A New Justification for Section 12 Hypotheticals andTwo Rules for Constructing Them

Authors

Lisa Kerr, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University
Michael Perlin, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General

Abstract

The use of the reasonable hypothetical device in the section 12 context has been a source of unceasing controversy. The Supreme Court has tried to lay the debate to rest; but we argue that there are convincing and practical reasons for the use of hypotheticals which the Court could do more to explain, as a way to persuade skeptics. These reasons are tied to the realities of the criminal justice system and how mandatory penalties can shape penal outcomes in covert ways, apart from, and in addition to, delivering cruel and unusual punishment to individuals. Along with articulating this new justification for reasonable hypotheticals, we also identify organizing principles guiding their construction that are equally grounded in the realities of our criminal law. Rule #1 is that, given how the law has evolved, personal mitigating characteristics are now clearly proper components of a hypothetical scenario, such that longstanding debate on this issue should come to an end. Our second rule calls for greater restraint. Rule #2 is that the hypothetical commission of the offence should generally involve scenarios that have close analogues in the jurisprudence, and, when departing from the jurisprudence, should not involve the coincidence of multiple discrete events. Novel hypotheticals should be straightforward scenarios, not a collection of discrete events that only amount to a crime once spun together. We argue that these two rules would help to clarify and stabilize the law in this area. These rules would also help to show critics that the proper construction of reasonable hypotheticals is not a judicial game of “make- believe”. Rather, considering the reasonably foreseeable applications of a law entails ordinary judicial activity, including the use of expert evidence, statutory interpretation, and judicial notice.

Citation Information

Kerr, Lisa and Perlin, Michael. "A New Justification for Section 12 Hypotheticals andTwo Rules for Constructing Them." The Supreme Court Law Review, Third Series: Osgoode's Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 5. (2026).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1007
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr-third-series/vol5/iss1/8

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

References

1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter the "Charter"].

2 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 314 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C.

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5 See e.g., R. v. Appulonappa, [2015] S.C.J. No. 59, 2015 SCC 59 (S.C.C.), in which the Court struck a provision in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that made it an offence to "organize, induce, aid or abet" people coming into Canada in contravention of the Act. The migrants before the Court were part of a for profit smuggling operation, but they challenged the constitutionality of the law based on its possible application to "humanitarian workers or family members assisting asylum-seekers for altruistic reasons" (at para. 10). See e.g., R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.), which examined and upheld legislation addressing when accused persons should have access to private records of complainants and witnesses in sexual assault trials, based partly on reasonable hypothetical circumstances (at para. 41). See e.g., R. v. Ndhlovu, [2022] S.C.J. No. 38, 2022 SCC 38 (S.C.C.), where the Court found lifetime sex-offender registration to be overbroad, in part through reference to a reported case in which a woman who had committed an offence against a child under her care no longer had access to the child or any other children, such that registration would serve no purpose (at paras. 88-90).

6 Division-of-powers challenges also routinely involve an individual asserting not that their own rights have been infringed, but rather that a law is unconstitutional based on one level of government's entrenchment into the constitutional jurisdiction of the other level of government.

7 See R. v. Ferguson, [2001] S.C.J. No. 7, 2001 SCC 6 (S.C.C.); see also Benjamin L. Berger, "A More Lasting Comfort?: The Politics of Minimum Sentences, the Rule of Law and R. v. Ferguson" (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 101. https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1172

8 See R. v. Hills, [2023] S.C.J. No. 2, 2023 SCC 2, at para. 68 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Hills"].

9 See R. v. Nur, [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, 2015 SCC 15, at para. 49 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Nur"]: "excluding consideration of reasonably foreseeable applications of a mandatory minimum sentencing law would "artificially constrain the inquiry into the law's constitutionality".

10 We are focused here on arguments that are tied to the practical realities of how the criminal law operates. But for an excellent higher-level political theory argument about the legitimacy of mandatory minimums in terms of democratic values, see Jeffrey Kennedy, "Justice as Justifiability: Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Section 12, and Deliberative Democracy" (2020) 53:2 U.B.C. Law Review 351.

11 Hills, at para. 78 (S.C.C.).

12 Nur, at para. 75 (S.C.C.).

13 Lauren Witten, "Proportionality as a Moral Process: Reconceiving Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimum Penalties" (2017) 48:1 Ottawa L. Rev. 81, at 88.

14 Sentencing in the Canadian system is highly individualized, allowing judges to consider these personal circumstances in the analysis of a fit sentence. For the robust mode of "individualized proportionality" that he takes to define Canadian sentencing today, see Benjamin L. Berger, "Proportionality and the Experience of Punishment" in David Cole & Julian Roberts, eds., Sentencing in Canada: Essays in Law, Policy, and Practice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020) at 368.

15 Hills, at para. 95 (S.C.C.).

16 R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Smith"].https://doi.org/10.7748/ns.2.3.36.s74

17 Hills, at para. 79 (S.C.C.); Nur at para. 68 (S.C.C.).

18 Nur, at para. 61 (S.C.C.).

19 R. v. Lloyd, [2016] S.C.J. No. 13, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Lloyd"].

20 R. v. Bertrand Marchand, [2023] S.C.J. No. 26, 2023 SCC 26 (S.C.C.).

21 Smith (S.C.C.), per Lamer J.

22 Smith, at 1056 (S.C.C.).

23 Smith, at 1056 (S.C.C.).

24 Justice McIntyre, dissenting in Smith, at 1083-1084 (S.C.C.) (emphasis in original).

25 For a collection of these critiques and a suggestion that concerns about the use of reasonable hypotheticals may be heightened outside of the s. 12 context that we are focused on here, see Debra Haak, "The Case of the Reasonable Hypothetical Sex Worker" (2022) 60:1 Alberta Law Review 205. For an example of the critique of the reasonable hypothetical device in media discourse, see Editorial Board, "A reality check on the Supreme Court's legal hypotheticals", The Globe and Mail (January 4, 2025). https://doi.org/10.29173/alr2715

26 R. v. Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.).

27 R. v. Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485, at 506 (S.C.C.). https://doi.org/10.1515/jom-1991-900518

28 R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, 2000 SCC 39, at paras. 53-54 (S.C.C.). https://doi.org/10.1212/WNL.54.1.39

29 Kent Roach, "Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Minimum Sentences" (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L. J. 367 https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1466

Debra Parkes, "From Smith to Smickle: The Charter's Minimal Impact on Mandatory Minimum Sentences" (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 149. https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1235

30 Nur, Factum of the Appellant, Her Majesty the Queen (August 20, 2014), at para. 26 (S.C.C.).

31 Nur, at para. 73 (S.C.C.).

32 Nur, at para. 74 (S.C.C.).

33 Nur, at para. 74 (S.C.C.).

34 Nur, at para. 75 (S.C.C.).

35 Nur, at para. 73 (S.C.C.).

36 Nur, at para. 73 (S.C.C.).

37 Hills, Factum of the Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario (August 5, 2022), at paras. 40-46 (S.C.C.).

38 Lloyd (S.C.C.).

39 Lloyd, at para. 33 (S.C.C.).

40 See the debate on the inferences to be drawn from the second hypothetical in Lloyd in the factums filed in R. v. Hilbach, [2023] S.C.J. No. 3, 2023 SCC 3, Factum of the Respondent, Mr. Zwozdesky, at para. 27 c.f. & Factum of the Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario, at para. 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Hilbach"].

41 Including, to take just one example, his view that no custodial sentence can violate s. 12, because imprisonment is not an unusual method of punishment: R. v. Hills, [2020] A.J. No. 740, 2020 ABCA 263, at paras. 234-250 (Alta. C.A.).

42 Justice Martin says the desire of both O'Ferrall and Wakeling JJ. to "excise" the use of reasonably foreseeable scenarios from s. 12 framework is "completely contrary to both precedent and principle" and "lacks merit" (Hills, at paras. 67 & 75 (S.C.C.)).

43 To take just a few examples, Wakeling J. implies either bad faith or misrepresentation when he suggests that Lamer J. "knew" that the reasonable hypothetical in Smith would "never happen" (at para. 280); Justice Wakeling then says that the Court in Smith "completely ignored" that a responsible prosecutor would never charge the hypothetical offender with the offence provision at issue, before citing a paragraph in which the Court dealt with exactly that issue, albeit disagreeing with Wakeling J.'s analysis of it (at para. 255).

44 See e.g., the move from paras. 287-288 of his judgment, but this issue occurs throughout.

45 R. v. Hills, [2020] A.J. No. 740, 2020 ABCA 263, at para. 263 (Alta. C.A.).

46 It's important to notice, for example, that cases involving reasonable hypotheticals may rely on expert evidence placed before the trial judge. In Hills, for example, a firearms expert, called by the defence, tested eight different types of air‑powered pistols or rifles and concluded that while they met the Criminal Code definition of a firearm, many of them were incapable of penetrating the wall of a house: see Hills, at para. 22 (S.C.C.).

47 Sections 244.2(1)(a) and (b). https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.2.3527.244

48 Section 344(1)(a.1) with an ordinary firearm; s. 344(1)(a)(i) with a restricted or prohibited firearm.

49 Justice Martin was clear that these factors properly carry "significant weight". (Hilbach, at paras. 62-63 (S.C.C.)).

50 Hilbach, at para. 75 (S.C.C.).

51 Of course, many would reply to Martin J. that there is in fact a significant qualitative contrast between the fit sentence of three years and the mandatory of five years: the mandatory entails release into the community at a far later date, whether on parole, statutory release or warrant expiry.

52 See s. 172.1(2)(a) & s. 172.1(1)(b).

53 R. v. Bertrand Marchand, [2023] S.C.J. No. 26, 2023 SCC 26, at para. 116 (S.C.C.).

54 See s. 172.1(2)(b) & s. 172.1(1)(a).

55 R. v. Bertrand Marchand, [2023] S.C.J. No. 26, 2023 SCC 26, at para. 119 (S.C.C.). (emphasis in original).

56 R. v. Bertrand Marchand, [2023] S.C.J. No. 26, 2023 SCC 26, at para. 132 (S.C.C.).

57 Hills, at para. 72 (S.C.C.).

58 Hills, at para. 73 (S.C.C.).

59 Hills, at para. 69 (S.C.C.).

60 Ontario (Attorney General) v. G, [2020] S.C.J. No. 38, 2020 SCC 38, at para. 96 (S.C.C.); R. v. Albashir, [2021] S.C.J. No. 48, 2021 SCC 48, at paras. 40-42 (S.C.C.) https://doi.org/10.51202/0933-3754-2021-3-048-1; Lloyd, at para. 16 (S.C.C.). As Colton Fehr has put it: "allowing accused to employ reasonable hypothetical scenarios is more likely to further the purpose of the Charter: protecting citizens from abuse of state power". Colton Fehr, "Tying Down the Tracks: Severity, Method, and the Text of Section 12 of the Charter" (2021) 25 Can. Crim. L.R. 235, at 236.

61 Palma Paciocco, "Proportionality, Discretion, and the Roles of Judges and Prosecutors at Sentencing" (2014) 81:3 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 241, at 242-243.

62 Hilbach, Factum of the Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties (September 1, 2021), at para. 47 (S.C.C.).

63 Nur, at paras. 92, 95-96 (per McLachlin C.J.C.) and para.169 (per Moldaver J., dissenting).

64 See, e.g., Ontario, Crown Prosecution Manual, s. D. 14: Firearms, online: https://www.ontario.ca/document/crown-prosecution-manual/d-14-firearms.

65 R. v. Naslund, [2022] A.J. No. 32, 2022 ABCA 6 (Alta. C.A.).

66 See Hilbach (S.C.C.) and R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87,[1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.).

67 This possibility rests on the fact that the standard of gross disproportionality under s.12 is considerably higher than the standard of fitness which guides trial judges as well as the standard of demonstrably unfit which guides appellate intervention.

68 Hilbach, at paras. 92-93 & 108 (S.C.C.).

69 Hilbach, Factum of the Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (September 1, 2021), at para. 44 (S.C.C.).

70 Hills, Factum of the Intervener, Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario (August 30, 2021), at para. 22 (S.C.C.).

71 Hills, at para. 136 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added).

72 Smith, at 1080-1081 (S.C.C.).

73 The majorities in Smith and Lloyd also did not identify fit sentences for the hypotheticals they considered.

74 Nur, at para. 74 (S.C.C.).

75 Hills, at para. 179 (S.C.C.).

76 Hills, at para. 94 (S.C.C.).

77 R. v. Boudreault, [2018] S.C.J. No. 58, 2018 SCC 58, at para. 55 (S.C.C.).

78 In Lloyd, the intervener African Canadian Legal Clinic put the point this way: "every criminal lawyer in a major urban centre is aware that courts consistently deal with cases involving African Canadian offenders that face systemic barriers and personal disadvantage that have contributed to their arrest, drug dependency, and involvement in low end drug deals. . ." (Intervener Factum December 18, 2015), at para. 14).

79 R. v. Boudreault, [2018] S.C.J. No. 58, 2018 SCC 58, at paras. 56-58 (S.C.C.). https://doi.org/10.1071/PVv2018n192p58

80 See Hilbach, at paras. 40 & 43 (S.C.C.); Hills, at para. 86 (S.C.C.).

81 R. v. Boudreault, [2018] S.C.J. No. 58, 2018 SCC 58, at para. 55 (S.C.C.). https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2018.810105

82 We acknowledge that in Canadian criminal law, the "basic elements of the offence" are often not readily apparent from the face of a Criminal Code provision and that a great deal flows from how offences are constructed by courts. But the fact that offence interpretations are contested and change over time, or that new offences are added to the Code, does not affect our claim here: that courts analyzing a mandatory penalty should look primarily to the provision and related caselaw in order to discern its elements according to the prevailing law.

83 Smith, at 1053-1054 & 1078 (S.C.C.).

84 R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, 2000 SCC 39, at paras. 30-33 & 50-54 (S.C.C.). https://doi.org/10.3406/enphi.2000.16111

85 Nur, at paras. 67-68 & 72 (S.C.C.).

86 Nur, at paras. 57, 62 & 75 (S.C.C.).

87 Hills, at para. 83 (S.C.C.).

88 Hills, at para. 79 (S.C.C.); Nur, at para. 68 (S.C.C.).

89 Nur, at para. 22 (S.C.C.).

90 Hills, at para. 77 (S.C.C.): (1) The hypothetical must be reasonably foreseeable; (2) Reported cases may be considered in the analysis; (3) The hypothetical must be reasonable in view of the range of conduct in the offence in question; (4) Personal characteristics may be considered as long as they are not tailored to create remote or far-fetched examples; and (5) Reasonable hypotheticals are best tested through the adversarial process.

91 Hills, at para. 151 (S.C.C.).

92 Hills, at para. 91 (S.C.C.).

93 This penalty provision was upheld in Hilbach but was repealed between the hearing and judgment in Hilbach.

94 Hilbach, Factum of the Respondent, Mr. Zwozdesky (July 28, 2021), at para. 73 (S.C.C.).

95 Hilbach, at para. 89 (S.C.C.); see also Hills, at para. 83 (S.C.C.).

96 Hilbach, at paras. 88-89 (S.C.C.).

97 R. v. Briscoe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 13, 2010 SCC 13, at para. 18 (S.C.C.). https://doi.org/10.7748/en.18.4.13.s18

98 Hilbach, at paras. 88-89 (S.C.C.).

99 Hills, at para. 85 (S.C.C.).

100 R. v. Smart, [2014] A.J. No. 835, 2014 ABPC 175 (Alta. Prov. Ct.).

101 R. v. Bertrand Marchand, [2023] S.C.J. No. 26, 2023 SCC 26, at para. 116 (S.C.C.).

102 R. v. Bertrand Marchand, [2023] S.C.J. No. 26, 2023 SCC 26, at para. 119 (S.C.C.).

103 R. v. Bertrand Marchand, [2023] S.C.J. No. 26, 2023 SCC 26, at para. 121 (S.C.C.). https://doi.org/10.1002/vomw.202370018

104 R. v. Brown, [1994] S.C.J. No. 95, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.). This approach allows courts to focus on the narrow problem actually at issue, and to grant an appropriately tailored remedy. If a particular statutory pathway results in a Charter breach, the court might be able to "read down" the minimum sentence so that it no longer applies to that offending pathway. See Ontario (Attorney General) v. G, [2020] S.C.J. No. 38, 2020 SCC 38, at paras. 100-103 & 112-113 (S.C.C.); Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at 695-696 (S.C.C.).

105 R. v. Bertrand Marchand, [2023] S.C.J. No. 26, 2023 SCC 26, at paras. 17-19 & 111 (S.C.C.). 106 Hills, at para. 91 (S.C.C.). https://doi.org/10.21608/acss.2023.358459