimism: Fraser v Canada (Attorney General)" (2021) 30:2 Const. Forum Const. 1.

https://doi.org/10.21991/cf29418

25 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 82, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

26 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 57, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

27 Justice Abella notes evidence coming "from the claimant, from expert witnesses, or through judicial notice". Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

28 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 57, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

29 Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, at 764-65 (S.C.C.).

30 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, note 8 at paras. 59, 69-72, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

31 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 59, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

32 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 1, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.). Justice Abella, of course, authored the ground-breaking Royal Commission on Equality in Employment (1984).

33 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

34 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 91, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

35 Sonia Lawrence, "Critical Reflections on Fraser: What Equality Are We Seeking?" (2021) 30:2 Const. Forum Const., at 43.

https://doi.org/10.21991/cf29421

36 The respondent's factum devoted fewer than 10 paragraphs to section 1.

37 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 126, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.). Given the overwhelming evidence surrounding women's participation in the workforce and the various factors that combine to subject them to severe disadvantage at a chronic and continuing level, perhaps the policy in Fraser always stood a very weak chance of surviving under s. 1. But one need only tweak the facts but a little to upset any confident predictions about a judicial response. Suppose that the program required some pre-vetting of the reason that an employee wanted to job-share and reserved the right to deny entry into it in cases that did not raise a conflict with one's family responsibilities. It is entirely possible that a majority of the Court would have less trouble justifying such a scheme.

38 Justice Côté's dissent in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17 (S.C.C.), is briefly discussed, at note 11, above. Henceforth, I use "dissent" to refer to the Brown and Rowe JJ. opinion.

39 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 146, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

40 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 196, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

41 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 148, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

42 Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, at para. 73, 2011 SCC 12 (S.C.C.).

43 For a critique, see Koshan & Watson Hamilton, "Meaningless Mantra" (2011) 16 Rev. Const. Stud. 31.

44 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 167, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

45 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 132, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

46 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 191, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

47 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 193, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

48 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 194, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

49 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 207, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

50 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 208, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

51 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at paras. 206-213, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

52 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 216, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

53 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 217, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

54 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 219, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

55 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

56 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 221, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

57 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at paras. 132-133, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.): The version of s. 15(1) advanced in my colleagues' reasons is essentially that advanced in the dissenting reasons in Alliance. They argued then, as they do now, that a finding of a breach would have a "chilling effect" on legislatures; that the impugned legislation was not "the source of the differences in compensation between men and women" (at para. 97); that the Court should not interfere with "incremental" efforts intended to narrow the gap between a group and the rest of society; and that finding a s. 15(1) breach would place legislatures under a freestanding positive obligation "to act in order to obtain specific societal results such as the total and definitive eradication of gender-based pay inequities" (para. 65). All of these propositions were squarely rejected by the majority in Alliance. Nothing, as far as I can see, has happened since [then] to justify discarding its premises. And no one involved in this case argued that we should, except, inferentially, my colleagues[.]

58 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 134, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

59 Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] S.C.J. No. 28, at para. 136, 2020 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).

60 For a skeptical critique of the dissent's demand for precision, see Joshua Sealy-Harrington, "The Alchemy of Equality Rights" (2021) 30:2 Const. Forum Const. 53.

https://doi.org/10.21991/cf29422

61 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 [emphasis added].

62 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 2.

63 Given space constraints, I will not discuss the Bill of Rights guarantee of equal protection of the law.

64 Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, at 1366 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Lavell"], citing Stephens Commentaries on the Laws of England, 21st ed. (1950).

65 Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, at 1366 (S.C.C.).

66 I use "equality before the law" and "formal equality" interchangeably.

67 R. v. Gonzales, [1962] B.C.J. No. 71, 32 D.L.R. (2d) 290 (B.C.C.A.), cited in R. v. Drybones, [1969] S.C.J. No. 83, [1970] S.C.R 282, at 296 (S.C.C.) per Hall J.

68 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomacea, trans. W. Ross, Book V3, at 1131a-6 (1925) cited in Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.).

69 Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Lavell"].

70 Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General), [1978] S.C.J. No. 81, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Bliss"].

71 The case included a second plaintiff: Yvonne Bedard.

72 R. v. Drybones, [1969] S.C.J. No. 83, [1970] S.C.R. 282 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Drybones"].

73 R. v. Drybones, [1969] S.C.J. No. 83, [1970] S.C.R. 282 (S.C.C.).

74 R. v. Drybones, [1969] S.C.J. No. 83, [1970] S.C.R. 282, at 297 (S.C.C.).

75 R. v. Drybones, [1969] S.C.J. No. 83, [1970] S.C.R. 282, at 300 (S.C.C.), citing Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537.

76 In a few other cases, the Supreme Court found federal state action to be inconsistent as well: Leiba v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration), [1972] S.C.R. 660 (S.C.C.); R. v. Brownridge, [1972] S.C.J. No. 68, [1972] S.C.R. 926 (S.C.C.); R. v. Lowry, [1972] S.C.J. No. 116, [1974] S.C.R. 195 (S.C.C.); Ontario (Attorney General) v. Reale, [1974] S.C.J. No. 118, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Shelley, [1981] S.C.J. No. 77, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 196 (S.C.C.).

77 Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, at 1372 (S.C.C.).

78 Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, at 1374 (S.C.C.). It is worth mentioning that Abbott J. dissented in R. v. Drybones, [1969] S.C.J. No. 83, [1970] S.C.R. 282 (S.C.C.).

79 Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, at 1388 (S.C.C.).

80 Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, at 1376 (S.C.C.).

81 Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, at 1383 (S.C.C.).

82 Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General), [1978] S.C.J. No. 81, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, at 190 (S.C.C.).

83 Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General), [1978] S.C.J. No. 81, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, at 192-193 (S.C.C.).

84 Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General), [1978] S.C.J. No. 81, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, at 190-191 (S.C.C.); P.W. Hogg, "The Canadian Bill of Rights - "Equality Before the Law" - A.-G. Can. v. Lavell" (1974) 52:2 Can. Bar Rev. 263.

85 Brooks v Canada Safeway, [1989] S.C.J. No. 42, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, at 1243 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C..

86 Margot Young, "Blissed Out: Section 15 at Twenty" in Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers, eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2006), at 45.

87 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at 166 (S.C.C.).

88 Catholic Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. S. (T.), [1989] O.J. No. 754, 69 O.R. (2d) 189 (Ont. C.A.), per Tarnopolsky J.A.

89 The Charter's legal rights (ss. 7-14) could be pressed into service here.

90 Of course, Parliament is free to define more than one way to commit a crime, but it cannot apply those definitions differently depending on one's personal characteristics such as race or sex.

91 The one ground that would seem to be relevant is mental disability (incapacity) which is already recognized as a potentially exculpatory condition. See, e.g., Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 16.

92 See R. v. Lavallee, [1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (S.C.C.); Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 34.

93 Certainly, one could challenge the utility of a citizenship test applied to naturalized but not birthright citizens; or, perhaps, the requirement to swear fidelity to the Crown.

94 Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] S.C.J. No. 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703 (S.C.C.).

95 Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.).