Justiciability in Private Law: Religion and Politics

Authors

• Manish Oza, University of Western Ontario

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0000-0002-1807-5233

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Article

Abstract

This article discusses whether private law disputes are ever non-justiciable. I argue that, as a general rule, a private law dispute is justiciable if, and only if, the claim asserts that the plaintiff’s legal rights have been breached by the defendant. Contrary to recent suggestions, there is no rule that renders disputes non-justiciable because they involve religion. Rather, the only private law disputes that may be non-justiciable despite asserting the breach of a private right are those which would require a court to exceed its role under the separation of powers.

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Citation Information

Oza, Manish. "Justiciability in Private Law: Religion and Politics." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 63.1 (2026) : 9-44.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.4204
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol63/iss1/2

References

1. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. For comments and criticism, I would like to thank Manula Adhihetty, Richa Oza, Amit Singh, Kerry Sun, Andy Yu, audience members at the Canadian Law of Obligations IV at the Université de Montréal, and two anonymous reviewers.

2. See Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v Wall, 2018 SCC 26 at para 32 [Wall].

3. The idea of a cause of action is broader than the idea of a legal right being breached, because a plaintiff may have a cause of action when they anticipate that their legal right is going to be breached and take pre-emptive legal action to prevent the breach. Such situations may be dealt with by seeking declaratory relief. See generally Malcolm Rowe & Diane Shnier, “The Limits of the Declaratory Judgment” (2022) 67 McGill LJ 295 at 310, DOI: . I will bracket this complication for purposes of this article and will proceed as though all causes of action involve the breach of legal rights.

4. See Gerard J Kennedy & Kristopher EG Kinsinger, “Justiciability, Religious Tenets, and Private Law Causes of Action: Towards a Predictable Framework” (2024) 4 SCLR (3d) 297 at 301, DOI: ; Lorne M Sossin & Gerard Kennedy, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada, 3rd ed (Thomson Reuters, 2024) at 540.

5. See e.g. Levitts Kosher Foods Inc v Levin, 1999 CanLII 14818 (ONSC) [Levitts]; Shergill and others v Khaira and others, 2012 EWCA Civ 983. I discuss both cases below in Part II(C).

6. See Timothy Liau, Standing in Private Law: Powers of Enforcement in the Law of Obligation and Trusts (Oxford University Press, 2023), DOI: .

7. The “who-when-what” categorization is from Russell W Galloway. See “Basic Justiciability Analysis” (1990) 30 Santa Clara L Rev 911.

8. See Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 at para 34 [Doucet-Boudreau]; Shergill and others v Khaira and others, 2014 UKSC 33 [Shergill] (“unsuitable for judicial determination by reason only of its subject-matter” at para 41).

9. 2001 CanLII 8537 (ONCA).

10. Ibid at para 62. By contrast, see Chauvin v Canada, 2009 FC 1202. A challenge to the appointment of Dr. Morgentaler to the Order of Canada was held to be justiciable because, unlike in the case of the peerage, there were legal criteria for such an appointment.

11. 1943 CanLII 5 (SCC) [Temple]. Similarly, the Court declined to grant an order in support of the Auditor General’s right to information from the government under a statute, holding that granting such a remedy “would result in a de facto shift in the constitutional balance of powers.” See Canada (Auditor General) v Canada (Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources), 1989 CanLII 73 at 109 (SCC).

12. See Friends of the Earth v Canada (Governor in Council), 2008 FC 1183, aff’d 2009 FCA 297 [Friends of the Earth]. There is some indication that such claims are now justiciable. See Mathur v Ontario, 2024 ONCA 762.

13. 1st ed (Carswell, 1999) at 4-5.

14. 1991 CanLII 74 at 545 (SCC) [Canada Assistance Plan]. See also Operation Dismantle v The Queen, 1985 CanLII 74 at para 38 (SCC); Doucet-Boudreau, supra note 8 at para 34.

15. See generally Iain T Benson, “The Limits of Law and the Liberty of Religious Associations” (2017) 79 SCLR (2d) xxi at para 9. For discussion, see Kathryn Chan, “Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v Hofer: Jurisdiction, Justiciability and Religious Law” in Renae Barker, Paul T Babie & Neil Foster, eds, Law and Religion in the Commonwealth: The Evolution of Case Law (Hart Publishing, 2022) 211, DOI: .

16. Kennedy & Kinsinger refer to this as the idea that “religious disputes are only deemed to be injusticiable so long as they fail to meet the procedural requirements for courts to adjudicate such matters.” Supra note 4 at 307. The requirements they have in mind, however, are not procedural but substantive (requirements such as consideration, certainty of terms, and contractual intention).

17. Ibid.

18. Sossin & Kennedy, supra note 4 at 537-38. The two cases centrally relied on for these claims are Wall, supra note 2, and Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, neither of which are private law cases. The other cases relied on are trial-level decisions. I deal with some of these below in Part II(C).

19. Sossin & Kennedy, supra note 4 at 546.

20. [1867] UKHL 6 at 8 [Forbes].

21. Ibid at 7-8.

22. Ibid.

23. [1877] OJ No 227 (ON Ct Ch) [Dunnet]. See also Pinks v Bornhold, [1904] OJ No 216 (ON H Ct J).

24. Dunnet, supra note 23 at para 18.

25. 1940 CanLII 59 (SCC).

26. 2021 SCC 22 [Aga].

27. On the effects of establishment in law, see Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank, [2003] UKHL 37 at paras 58-61 [Aston Cantlow].

28. On the relation between ecclesiastical courts and common law courts, see Attorney-General v Dean and Chapter of Ripon Cathedral, [1945] All ER 479 (Ch UK). There the court held that “[t]he law is one, but jurisdiction as to its enforcement is divided between the ecclesiastical courts and the temporal courts.…The unity and coherence of the law is not affected by the division of jurisdiction as to its enforcement” (ibid at 483). See also R v Chancellor of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocese, ex parte White, [1947] 2 All ER 170 (CA UK). There, the court held that “ecclesiastical courts are not inferior courts. In spiritual causes they are as unfettered as is the superior court in temporal causes” at 171. For an overview, see Mark Hill, Ecclesiastical Law, 3rd ed (Oxford University Press, 2007), ch 1.

29. Dunnet, supra note 23 at para 12.

30. Ibid at para 17.

31. [1874] UKPC 70.

32. Ibid at 19.

33. Ibid at 18.

34. See Re West Pennard Churchyard, [1991] 4 All ER 124 (Consistory Court UK); Aston Cantlow, supra note 27 at para 130 (Lord Scott of Foscote, dissenting but not on this point); Re St Thomas à Becket and St Thomas the Apostle Heptonstall, [2021] ECC Lee 2 (Consistory Court UK).

35. See Tully v Farrell, [1876] OJ No 98 (ON Ct Ch). As MH Ogilvie argues, “there can be little doubt, from the perspective of [the] civil authorities, that they enjoy as much civil jurisdiction over religious institutions as over any other individual or group of individuals.” See Religious Institutions and the Law in Canada, 4th ed (Irwin Law, 2017) at 228.

36. See McCaw v United Church of Canada, 1991 CanLII 7048 (ONCA). See also Davis v United Church of Canada, 1992 CanLII 7731 (ONSC). Actions by Roman Catholic priests have been stayed where they failed to exhaust their internal remedies under canon law. In such cases, the relation between priest and church is contractual, and the rules of canon law are terms of that contract. See Pederson v Fulton, 1994 CanLII 7483 (ONSC) [Pederson]; Hart v Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of the Diocese of Kingston, in Canada, 2011 ONCA 728 [Hart]. In Anozie v McGrattan, 2017 HRTO 1208, and Elamplakatt v Roman Catholic Diocese of London, 2022 HRTO 411, disputes subject to canon law were held to be outside the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

37. 1992 CanLII 37 (SCC).

38. 1887 CanLII 5 (SCC).

39. [1904] AC 515 (HL (Scot)) [Free Church].

40. Ibid at 612-13.

41. Metropolitan Petar v Mitreski, [2012] NSWSC 16 at para 34.

42. Pankerichan v Djokic, 2014 ONCA 709 at paras 62, 86 [Pankerichan]. See also Itter v Howe, [1896] OJ No 31 (ONCA). I do not mean to suggest that these rules are beyond criticism. In particular, the courts’ focus on doctrine in church property disputes can have the effect of freezing a church in the past, preventing its views from evolving over time. This seems inconsistent with the autonomy of voluntary associations, as noted by Lord Cranworth. See Forbes, supra note 20 (“[a] religious body…forms an imperium in imperio, of which the Synod is the supreme body….If this is so, I feel it impossible to say that any canons which they establish can be treated as being ultra vires” at 9). Similarly, John Neville Figgis criticized Free Church on the basis that it failed to treat the church as a living organization, capable of developing over time. See David Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State (Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 135, DOI: ; John Neville Figgis, Churches in the Modern State (Longmans, Green and Co, 1913) at 18-22. These issues are discussed with greater legal detail, and an alternative proposed, by Alvin J Esau. See “The Judicial Resolution of Church Property Disputes: Canadian and American Models” (2003) 40 Alta L Rev 767, DOI: .

43. 2010 BCCA 506 at para 76 [Bentley]. For discussion, see MH Ogilvie, “The Meaning of ‘Religion’ and the Role of the Courts in the Adjudication of Religious Matters: An English and Canadian Comparison” (2015) 93 Can Bar Rev 303; MH Ogilvie, “Three Recent Cases Confirm Canadian Approach to Church Property Disputes” (2015) 93 Can Bar Rev 537.

44. Bentley, supra note 43 at para 76 [emphasis in original]. This approach aligns with certain earlier cases where courts awarded property to the majority of a congregation in a dispute, regardless of whether the proposed changes amounted to a fundamental change of doctrine, on the basis either that the majority was empowered by the congregational constitution to make changes or that the changes had been made in accordance with the denomination’s hierarchical processes for so doing. See MH Ogilvie, “Church Property Disputes: Some Organizing Principles” (1992) 42 UTLJ 377 at 390, DOI: [Ogilvie, “Church Property Disputes”].

45. Aga, supra note 26 at paras 39-41. For related discussion, see Jason W Neyers et al, Fridman’s The Law of Contract in Canada, 7th ed (Thomson Reuters, 2024), ch 3.

46. 1988 ABCA 256.

47. Sheena Grattan & Heather Conway, “Testamentary Conditions in Restraint of Religion in the Twenty-First Century: An Anglo-Canadian Perspective” (2005) 50 McGill LJ 511 at 514.

48. [1943] AC 320 at 325 (HL (Eng)).

49. See Lord Romer’s discussion, ibid at 334. In Canada, Clayton was followed by Rand J in Noble v Alley, 1950 CanLII 13 (SCC) and by Lett CJ in Royal Trust Company v Richter, 1964 CanLII 645 (BCCA).

50. [1976] AC 397 at 400 (HL (Eng)) [Blathwayt]. In another matter, a provision requiring a son to “rejoin” the Catholic Church was held not to be void for uncertainty. See Re Starr, 1946 CanLII 70 (ONCA). Another provision required the testator’s nephews to be members of a Protestant church “in good faith and standing.” See Re Going, 1951 CanLII 87 (ONCA). The court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the condition was valid, because this would make no difference. Grattan & Conway discuss several further cases and conclude that, aside from Royal Trust Company, references to other religions were found to be sufficiently certain. Grattan & Conway, supra note 47 at 525-26.

51. Blathwayt, supra note 50 at 425.

52. See Canada Trust Co v Ontario Human Rights Commission, 1990 CanLII 6849 (ONCA); Jane Thomson, “Discrimination and the Private Law in Canada: Reflections on Spence v. BMO Trust Co” (2019) 36 Windsor YB Access Just 138, DOI: .

53. See Levitts, supra note 5.

54. Sossin & Kennedy list Levitts as a case in which a court “declined to intervene, even when private interests are clearly affected.” Supra note 4 at 540. The same proposition, supported by the same cases, occurs in Kennedy & Kinsinger, supra note 4 at 300. But the issue is private rights, not private interests; there can be harms to interests which are not wrongs. See JD v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust, [2005] UKHL 23 at para 100. This point also applies to several other cases relied on by both Sossin & Kennedy and Kennedy & Kinsinger. See e.g. Demiris v Hellenic Community, 2000 BCSC 733 at para 33 (where the court refused to comment on whether a church should withdraw the charter of a parish); Mathai v George, 2019 ABQB 116 at para 13 (which concerned the removal of the right to hold office and vote in church elections); McTaggart v Jehovah’s Witnesses, 2019 HRTO 207 (where the discrimination did not occur in an area covered by the Human Rights Code); Sivanadian v Kanagaratnam, 2020 ONSC 6760 (which was an application for judicial review, not a private law action, and in any event did not involve a religious organization). None of these cases stand for the proposition for which they are cited.

55. 1989 CanLII 4059 (ONCA) [Balkou].

56. Ibid at para 3.

57. “Church Property Disputes,” supra note 44 at 393. The use of American constitutional law in Balkou was questioned in both Bentley and Pankerichan. See Bentley, supra note 43 at para 55; Pankerichan, supra note 42 at para 85.

58. 2007 SCC 54.

59. Ibid at para 41.

60. Ibid at para 180.

61. Ibid at paras 123, 184.

62. Ibid at paras 174-75.

63. See supra note 8.

64. Ibid at paras 42-43.

65. Ibid at para 45.

66. Ibid at para 53.

67. 1986 CanLII 1100 (BCCA).

68. Ibid at para 19 (cited in McKinney v University of Guelph, 1990 CanLII 60 at para 30 (SCC)).

69. Kennedy & Kinsinger, supra note 4 at 316 suggest something similar. In Canada, the Charter does have a role in informing the development of the common law. See RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, 1986 CanLII 5 at para 39 (SCC). For a recent discussion of horizontal effect, see Ernest J Weinrib, Reciprocal Freedom: Private Law and Public Right (Oxford University Press, 2022), chs 6-7.

70. See Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45 at para 37.

71. Setting aside the tort of public nuisance, which does include rules of standing—indeed, these rules are the source of the rules of standing in public law. See Finlay v Canada (Minister of Finance), 1986 CanLII 6 (SCC).

72. See Liau, supra note 6 at 103.

73. Ibid at 196.

74. Ibid at 237.

75. I use “certain norms” because administrative law contains norms that relate public authorities to the individuals affected by their decisions. See Megan Pfiffer, “Administrative Law as a Source of Rights” (2025) 88 Mod L Rev 366, DOI: . It would require further investigation to determine whether public law necessarily contains norms that relate public authorities to the public broadly, or whether it could be revised so that all its norms related public authorities to affected individuals. I do not mean to take a position on this here.

76. See Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, rr 1.03(1), 7.02(1).

77. See Dawson v Dawson, 2020 ONSC 6724 at para 30.

78. See e.g. David Mullan, Book Review of Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada by Lorne Sossin, (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall LJ 221 at 227, DOI: .

79. If standing is a Hohfeldian power, then justiciability might be its counterpart, a Hohfeldian liability: If the plaintiff exercises their power to sue, then the court will have a duty to decide it. However, given that it is controversial whether Hohfeld’s scheme can be applied to public bodies, I am stating the rule without relying on that scheme. On this issue, see TM Sichelman, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” in Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Ted M Sichelman & Henry E Smith, eds, Wesley Hohfeld A Century Later: Edited Work, Select Personal Papers, and Original Commentaries (Cambridge University Press, 2022) 15 at 23, DOI: ; Nicholas Bamforth, “Hohfeldian Rights and Public Law” in Matthew H Kramer, ed, Rights, Wrongs and Responsibilities (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 1, DOI: .

80. For a rule that is in substance similar to what I am proposing (though he uses different terms), see Lord Mance, “Justiciability” (2018) 67 Inti & CLQ 739 at 756. I do not intend to rule out the possibility that a similar rule applies in public law, as suggested by Erwin Chemerinsky. See “A Unified Approach to Justiciability” (1991) 22 Conn L Rev 677. Chemerinsky observes that “if the constitutional or statutory provision creates a legal right in the individual, then he or she should be able to sue to vindicate that right” (ibid at 698). However, Chemerinsky adds that other rules are needed to make sense of public law justiciability. While claims under the Charter and similar instruments have a rights-based structure that fits with the rule I have stated in the main text, it would require further investigation to determine whether all of public law would fit.

81. Dawson v Rexcraft Storage and Warehouse Inc, 1998 CanLII 4831 at para 10 (ONCA); Wall v Judicial Committee of the Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 2016 ABCA 255 at para 82 [Wall CA].

82. See Shergill, supra note 8 at para 43.

83. 2019 SCC 4.

84. Ibid at para 93.

85. The fact that this is also true of Liau’s Private Law Standing Rule is suggestive. Liau, supra note 6. Both rules tie adjudicability to the existence of a legal right. This suggests that private law may have a more general idea of which claims should be decided from which both the Standing Rule and the Justiciability Rule follow. However, I leave this as a conjecture; pursuing it would take us far afield.

86. Chan, supra note 15 at 220.

87. Ibid at 221-22 [emphasis in original]. See also Patrick Hart, “Justice for W(all): Judicial Review and Religion” (2017) 43 Queen’s LJ 1 at 9-11.

88. Ibid at 10 [emphasis in original]. Hart proposes that the principle from Dunnet is not “the sole measure in determining justiciability” but rather “one factor relevant to…whether a court should intervene” (ibid at 27 [emphasis in original]). See also Chan, supra note 15 at 221.

89. See Shergill, supra note 8. The court stated that “once the forbidden area is identified, the court may not adjudicate on the matters within it” (ibid at para 42).

90. This claim is characteristic of Kantian private law theories. See Ernest Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 82; Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom (Harvard University Press, 2009) at 16; Immanuel Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals” in Mary J Gregor, ed, Practical Philosophy, translated by Mary J Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 353 at 389, DOI: . For a dramatic example, see Bradford Corporation v Pickles, [1895] UKHL 1.

91. Attorney General of Canada v Lavell, 1973 CanLII 175 at 1366 (SCC). The SCC then cited AV Dicey. See AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed (Macmillan & Co, 1915). See also R v Burnshine, 1974 CanLII 150 at 705 (SCC); Samuel Beswick, “Equality Under Ordinary Law” (2024) 4 SCLR (3d) 65.

92. 1877 CanLII 23 (SCC) [Brassard]. For discussion, see Leonid Sirota, “Undue Spiritual Influence” (6 October 2013), online: [perma.cc/ASP7-9DCP].

93. Brassard, supra note 92 at 197.

94. Ibid at 220-22.

95. Some of the examples that follow are inspired by Wall CA, supra note 81 at paras 80-85, Wakeling JA, dissenting. I am grateful to Amit Singh for suggesting this account.

96. For general discussion, see Neyers et al, supra note 45, s 2:37.

97. [1864] EWHC Exch J19. See also Neyers et al, supra note 45, s 2:38.

98. On the inappropriateness of declaratory relief outside of a claim, see 1472292 Ontario Inc (Rosen Express) v Northbridge General Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 753 at paras 22, 34. For discussion, see Rowe & Shnier, supra note 3 at 313-14.

99. [1982] AC 888 (HL (Eng)) [Buttes Gas].

100. Ibid at 931.

101. Ibid at 936.

102. Ibid at 938.

103. Shergill, supra note 8 at para 40.

104. 2020 SCC 5 [Nevsun].

105. For the suggestion that this claim provides the best explanation for the result in Buttes Gas, see Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 484, para 12.22, DOI: . See also FA Mann, Foreign Affairs in English Courts (Oxford University Press, 1986), ch 9, DOI: .

106. See Nevsun, supra note 104 at paras 296, 300. Côté J seemed to suggest that the courts have a special mandate to consider international law in public law cases which they lack in private law. But no such mandate is necessary if answering an international law question is necessary for resolving private rights.

107. For discussion, see Lawrence Collins, “Foreign Relations and the Judiciary” (2002) 51 Intl & CLQ 485 at 507-508, DOI: ; Marcus Teo, “Denouncing the ‘One Voice’ Doctrine” (2025) 45 Oxford J Leg Stud 26 at 44, DOI: .

108. See Kamloops v Nielsen, 1984 CanLII 21 (SCC) [Kamloops]; Cooper v Hobart, 2001 SCC 79.

109. See R v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2011 SCC 42.

110. See Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69 at para 26; AL v Ontario (Minister of Community and Social Services), 2006 CanLII 39297 at para 37 (ONCA); First National Properties Ltd v McMinn, 2001 BCCA 305 at para 45.

111. See Ernest Weinrib, “The Disintegration of Duty” (2006) 31 Adv Q 212. For discussion, see Joost Blom, “Do We Really Need the Anns Test for Duty of Care in Negligence?” (2016) 53 Alta L Rev 895. Another point of uncertainty which arises on the ordinary understanding is precisely where in the duty of care analysis the policy immunity is considered. See Nelson (City) v Marchi, 2021 SCC 41 at paras 33-36 [Marchi].

112. 1989 CanLII 81 (SCC).

113. See St-Hilaire v Canada (Attorney General), 2001 FCA 63 at paras 40-42.

114. This continues to hold under the Civil Code of Quebec. See Entreprises Sibeca Inc v Frelighsburg (Municipality), 2004 SCC 61 at para 27. See also Kosoian v Société de transport de Montréal, 2019 SCC 59. It states: “The purpose of this immunity is to preserve the latitude that a legal person established in the public interest must have in order to make policy decisions in the interests of the community” (ibid at para 107).

115. Marchi, supra note 111 at para 42. See also Kamloops, supra note 108, which states that the Anns principle “prevents the courts from usurping the proper authority of elected representatives and their officials” at 25. See also Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd, [1988] AC 473 at 501 (JCPC UK).

116. More specifically, the Court is prevented from adjudicating the claim in private law. The plaintiff might still be entitled to challenge the policy decision in administrative law (e.g., for bad faith). See especially Just v British Columbia, 1989 CanLII 16 at 1239 (SCC).

117. This is not ruled out by the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent rejection of a proposal by Stratas JA. For that proposal, see Paradis Honey Ltd v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FCA 89. For the rejection, see Marchi, supra note 111 at para 41. Stratas JA was proposing that private law does not apply at all to the state; I am proposing that the policy immunity determines when private law applies.

118. Canada Assistance Plan, supra note 14 at 545. For general discussion of the separation of powers, see The Honourable Malcolm Rowe, Chris Puskas & Allyse Cruise, “The Separation of Powers in Canada” (2024) 1 SCLR (3d) 323.

119. Cases in which a private law claim is blocked by Parliamentary privilege—for example, where a defamation claim is rejected because it would intrude on freedom of speech in Parliament—might be an additional example. See Shergill, supra note 8 at para 42. See also Mance, supra note 80 at 751. The dismissal of claims which have passed their limitation period is structurally similar to these exceptions, but it depends on the timing of the claim rather than its content. As a result, I would not class it among the exceptions to the rule. For discussion of expired claims, see Samuel Beswick, “Retroactive Adjudication” (2020) 130 Yale LJ 276 at 340.

120. See Kennedy & Kinsinger, supra note 4 at 297.

121. See Pederson, supra note 36; Hart, supra note 36.