The Law of Racial Profiling

Authors

Terry Skolnik, Arizona State University, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law
Jeanne Mayrand-Thibert
Fernando Belton, Belton Avocats

Document Type

Special Symposium on Policing, Racial Profiling, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Abstract

Racial profiling is one of the most enduring problems in policing. Yet it remains largely under-theorized, which generates important theoretical and practical implications. Racial profiling tends to be construed as an arbitrary detention rather than a form of unconstitutional discrimination. For this reason, the section 15 Charter right to equality plays little to no role in most leading cases on racial profiling. The legal framework that governs racial profiling lacks clarity and can be applied inconsistently. And the remedial landscape associated with racial profiling claims has evolved minimally. This article advances a novel approach to racial profiling that addresses these shortfalls. It demonstrates why racial profiling is wrongful primarily because it embodies discrimination that violates the section 15 Charter right to equality, and secondarily, infringes liberty or privacy interests, and in so doing, breaches other constitutional rights. It offers a simplified legal framework for how courts can better approach racial profiling in constitutional criminal procedure. Drawing on the republican theory of freedom (or republicanism), it shows why racial profiling results in domination—meaning vulnerability to unchecked threats of interference— that courts fail to control. In doing so, it deepens our theoretical understanding of racial profiling and its connection to equality and liberty. The concluding parts of this article contend that courts can incorporate two innovative remedies that can better prevent and address racial profiling: structural injunctions and constitutional settlement agreements. Ultimately, this article offers a new path forward for how racial profiling can be approached in a manner that better safeguards individuals’ fundamental rights and interests.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Citation Information

Skolnik, Terry; Mayrand-Thibert, Jeanne; and Belton, Fernando. "The Law of Racial Profiling." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 62.1 (2025) : 365-416.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.4103
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol62/iss1/9

References

1. Research professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University (ASU). Executive Director of ASU’s Academy for Justice. Associate professor (on leave) at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Civil Law Section.

2. SJD student, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law.

3. Criminal defense lawyer at Belton Avocats and Executive Director of the Clinique Juridique de Saint-Michel. He has taught the law of racial profiling at the University of Ottawa and at every law school in the province of Quebec. He also represents victims of racial profiling.

We thank Anna Maria Konewka and Michelle Biddulph for comments or discussion on prior drafts, and François Tanguay-Renaud for discussions that helped shape our article and reply.

4. Nathan JS Gorham, “Police Discretion, Racial Profiling and Articulable Cause” (2004) 49 Crim LQ 50 at 60-61; Luamba c Procureur général du Québec, 2022 QCCS 3866 at para 153 [Luamba QCCS].

5. David M Tanovich, “Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an Equality-Based Conception of Arbitrary Detention” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall LJ 145 at 168, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1446.

6. Steven Penney, “Driving While Innocent: Curbing the Excesses the ‘Traffic Stop’ Power” (2019) 24 Can Crim L Rev 339 at 341.

7. David Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining Racial Injustice in the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2008) 40 SCLR 655 at 673, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1128 [Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness”]. It is unclear whether roving traffic stops will continue to be constitutionally valid. This article was written following a Court of Appeal of Quebec decision that cast aside the 1990 Supreme Court of Canada decision that upheld the validity of the roving traffic stop police power. See Procureur général du Québec c Luamba, 2024 QCCA 1387 [Luamba QCCA]; R v Ladouceur, 1990 CanLII 108 (SCC) [Ladouceur]. This article expands on the Luamba decision’s significance below.

8. Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, “Racial and Ethnic Profiling: Statutory Discretion, Constitutional Remedies, and Democratic Accountability” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 6, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1429; Terry Skolnik, “Rééquilibrer le rôle de la Cour suprême du Canada en procédure criminelle” (2022) 67 McGill LJ 259 at 278-84, DOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/1098443ar [Skolnik, “Rééquilibrer le rôle de la Cour suprême”]; Kent Roach, “Remedies for Discriminatory Profiling” in Kent Roach & Robert Sharpe, eds, Taking Remedies Seriously (Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2010) at 402, 404 [Roach, “Remedies for Discriminatory Profiling”].

9. Roach, “Remedies for Discriminatory Profiling,” supra note 8 at 402, 404.

10. David Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (UBC Press, 2006) at 130 [Tanovich, The Colour of Justice]; Danardo S Jones, “Lifting the Judicial Embargo on Race-Based Charter Litigation: A Comment on R. v. Le” (2019) 67 Crim LQ 42 at 42-43; David M Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling” (2004) 41 Alta L Rev 905 at 929-30, DOI: https://doi.org/10.29173/alr1313 [Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling”]; Gorham, supra note 4 at 61; Terry Skolnik, “Expanding Equality” (2024) 47 Dal LJ 195 at 197 [Skolnik, “Expanding Equality”]. Exceptionally, courts do recognize that racial profiling violates the s 15 right to equality. See e.g. Luamba QCCA, supra note 7; R v Neyazi, 2014 ONSC 6838 at para 205 [Neyazi]; Elmardy v Toronto Police Services Board, 2017 ONSC 2074 at para 23; R v Douglas-Hodgson, 2023 ONSC 6769 at para 91 [Douglas-Hodgson].

11. See Part II(C), below.

12. See generally Skolnik, “Expanding Equality,” supra note 10 at 217-18.

13. See generally Skolnik, “Rééquilibrer le rôle de la Cour suprême,” supra note 8 at 273-84.

14. Ibid.

15. See Parts II and III, below.

16. See Part II(C), below.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. See Part V(A), below.

21. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford University Press, 1999) at 51, 66, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0198296428.003.0001 [Pettit, Republicanism]; Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 7, 46, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139017428 [Pettit, On the People’s Terms]; Philip Pettit, Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World (WW Norton, 2014) at 4-7; Christian Nadeau, “Republicanism” in Gerald Gaust, Fred D’Agostino & Ryan Muldoon, eds, The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy (Routledge, 2012) at 254; Fabian Schuppert, Freedom, Recognition and Non-Domination: A Republican Theory of (Global) Justice (Springer, 2014) at 27-29, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6806-2; Terry Skolnik, “Freedom and Access to Housing: Three Conceptions” (2018) 35 Windsor YB Access Just 226 at 228, DOI: https://doi.org/10.22329/wyaj.v35i0.5690.

22. Pettit, On the People’s Terms, supra note 21 at 7; Philip Pettit, “The General Will, the Common Good, and a Democracy of Standards” in Yiftah Elazar & Geneviève Rousselière, eds, Republicanism and the Future of Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2019) at 14-16, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108630153.

23. Frank Lovett, “Non-Domination” in David Schmidtz & Carmen Pavel, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2018) at 112, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199989423.001.0001 [Lovett, “Non-Domination”]. See also Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2009) at 42-43, DOI: https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674054516.

24. See Lovett, “Non-Domination,” supra note 23. See also Cécile Laborde, “Republicanism” in Michael Freeden & Marc Stears, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 519, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199585977.013.0029.

25. Marie Garrau & Cécile Laborde, “Relational Equality, Non-Domination, and Vulnerability” in Carina Fourie et al, eds, Social Equality: What it Means to Be Equal (Oxford University Press, 2014) at 50-52, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199331109.001.0001.

26. Eric J Miller, “The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure” (2010) 43 Conn L Rev 1 at 65, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1575356 (drawing a connection between discriminatory policing and domination); Terry Skolnik, Homelessness, Liberty, and Property (Cambridge University Press, 2024) at 103-105, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009392631 [Skolnik, Homelessness, Liberty, and Property].

27. See Part IV, below. See also Matthew Rosati, “Freedom from Domination: The Republican Revival” (2000) 26 Phil & Soc Criticism 83 at 85, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/019145370002600306.

28. See Parts IV(B) and V(B), below. On remedial limitations, see generally Skolnik, “Rééquilibrer le rôle de la Cour suprême,” supra note 8 at 273-84.

29. See Part IV(B), below.

30. For a discussion of the access to justice concerns and remedial inapplicability in the context of racial profiling, see Terry Skolnik & Fernando Belton, “Luamba et la fin des interceptions routières aléatoires” (2023) 101 Can Bar Rev 671 at 690-94.

31. Parts IV(B) and V(B), below.

32. For an overview of the uses of structural injunctions as remedies, see Russell L Weaver, “The Rise and Decline of Structural Remedies” (2004) 41 San Diego L Rev 1617 at 1617-23. For an example of the use of a constitutional settlement agreement as a remedy, see Good v Toronto Police Services Board, 2020 ONSC 6332 [Good 2020].

33. See e.g. Terry Skolnik, “Ancillary Police Powers” (2021) 99 Can B Rev 429 at 436-39 [Skolnik, “Ancillary Police Powers”]. See also The Honourable Michael H Tulloch, Report of The Independent Street Checks Review (Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2018) at 43-44 [“Tulloch Report”].

34. Scot Wortley & Lysandra Marshall, Bias-Free Policing: The Kingston Data Collection Project: Final Results (The Kingston Data Collection Project, 2005) at 20, online: qspace.library.queensu.ca/server/api/core/bitstreams/9831977f-6af1-43e9-9017-f00f9f664ffc/content [perma.cc/U2V6-DBAA] (noting “Odds Ratios, by Type of Stop and Race, City of Kingston Census Benchmark (Merged Data)”).

35. Lorne Foster, Les Jacobs & Bobby Siu, Race Data and Traffic Stops in Ottawa, 2013-2015: A Report on Ottawa and the Police Districts (Ottawa Police Service, 2016) at 3-4, online: www.researchgate.net/publication/344906617_Final_OPS_OTTAWA_REPORT_-_2016EN [perma.cc/9AA3-PL34].

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid at 3-4.

38. Ibid at 18.

39. Chief of Police, Ottawa Police Service, 10-Year Traffic Stop Data Collection Report (Ottawa Police Service Board, 2024), online: pub-ottawa.escribemeetings.com/filestream.ashx?DocumentId=188293 [perma.cc/DK7U-9LSQ].

40. Ibid at 5. See also Jenna Legge, “Decade-Long Study Shows Racial Disparities in Ottawa Traffic Stops,” CBC News (23 June 2024), online: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/decade-long-study-shows-racial-disparities-in-ottawa-traffic-stops-1.7238620 [perma.cc/SEK4-YQC2].

41. Scot Wortley, Halifax, Nova Scotia: Street Checks Report (Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission, 2019) at 40, online (pdf): humanrights.novascotia.ca/sites/default/files/editor-uploads/halifax_street_checks_report_march_2019_0.pdf [perma.cc/6C2C-UE87].

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. “Tulloch Report,” supra note 33 at xi, xiv.

45. Ibid at 43-44.

46. Victor Armony, Mariam Hassaoui & Massimiliano Mulone, Les interpellations policières à la lumière des identités racisées des personnes interpellées. Analyse des données du Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM) et élaboration d’indicateurs de suivi en matière de profilage racial: Rapport final (Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal , 2019), online (pdf): spvm.qc.ca/upload/Rapport_Armony-Hassaoui-Mulone.pdf [perma.cc/2WE8-39P2].

47. Ibid at 10.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid at 11.

50. Scot Wortley & Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, “The Usual Suspects: Police Stop and Search Practices in Canada” (2011) 21 Policing & Soc’y 395 at 398, DOI: doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2011.610198 [Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, “The Usual Suspects”]. Note that other scholars purport to examine disparate “stop and search” rates, but the research does not clearly differentiate between police stops on the one hand, and police stops that result in searches on the other. See e.g. Yunliang Meng, Sulaimon Giwa & Uzo Anucha, “Is There Racial Discrimination in Police Stop-and-Searches of Black Youth? A Toronto Case Study” (2015) 7 Can J Family & Youth 115 at 125, DOI: doi.org/10.29173/cjfy24301; Yunliang Meng, “Profiling Minorities: Police Stop and Search Practices in Toronto, Canada” (2017) 11 Human Geographies 5 at 12-18, DOI: doi.org/10.5719/hgeo.2017.111.1; Scot Wortley & Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, “Race, Police Stops, and Perceptions of Anti-Black Police Discrimination in Toronto, Canada over a Quarter Century” (2022) 45 Policing 570 at 577-78, DOI: doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-11-2021-0157. On US statistics for stop and search disparities, see Floyd et al v New York (City of) et al, 959 F Supp (2d) 540 (SDNY 2013) at 559-60 [Floyd]; Henry F Fradella, Weston J Morrow & Michael D White, “An Empirical Analysis of the Racial/Ethnic and Sex Differences in NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Practices” (2021) 21 Nevada LJ 1151 at 1162-63; David Rudovsky & David A Harris, “Terry Stops and Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a World of Empirical Data” (2018) 79 Ohio St LJ 501 at 532.

51. Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, “The Usual Suspects,” supra note 50 at 398.

52. Steven Hayle, Scot Wortley & Julian Tanner, “Race, Street Life, and Policing: Implications for Racial Profiling” (2016) 58 Can J Crim & Corr 322 at 328-30, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/cjccj.2014.E32.

53. Ibid at 332.

54. Ibid.

55. Ontario Human Rights Commission, From Impact to Action: Final report into anti-Black racism by the Toronto Police Service (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2024) at ch 5 [OHRC, Impact to Action].

56. Skolnik, “Expanding Equality,” supra note 10 at 215-17.

57. See e.g. Foster, Jacobs & Siu, supra note 35 at 2-3, 18-19; Armony, Hassaoui & Mulone, supra note 46 at 10-11; Wortley & Marshall, supra note 34 at 20.

58. Supra note 57 and the accompanying text.

59. See generally John Burchill et al, Ancillary Police Powers in Canada: A Critical Reassessment (UBC Press, 2024) at ch 5.

60. See e.g. Foster, Jacobs & Siu, supra note 35 at 2-3, 18-19; Wortley, supra note 41 at 40.

61. To be clear, some studies have reported that white persons report that they are subject to some proactive police encounters more frequently than Black persons. See e.g. Hayle, Wortley & Tanner, supra note 52 at 332 (18% of white high school students report being stopped by the police in contrast to 13.3% of Black high school students).

62. Frank Baumgartner, Derek Epp & Kelsey Shoub, Suspect Citizens: What 20 Million Traffic Stops Tell Us About Policing and Race (Cambridge University Press, 2018) at 65-66, 68-69, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108553599 (highlighting that Black persons are disproportionately stopped by the police in North Carolina); Charles Epp et al, Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship (University of Chicago Press, 2014) at 71-72; Floyd, supra note 50 at 559-60; Ben Bowling & Coretta Phillips, “Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the Evidence on Police Stop and Search” (2007) 70 Mod L Rev 936 at 944, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2007.00671.x.

63. Amber A Hawk, “The Dangers of Racial Profiling” (2002-2003) 2 Law & Soc’y Rev UCSB 35 at 41.

64. Jeffrey Fagan, “No Runs, Few Hits, and Many Errors: Street Stops, Bias, and Proactive Policing” (2022) 68 UCLA L Rev 1584 at 1584, 1598, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4052926.

65. Ibid at 1666; Ben Bowling & Leanne Weber, “Stop and Search in Global Context: An Overview” (2011) 21 Policing & Soc’y 480 at 483, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2011.618735.

66. Kevin Roach et al, “At the Intersection: Race, Gender, and Discretion in Police Traffic Stop Outcomes” (2022) 7 J Race Ethnicity & Pol 239 at 242, 256-57, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2020.35; L Song Richardson, “Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment” (2012) 87 Ind LJ 1143 at 1145. Note that other studies suggest that hit rates are slightly higher for Black persons than white persons. However, the authors also observe that hit rates may be comparable between both populations. See Nicola Persico & Petra E Todd, “The Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Motor‐Vehicle Searches” (2008) 25 Justice Q 37 at 47, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/07418820701717201.

67. Floyd, supra note 50 at 558-59.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Roach et al, supra note 66 at 242, 256.

74. Jack Glaser, Suspect Race: Causes and Consequences of Racial Profiling (Oxford University Press, 2014) at 36-37, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370409.001.0001.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. For an overview of these arguments, see R v Le, 2019 SCC 34 at paras 93-95 [Le]; Luamba QCCS, supra note 4 at paras 49-50, 445, 822; Ontario Human Rights Commission, Under Suspicion: Research and Consultation Report on Racial Profiling (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2017) at 40 [OHRC, Under Suspicion]; Skolnik, “Ancillary Police Powers,” supra note 33 at 438-42; Skolnik & Belton, supra note 30 at 685-89; Skolnik, “Rééquilibrer le rôle de la Cour suprême,” supra note 8 at 289-90.

79. Cato T Laurencin & Joanne M Walker, “Racial Profiling Is a Public Health and Health Disparities Issue” (2020) 7 J Racial & Ethnic Health Disparities 393 at 395.

80. OHRC, Under Suspicion, supra note 78 at 40.

81. Tino Plümecke, Claudia S Wilopo & Tarek Naguib, “Effects of Racial Profiling: The Subjectivation of Discriminatory Police Practices” (2023) 46 Ethnic & Racial Studies 811 at 813, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2022.2077124; Natalie Slopen, Tené T Lewis & David R Williams, “Discrimination and Sleep: A Systematic Review” (2016) 18 Sleep Medicine 88 at 89-92, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sleep.2015.01.012.

82. Annabelle Lever, “Why Racial Profiling Is Hard to Justify: A Response to Risse and Zeckhauser” (2005) 33 Phil & Pub Affairs 94 at 106, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00026.x; Michael Gentithes, “Suspicionless Witness Stops: The New Racial Profiling” (2020) 55 Harv CR-CLL Rev 491 at 518-19, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3420816.

83. Plümecke, Wilopo & Naguib, supra note 81 at 819.

84. Wortley, supra note 41 at 36.

85. Ibid.

86. OHRC, Under Suspicion, supra note 78 at 40; Charles R Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody & Donald Haider-Markel, “Beyond Profiling: The Institutional Sources of Racial Disparities in Policing” (2016) 77 Pub Admin Rev 168 at 169-70, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12702.

87. Kevin L Nadal, Kristin C Davidoff & Neil Allicock, “Perceptions of Police, Racial Profiling, and Psychological Outcomes: A Mixed Methodological Study” (2017) 73 J Soc Issues 808 at 809-10, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12249.

88. Tom R Tyler, Jonathan Jackson & Avital Mentovich, “The Consequences of Being an Object of Suspicion: Potential Pitfalls of Proactive Police Contact” (2015) 12 J Empirical Legal Stud 602 at 615-16, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12086.

89. Dennis P Rosenbaum et al, “Attitudes toward the Police: The Effects of Direct and Vicarious Experience” (2005) 8 Police Q 343 at 354-61, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611104271085; Scot Wortley & Akwasi Owusu-Bempa, “Unequal Before the Law: Immigrant and Racial Minority Perceptions of the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2009) 10 Int Migration & Integration 447 at 449, 463, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-009-0108-x.

90. Ronald Weitzer & Steven A Tuch, “Racially Biased Policing: Determinants of Citizen Perceptions” (2005) 83 Soc Forces 1009 at 1026, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2005.0050; Jonathan Intravia, Andrew J Thompson & Justin T Pickett, “Net Legitimacy: Internet and Social Media Exposure and Attitudes toward the Police” (2020) 40 Sociological Spectrum 58 at 72, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/02732173.2020.1720554; Andrew J Baranauskas, “News Media and Public Perceptions of Police Misconduct: Does Racial Empathy Matter?” (2023) 36 Crim Justice Studies 331 at 336-37, 345, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1478601X.2023.2233675; Monica C Bell, “Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement” (2017) 126 Yale LJ 2054 at 2108.

91. Wesley G Skogan, “Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with Police” (2006) 16 Policing & Soc’y 99 at 100, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10439460600662098.

92. Ibid. See also Wesley G Skogan, “Assessing Asymmetry: The Life Course of a Research Project” (2012) 22 Policing & Soc’y 270 at 272, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2012.704035 [Skogan, “Assessing Asymmetry”].

93. Skogan, “Assessing Asymmetry,” supra note 92 at 272.

94. See e.g. Jean-Denis David, “Sources of Public Confidence in the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2021) 63 Can J Crim & Corr 47 at 49-50, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/cjccj.2020-0059; Julian V Roberts, “Public Confidence in Criminal Justice in Canada: A Comparative and Contextual Analysis” (2007) 49 Can J Corr 153 at 154, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/RN84-2371-2482-MR06.

95. Beverley McLachlin, “Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts and the Legal Profession” (2003) 29 Man LJ 277 at 278 (noting the importance of public confidence in courts); William Poulos, “Public Confidence in the Administration of Justice” (2020) 68 Crim LQ 309 at 317; R v Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para 12 (noting the connection between proportionate sentencing and public confidence in the justice system); Jonathan Avey & Bryton MP Moen, “Breaches, Bargains, and Exclusion of Evidence: Bringing the Administration of Justice into Disrepute” (2022) 59 Alta L Rev 701 at 705; Patrick McGuinty, “Section 24(2) of the Charter; Exploring the Role of Police Conduct in the Grant Analysis” (2018) 41 Man LJ 273 at 277-78 (discussing exclusion of evidence under s 24(2) of the Charter and public confidence in the administration of justice); R v Ahmad, 2020 SCC 11 at para 16 (discussing entrapment and public confidence in the administration of justice); R v Kokopenace, 2015 SCC 28 at paras 39, 190 (discussing jury formation and public confidence in the administration of justice); R v Chouhan, 2021 SCC 26 at paras 68-69 [Chouhan] (same); R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 at para 22 (discussing the s 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time and public confidence in the administration of justice); R v St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27 at paras 1-2 [St-Cloud] (discussing bail and public confidence in the administration of justice).

96. Peter DeAngelis, “Racial Profiling and the Presumption of Innocence” (2014) 43 Netherlands J Leg Phil 43 at 43, 53-57; Jelani Jefferson Exum, “Presumed Punishable: Sentencing on the Streets and the Need to Protect Black Lives through a Reinvigoration of the Presumption of Innocence” (2021) 64 How LJ 301 at 303.

97. Skolnik & Belton, supra note 30 at 697.

98. See e.g. Glaser, supra note 74 at 124; Christian Briggs, “The Reasonableness of a Race-Based Suspicion: The Fourth Amendment and the Costs and Benefits of Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement” (2015) 88 S Cal L Rev 379 at 391.

99. Skolnik, “Ancillary Police Powers,” supra note 33 at 439; Tom R Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, “Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities” (2008) 6 Ohio State J Crim L 231 at 233; Tom R Tyler, Phillip Atiba Goff & Robert J MacCoun, “The Impact of Psychological Science on Policing in the United States: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Effective Law Enforcement” (2015) 16 Psychological Sci Pub Interest 75 at 83.

100. Tom Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, “Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and Engagement” (2014) 20 Psychol Pub Pol’y & L 78 at 79-80, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034514.

101. Keith Hogg, “Seeing Justice Done: Increasing Indigenous Representation on Canadian Juries” (2021) 26 Appeal 51 at 68.

102. Chris Rudnicki, “Implicit Bias and Racial Profiling: Why R. v. Dudhi’s Novel ‘Attitudinal Component’ Imposes an Unjustifiable Burden on Claimants” (2020) 68 Crim LQ 410 at 413-14.

103. 2003 CanLII 52142 (ONCA) [Brown]. See also Carol Tator & Frances Henry, Racial Profiling in Canada: Challenging the Myth of “a Few Bad Apples” (University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 89 (providing an overview of the decision).

104. Brown, supra note 103 at para 3. See generally Reem Bahdi, “No Exit: Racial Profiling and Canada’s War Against Terrorism” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall LJ 293 at 306.

105. Brown, supra note 103 at para 3.

106. Ibid at para 4.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid at para 6.

109. Ibid at para 5.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid at para 10.

112. Ibid at para 42.

113. Ibid at para 46.

114. See David MacAlister, “The Law Governing Racial Profiling: Implications of Alternative Definitions of the Situation” (2011) 53 Can J Corr 95 at 98-99, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/cjccj.53.1.95.

115. Brown, supra note 103 at paras 7-8.

116. Ibid at paras 8, 44.

117. Ibid at para 10. See also James Singh Gill, “Permissibility of Colour and Racial Profiling” (2014) 5 Western J Legal Stud 1 at 4-5.

118. 2006 CanLII 37566 at para 89 (ONCA) [Peart].

119. Ibid at para 91. As explained more below, later decisions expand upon this concept and refer to it as the “contamination principle.”

120. Ibid. See also David M Tanovich, “Applying the Racial Profiling Correspondence Test” (2017) 64 Crim LQ 359 at 361-68 [Tanovich, “Racial Profiling Test”].

121. Tamar Hopkins, “Litigating Racial Profiling: The Use of Statistical Data” (2021) 37 L in Context 37 at 41, DOI: https://doi.org/10.26826/law-in-context.v37i2.155.

122. Peart, supra note 118 at para 110; Rudnicki, supra note 102 at 414. See also Terry Skolnik, “Policing in the Shadow of Legality: Pretext, Leveraging, and Investigation Cascades” (2023) 60 Osgoode Hall LJ 505 at 519, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3923 [Skolnik, “Policing in the Shadow of Legality”].

123. Peart, supra note 118 at para 114.

124. Le, supra note 78 at para 76.

125. Ibid. For definitions of racial profiling, see ibid at para 77; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Bombardier Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at para 33 [Bombardier]; Amar Khoday, “Ending the Erasure?: Writing Race into the Story of Psychological Detentions – Examining R. v. Le” (2021) 100 SCLR 165 at 178; OHRC, Under Suspicion, supra note 78 at 94.

126. See R v Sitladeen, 2021 ONCA 303 at paras 50-51; R v Dudhi, 2019 ONCA 665 at para 54 [Dudhi]; R v Uthayakumar, 2024 ONCJ 419 at para 29; R v Ali, 2023 SKCA 127 at para 52 [Ali].

127. Dudhi, supra note 126 at para 54; Ali, supra note 126 at para 89 (per the dissenting opinion). See also Rudnicki, supra note 102 at 415.

128. Dudhi, supra note 126 at para 55.

129. Ibid.

130. See e.g. Le, supra note 78 at para 76; Dudhi, supra note 126 at para 55.

131. Fernando Belton, “La preuve du profilage racial et son impact en droit criminel” in Développements récents en droit criminel (Éditions Yvon Blais, 2023) at 163-64.

132. Ali, supra note 126 at para 108, citing Peart, supra note 118 at para 91.

133. Rudnicki, supra note 102 at 412. See Brown v Regional Municipality of Durham Police Service Board, 1998 CanLII 7198 (ONCA); R v Storrey, 1990 CanLII 125 at 251-52 (SCC).

134. See e.g. Brown, supra note 103 at paras 10; Dudhi, supra note 126 at para 60; Sitladeen, supra note 126 at para 52.

135. See Le, supra note 78 at para 20; Steve Coughlan, “Arbitrary Detention: Whither — or Wither?: Section 9” (2008) 40 SCLR 147 at 154, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1113; R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at paras 19-20 [Grant].

136. Douglas-Hodgson, supra note 10 at paras 134-39.

137. Ibid.

138. See supra note 78 at paras 76, 78; Khoday, supra note 125 at 178.

139. Supra note 78 at para 8.

140. Ibid at para 9.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid at para 10.

143. Ibid at para 14.

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid at paras 28-30, 133.

147. Ibid at para 133. See also R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52 at para 45 [Mann]; Terry Skolnik, “The Suspicious Distinction between Reasonable Suspicion and Reasonable Grounds to Believe” (2016) 47 Ottawa L Rev 223 at 234, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2680362.

148. See supra note 78 at paras 74-97.

149. See generally Elsa Kaka, “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Justification of Charter Breaches and its Effect on Black and Indigenous Communities” (2020) 43 Man LJ 117 at 135-38, DOI: https://doi.org/10.29173/mlj1225.

150. A keyword search (ctrl+F) was used to identify the number of times that each of these words were used. See Le, supra note 78.

151. Ibid at paras 60, 90-91.

152. Ibid at paras 78-79.

153. Supra note 126 at para 60.

154. Ibid at paras 1, 31, 44, 56, 64. See also Sitladeen, supra note 126 at paras 32, 52-54; Ali, supra note 126 at paras 27-67. However, for the ONCA’s references to equality and discrimination in the context of racial profiling, see Dudhi, supra note 126 at para 65; Brown, supra note 103 at para 10; Peart, supra note 118 at paras 35-79 (although the decision mentions equality and discrimination extensively, it explores these notions in the context of an application for reasonable apprehension of bias rather than racial profiling).

155. Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (Nyembwe) c Ville de Gatineau, 2021 QCTDP 1 at para 306 [Nyembwe]. This decision was later confirmed. See Ville de Gatineau c Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, 2021 QCCA 339.

156. See supra note 10 and the accompanying text; Skolnik, “Expanding Equality,” supra note 10 at 197.

157. See Luamba QCCA, supra note 7.

158. Ibid at paras 103-104, 203.

159. Ibid at paras 71, 203.

160. CanLII 46666 at paras 30-40. See also Neyazi, supra note 10 at para 174. Note that the Crown conceded that customs officials violated s 7 of the Charter if they directed the accused to secondary inspection due to racial profiling. The court did not conduct a s 15 analysis because it decided that a s 15 breach would have been encompassed within the Crown’s concession regarding the s 7 breach.

161. 2021 ONSC 5375 at para 69. See also R v Chase, 2022 ONCJ 253; Longueuil (Ville de) c Debellefeuille, 2012 QCCM 235.

162. See e.g. Le, supra note 78 at paras 28-30, 133; Dudhi, supra note 126 at paras 54-66; Sitladeen, supra note 126 at paras 52-53; Brown, supra note 103 at para 10.

163. On the notion of path dependency, see Oona A Hathaway, “Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System” (2001) 86 Iowa L Rev 601 at 603-604, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.239332; Terry Skolnik, “Three Stages of Criminal Justice Remedies” (2024) 57 UBC L Rev 565 at 591-92 [Skolnik, “Criminal Justice Remedies”]; John Burchill et al, supra note 59 at 176.

164. Hathaway, supra note 163 at 602, 605.

165. Ibid at 628. For example, in Le, the accused’s factum to the SCC made no express submissions related to racial profiling, s 15 of the Charter, or the violation of equality rights. Rather, their submissions focused on the fact that the police had violated Mr. Le’s reasonable expectation of privacy and that he was arbitrarily detained. Out of the nine interveners who submitted a factum, only the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) mentioned s 15 in a passing comment on its main submission on s 8. The CCLA states that “[t]o delineate s. 8 protection in accordance with Charter values, it is important to recognize the intersectionality between economic inequality and the historical disadvantage that is experienced by groups protected by s. 15 of the Charter, including racialized communities.” See Le, supra note 78 (Factum of the Intervener, CCLA at para 6).

166. See Hathaway, supra note 163 at 628; Kevin M Scott, “Understanding Judicial Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges” (2006) 40 Law & Soc’y Rev 163 at 164, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2006.00249.x (noting that judges may follow precedent because they do not wish to be reversed on appeal).

167. Skolnik, “Expanding Equality,” supra note 10 at 214-15.

168. See e.g. Cass R Sunstein, “Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided” (1996) 110 Harv L Rev 4 at 15-20 (discussing why judges tend to decide cases narrowly rather than broadly); Thomas P Schmidt, “Judicial Minimalism in the Lower Courts” (2022) 108 Va L Rev 829 at 841, DOI: http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2781624.

169. Skolnik, “Expanding Equality,” supra note 10 at 214-15.

170. See e.g. Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, 1989 CanLII 2 (SCC) [Andrews]; Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 675 (SCC) [Law]; Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5 [“A”]; Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12; Egan v Canada, 1995 CanLII 98 (SCC). To be clear, s 15’s scope is not limited to statutes or regulations. Section 15 has been applied to common law rules and to exercises of discretion conferred by statutes. For an application of s 15 to common law rules, see R v Swain, 1991 CanLII 104 (SCC). For applications of s 15 to exercises of discretion conferred by statutes, see Lovelace v Ontario, 2000 SCC 37; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2000 SCC 69 [Little Sisters].

171. See e.g. Grant, supra note 135; Mann, supra note 147; Le, supra note 78; R v Lafrance, 2022 SCC 32. For examples where litigants challenge a law that authorizes an arbitrary detention, see Ladouceur, supra note 7; Luamba QCCA, supra note 7. See also Gabriella Jamieson, “Using Section 24(1) Charter Damages to Remedy Racial Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System” (2017) 22 Appeal 71 at 82.

172. See e.g. Le, supra note 78; Dudhi, supra note 126; Sitladeen, supra note 126.

173. See Dudhi, supra note 126 at paras 54-93 (setting aside the accused’s conviction and ordering a re-trial because the trial judge erred in their analysis of the accused’s racial profiling claim); Nicely c Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions, 2024 QCCQ 3594 at paras 18-31 [Nicely] (ordering a stay of proceedings due to racial profiling); R v Elawad, 2025 ONSC 1298 at paras 113-219 [Elawad] (excluding evidence due to racial profiling that stemmed from an arbitrary detention).

174. See e.g. Elawad, supra note 173 at paras 129-41; Nicely, supra note 173 at paras 18-26.

175. See e.g. Luamba QCCS, supra note 4 at paras 152-463; Ligue des Noirs du Québec c Ville de Montréal, 2024 QCCS 3241 at paras 35-135 [Ligue des Noirs du Québec]. See also Skolnik & Belton, supra note 30 at 692 (noting that expert evidence may help support racial profiling claims).

176. Ibid.

177. See Andreas Mogensen, “Racial Profiling and Cumulative Injustice” (2019) 98 Phil & Phenomen Research 452 at 460-65, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12451.

178. Skolnik, “Expanding Equality,” supra note 10 at 215-22.

179. Fareed Nassor Hayat, “Dignity or Death: The Black Male Assertion of the Fourth Amendment” (2022) 83 Ohio St LJ 857 at 870-71; Skolnik, “Policing in the Shadow of Legality,” supra note 122 at 539.

180. Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10 at para 188, citing R v Sharma, 2022 SCC 39 at para 28 [Sharma].

181. See e.g. Sujit Choudhry, “Protecting Equality in the Face of Terror: Ethnic and Racial Profiling and S. 15 of the Charter” in Ronald J Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, eds, The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (University of Toronto Press, 2001) at 371-77; Skolnik, “Expanding Equality,” supra note 10 at 225.

182. See Aaron Haas, “Profiling and Immigration” (2011) 18 Wash & Lee J Civ Rights & Soc Justice 3 at 3.

183. See Kelly Welch, “Black Criminal Stereotypes and Racial Profiling” (2007) 23 J Contemporary Crim J 276 at 276-77, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986207306870; David A Harris, “Driving While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops” (1997) 87 J Crim L & Criminology 544 at 572, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1143954.

184. See Reginald T Shuford, “Any Way You Slice It: Why Racial Profiling Is Wrong” (1999) 18 St Louis U Pub L Rev 371 at 372; Akwasi Owusu-Bempah et al, “Race and Incarceration: The Representation and Characteristics of Black People in Provincial Correctional Facilities in Ontario, Canada” (2023) 13 Race & Just 530 at 532, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/21533687211006461 [Owusu-Bempah et al, “Race and Incarceration”]. See also Maria C Dugas, “Committing to Justice: The Case for Impact of Race and Culture Assessments in Sentencing African Canadian Offenders” (2020) 43 Dal LJ 103 at 127; R v Morris, 2021 ONCA 680 at paras 39-43.

185. See Tom R Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, “Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization” (2014) 11 J Empirical Leg Stud 751 at 756, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12055.

186. “Tulloch Report,” supra note 33 at 43-45.

187. Skolnik, “Expanding Equality,” supra note 10 at 215-18; Skolnik & Belton, supra note 30 at 698-703.

188. See e.g. A, supra note 170 at para 138, citing Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 at para 77; Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84 at para 20; Miron v Trudel, 1995 CanLII 97 at paras 145-46 (SCC); Law, supra note 170 at paras 52, 54.

189. See Catharine A MacKinnon, “Substantive Equality: A Perspective” (2011) 96 Minn L Rev 1 at 11.

190. See e.g. Mario L Barnes, “Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the Margins—Addressing Hidden Forms of Bias and the Politics of Which Lives Matter” (2015) 5 UC Irvine LR 711 at 730, citing George Yancy & Judith Butler, Opinion, “What’s Wrong with ‘All Lives Matter?’,” The New York Times (12 January 2015), online: archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/whats-wrong-with-all-lives-matter [perma.cc/CQ5B-3ZXJ]. See also Eliana Machefsky, “The California Act to Save [Black] Lives? Race, Policing, and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma in the State of California” (2021) 109 Cal L Rev 1959 at 1983.

191. See Catalina Carpan, “Racial Profiling and Second-Class Citizenship” (2024) 72 Pol Stud 249 at 250, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217221099101.

192. Skolnik, “Expanding Equality,” supra note 10 at 217-19 (providing an overview of expressive theories of law).

193. CQLR c C-12, s 4 (“[e]very person has a right to the safeguard of his dignity, honour and reputation”). See also Ligue des Noirs du Québec, supra note 175 at paras 198-200.

194. See Terry Skolnik, “Two Cultures of Justification in Constitutional Law” Intl J Const L [forthcoming in 2025] [Skolnik, “Two Cultures”]. See also Daniel Susser, “Predictive Policing and the Ethics of Preemption” in Ben Jones & Eduardo Mendieta, eds, The Ethics of Policing: New Perspectives on Law Enforcement (NYU Press, 2021) 268 at 268, 284, DOI: https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479803729.003.0013.

195. See Neomi Rao, “Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law” (2011) 86 Notre Dame L Rev 183 at 196-202 (describing Kantian conceptions of dignity). See also Kristi Giselsson, “Rethinking Dignity” (2018) 19 Human Rights Rev 331 at 332, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-018-0501-y.

196. See Oliver Sensen, “Kant’s Conception of Human Dignity” (2009) 100 Kant-Studien 309 at 311, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/KANT.2009.018; Thomas Christiano, “Two Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons” (2008) 16 Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 101 at 101-102; George Fletcher, “Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value” (1984) 22 UWO L Rev 171 at 175.

197. Rao, supra note 195 at 200.

198. See Terry Skolnik, “Two Cultures,” supra note 194.

199. Ibid.

200. See e.g. Foster, Jacobs & Siu, supra note 35 at 3-4.

201. See Rinat Kitai, “Presuming Innocence” (2002) 55 Okla L Rev 257 at 288, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-47993-7_12 (noting the connection between the presumption of innocence and equality).

202. As discussed below, primary wrongs violate interests that are associated with s 15 of the Charter, such as dignity and equality-based interests. Secondary wrongs violate interests that are associated with other legal rights, such as ss 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

203. See Part II(B), above.

204. Ibid.

205. Skolnik, “Expanding Equality,” supra note 10 at 215-19, 225-27.

206. See MacKinnon, supra note 189 at 11.

207. See Rosalind Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Constitutional (Equality) Baselines” (2013) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 637 at 640, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1019. The constitutional right to equality provision specifies that race and colour are grounds of discrimination. More specifically, s 15 of the Charter states “[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” See Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.

208. See Part IV(A), below. See also Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law (Random House, 1997) at 158-59; Albert W Alschuler, “Racial Profiling and the Constitution” (2002) U Chicago Legal F 163 at 213-14.

209. See Part IV(A), below.

210. See e.g. Kent Roach, “Making Progress on Understanding and Remedying Racial Profiling” (2004) 41 Alta L Rev 895 at 896. Choudhry & Roach, supra note 8 at 3, 8, DOI: https://doi.org/10.29173/alr1312.

211. See Yoram Margalioth & Tomer Blumkin, “Targeting the Majority: Redesigning Racial Profiling” (2006) 24 Yale L & Pol’y Rev 317 at 330-31; David A Harris, “Racial Profiling” in Erik Luna, ed, Reforming Criminal Justice, Volume 2: Policing (The Academy for Justice, 2017) at 125; Dudhi, supra note 126 at para 55.

212. See e.g. Harris, “Racial Profiling,” supra note 211 at 131. Annabelle Lever, “Review of White Privilege and Black Rights: The Injustice of U.S. Police Racial Profiling and Homicide by Naomi Zack” (2016) 126 Ethics 1129 at 1129, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/686066.

213. See e.g. Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy and Guidelines on Racism and Racial Discrimination (Government of Ontario, 2007) at 7-10 [OHRC, Policy and Guidelines on Racism and Racial Discrimination]; Delores V Mullings, Anthony Morgan & Heather Kere Quelleng, “Canada the Great White North where Anti-Black Racism Thrives: Kicking Down the Doors and Exposing the Realities” (2016) 53 Phylon 20 at 21; Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950 (University of Toronto Press, 2007) at 14-17; Jeffrey G Reitz & Rupa Benarjee, “Racial Inequality, Social Cohesion and Policy Issues in Canada” (Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2007) at 12-15.

214. See Carol Tator & Frances Smith, Racial Profiling in Canada: Challenging the Myth of “a Few Bad Apples” (University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 39-54 [Tator & Smith, Racial Profiling]; OHRC, Policy and Guidelines on Racism and Racial Discrimination, supra note 213 at 7-10. See also OHRC, Under Suspicion, supra note 78 at 30-63.

215. See e.g. Akwasi Owusu-Bempah & Scot Wortley, “Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Canada” in Sandra M Bucerius & Michael Tonry, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration (Oxford University Press, 2014) 281 at 301-10, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199859016.013.020 [Owusu-Bempah & Wortley, “Criminal Justice”]; OHRC, Under Suspicion, supra note 78 at 30-52; Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Government of Ontario, 1995) at 183-85 [CSROCJS, Systemic Racism] (noting various disparities in charging decisions); Owusu-Bempah et al, “Race and Incarceration,” supra note 184 at 533 (disparities in sentencing); Toronto Police Service, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 Detailed Report (Toronto Police Service Board, 2022) at 48-49 (disparities in use of force); OHRC, Impact to Action, supra note 55 at ch 6 (disparities in charging decisions); Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, “The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials” (2012) 127 QJ Econs 1017 at 1019-20 (describing conviction rates for all white juries versus more diverse juries), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs014; Andrea S Anderson, “Analysis: Considering Social Context Evidence in the Sentencing of Black Canadian Offenders” (2022) 45 Man LJ 152 at 153 (noting incarceration disparities), DOI: https://doi.org/10.29173/mlj1355; Ontario Human Rights Commission, A Disparate Impact: Second Interim Report on the Inquiry into Racial Profiling and Racial Discrimination of Black Persons by the Toronto Police Service (Government of Ontario, 2020) at 2-10; Kaka, “Justification of Charter Breaches,” supra note 149 at 119-24.

216. Tator & Smith, Racial Profiling, supra note 214 at 55; Le, supra note 78 at paras 93-94; Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling,” supra note 10 at 911-12.

217. OHRC, Under Suspicion, supra note 78 at 30-63; Kevin R Johnson, “The Case for African American and Latina/o Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement” (2003) 55 Fla L Rev 341 at 353.

218. Wortley, supra note 41 at 36, 38; OHRC, Under Suspicion, supra note 78 at 24. See also Statistics Canada, Half of Racialized People Have Experienced Discrimination or Unfair Treatment in the Past Five Years (Statistics Canada, 2024) at 1-5.

219. See Statistics Canada, Black and Indigenous People’s Confidence in Police and Experiences of Discrimination in Their Daily Lives (Statistics Canada, 2022) at 1-3; Owusu-Bempah & Wortley, “Criminal Justice,” supra note 215 at 298-301.

220. See e.g. Bombardier, supra note 125 at para 39 (noting that the personal characteristic “results in” adverse selection or treatment). This account elucidates how the primary wrong of discrimination results in the secondary wrong of setting back interests, such as freedom, autonomy, or privacy. See also Sheri Lynn Johnson, “Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect” (1983) 93 Yale LJ 214 at 236, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/796306; Randall Kennedy, “Racial Trends in the Administration of Criminal Justice” in Neil J Smelser, William Julius Wilson & Faith Mitchell, eds, America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences: Volume 2 (National Academy Press, 2001) 1 at 3.

221. See Kennedy, “Racial Trends in the Administration of Criminal Justice,” supra note 220 at 3.

222. Ibid.

223. See e.g. R v Ewanchuk, 1999 CanLII 711 at para 69 (SCC); R v Kirkpatrick, 2022 SCC 33 at para 62; R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para 68; Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and Ideal Victims: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 22 CJWL 397 at 433, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/cjwl.22.2.397.

224. See Susan A Lentz & Robert H Chaires, “Sexual Assault Statutes Targeting Authority & Power Imbalances: A Step Forward in Rape Law Reform” (2011) 3 Freedom Center J 1 at 12-16. To be clear, this does not suggest that sexual assault occurs only between heterosexual persons; perpetrators and victims of sexual assault can be the same sex or gender. Nor does this argument discount the fact that sexual assaults occur in a broad array of circumstances, and involve perpetrators and victims with an array of different personal traits.

225. See e.g. Lise Gotell, “Governing Heterosexuality through Specific Consent: Interrogating the Governmental Effects of R. v J.A.” (2012) 24 CJWL 359 at 363, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/cjwl.24.2.359.

226. Ekow N Yankah, “Pretext and Justification: Republicanism, Policing, and Race” (2019) 40 Cardozo L Rev 1543 at 1597, 1619-20, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108354721. 007; Eric J Miller, “Challenging Police Discretion” (2015) 58 Howard LJ 521 at 537, 540; Burchill et al, supra note 59 at 180-85 (discussing the relationship between police powers and domination).

227. See e.g. Pettit, Republicanism, supra note 21 at 51, 66. Note that the terms “freedom” and “liberty” are used interchangeably throughout this article.

228. Pettit, On the People’s Terms, supra note 21 at 7, 46.

229. See Fabian Wendt, “Slaves, Prisoners, and Republican Freedom” (2011) 17 Res Publica 175 at 177-78, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9151-5.

230. Pettit, On the People’s Terms, supra note 21 at 64.

231. Ibid. See also Eoin Daly, “Freedom as Non-Domination in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Rights” (2015) 28 Can JL & Jur 289 at 291, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2015.29.

232. See Laborde, “Republicanism,” supra note 24 at 519.

233. Pettit, On the People’s Terms, supra note 21 at 48-49; Frank Lovett, “Domination and Distributive Justice” (2009) 71 J Politics 817 at 821, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381609090732.

234. Christopher McCammon, “Domination: A Rethinking” (2015) 125 Ethics 1028 at 1043, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/680906.

235. Pettit, On the People’s Terms, supra note 21 at 61.

236. Ibid at 61-2.

237. Garrau & Laborde, supra note 25 at 151-52; Frank Lovett & Philip Pettit, “Neorepublicanism: A Normative and Institutional Research Program” (2019) 12 Ann Rev Pol Sci 11 at 17-18, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.120952.

238. Pettit, Republicanism, supra note 21 at 57-58, 60-61.

239. Ibid at 60-61.

240. Ibid.

241. Ibid.

242. Ibid.

243. See e.g. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “Pluralist Republicanism: Race, Gender and Domination” (2024) 98 Aristotelian Soc’y 47 at 63, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae006; Eric J Miller, “Police Encounters with Race and Gender” (2015) 5 UC Irvine L Rev 735 at 743-44; William Smith, “Republican Policing: From Consent to Contestation” (2025) 23 Perspectives on Politics 270 at 271-73, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592724000574; Skolnik, Homelessness, Liberty, and Property, supra note 26 at 103-104 (describing “non-egalitarian enforcement” as a form of vertical domination).

244. Yankah, supra note 226 at 1592, 1597.

245. See e.g. OHRC, Under Suspicion, supra note 78 at 40; Wortley, supra note 41 at 36; Le, supra note 78 at para 95; Luamba QCCS, supra note 4 at para 737.

246. See Harris, “Driving While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses,” supra note 183 at 570; Luamba QCCS, supra note 4 at para 209.

247. See Harris, “Driving While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses,” supra note 183 at 570; Luamba QCCS, supra note 4 at paras 209, 268.

248. Ibid at para 268.

249. Utah v Strieff, 579 US 232 (2016) at 2070 (per Sotomayor J); Sherri Lee Keene, “Teaching Dissents” (2023) 107 Minn L Rev 2619 at 2654-55; Josh Bowers, “Annoy No Cop” (2017) 166 U Pa L Rev 129 at 171-72. For an example of a Canadian court’s use of this expression, see Nyembwe, supra note 155 at para 471.

250. Bennett Capers, “Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal Assists” (2018) 69 Fla L Rev 723 at 744; James Stribopoulos, “Unchecked Power: The Constitutional Regulation of Arrest Reconsidered” (2003) 48 McGill LJ 225 at 262; James Stribopoulos, “Packer’s Blind Spot: Low Visibility Encounters and the Limits of Due Process versus Crime Control” in François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos, eds, Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law (Hart, 2012) at 201, DOI: https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472561091; Terry Skolnik, “Policing, Technology, and the Erosion of Constitutional Rights” (2023) 49 Queen’s LJ 40 at 53; Belton, “La preuve du profilage racial et son impact en droit criminal,” supra note 131 at 171.

251. Capers, supra note 250 at 744.

252. See Part IV(B), below; Skolnik & Belton, supra note 30 at 690.

253. Dudhi, supra note 126 at para 78; Brown, supra note 103 at para 44; Peart, supra note 118 at para 95.

254. Dudhi, supra note 126 at paras 75-78; Ali, supra note 126 at para 95. See also Tanovich, “Racial Profiling Test,” supra note 120 at 361-62; Tanovich, The Colour of Justice, supra note 10 at 130-34; Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling,” supra note 10 at 929-30.

255. Skolnik, “Rééquilibrer le rôle de la Cour suprême,” supra note 8 at 281-85.

256. Ibid.

257. Ibid.

258. See Skolnik, “Ancillary Police Powers,” supra note 33 at 446-53.

259. Supra note 7 at 1288-89. See also Coughlin, supra note 135 at 149, 164.

260. Ladouceur, supra note 7 at 1288-89.

261. Ibid at 1279-88.

262. Ibid at 1286.

263. Ibid.

264. Ibid at 1287.

265. See Part I, above.

266. Ibid. Tanovich noted that Ladouceur constituted a writ of assistance for racial profiling in “E-Racing Racial Profiling,” supra note 10 at 928; Tanovitch, “The Charter of Whiteness,” supra note 7 at 673.

267. Supra note 147. See also Skolnik, “Ancillary Police Powers,” supra note 33 at 450-51.

268. See e.g. Benjamin Berger, “Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 CR (6th) 58; David Tanovich, “The Colourless World of Mann” (2004) 21 CR (6th) 47; David Tanovich, “The Further Erasure of Race in Charter Cases” (2006) 38 CR (6th) 84.

269. Ibid; Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling,” supra note 10 at 921-22.

270. See e.g. Rosemary Cairns Way, “Attending to Equality: Criminal Law, the Charter and Competitive Truths” (2012) 57 SCLR (2d) 39 at 49, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1231; Rosemary Cairns Way, “An Opportunity for Equality: Kokopenace and Nur at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014) 61 Crim LQ 465 at 466-67; Skolnik, “Rééquilibrer le rôle de la Cour supreme,” supra note 8 at 290-93.

271. House of Commons, Systemic Racism in Policing in Canada: Report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (June 2021) (Chair Hon Jon McKay) at 54-57; Le, supra note 78 at paras 84-97; R v Morris, 2021 ONCA 680 at para 1; CSROCJS, Systemic Racism, supra note 215 at i-vii; OHRC, Under Suspicion, supra note 78 at 31-51.

272. Skolnik, “Rééquilibrer le rôle de la Cour suprême,” supra note 8 at 261.

273. Skolnik & Belton, supra note 30 at 685-89.

274. The Supreme Court of Canada has granted leave to appeal in Luamba.

275. See e.g. Luamba QCCA, supra note 7 at para 222.

276. Ibid.

277. See Part III(A).

278. Choudhry, supra note 181 at 377.

279. Brown, supra note 103 at para 10; Dudhi, supra note 126 at para 60; Sitladeen, supra note 126 at para 52; Douglas-Hodgson, supra note 10 at paras 134-39.

280. See R v Khill, 2021 SCC 37 at para 56; Noah Weisbord, “Who’s Afraid of the Lucky Moose? Canada’s Dangerous Self-Defence Innovation” (2018) 64 McGill LJ 349 at 395; R v Tran, 2010 SCC 58 at para 34; St-Cloud, supra note 95 at paras 78-79; Chouhan, supra note 95 at para 116.

281. Luamba QCCA, supra note 7 at para 222.

282. Ibid.

283. Le, supra note 78 at para 76.

284. Ibid.

285. Ibid at para 78.

286. For an overview of the test, see Sharma, supra note 180 at para 28.

287. Ibid. We are not aware of any decisions that have applied the two-part s 15 framework to individual instances of racial profiling. However, a court could do so in the future. The SCC has recognized that the exercise of common law police powers must comply with the Charter. See e.g. R v Golden, 2001 SCC 83 at paras 87-113; Mann, supra note 147 at paras 20, 34. Courts have recognized that the common law power to detain individuals can be exercised arbitrarily due to racial profiling, which violates s 9 of the Charter. See Le, supra note 78 at para 78 (noting that suspicion based on racial profiling is unreasonable). Similarly, a common law power to detain individuals can be exercised discriminatorily due to racial profiling, which could violate s 15 of the Charter.

288. See e.g. Elawad, supra note 173 at paras 113-219 (excluding evidence due to racial profiling that stemmed from an arbitrary detention); Nicely, supra note 173 at paras 18-31 (ordering a stay of proceedings due to racial profiling).

289. Luamba QCCA, supra note 7; Ligue des Noirs du Québec, supra note 175.

290. Sharma, supra note 180 at para 28.

291. Ibid.

292. See e.g. Luamba QCCA, supra note 7; Ligue des Noirs du Québec, supra note 175.

293. Ibid.

294. See Skolnik & Belton, supra note 30 at 678; Skolnik, “Ancillary Police Powers,” supra note 33 at 451.

295. See Luamba QCCA, supra note 7 at paras 775-829; Skolnik & Belton, supra note 30 at 681-82, 695.

296. See Luamba QCCA, supra note 7 at paras 601-705, 775-832.

297. Ibid.

298. See Ligue des Noirs du Québec, supra note 175 at paras 11, 31-39.

299. Ibid at paras 44-91.

300. Ibid at paras 1-14.

301. See generally Charles F Sabel & William H Simon, “The Duty for Responsible Administration and the Problem of Police Accountability” (2016) 33 Yale J Reg 165 at 173-74; Skolnik, “Criminal Justice Remedies,” supra note 163 at 566; Skolnik, “Rééquilibrer le rôle de la Cour suprême,” supra note 44 at 278-84.

302. See Skolnik, “Criminal Justice Remedies,” supra note 163 at 566.

303. Ibid.

304. Ibid. See also Kent Roach, “The Disappointing Remedy? Damages as a Remedy for Violations of Human Rights” (2019) 69 UTLJ 33 at 38, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/utlj.69.s1.002; Nancy Sarmento Barkhordari, “Palpable & Enforceable: A Normative Framework for a Stronger Damages Remedy under Section 24(1) of the Charter” (2024) 50 Queen’s LJ 32 at 49, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4744088.

305. See Ranjan Agarwal & Joseph Marcus, “Where There is No Remedy, There is No Right: Using Charter Damages to Compensate Victims of Racial Profiling” (2015) 34 NJCL 75 at 82-84; Kent Roach, Canadian Policing: Why and How it Must Change (Irwin Law, 2022) at 61-62 [Roach, “Canadian Policing”].

306. See Skolnik, “Criminal Justice Remedies,” supra note 163 at 594-95; Vancouver (City) v Ward, 2010 SCC 27 at para 58.

307. See Skolnik, “Criminal Justice Remedies,” supra note 163 at 608-12.

308. Iryna Ponomarenko, “The Devil Is in the Scale: Revisiting the Commonality Requirement in Charter Class Actions” (2019) 57 Alta L Rev 69 at 70, DOI: https://doi.org/10.29173/alr2565, citing Thorburn v British Columbia (Public Safety and Solicitor General), 2013 BCCA 480 at paras 48-52 [Thorburn].

309. See e.g. Thorburn, supra note 308 at paras 48-52.

310. See Skolnik, “Criminal Justice Remedies,” supra note 163 at 608.

311. Roach, “Canadian Policing,” supra note 305 at 62-63.

312. Ibid at 6.

313. Ibid at 6, 23. Although judicial remedies do not generally address these types of shortcomings, public inquiries or coroners’ investigations may lead to non-binding recommendations. See Kent Roach, “Models of Civilian Police Review: The Objectives and Mechanisms of Legal and Political Regulation of the Police” (2014) 61 Crim LQ 29 at 70-71.

314. See Skolnik, “Ancillary Police Powers,” supra note 33 at 447, 459; Christi L Gullion & William R King, “Early Intervention Systems for Police: A State-of-the-Art Review” (2020) 43 Policing 643 at 644-47, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-02-2020-0027.

315. Choudhry & Roach, supra note 8 at 29-30.

316. Some scholars have argued for structural injunctions to address systemic forms of police wrongdoing or civil rights violations in the criminal justice system. See e.g. Roach, “Remedies for Discriminatory Profiling,” supra note 8 at 397.

317. Owen Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction (Indiana University Press, 1978) at 7.

318. Ibid. See also John C Jeffries Jr & George A Rutherglen, “Structural Reform Revisited” (2007) 95 Cal L Rev 1387 at 1399-1400; Robert E Easton, “The Dual Role of the Structural Injunction” (1990) 99 Yale LJ 1983 at 1993, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/796680; Kamina Aliya Pinder, “Reconciling Race-Neutral Strategies and Race-Conscious Objectives: The Potential Resurgence of the Structural Injunction in Education Litigation” (2013) 9 Stan JCR-CL 247 at 250-51; Ghislain Otis, “La Charte et la modification des programmes gouvernementaux: l’exemple de l’injonction structurelle en droit Américain” (1991) 36 McGill LJ 1348 at 1351.

319. Cass R Sunstein, “Suing Government” (1983) 92 Yale LJ 749 at 750, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/796327.

320. See Easton, supra note 318 at 1983-84; Nora Gillespie, “Charter Remedies: The Structural Injunction” (1990) 11 Adv Q 190 at 190.

321. See John Geoffrey Howard, “Civil Remedies under the Charter: Options and Issues” (1989) 11 Adv Q 47 at 61.

322. Karla Grossenbacher, “Implementing Structural Injunctions: Getting a Remedy When Local Officials Resist” (1992) 80 Geo LJ 2227 at 2228-29; Russell L Weaver, “The Rise and Decline of Structural Remedies” (2004) 41 San Diego L Rev 1617 at 1619.

323. See Danielle Elyce Hirsch, “A Defense of Structural Injunctive Remedies in South African Law” (2007) 9 Or Rev Int’l L 1 at 5-6; Chintan Chandrachud, “Anticorruption by Fiat: Structural Injunctions and Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme Court of India” (2018) 14 Socio-Legal Rev 170 at 172-75, DOI: https://doi.org/10.55496/ARBC3995.

324. Doucet‐Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 at paras 55-58 [Doucet-Boudreau]. For an overview of the decision and the structural injunction, see Paul S Rouleau & Linsey Sherman, “Doucet-Boudreau, Dialogue and Judicial Activism: Tempest in a Teapot” (2009) 41 Ottawa L Rev 171 at 173-78.

325. Doucet‐Boudreau, supra note 324 at paras 60-88; Debra M McAllister, “Charter Remedies and Jurisdiction to Grant Them: The Evolution of Section 24(1) and Section 52(1)” (2004) 25 SCLR 1 at 46-53.

326. Doucet‐Boudreau, supra note 324 at para 7.

327. Ibid.

328. Ibid. See also Alana Klein, “Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights” (2008) 39 Colum HRLR 351 at 387-89.

329. Choudhry & Roach, supra note 8 at 30.

330. Ibid, citing Little Sisters, supra note 170 at para 261.

331. Robert J Sharpe, “Injunctions and the Charter” (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ 473 at 478-79, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1926.

332. Ibid.

333. See Samuel Buckberry Joyce, “Climate Injunctions: The Power of Courts to Award Structural Relief against Federal Agencies” (2023) 42 Stan Envtl LJ 241 at 262; Pinder, supra note 318 at 260-61.

334. Allan Y Jiao, “Federal Consent Decrees: A Review of Policies, Processes, and Outcomes” (2021) 22 Police Prac & Research 793 at 794, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2020.1722664.

335. David L Douglass, “Department of Justice Consent Decrees as the Foundation for Community-Initiated Collaborative Police Reform” (2017) 20 Police Q 322 at 326, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611117712237. See also Zachary A Powell, Michele Bisaccia Meitl & John L Worrall, “Police Consent Decrees and Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation” (2017) 16 Crim & Pub Pol’y 575 at 578, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12295.

336. For an example of a constitutional settlement agreement, see Good 2020, supra note 32; Roach, “Canadian Policing,” supra note 305 at 62. See also Good v Toronto (Police Services Board), 2016 ONCA 250 at paras 38-39, 87 [Good 2016].

337. Catherine Piche, “Judging Fairness in Class Action Settlements” (2010) 28 Windsor YB Access Just 111 at 112, 129; Howard M Erichson & Ethan J Leib, “Class Action Settlements as Contracts?” (2023) 102 NCL Rev 73 at 74-75.

338. Jasminka Kalajdzic, Class Actions in Canada: The Promise and Reality of Access to Justice (UBC Press, 2018) at 115, DOI: https://doi.org/10.59962/9780774837903.

339. Ibid at 95-96; S Arthur Spiegel, “Settling Class Actions” (1994) 62 U Cin L Rev 1565 at 1570, 1579; Vince Morabito, “Judicial Supervision of Individual Settlements with Class Members in Australia, Canada, and the United States” (2003) 38 Tex Intl LJ 663 at 679, DOI: https://doi.org/10.29173/alr1327.

340. D Theodore Rave, “When Peace Is Not the Goal of a Class Action Settlement” (2016) 50 Ga L Rev 475 at 483-84.

341. Erichson & Leib, supra note 337 at 79 (noting that courts conceptualize settlement agreements as a compromise).

342. See Skolnik, “Criminal Justice Remedies,” supra note 163 at 608. In Quebec, three class action lawsuits for racial profiling are currently before the courts. See Ligue des Noirs du Québec, supra note 175; Ligue des Noirs du Québec et Gregory Luzincourt c Procureur Général du Québec (11 November 2022), Montreal, QCCS 500-06-001206-222 (application for authorization to institute a class action); Papa Ndianko Gueye c Ville de Longueuil et Ville de Repentigny et Ville de Laval et Ville de Blainville et Ville de Québec et Ville de Gatineau et Ville de Montréal et Ville de Terrebonne et Procureur général du Québec (9 November 2022), Montreal, QCCS 500-06-001205-224 (application for authorization to institute a class action).

343. See e.g. Brazeau v Canada (Attorney General), 2023 ONSC 7240 [Brazeau]; Francis v Ontario, 2021 ONCA 197 [Francis]; Good 2016, supra note 336 at paras 38-39, 87; Carrier c Attorney General of Québec, 2022 QCCA 77 [Carrier]; Picard c Ville de Gatineau, 2024 QCCS 4897. For an overview of the recent rise of class action lawsuits, see Allan Cocunato, “And (Judicially Economical) Justice for All: The Case for Class Proceedings as the Preferable Procedure in Mass Claims for Charter Damages” (2019) 14 Can Class Action Rev 339 at 348-49.

344. See e.g. Brazeau, supra note 343; Francis, supra note 343; Lisa Kerr, “The End Stage of Solitary Confinement” (2019) 55 CR (7th) 382 at 392-93.

345. Carrier, supra note 343.

346. Good 2020, supra note 32; Wendy Gillis & Jim Rankin, “Toronto Police Board Agrees to $16.5 Million Settlement over Mass Arrests at 2010 G20 Summit,” Toronto Star (17 August 2020), online: www.thestar.com/news/gta/toronto-police-board-agrees-to-16-5-million-settlement-over-mass-arrests-at-2010-g20/article_3242127e-c07a-54c1-8197-f25c9f3f3328.html [perma.cc/SZZ6-RZ5X].

347. 2013 ONSC 3026.

348. Good 2016, supra note 336. For an overview of the issues and procedural history, see Elizabeth Emery, “A Wrench in the Social Justice Toolbox: Assessing the Constitutional Class Action as a Tool for Addressing Racial Discrimination” (2021) 17 Can Class Action Rev 159 at 177-79.

349. Good 2020, supra note 32 at para 22.

350. Ibid at para 29.

351. Ibid at para 4.

352. See Ayesha Bell Hardaway, “Time Is Not on Our Side: Why Specious Claims of Collective Bargaining Rights Should Not Be Allowed to Delay Police Reform Efforts” (2019) 15 Stan J CR-CL 137 at 159, 162; Joshua Chanin, “On the Implementation of Pattern or Practice Police Reform” (2014) 15 Criminology, Crim Just, L & Soc’y 38 at 39-40. Note that these settlement agreements tend to be imposed pursuant to DOJ Pattern-or-Practice Investigations under the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute, 42 USC §14141.

353. Stephen Rushin, “Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments” (2015) 99 Minn L Rev 1343 at 1378-87.

354. Ibid.

355. Supra note 7.

356. Supra note 78 at para 76.

357. Ibid.

358. Sharma, supra note 180 at para 28.

359. Ibid.

360. On the distinction between s 2(a) and s 15 under the Charter, see Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, “Religious Freedom and Equality Concerns under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2001) 34 Can J Pol Sci 85, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423901777827; Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 15-18.

361. See e.g. Jennifer Koshan, “Redressing the Harms of Government (In)Action: A Section 7 Versus Section 15 Charter Showdown” (2013) 22 Const Forum Const 31, DOI: https://doi.org/10.21991/C9D962; C Tess Sheldon, Karen R Spector & Mercedes Perez, “Re-Centering Equality: The Interplay between Sections 7 and 15 of the Charter in Challenges to Psychiatric Detention” (2016) 35 NJCL 193; Timothy Zick, “The Dynamic Relationship Between Freedom of Speech and Equality ” (2016) 12 Duke J Constitutional L & Pub Pol’y 13, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2705509.