How to Design a Program for the Poor that is Not a Poor Program: Explaining the Political Sustainability of the Guaranteed Income Supplement

Authors

Daniel Béland, McGill University
Patrik Marier, Concordia University

Document Type

Article

Abstract

Created in 1967 as a temporary program aimed at supporting low-income people during the maturation of the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans, the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) has since become a permanent policy that remains a central component of Canada’s multi-layered public pension system. In this article, we explain why GIS is a popular and politically successful program that challenges the common wisdom in political science and policy analysis that “programs for the poor are poor programs.” The article shows that the success of GIS stems from its policy design (e.g., income-tested rather than means-tested benefits), the social construction of its target population (older people), and the vested interests that the program has created over time through self-reinforcing feedback effects with its constituencies. We show how the combination of these factors generated a strong consensus around GIS while not only legitimizing its survival but promoting its expansion over time. The article draws clear lessons about how we can learn from GIS to design more effective and politically sustainable social assistance programs for vulnerable populations, including people with disabilities in light of the debate over Bill C-22, the Canada Disability Benefit Act (CDBA).

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Citation Information

Béland, Daniel and Marier, Patrik. "How to Design a Program for the Poor that is Not a Poor Program: Explaining the Political Sustainability of the Guaranteed Income Supplement." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 61.2 (2024) : 419-440.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.4019
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol61/iss2/5

References

1 Daniel Béland is the Director of the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada and James McGill Professor in the Department of Political Science at McGill University. Patrik Marier is Professor of Political Science at Concordia University and Scientific Director of the Centre for Research and Expertise in Social Gerontology (CREGÉS). The authors thank Ally Hays-Alberstat, Jinyan Li, and the reviewers for their suggestions.

2 For a critical review, see Christopher Howard, The Welfare State Nobody Knows: Debunking Myths About U.S. Social Policy (Princeton University Press, 2007), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691235226.

3 See Daniel Béland, What is Social Policy? Understanding the Welfare State (Polity Press, 2010).

4 See Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Polity Press, 1990), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/095892879100100108; John Myles, “How to Design a ‘Liberal’ Welfare State: A Comparison of Canada and the United States” (1998) 32 Soc Pol’y & Admin 341, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9515.00120 [Myles, “Liberal Welfare”].

5 See Robert Castel, From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers: Transformation of the Social Question (Routledge, 2017); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 2nd ed (Beacon Press, 2001).

6 Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, “Contract Versus Charity: Why Is There No Social Citizenship in the United States?” (1992) 22 Socialist Rev 45; Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, “‘Dependency’ Demystified: Inscriptions of Power in a Keyword of the Welfare State” (1994) 1 Soc Politics 4, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/1.1.4.

7 See Béland, supra note 3.

8 See Brian Steensland, The Failed Welfare Revolution: America’s Struggle Over Guaranteed Income Policy (Princeton University Press, 2008).

9 See Howard, supra note 2 at 6.

10 See Béland, supra note 3.

11 See John Myles, The Maturation of Canada’s Retirement Income System: Income Levels, Income Inequality and Low-Income among the Elderly (Statistics Canada and Florida State University, 2000), DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.229486.

12 See Gregg M Olsen, Poverty and Austerity Amid Prosperity: A Comparative Introduction (University of Toronto Press, 2021) note 19 at 134; Myles, “Liberal Welfare,” supra note 4.

13 See “Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy” (1993) 87 Am Political Science Rev 334, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2939044.

14 Ibid at 334.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid at 336.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 For policy feedback literature, see Daniel Béland, Andrea Louise Campbell & R Kent Weaver, Policy Feedback: How Policies Shape Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2022), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108938914; Daniel Béland & Edella Schlager, “Varieties of Policy Feedback Research: Looking Backward, Moving Forward” (2019) 47 Pol’y Studies J 184, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12340; Andrea Louise Campbell, How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare State (Princeton University Press, 2003), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400841318; Jacob S Hacker & Paul Pierson, “Policy Feedback in an Age of Polarization” (2019) 685 Annals Am Academy Political & Soc Science 8, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716219871222; Suzanne Mettler & Mallory Sorelle, “Policy Feedback Theory” in Paul A Sabatier & Christopher M Weible, eds, Theories of the Policy Process (Westview Press, 2018) 103 at 103-34, DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429494284-4; Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment (Cambridge University Press, 1994), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511805288 [Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State?]; Paul Pierson, “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change” (1993) 45 World Politics 595, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2950710.

20 See “When Policies Undo Themselves: Self-Undermining Feedback as a Source of Policy Change” (2015) 28 Governance 441, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12101.

21 See Campbell, supra note 19 at 8-10.

22 For a broader discussion of the relationship between federalism and policy feedback, see Daniel Béland & André Lecours, “Ideas, Federalism and Policy Feedback: An Institutionalist Approach” (2023) 11 Territory, Politics, Governance 377, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2020.1837225.

23 See Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State?, supra note 19 at 13.

24 See Béland and Schlager, supra note 19 at 193.

25 See Howard, supra note 2 at 92.

26 See Daniel Béland & Patrik Marier, “The Magic Is in the Mix: How the Guaranteed Income Supplement and Old Age Security Interact in Canada’s Pension System to Tackle Successfully Poverty in Old Age” in Evert Lindquist et al, eds, Policy Success in Canada: Cases, Lessons, Challenges (Oxford University Press, 2022) 206 at 206, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192897046.003.0011.

27 See Keith Banting, “Canada: Nation-Building in a Federal Welfare State” in Herbert Obinger, Stephan Leibfried & Frank G Castles, eds, Federalism and the Welfare State: New World and European Experiences (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 89, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491856.005; Kenneth Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1974).

28 See Daniel Béland & John Myles, “Stasis Amidst Change: Canadian Pension Reform in an Age of Retrenchment” in Giuliano Bonoli & Toshimitsu Shinkawa, eds, Ageing and Pension Reform Around the World: Evidence from Eleven Countries (Edward Elgar, 2005) 252 at 255, DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781845423377.00019.

29 Government of Canada, Old Age Security: Do You Qualify (April 2022), online: [perma.cc/525L-RQE4].

30 Government of Canada, The Old Age Security Program Toolkit (April 2022), online: [perma.cc/5GEB-UYCQ].

31 See Ken Battle, “Pension Reform in Canada” (1997) 16 Can J on Aging 519, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0714980800008771.

32 See Banting, supra note 27 at 108-11.

33 See Béland & Myles, supra note 28.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 See Daniel Béland & R Kent Weaver, “Federalism and the Politics of the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans” (2019) 35 J Intl & Comp Soc Pol’y 25 at 35-37, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/21699763.2018.1526698.

37 See Béland & Marier, supra note 26 at 214; Dennis Guest, “Old-Age Pension” (7 February 2006), online: www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/old-age-pension [perma.cc/W8BZ-77TP].

38 See Béland & Myles, supra note 28.

39 Government of Canada, Guaranteed Income Supplement: How Much You Could Receive (5 October 2023), online: [perma.cc/A6NG-3TRH].

40 See e.g., Maclean’s, “2021 Election Platform Guide” (July 2021), online: [perma.cc/83CH-25LH].

41 See Ross Finnie, David Gray & Yan Zhang, “Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) Status Amongst the Retired Population: An Analysis of the Incidence” (2013) 39 Can Pub Pol’y S65 at S72, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/CPP.39.Supplement1.S65 [Finnie, Gray & Zhang, “(GIS) Status Amongst”].

42 See Employment and Social Development Canada, Evaluation of the Guaranteed Income Supplement – Phase I Summary Report (ESDC, 2019) at 4, online: [perma.cc/TTM9-B4ZV].

43 See Ross Finnie, David Gray & Yan Zhang, “A Longitudinal Analysis of GIS Entries and Exits” (2016) 42 Can Pub Pol’y 287, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.2015-077 [Finnie, Gray & Zhang, “Longitudinal Analysis”].

44 See Esping-Andersen, supra note 4. For a study on the paradox of redistribution, see Walter Korpi & Joakim Palme, “The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in Western Countries” (1998) 63 Am Sociological Rev 611, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2657333.

45 See Kevin Milligan & Tammy Schirle, “The Pressing Question: Does CPP Expansion Help Low Earners?” (July 2016) CD Howe Institute 1, online: [perma.cc/RQK9-NVG2], DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2812229.

46 See Patrik Marier, The Four Lenses of Population Aging: Planning for the Future in Canada’s Provinces (University of Toronto Press, 2021) at 101-31, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442699816.

47 Statistics Canada, “Pensions Plans in Canada as of January 1, 2020” (November 2020), online: [https://perma.cc/SY55-98WG].

48 See OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2019 (Paris: OECD, 2019) at 135, online: [perma.cc/G4BW-TJE8].

49 See Mayssun El-Attar & Raquel Fonseca, “Public Pensions and Low-Income Dynamics in Canada” (2022) 22 J Pension Econs & Finance 238, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474747221000433.

50 See Béland & Marier, supra note 26 at 218-20.

51 See generally, Pamela Herd & Donald P Moynihan, Administrative Burden: Policymaking by Other Means (Russell Sage Foundation, 2018).

52 As an illustration, up to a third of entitled pensioners in the United Kingdom do not claim means-tested pension benefits due to stigmas around receiving benefits. See Ruth Hancock et al, “The Take-Up of Multiple Means-Tested Benefits by British Pensioners: Evidence from the Family Resources Survey” (2004) 25 Fiscal Studies 279, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2004.tb00540.x.

53 For a broader discussion on the means-test in pension policy and its implications, see Esping-Andersen, supra note 4.

54 Government of Canada, Old Age Security: How Much You Could Receive (30 October 2022), online: [perma.cc/XDB4-YY38].

55 See John Myles, “Income Security for Seniors: System Maintenance and Policy Drift” in Keith Banting & John Myles, eds, Inequality and the Fading of Redistributive Politics (UBC Press, 2013) 312 at 313, DOI: https://doi.org/10.59962/9780774826013-015.

56 See Employment and Social Development Canada, Take-up Rate of the Guaranteed Income Supplement: findings from tax and program administrative data (ESDC, 2018) at 13, online: [perma.cc/274E-JW9J].

57 See supra note 39.

58 See supra note 56 at 20.

59 See supra note 42 at 5.

60 Ibid; Employment and Social Development Canada, Evaluation of the Guaranteed Income Supplement – Phase II (Ottawa: ESDC, 2020), online: [perma.cc/G5UW-XE5M].

61 See supra note 42 at 16, 18.

62 See supra note 42 at 33.

63 See Patrik Marier & Anne-Marie Séguin, “Aging and Social Assistance in the Provinces” in Daniel Béland & Pierre-Marc Daigneault, eds, Welfare Reform in Canada: Provincial Social Assistance in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2015) 339, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442609730-023.

64 See Patrik Marier et al, “Recognizing Precarity? A Comparative Analysis of Governmental Documents in Provincial and Federal Administrations” (2022) 65 Can Pub Administration 278, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/capa.12457.

65 Ibid.

66 See Keith G Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism, 2nd (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9780773580732.

67 See Bryden, supra note 27 at 152-62.

68 See Béland & Myles, supra note 28 at 261.

69 See Schneider & Ingram, supra note 13.

70 See supra note 42 at 7.

71 See supra note 42 at 11.

72 Government of Canada, Gender-based analysis plus (March 2021), online: [perma.cc/2K5F-Z7YP].

73 See supra note 41 at S76.

74 See Patrik Marier & Suzanne Skinner, “The Impact of Gender and Immigration on Pension Outcomes in Canada” (2008) 34 Can Pub Pol’y 59 (1), DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.34.Supplement.S59; Ibid.

75 See Myles, supra note 11; Kevin Milligan, “The Evolution of Elderly Poverty in Canada” (2008) 34 Can Pub Pol’y 79 (1), DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.34.Supplement.S79; Régie des rentes du Québec (Direction de l’évaluation et de la révision), Évaluation du système québécois de sécurité financière à la retraite par rapport à celui d’autres pays industrialisés (Régie des rentes du Québec, 2004).

76 See supra note 42 at 11.

77 See supra note 48 at 187.

78 See “Régie des rentes du Québec, 2004” supra note 75 at 74.

79 See Finnie, Gray & Zhang, “Longitudinal Analysis,” supra note 43.

80 See Marier & Skinner, supra note 74.

81 Derek Hum & Wayne Simpson, “The Declining Retirement Prospects of Immigrant Men” (2010) 36 Can Pub Pol’y 287, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.36.3.287.

82 See Marier & Skinner, supra note 74.

83 See Edward A Koning & Keith G Banting, “Inequality below the Surface: Reviewing Immigrants’ Access to and Utilization of Five Canadian Welfare Programs” (2013) 39 Can Pub Pol’y 581 at 586.

84 See Lisa Kaida & Monica Boyd, “Poverty Variations Among the Elderly: The Roles of Income Security Policies and Family Co-Residence” (2011) 30 Can J on Aging 83 at 96, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0714980810000814; Josh Curtis et al, “Race, Language, or Length of Residency? Explaining Unequal Uptake of Government Pensions in Canada” (2017) 29 J of Aging & Soc Pol’y 332 at 334, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/08959420.2017.1319452.

85 See Marier & Skinner, supra note 74 at 68, 72.

86 Kaida & Boyd, supra note 84 at 91.

87 See generally Josh Curtis & Julie McMullin, “Dynamics of Retirement Income Inequality in Canada, 1991-2011” (2019) 12 J Population Ageing 51, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12062-018-9219-5; Tammy Schirle, “Senior Poverty in Canada: A Decomposition Analysis” (2013) 39 Can Pub Pol’y 517, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/CPP.39.4.517.

88 See Schneider & Ingram, supra note 13.

89 Ibid at 336.

90 See Julie Smart, “Models of Disability: The Juxtaposition of Biology and Social Construction” in TF Riggar & Dennis R Maki, eds, Handbook of Rehabilitation Counseling (Springer, 2004) 25.

91 Jennifer Robson & Lindsay Tedds, “The Canada Disability Benefit: Battling Ableism in Design and Implementation” (2024) 61 Osgoode Hall LJ 577 at 592–93.

92 Ibid at 578.