The Enduring Significance of Nuanced Ideological Voting in the Supreme Court of Canada

Authors

C. L. Ostberg, University of the Pacific
Matthew E. Wetstein, Cabrillo College

Document Type

Article

Abstract

THE CHARTER REVOLUTION IN CANADA has ushered in a new era of politics on the Supreme Court of Canada that places the Court at the centre of controversial policy questions that are fundamental to a democratic society. Through its early Charter rulings, the Court advanced a host of rights and liberties claims resulting in the charge that it had become far more activist. This shift exemplifies a broader pattern occurring across high courts around the world in the late twentieth century that some scholars describe as the growing judicialization of politics. The Court’s increased role in reviewing government policy has led to greater scrutiny and broader discussion of what influences Canadian justices when they resolve disputes. It is our contention that courts function as both legal and political institutions and, as such, justices necessarily consider a variety of factors, consciously and instinctively, when handing down rulings. Obviously, justices adhere to precedents, statutory norms, and legal principles when handing down rulings, and in the more mundane cases, unanimity is relatively easy to achieve. Justices also pay attention to collegiality and other governmental institutions in their effort to hand down good law. Yet, one of the central discussions of the judicialization of politics in Canada is the degree to which the activism documented in the early Charter period aligns with ideological divisions in the Court, and if so, whether said activism aligns with ideological divisions across a much longer time frame of analysis.

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Citation Information

Ostberg, C. L. and Wetstein, Matthew E.. "The Enduring Significance of Nuanced Ideological Voting in the Supreme Court of Canada." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 61.3 (2025) :
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.4070
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol61/iss3/6

References

1 CL Ostberg is Professor of Political Science at University of the Pacific in Stockton, California. Matthew E Wetstein is President of Cabrillo College in Aptos, California.

2 See FL Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Broadview, 2000); Carl Baar, “Judicial Activism in Canada” in Kenneth M Holland, ed, Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective (Macmillan, 1991) at 53; Christopher P Manfredi, “Adjudication, Policy-Making and the Supreme Court of Canada: Lessons from the Experience of the United States” (1989) 22 Can J Political Science 313; Peter H Russell, “Canadian Constraints on Judicialization from Without” in C Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder, eds, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York University Press, 1995) 137; Ian Greene & Peter McCormick, Judges and Judging: Inside the Canadian Judicial System (James Lorimer & Company, 1990).

3 See C Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York University Press, 1995); Mark Tushnet, “Judicial Review of Legislation” in Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2005) 166, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199248179.013.0009; Kenneth M Holland, “Judicial Activism in Western Europe” in Stuart Nagel, ed, Handbook of Global Legal Policy (Routledge, 2000) 179, DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429272745-11.

4 Interviews with the justices indicate that they are uncomfortable being characterized as ideological. They instead emphasize the legal reasoning that takes place in their work and their desire to write good law. See Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-making in Canada’s Courts of Appeal (James Lorimer & Company, 1998) at 128-29; Donald R Songer et al, Law, Ideology, and Collegiality: Judicial Behaviour in the Supreme Court of Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012) at 9, 46; Emmett MacFarlane, Governing from the Bench: The Supreme Court and the Judicial Role (UBC Press, 2013) at 56-62.

5 See C Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong, “Decision Making in the Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the Personal Attributes Model across Nations” (1989) 51 J Politics 557, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2131540; CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of Canada (UBC Press, 2007) [Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making]; Donald R Songer & Susan W Johnson, “Judicial Decision Making in the Supreme Court of Canada: Updating the Personal Attribute Model” (2007) 40 Can J Political Science 911, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423907071156; see generally Peter McCormick, Supreme At Last: The Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada (James Lorimer & Company Ltd, 2000); Peter McCormick, “Birds of a Feather: Alliances and Influences on the Lamer Court 1990–1997” (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall LJ 339, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1565.

6 Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 69-73; see also Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

7 See Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 5; Songer et al, supra note 4; Matthew E Wetstein et al, “Ideological Consistency and Attitudinal Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the US and Canadian Supreme Courts” (2009) 42 Comp Political Studies 763, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008329897.

8 See Sidney R Peck, “A Behavioural Approach to the Judicial Process: Scalogram Analysis” (1967) 5 Osgoode Hall LJ 1, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.2402 [Peck, “Behavioural Approach”]; Sidney R Peck, “The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958–1966: A Search for Policy through Scalogram Analysis” (1967) 45 Can Bar Rev 666 [Peck, “Scalogram Analysis”]; Donald E Fouts, “Policy-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-1960” in Glendon Schubert & David J Danelski, eds, Comparative Judicial Behaviour, Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making in the East and West (Oxford University Press, 1969) at 257. For criticism of their work, compare Ian Bushnell, The Captive Court: A Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992); Philip Slayton, “A Critical Comment on Scalogram Analysis of Supreme Court of Canada Cases” (1971) 21 UTLJ 393, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/824942.

9 See Morton & Knopff, supra note 2; Christopher P Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism, 1st ed (Oxford University Press, 1993) [Manfredi, Judicial Power]; see also Christopher P Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2001); Ian Brodie, Friends of the Court: The Privileging of Interest Group Litigants in Canada (SUNY Press, 2002).

10 This version of judicial behaviour is commonly called the “law school model.” For examples of this depiction, see Lief H Carter & Thomas F Burke, Reason in Law, 9th ed (The University of Chicago Press, 2016) at 16-21; Tracey E George & Lee Epstein, “On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making” (1992) 86 Am Political Science Rev 323 at 324, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1964223; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 2nd ed (Harvard University Press, 1986) at 8-10; Manfredi, Judicial Power, ibid at 164; Songer et al, supra note 4 at 46-47; CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, Value Change in the Supreme Court of Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2017) at 4-5 [Ostberg & Wetstein, Value Change].

11 See MacFarlane, supra note 4.

12 See Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 75, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1612; James B Kelly, Governing with the Charter: Legislative and Judicial Activism and Framers’ Intent (UBC Press, 2005); Christopher P Manfredi & James B Kelly, “Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 513, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1520.

13 See Troy Riddell, Lori Hausegger & Matthew Hennigar, “Evaluating Federally Appointed Judges in Canada: Analyzing the Controversy” (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 403, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1025.

14 Kent Roach, “The Myths of Judicial Activism” (2001) 14 SCLR 297 at 312, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1016. This notion of creative discretion also appears in the work of Hausegger & Riddell and their examination of judicial behaviour in Canadian appellate courts. While unanimity is ubiquitous in these courts, surveys of the judges did acknowledge that they will “reason differently due to their backgrounds and experiences.” See Lori Hausegger & Troy Riddell, “Judges on Judging in Canadian Appellate Courts: The Role of Legal and Extra-Legal Factors in Decision-Making” (2020) 52 Ottawa L Rev 3 at 26.

15 Peter J McCormick, The End of the Charter Revolution: Looking Back from the New Normal (University of Toronto Press, 2015) at 242.

16 Ibid.

17 See e.g. Peck, “Behavioural Approach,” supra note 8; Peck, “Scalogram Analysis,” supra note 8; Fouts, supra note 8; Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 5; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Should They All Just Get Along? Judicial Ideology, Collegiality and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 58 UNBLJ 73; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 1, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1161 [Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference”]; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Charter Decisions in the McLachlin Era: Consensus and Ideology at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 SCLR 475, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1185 [Alarie & Green, “Charter Decisions”]; Lori Hausegger, Matthew Hennigar & Troy Riddell, Canadian Courts: Law, Politics and Process (Oxford University Press, 2009) [Hausegger, Hennigar & Riddell, Canadian Courts]; Songer & Johnson, supra note 5; Donald R Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical Examination (University of Toronto Press, 2008), DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442689473; CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, “Dimensions of Attitudes Underlying Search and Seizure Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada” (1998) 31 Can J Political Science 767, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S000842390000963X [Ostberg & Wetstein, “Dimensions of Attitudes”].

18 Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 5 at 913.

19 See Ostberg & Wetstein, “Dimensions of Attitudes,” supra note 17; see also CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, “Search and Seizure Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada: Extending an American Model of Judicial Decision Making across Countries” (1999) 80 Soc Science Q 757 at 770: “[L]iberal justices are more likely to side with the individual in search and seizure cases than their conservative counterparts, even when controlling for other variables.”

20 CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, “The Canadian Supreme Court: Attitudinal Conflict in Right to Counsel Cases” (2006) 121 Political Science Q 677 at 692, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2006.tb00586.x.

21 Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green “The Reasonable Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Frank Iacobucci’s Career on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 57 UTLJ 195 at 225, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/tlj.2007.0004 [Alarie & Green, “Reasonable Justice”].

22 See Songer et al, supra note 4. See also Songer & Johnson, supra note 5.

23 Alarie & Green, “Charter Decisions,” supra note 17 at 500-01.

24 Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada: Accuracy, Affiliation and Acceptance” (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ 381 at 408, DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1086.

25 See Hausegger, Hennigar & Riddell, Canadian Courts, supra note 17; Jacob S Ziegel, “Merit Selection and Democratization of Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada,” in Paul Howe & Peter H Russell, eds, Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) 131, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9780773568891-017.

26 John Paul Tasker, “Justin Trudeau outlines selection process for new Supreme Court justices,” CBC (2 August 2016), online: www.cbc.ca/news/politics/supreme-court-canada-justices-selection-1.3703779 [perma.cc/MY44-7QWB]; Lorne Sossin, “The puzzle of independence and parliamentary democracy in the common law world: a Canadian perspective” in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L Lindseth & Blake Emerson, eds, Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 159, DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781784718671.00018.

27 See Hausegger et al, “Exploring the Links between Party and Appointment: Canadian Federal Judicial Appointments from 1989 to 2003” (2010) 43 Can J Political Science 633, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423910000648.

28 See Lori Hausegger, Matthew Hennigar & Troy Riddell, “Does Patronage Matter? Connecting Influences on Judicial Appointments with Judicial Decision Making” (2013) 46 Can J Political Science 665 at 678-80, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423913000681 [Hausegger, Hennigar & Riddell, “Patronage”].

29 See Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 5 at 144-49.

30 See generally The Globe and Mail, “No sign of a hidden agenda” (9 September 2008), online: www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/no-sign-of-a-hidden-agenda/article25581680; Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference,” supra note 17.

31 See Susan W Johnson, “Stability and Change: Policy Evolution on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1945-2005” (2019) 52 Can J Political Science 343 at 358, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423918000732.

32 See C Neal Tate, “Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of US Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economic Decisions, 1946–1978,” (1981) 75 Am Political Science Rev 355, DOI: https://doi-org/10.2307/1961370; Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 5.

33 See S Sidney Ulmer, “Are Social Background Models Time-Bound?” (1986) 80 Am Political 957, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1960547.

34 See Ostberg & Wetstein, Value Change, supra note 10.

35 See Songer & Johnson, supra note 5; Songer et al, supra note 4 at 146-51; Susan W Johnson & Ali S Masood, “Trailblazer women in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2023) 11 Politics, Groups & Identities 226, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2021.1946098; Susan W Johnson & Rebecca A Reid, “Speaking Up: Women and Dissenting Behavior in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2020) 41 Justice System J 191, DOI: https://10.1080/0098261X.2020.1768185; Susan W Johnson, “Family Matters: Justice Gender and Female Litigant Success in Family Law Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2017) 38 Justice System J 332, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2017.1296387; Evan Rosevear & Andrew McDougall, “Cut to the Chase Counsellor: Judicial Writing at the Supreme Court of Canada 1970-2015” (Paper delivered at the Canadian Political Science Association, Regina, 31 May 2018) [unpublished], online: www.cpsa-acsp.ca/documents/conference/2018/856.McDougall.Rosevear.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PRN-MVX6].

36 Kirk Makin, “The coming conservative court,” The Globe and Mail (14 May 2011) A3.

37 Lawrence Martin, “The making of the Harper court,” The Globe and Mail (15 October 2013) A15.

38 Lorne Sossin, “Picking judges injudiciously,” The Globe and Mail (18 October 2011) A15.

39 The Globe and Mail, “Prime Minister Harper should keep gender balance in mind for the Supreme Court” (2 October 2012), online: www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/prime-minister-harper-should-keep-gender-balance-in-mind-for-the-supreme-court/article4583073.

40 The Globe and Mail, “No sign of a hidden agenda” (9 September 2008), online: www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/no-sign-of-a-hidden-agenda/article25581680.

41 Sean Fine, “Trudeau waffles on approach to appointing Supreme Court judge,” The Globe and Mail (27 September 2016), online: www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/trudeau-waffles-on-approach-to-appointing-supreme-court-judge/article32094612.

42 We omit Justices de Grandpré (1974) and Pratte (1977) from our analysis because of their brief tenure on the Court in the 1970s and the lack of newspaper coverage of their nominations. Although neither Chief Justice Dickson nor Justice Beetz had ideological commentary surrounding their appointments, their long service on the Court, and the fact that Chief Justice Dickson was a prominent figure on the court for seventeen years merits their inclusion in the data set.

43 See Jeffrey A Segal & Albert D Cover, “Ideological Values and Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices” (1989) 83 Am Political Science Rev 557, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1962405; Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 5.

44 For discussion of their measures, see Alarie & Green, “Reasonable Justice,” supra note 21 at 205-15.

45 For a complete description of the approach, see Ostberg & Wetstein, Value Change, supra note 10 at 56. See also Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 5 at 49-58; Songer et al, supra note 4 at 121-22.

46 Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 5 at 53.

47 Although Justice Brown had the highest conservative score across all cases, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé had a more negative score for criminal ideology (-2.000), but we calculated two scores for her given her divergent views in cases outside the criminal area (score = +1.320).

48 We have thirty-seven total justices scored on the ideological scale, with two of the justices (L’Heureux-Dubé and Charron) receiving separate scores for their approach to criminal and civil rights and liberties cases, given their noticeably divergent views in each of these areas.

49 Those justices include Justices LaForest, L’Heureux-Dubé, Cory, McLachlin, Stevenson, and Sopinka.

50 Our findings align well with prior work that examines party linkages with appointments to the lower courts. See Hausegger, Hennigar & Riddell, Canadian Courts, supra note 17 at 152. For a somewhat contrary view, see Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference,” supra note 17.

51 Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44.

52 Alarie & Green as cited in Tonda MacCharles, “Top court to name judges on short list,” Toronto Star, 22 September 2011, A31; see also Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference,” supra note 17.

53 See Donald R Songer & Julia Siripurapu, “The Unanimous Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada as a Test of the Attitudinal Model” (2009) 42 Can J Political Science 65, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423909090039. Readers should note that the selection of non-unanimous cases misses a large swath of cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. Data from our own analysis of cases and that of Songer & Siripurapu suggest that in any given year, the percentage of cases decided unanimously can run from around 60% to 85%. Even so, we focus on non-unanimous decisions because we are interested in the factors that drive division within the court.

54 For discussion of the logistic regression approach to dichotomous dependent variables, see John H Aldrich and Forrest D Nelson, Linear Probability, Logit and Probit Models (SAGE Publications, Inc, 1984), DOI: https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412984744.

55 See Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 5; Songer & Johnson, supra note 5; Songer et al, supra note 4 at 135-52.

56 See Johnson & Masood, supra note 35, who make the judicial empathy case about female justices most explicitly. See also Hausegger, Hennigar & Riddell, “Patronage,” supra note 28; CL Ostberg, Matthew E Wetstein & Craig R Ducat, “Attitudinal Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision Making in Canada: The Lamer Court, 1991–1995” (2002) 55 Pol Research Q 235 at 244-45, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290205500110; Ostberg & Wetstein, Value Change, supra note 10 at 141, 195; Johnson, supra note 35; Johnson & Reid, supra note 35; Rosevear & McDougall, supra note 35.

57 Songer et al, supra note 4 at 149. Female justices are “less than half as likely as a male to support a criminal defendant” when controlling for party, region, and religion.

58 Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-making in Canadian Courts of Appeal (James Lorimer & Company Ltd, 1998) at 33; Songer et al, supra note 4 at 142.

59 Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 5 at 912-13, indicate that for justices serving between 1949 and 1985, Catholicism had a liberalizing influence in civil rights and liberties cases and in criminal disputes. Songer & Johnson, supra note 5 at 927, found that Catholicism had a positive liberalizing impact only in criminal cases for justices on the Court between 1987 and 2000.

60 Although the new appointment process established in 2016 by Prime Minister Trudeau stated new applicants could apply from across the country, the fact that he replaced Justice Cromwell with Justice Rowe (both from the East), indicates that for now the informal regional norm remains intact.

61 Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 5 at 911; Songer et al, supra note 4 at 141-42, 147-150.

62 Ibid.

63 To calculate the proportional reduction in error (PRE) we modelled our calculation after prior work by Timothy M Hagle and Harold J Spaeth, “The Emergence of a New Ideology: The Business Decisions of the Burger Court” (1992) 54 J Politics 120 at 126, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2131646. The PRE measure is calculated by taking the improvement over the modal guessing strategy (in this case 58.0 – 50.3 = 7.7) and dividing that by the amount of variance that exists between the modal guessing strategy and 100% (100 – 50.3 = 49.7). The result is 15.5% reduction in error.

64 Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 5 at 911, found that non-Quebec Catholics were most liberal on civil rights and liberties and economic cases, implying that other regional appointees tended to be more conservative in the cases they analyzed (1949-1985). Meanwhile, Songer & Johnson, supra note 5, obtained results more in line with the ones reported in this study.

65 See Songer et al, supra note 4 at 142, for the role of Catholicism in driving more conservative votes in civil rights and liberties cases and those involving criminal defendants. Note that these religious findings diverge from earlier work by Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 5.

66 Ibid; Hausegger, Hennigar & Riddell, “Patronage,” supra note 28 at 678, 682; Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 5 at 133-34, 138-39; Ostberg & Wetstein, Value Change, supra note 10 at 225-26; Johnson & Masood, supra note 35 (see the appendix for results).

67 Songer & Johnson, supra note 5 at 928. They found only a slight negative coefficient for their Catholic indicator when analyzing civil rights and liberties disputes between 1978-2000. See also Songer et al, supra note 4 at 150. Our indicator suggests a much stronger negative relationship has taken hold when looking across a broader swath of civil rights and liberties cases and justices (1973-2019).

68 Songer et al, supra note 4 at 150.

69 Songer & Johnson, supra note 5 at 928, indicate that Party of Prime Minister was not a significant predictor of pro-defendant voting. Our measurement of ideology does, however, parallel earlier results, finding a link between Liberal Party appointees and pro-defendant voting in Songer et al, supra note 4 at 147. We believe our five-point scale of ideology captures more variation across the justices and therefore serves as a better gauge of ideological leanings.

70 Songer et al, supra note 4 at 149. This finding also aligns with the judicial empathy argument advanced by Johnson & Masood, supra note 35, to the extent that female justices appear to have greater empathy for victims of crime than their male counterparts.

71 Songer et al, supra note 4 at 148.

72 Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 5 at 186-87.

73 See Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 5.

74 See Ostberg & Wetstein, Value Change, supra note 10.

75 See David L Weiden, (2011) “Judicial Politicization, Ideology, and Activism at the High Courts of the United States, Canada, and Australia” 64 Politics Research Q 335, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912909352775.