Constitutional Statutes Are “Always Speaking”

Authors

• Andy Yu, University of Western Ontario

Author ORCID Identifier

0000-0002-1011-0444

Document Type

Article

Abstract

In this article, I aim to vindicate the “living tree” approach to constitutional interpretation by proposing that constitutional statutes are “always speaking,” a proposal which I suggest clarifies the approach and explains its proper place in doctrine. After reviewing the “living tree” approach and recent criticism of it, I adopt a unified approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation, and I provide an account of the “always speaking” principle of statutory interpretation. I use the account to suggest that the “always speaking” principle of statutory interpretation manifests itself as the “living tree” approach in constitutional interpretation, and I explain how the “living tree” approach is (and is not) linked to the purposive approach and to “originalism.”

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Citation Information

Yu, Andy. "Constitutional Statutes Are “Always Speaking”." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 63.1 (2026) : 75-122.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.4206
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol63/iss1/4

References

1. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. I am indebted to the participants at the Western Law Faculty Workshop, the Evolving Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in Canada Conference, the New Directions in Law and Language Workshop, the Edinburgh Workshop on Laws, Words, and Meanings, the Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group, the Deakin Law School Seminar, and the Australasian Society of Legal Philosophy Annual Conference. Thanks to Tom Adams, Amin Ebrahimi Afrouzi, Emad Atiq, Andrew Botterell, Colin Campbell, Bruce Chen, Andrea Dolcetti, Francesco Ducci, George Duke, Patrick Emerton, Maytal Gilboa, Rory Gillis, Claudia Zulema Robles Gómez, Emma Howes, Grant Huscroft, Alex Kaiserman, John Mark Keyes, Rande Kostal, Joanna Langille, Malcolm Lavoie, Ryan Liss, Alan Miller, Amalia Amaya Navarro, Jason Neyers, Maggie O’Brien, Filipa Paes, Adam Perry, Stephen Pitel, Akis Psygkas, Diana Raffman, Diego de Guadalupe Romero Rivero, Oscar Roos, Angelo Ryu, David Sandomierski, Trenton Sewell, Zoë Sinel, Ron Stevenson, David Tan, Tsampika Taralli, and Lael Weis for comments and discussion. Thanks also to the anonymous referees and the editors of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal. Special thanks to Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Randal Graham, Anton Konach, Shahed Khalil, Martin David Kelly, Luciana Moro, Manish Oza, Ross Pey, Samuel Rickless, and Anthony Sangiuliano. Apologies for names missed. I am grateful for support from the Western Law Dean’s Research Fellowship and the Laura Bassi Scholarship.

2. 1929 CanLII 438 (UK JCPC) [Persons Case]. See also R v British Coal Corporation, 1935 CanLII 308 at 410 (UK JCPC). For the legal history, see Emma C Howes, “Living Tree Doctrines of the Canadian Constitution and Indigenous Law” (2022) 31 Dal J Leg Stud 31; Preston Lim, “Nourishing the Living Tree: Vincent MacDonald and His Constitutional Thought” (2025) 48 Dal LJ 333.

3. Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Thomson Reuters, 2007) (loose-leaf 2022 supplement), s 15:27.

4. Persons Case, supra note 2 at 106-107.

5. Ibid at 98.

6. Ibid at 99.

7. Ibid at 105-108.

8. See Att Gen of Quebec v Blaikie, 1979 CanLII 21 at 1029 (SCC); Attorney General of British Columbia v Canada Trust Co, 1980 CanLII 221 at 478 (SCC); Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1981 CanLII 24 at 723 (SCC). The Court has also affirmed the approach in Charter cases. See Hunter v Southam Inc, 1984 CanLII 33 at 155-56 (SCC) [Hunter v Southam]; Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, 1985 CanLII 81 at 509 (SCC); Reference Re Prov Electoral Boundaries (Sask), 1991 CanLII 61 at 180 (SCC); Reference Re Secession of Quebec, 1998 CanLII 793 at para 52 (SCC); Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84 at para 82.

9. Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 at paras 1-2, 4, 22 [Same-Sex Marriage Reference].

10. Ibid at paras 16-17, 19.

11. Ibid at para 20.

12. Ibid at paras 21-22.

13. Ibid at para 22, citing Persons Case, supra note 2 at 136.

14. See Reference Re Employment Insurance Act (Can) ss 22 and 23, 2005 SCC 56 at para 9 [Employment Insurance Act Reference]; Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop, 2007 SCC 10 at para 94; Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 at para 23; Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66 at para 56; R v Comeau, 2018 SCC 15 at para 52 [Comeau]; Reference Re Code of Civil Procedure (Que), art 35, 2021 SCC 27 at paras 53, 89; R v Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23 at para 65 [Bissonnette].

15. Hogg & Wright, supra note 3, s 15:27 [footnotes omitted], citing R v Big M Drug Mart, 1985 CanLII 69 at 344 (SCC), Dickson J [Big M Drug Mart]; R v Blais, 2003 SCC 4 [Blais].

16. For Canadian defences of originalism, see FL Morton & Rainer Knopff, “Permanence and Change in a Written Constitution: The ‘Living Tree’ Doctrine and the Charter of Rights” (1990) 1 SCLR (2d) 533; Grant Huscroft, “The Trouble with Living Tree Interpretation” (2006) 25 UQLJ 1; Bradley W Miller, “Beguiled by Metaphors: The Living Tree and Originalist Constitutional Interpretation in Canada” (2009) 22 Can JL & Jur 331, DOI: [Miller, “Beguiled by Metaphors”]; Kerri A Froc, “Is Originalism Bad for Women? The Curious Case of Canada’s ‘Equal Rights Amendment’” (2015) 19 Rev Const Stud 237; Benjamin Oliphant & Léonid Sirota, “Has the Supreme Court of Canada Rejected ‘Originalism’?” (2016) 42 Queen’s LJ 107, DOI: [Oliphant & Sirota, “Rejected Originalism”]; Léonid Sirota & Benjamin Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning in Canadian Constitutional Jurisprudence” (2017) 50 UBC L Rev 505, DOI: [Sirota & Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning”]; Kerri A Froc, “A Prayer for Original Meaning: A History of Section 15 and What It Should Mean for Equality” (2018) 38 NJCL 35; Asher Honickman, “The Original Living Tree” (2019) 28 Const Forum Const 29, DOI: ; Kerri A Froc & Michael Marin, “The Supreme Court’s Strange Brew: History, Federalism and Anti-Originalism in Comeau” (2019) 70 UNBLJ 297; Hoi L Kong, “Comeau and Constitutional Interpretation” (2020) 94 SCLR (2d) 57, DOI: ; Dwight Newman, “Is Canadian Constitutional Law Canadian?” (2023) 32 Const Forum Const 37, DOI: . For discussion, see Justice Ian Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” (2004) 23 SCLR (2d) 245; J Gareth Morley, “Dead Hands, Living Trees, Historic Compromises: The Senate Reform and Supreme Court Act References Bring the Originalism Debate to Canada” (2016) 53 Osgoode Hall LJ 745, DOI: ; Hogg & Wright, supra note 3, s 60:5 (“Originalism”). For the legal history, see Preston Jordan Lim, “The Originalism of F.R. Scott” (2023) 111 SCLR (2d) 391; Preston Jordan Lim, “The Great Depression and Canada’s Major Originalist Decade” (2026) 62 Osgoode Hall LJ 569, DOI: .

17. For Canadian commentary on these approaches, see Grant Huscroft & Bradley W Miller, eds, The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation (Cambridge University Press, 2011), DOI: ; Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Grant Huscroft, “Originalism in Australia and Canada: Why the Divergence?” in Richard Albert & David R Cameron, eds, Canada in the World: Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 155 at 155, DOI: .

18. See W J Waluchow, “The Living Tree” in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2017) 891, DOI: .

19. Miller, “Beguiled by Metaphors,” supra note 16 at 332.

20. Ibid at 333.

21. Ibid at 354.

22. Ibid at 353.

23. Bradley W Miller, “Origin Myth: The Persons Case, the Living Tree, and the New Originalism” [Miller, “Origin Myth”] in Huscroft & Miller, supra note 17, 120 at 122.

24. Ibid at 132. Miller has more recently articulated this distinction between constitutional “interpretation” and constitutional “construction” as a dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal for Ontario: see Drover v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 ONCA 468 at paras 114-15, Miller JA, dissenting.

25. Miller, “Origin Myth,” supra note 23 at 145. The reference is to Brian Dickson, who Miller says “conscript[ed] the Persons Case… fifty years after the fact to provide faux-precedential cover for the jurisprudence of the Dickson court.” Ibid at 138, n 86.

26. Ibid at 145.

27. “Constitutional Supremacy and Judicial Reasoning” (2020) 45 Queen’s LJ 353 [Miller, “Constitutional Supremacy”].

28. Ibid at 354.

29. Ibid at 361.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid at 366, 370-71.

33. See e.g. Huscroft, supra note 16; David M Brown, “Tradition and Change in Constitutional Interpretation: Do Living Trees Have Roots?” (2005) 19 NJCL 33; Larry Alexander, “Of Living Trees and Dead Hands: The Interpretation of Constitutions and Constitutional Rights” (2009) 22 Can JL & Jur 227, DOI: ; Peter Martin Jaworski, “Originalism All the Way Down. Or: The Explosion of Progressivism” (2013) 26 Can JL & Jur 313, DOI: ; Asher Honickman, “The Living Fiction: Reclaiming Originalism for Canada” (2014) 43 Adv Q 329; Marshall Rothstein, “Checks and Balances in Constitutional Interpretation” (2016) 79 Sask L Rev 1; Oliphant & Sirota, “Rejected Originalism,” supra note 16; Sirota & Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning,” supra note 16; Goldsworthy & Huscroft, supra note 17; Honickman, “The Original Living Tree,” supra note 16.

34. For responses to Miller, see Wilfrid J Waluchow, “The Living Tree, Very Much Alive and Still Bearing Fruit: A Reply to the Honourable Bradley W Miller” (2021) 46 Queen’s LJ 281 [Waluchow, “A Reply”]; Peter C Oliver, “Enduring Metaphors: The Persons Case and the Living Tree” (2022) 48 Queen’s LJ 44, DOI: . As I am about to explain in the main text, Waluchow’s defence of the approach focuses on normative considerations, while Oliver’s focuses on historical and doctrinal considerations.

35. Oliver, supra note 34.

36. Waluchow, “A Reply,” supra note 34.

37. I argue in detail for a unified approach in other work. See Andy Yu, “A Unified Approach to Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation,” Can Bar Rev [forthcoming]. Here, I provide an abridged version of the argument.

38. Persons Case, supra note 2 at 107, citing the Honourable WHP Clement, The Law of the Canadian Constitution, 3rd ed (Carswell Company, 1916) at 347.

39. Persons Case, supra note 2 at 107.

40. Hunter v Southam, supra note 8; Big M Drug Mart, supra note 15.

41. Hunter v Southam, supra note 8 at 155. The Court offered several reasons for distinguishing between constitutional and statutory interpretation, but as I will explain in the main text, those reasons do not withstand scrutiny.

42. Ibid at 157.

43. Big M Drug Mart, supra note 15 at 117.

44. Ibid.

45. See Quebec (Attorney General) v 9147-0732 Québec inc, 2020 SCC 32 at para 7. See also Bissonnette, supra note 14 at para 65. For discussion, see Benjamin J Oliphant, “Taking Purposes Seriously: The Purposive Scope and Textual Bounds of Interpretation under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2015) 65 UTLJ 239, DOI: ; Jacob Weinrib, “What is Purposive Interpretation?” (2023) 74 UTLJ 74, DOI: ; Vanessa MacDonnell, “Enduring Wisdom: The Purposive Approach to Charter Interpretation” in Howard Kislowicz, Richard J Moon & Kerri Anne Froc, eds, Canada’s Surprising Constitution (UBC Press, 2024) 369, DOI: .

46. Stubart Investments Ltd v The Queen, 1984 CanLII 20 at 578 (SCC), citing EA Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed (Butterworths, 1983) at 87 [Driedger, Construction of Statutes].

47. Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, 1998 CanLII 837 at para 21 (SCC) [Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes], citing Driedger, Construction of Statutes, supra note 46 at 87; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v Rex, 2002 SCC 42 at para 26 [Bell ExpressVu], citing Driedger, Construction of Statutes, supra note 46 at 87.

48. Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed (Irwin Law, 2016) at 205. See also Pierre-André Côté, Stéphane Beaulac & Mathieu Devinat, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed (Thomson Reuters, 2011), ch 4; 1704604 Ontario Ltd v Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22 at para 6; R v Borowiec, 2016 SCC 11 at para 18; Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at para 64; Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada, 2012 SCC 38 at paras 32-33.

49. Stéphane Beaulac, “Constitutional Interpretation: On Issues of Ontology and of Interlegality” in Peter Oliver et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2017) 867 at 871-78, DOI: . See also Cameron Hutchison, The Fundamentals of Statutory Interpretation (LexisNexis Canada, 2018) at 134, 146; Ruth Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, 7th ed (LexisNexis Canada, 2022), s 6.01 [Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes].

50. Beaulac, supra note 49 at 871.

51. Ibid, relying on Stéphane Beaulac & Pierre-André Côté, “Driedger's Modern Principle at the Supreme Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization” (2006) 40 RJT 131.

52. Blais, supra note 15 at para 16.

53. Beaulac, supra note 49 at 875-78.

54. Ibid at 878.

55. Comeau, supra note 14 at para 52. For critical discussion of Comeau, see Froc & Marin, supra note 16.

56. Comeau, supra note 14 at para 52, citing Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (LexisNexis, 2014), s 2.6.

57. Comeau, supra note 14 at para 52.

58. An earlier formulation of the same approach is in Bank of Toronto v Lambe, [1887] UKPC 29 (writing that the Constitution Act, 1867 must be interpreted “by the same methods of construction and exposition which [courts] apply to other statutes” at 2).

59. See Hogg & Wright, supra note 3, s 35:8.

60. See Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, supra note 8 at 510-11; R v Oakes, 1986 CanLII 46 at 124-25 (SCC).

61. Big M Drug Mart, supra note 15 at 344.

62. Hunter v Southam, supra note 8 at 155.

63. Ibid at 155-56.

64. Reference Re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 [Supreme Court Act Reference].

65. RSC 1985, c S-26.

66. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 64 at para 8.

67. Ibid at para 19.

68. Ibid at para 74.

69. Ibid at para 91.

70. See Hogg & Wright, supra note 3, ss 1:4, 8:14. See also Vanessa MacDonnell, “A Theory of Quasi-Constitutional Legislation” (2016) 53 Osgoode Hall LJ 508 at 525, DOI: .

71. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 64 at para 19.

72. Ibid at paras 20-68.

73. Ibid at para 97.

74. Ibid at para 102.

75. Hogg & Wright, supra note 3, s 1:4.

76. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 64 at para 32, citing Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed (LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 99-116; Côté, Beaulac & Devinat, supra note 48 at 347-49; R v Daoust, 2004 SCC 6 at para 28.

77. Hunter v Southam, supra note 8 at 155.

78. The principle was codified as early as 1859, before Confederation (as well as immediately after Confederation in 1867). See Chad Jacobi, Interpretation Acts: Origins and Meanings (Thomson Reuters, 2019) at 131.

79. RSC 1985, c I-21, s 10. Provincial interpretation acts include substantially similar provisions. See e.g., Interpretation Act, RSO 1990, c I.11, s 4 in Ontario; Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238, s 7 in British Columbia; The Interpretation Act, RSM 1987, c I80, s 7(1) in Manitoba.

80. See Ex parte Pratt (1884), 12 QBD 334 at 340 (CA UK), Bowen LJ. See also EA Driedger, “Legislative Drafting” (1949) 27 Can Bar Rev 291 at 303, where Driedger cites this as the source of the common law principle.

81. See Grand Trunk Railway Co v Department of Agriculture of Ontario, 1910 CanLII 61 at 566-67 (SCC), Davies J; Harvey v Dominion Textile Co, 1917 CanLII 83 at 538 (SCC), Anglin J; Re George Edwin Gray, 1918 CanLII 533 at 168 (SCC), Duff J; City of Vancouver v BC Telephone Co, 1950 CanLII 25 at 7, Rand J; Baldwin v Pouliot, 1969 CanLII 80 at 582 (SCC); Brule v Plummer, 1979 CanLII 40 at 492 (SCC), Laskin CJC; Tataryn v Tataryn Estate, 1994 CanLII 51 at 814 (SCC), McLachlin J [Tataryn]; R v Campbell, 1999 CanLII 676 at para 44 (SCC), Binnie J; R v 974649 Ontario Inc, 2001 SCC 81 at para 38, McLachlin CJC [974649 Ontario Inc]; Bell ExpressVu, supra note 47 at para 37, Iacobucci J; Telus Communications Inc v Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2025 SCC 15 at para 34, Moreau J [Telus].

82. See e.g. Vincent C MacDonald, “Canada’s Power to Perform Treaty Obligations” (1933) 11 Can Bar Rev 664 at 668 (interpreting section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867); Elmer A Driedger, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1982) 14 Ottawa L Rev 366 at 370 (interpreting section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11); Ian A Blue, “Long Overdue: A Reappraisal of Section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867” (2010) 33 Dal LJ 161 at 164 (interpreting section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867).

83. For a more thorough discussion, see Andy Yu, “What is Canada’s ‘Always Speaking’ Principle of Statutory Interpretation?,” Alta L Rev [forthcoming].

84. Tataryn, supra note 81.

85. Ibid at 813.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid at 814-15.

88. Ibid at 816-19.

89. Ibid at 816.

90. Ibid at 816-17.

91. Ibid at 817.

92. Ibid at 818.

93. Ibid at 819.

94. Ibid at 824-25.

95. Supra note 81.

96. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].

97. 974649 Ontario Inc, supra note 81 at para 37.

98. Charter, supra note 96, s 24(1).

99. 974649 Ontario Inc, supra note 81 at para 6.

100. Ibid at para 37.

101. Ibid at para 38 [emphasis added].

102. Ibid at para 39.

103. Ibid at paras 77, 93, 97.

104. Telus, supra note 81 at para 34, citing 974649 Ontario Inc, supra note 81 at para 38.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid at para 36.

107. Ibid at paras 155, 158.

108. See Jacobi, supra note 78 at 141. In the UK, leading cases include Burstow R v Ireland, R v, [1997] UKHL 34 [Burstow] and News Corp UK & Ireland Ltd v Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, [2023] UKSC 7 [News Corp]. In Australia, a leading case is Aubrey v The Queen, [2017] HCA 18. For treatises, see Diggory Bailey & Luke Norbury, Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation, 8th ed (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2020), s 14.1 [Bennion]; Daniel Greenberg, ed, Craies on Legislation, 12th ed (Sweet & Maxwell, 2022), ch 21; John Bell & Sir George Engle, eds, Statutory Interpretation by the late Sir Rupert Cross, 3rd ed (LexisNexis Butterworths, 1995) at 51-52; DC Pearce & RS Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 5th ed (Butterworths, 2001) at 93. I explain the alignment of approaches in other work. See Yu, “What is Canada’s ‘Always Speaking’ Principle of Statutory Interpretation?,” supra note 83; Andy Yu, “Taking the ‘Always Speaking’ Principle Seriously” [on file with author].

109. See Neal Goldfarb, “‘Always Speaking’?: Interpreting the Present Tense in Statutes” (2013) 58 Can J Linguistics 63, DOI: ; Jacinta Dharmananda, “The ‘Always Speaking’ Principle: Not Always Needed” (2017) 28 PLR 199; Dan Meagher, “The Principle of Legality and Contemporanea Expositio est Optima et Fortissima in Lege” (2017) 38 Stat L Rev 95, DOI: ; Dan Meagher, “Two Reflections on Retrospectivity in Statutory Interpretation” (2018) 29 PLR 224; Dan Meagher, “The ‘Always Speaking’ Approach to Statutes (and the Significance of its Misapplication in Aubrey v The Queen)” (2020) 43 UNSWLJ 191, DOI: [Meagher, “The ‘Always Speaking’ Approach”]; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Lord Burrows on Legislative Intention, Statutory Purpose, and the ‘Always Speaking’ Principle” (2022) 43 Stat L Rev 79, DOI: [Goldsworthy, “The ‘Always Speaking’ Principle”]; Martin David Kelly, “Applying Laws Across Time: Disentangling The ‘Always Speaking’ Principles” (2024) 44 Oxford J Leg Stud 563, DOI: . I address Kelly’s account in detail elsewhere. See Yu, “Taking the ‘Always Speaking’ Principle Seriously,” supra note 108.

110. Thinking About Statutes: Interpretation, Interaction, Improvement (Cambridge University Press, 2018) at 21-22, DOI: .

111. Telus, supra note 81 at para 36.

112. Ibid at para 30.

113. Burstow, supra note 108 at 157-58. See also Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, supra note 49 (“legislation that is aimed at a particular set of circumstances or is tied to a specific time or place invites a static interpretation. By contrast, legislation that is enacted to regulate an ongoing activity over an indefinite period of time invites a dynamic approach,” s 6.03[2]).

114. Telus, supra note 81 at para 33 (citations omitted). This is consistent with the claim that statutes are presumptively always speaking. See e.g. Canada’s Interpretation Act, supra note 79 (“Every provision of this Act applies, unless a contrary intention appears, to every enactment, whether enacted before or after the commencement of this Act,” s 3(1)); Bennion, supra note 108, s 14.1; Jacobi, supra note 78 at 140.

115. Telus, supra note 81 at para 34 [footnotes omitted].

116. Burstow, supra note 108 at 157-58; News Corp, supra note 108 at para 29.

117. Telus, supra note 81 at para 36.

118. Ibid.

119. RSC 1952, c 163, s 2(1). Other examples include statutory language concerning specific individuals, such as “Madam Justice Louise Arbour” in the Judges Act, RSC 1985, c J-1, s 56.1. See also Bennion, supra note 108, s 14.1. Bennion cites as “an obvious example…an indemnity Act (that is, an Act relieving certain persons from liability in respect of particular breaches of the law)” (ibid).

120. 974649 Ontario Inc, supra note 81 at para 38.

121. News Corp, supra note 108 at para 82, Lord Leggatt, concurring.

122. Ibid, citing Francis Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 1st ed (Butterworths, 1984) at 367-68.

123. News Corp, supra note 108 at para 82.

124. Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, “The Text Through Time” (2010) 31 Stat L Rev 217 at 219, DOI: .

125. Ibid at 218-20. See also Côté, Beaulac & Devinat, supra note 48 at 286, 291; Telus, supra note 81 at para 32.

126. See Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, supra note 49, s 2.01[2]:

[T]he law-maker wants to communicate the law that it intended to enact because that law, as set out in the provisions of a statute or regulation, is the means chosen by the law-maker to achieve a set of desired goals. Law-abiding readers (including those who administer or enforce the legislation and those who resolve disputes) try to identify the intended goals of the legislation and the means devised to achieve those goals, so that they can act accordingly.

Telus, supra note 81 (“Statutory interpretation is centered on the intent of the legislature at the time of enactment and courts are bound to give effect to that intent” at para 32). We can think of the legislature “not as a group of legislators who vote for or against a bill, but as a corporate entity that expresses its intentions through duly enacted legislation.” Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, supra note 49, s 23.03.

127. See e.g. Telus, supra note 81 at para 32. “Courts must be careful not to ‘exceed their institutional role’ by engaging in political questions raised by changes subsequent to enactment, which are better addressed by legislatures” (ibid).

128. See Gerald J Postema, “The Rule of Law” in Jan M Smits et al, eds, Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Elgar, 2023) 360 at 363, DOI: . Postema observes that “[i]t is nearly universally agreed that the rule of law requires that the laws be…accessible and intelligible to the public; prospective and within the capacity of its addressees to follow; reasonably stable; and issued from a duly authorized process by duly authorized lawmakers according to publicly recognized criteria of validity.”

129. Erik Encarnacion discusses the point in the context of law. See “Text Is Not Law” (2022) 107 Iowa L Rev 2027.

130. See John Mark Keyes & Wendy Gordon, Drafting, Interpreting, and Applying Legislation (Irwin Law, 2023) at 124. “[T]he meaning and usage of words change over time. Natural languages such as English and French constantly evolve with changing social conditions and new inventions and technologies” (ibid).

131. See Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd, [1999] UKHL 42. See especially paras 68, 74, 77, Lord Clyde.

132. See Burstow, supra note 108.

133. See John v Ballingall, 2017 ONCA 579, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37780 (17 May 2018).

134. See 974649 Ontario Inc, supra note 81.

135. Bennion, supra note 108, s 14.2.

136. See Côté, Beaulac & Devinat, supra note 48 at 287-89.

137. See Telus, supra note 81 at para 74, citing John v Ballingall, supra note 133 at para 23; Libel and Slander Act, RSO 1990, c L.12. See also Rogers Communications Inc v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35 at para 39.

138. John v Ballingall, supra note 133 at paras 22-23 [footnotes omitted].

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid at para 25.

141. Ibid at para 24. See also Goldsworthy, “The ‘Always Speaking’ Principle,” supra note 109 at 92.

142. The analogous view of 974649 Ontario Inc is not compelling: Pre-1982 courts could not have been wrong that an order that the court considers appropriate excluded Charter remedies, since the Charter did not exist until 1982.

143. The analogous view of 974649 Ontario Inc is compelling: An order that the court considers appropriate properly excluded Charter remedies before 1982, but such an order properly included Charter remedies after 1982.

144. See Telus, supra note 81 at para 33.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid. The accessibility and intelligibility requirements suggest considering changes since enactment, insofar as current circumstances are more accessible and intelligible to current interpreters. See also Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, supra note 49, s 6.01, citing Frederick Bowers, Linguistic Aspects of Legislative Expression (UBC Press, 1989) at 64. Sullivan explains that one reason for dynamic interpretation has to do with “rule of law: readers of legislation should be entitled to rely on the current ordinary meaning of words.” See also John Bell & Sir George Engle, Cross on Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed (Butterworths, 1987) at 50.

147. Compare this to Miller, “Beguiled by Metaphors,” supra note 16 at 334. Miller discusses how “the meaning of a constitutional text can be fixed or ‘frozen’” (ibid). His discussion does not distinguish between “fixing” and “freezing.”

148. “Dynamic Interpretation Amidst an Orgy of Statutes” (2004) 35 Ottawa L Rev 163 at 169.

149. Ibid, citing Bell & Engle, supra note 146 at 52.

150. Recall the formulation by Hogg & Wright of the living tree approach as one where constitutional words “are to be given a ‘progressive interpretation’, so that they are continuously adapted to new conditions and new ideas.” See Hogg & Wright, supra note 3, s 15:27.

151. Persons Case, supra note 2 at 106-107.

152. Hunter v Southam, supra note 8 at 155-56.

153. “The Evolving Approach to Charter Interpretation” (2022) 60 Alta L Rev 35 at 40.

154. Ibid at 46-47, citing Aharon Barak & Charles Fried, “The Supreme Court 2001 Term” (2002) 116 Harv L Rev 16, DOI: ; Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, translated by Sari Bashi (Princeton University Press, 2005), DOI: ; Robert J Sharpe, Good Judgment: Making Judicial Decisions (University of Toronto Press, 2018) at 241, DOI: .

155. Feasby, supra note 153 at 66.

156. “Purposivism, Textualism, and Originalism in Recent Cases on Charter Interpretation” (2021) 47 Queen’s LJ 78 at 87.

157. Ibid at 88.

158. This bears some similarity with the analytical framework proposed in Luanne A Walton, “Making Sense of Canadian Constitutional Interpretation” (2000) 12 NJCL 315 at 349-50.

159. Comeau, supra note 14 at para 52.

160. R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67 at paras 61-62 [Tessling].

161. See Sirota, supra note 156; Sirota & Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning,” supra note 16; Oliphant & Sirota, “Rejected Originalism,” supra note 16. Oliphant and Sirota’s joint work argues that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is consistent with and might even endorse originalism.

162. Employment Insurance Act Reference, supra note 14 at para 9. For a discussion, see Oliphant & Sirota, “Rejected Originalism,” supra note 16 at 150-52.

163. Employment Insurance Act Reference, supra note 14 at para 45.

164. Ibid, citing H Brun & G Tremblay, Droit Constitutionnel, 4th ed (Yvon Blais, 2002) at 207-08.

165. Ibid at para 47.

166. See Waluchow, “A Reply,” supra note 34 at 299; Miller, “Constitutional Supremacy,” supra note 27 at 361. See also Waluchow, “Living Tree,” supra note 18 at 908; Sirota & Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning,” supra note 16 at 184; Oliphant & Sirota, “Rejected Originalism,” supra note 16; Goldsworthy & Huscroft, supra note 17 at 206.

167. See Jack M Balkin, Living Originalism (Harvard University Press, 2011), DOI: . I take living constitutionalism to be the US analogue of Canada’s living tree constitutionalism. For more on living constitutionalism, see Andrew Coan, “Living Constitutional Theory” (2017) 66 Duke LJ 99; David A Strauss, The Living Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2010).

168. See e.g. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Constitutional Interpretation” (2009) 4 Philosophy Compass 682 at 689-90, DOI: .

169. Sharpe v Wakefield (1889), 22 QBD 239 at 242 (CA UK), Esher MR, aff’d [1891] AC 173 (HL UK). The full sentence adds the qualification “unless some subsequent statute has declared that some other construction is to be adopted or has altered the previous statute,” but this qualification is often omitted (ibid). See also The Longford (1889), 14 PD 34 at 36 (CA UK), Esher MR. In Canada, the leading cases are Bogoch Seed Company v CPR and CNR, 1963 CanLII 53 at 256 (SCC) [Bogoch] and especially Perka v The Queen, 1984 CanLII 23 at 265 (SCC) [Perka]. See also McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67 at para 46, citing Perka, supra note 169 at 265; R v DLW, 2016 SCC 22 at para 61, citing Perka, supra note 169 at 265; Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, supra note 49, s 6.02.

170. Perka, supra note 169 at 264-65.

171. Ibid at 265, citing Elmer A Driedger, The Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed (Butterworths, 1983) at 163.

172. Perka, supra note 169 at 265, citing Sir Peter Benson Maxwell, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed (Sweet & Maxwell, 1969) at 85.

173. Bogoch, supra note 169 at 254-56, Martland J; Perka, supra note 169 at 264-66, Dickson J. See also R v Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10 at para 96, Rowe J; Mark P Mancini, “Two Uses of Purpose in Statutory Interpretation” (2024) 45 Stat L Rev 1 at 4-5, DOI: .

174. Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, supra note 49, s 6.01[1]. See also EG Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings & Practice in Canada, 3rd ed (Thomson Reuters, 2022), s 33:71.

175. See 974649 Ontario Inc, supra note 81 at paras 37-38, McLachlin CJC; Telus, supra note 81 at paras 32-35, Moreau J, citing R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health, [2003] UKHL 13 at para 9, Bingham LJ [Quintavalle].

176. Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, supra note 49, s 6.02[1], [4].

177. Ibid. For a similar distinction, see Côté, Beaulac & Devinat, supra note 48 at 287. “It is necessary to distinguish between the meaning of a term from its ambit, the concept named by a term from the things the concept actually represents” (ibid).

178. Quintavalle, supra note 175 at para 9, Bingham LJ.

179. Telus, supra note 81 at para 35.

180. Ibid at para 32, citing Perka, supra note 169 at 264-65 and other cases.

181. Ibid at para 34, citing 974649 Ontario Inc, supra note 81 at para 38; Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21, s 10.

182. Goldsworthy & Huscroft, supra note 17 at 184-90.

183. See Lawrence B Solum, “The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning” (2015) 91 Notre Dame L Rev 1 at 1, DOI: . Solum provides a leading definition of originalism as the combination of two claims: (1) the meaning of the constitutional text is fixed when the provision is framed and ratified (the “fixation thesis”); and (2) the original meaning of the constitutional text should constrain constitutional practice (the “constraint principle”). This definition is also endorsed, with minor differences in formulation, in Miller, “Constitutional Supremacy,” supra note 27 at 363, citing Lawrence B Solum, “What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory” in Huscroft & Miller, supra note 17, 12 at 32-35.

184. It is likely that the weaker version of originalism holds. That version amounts to something like the now widely endorsed version of originalism that focuses on “original public meaning,” that is, the public meaning at the time of enactment. For discussion of that version of originalism, see Balkin, supra note 167 at 6-7; Oliphant & Sirota, “Rejected Originalism,” supra note 16 at 126; Sirota, supra note 156 at 84.

185. It is unlikely that the stronger version of originalism holds. That version amounts to something like the now rarely endorsed version of originalism that focuses on “original expected applications,” that is, the applications that the framers expected or would have intended. For discussion of that version of originalism, see Balkin, supra note 167 at 7; Oliphant & Sirota, “Rejected Originalism,” supra note 16 at 124; Sirota, supra note 156 at 84.

186. “(Ab)Originalism and Canada’s Constitution” (2012) 58 SCLR (2d) 351 at 358, DOI: [Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism”]. See also John Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism and Canada’s Constitution” in Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism (University of Toronto Press, 2016) 128.

187. “(Ab)Originalism,” supra note 186 at 360.

188. Ibid at 361.

189. Ibid.

190. Ibid.

191. Ibid at 370.

192. Blais, supra note 15.

193. Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism,” supra note 186 at 370.

194. Blais, supra note 15 at para 1.

195. Ibid at para 16.

196. Ibid at para 17.

197. Ibid at para 18.

198. Ibid at para 39.

199. Ibid at para 40. In emphasizing the purposive approach, the Court noted that “we must…‘not…overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedom in question,’” (ibid, citing Big M Drug Mart, supra note 15 at 344).

200. Here, I cannot discuss other cases that, as Sirota & Oliphant suggest, incorporate originalist reasoning. See Sirota & Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning,” supra note 16. Other cases are on such areas as constitutional structure (the division of powers, constitutional bargains or compromises, and the core jurisdiction of superior courts) and Charter rights. My overall suggestion is the same: Even if those cases exemplify originalism, that does not prevent them from also exemplifying the living tree approach.

201. One might wonder whether it similarly follows that the living tree approach governs ordinary statutory interpretation. Some members of the Court protest against that suggestion. See R v Kirkpatrick, 2022 SCC 33 at paras 131, 164, Wagner CJC, concurring, Côté J, Brown J, and Rowe J, dissenting.

202. See Waluchow, “A Reply,” supra note 34; Oliver, supra note 34.