Stitching the Canada Disability Benefit into the Social Security System: Expectations, Patchworks, and Goals

Authors

Michael J. Prince, University of Victoria

Document Type

Article

Abstract

New public policies stir old expectations and stimulate new expectations among people. For the planned Canada Disability Benefit (CDB), what is possible? What type of policy is at stake for women with disabilities? The CDB symbolizes an official acceptance by the federal government of a national public responsibility to address known risks of low income and poverty among hundreds of thousands of persons with disabilities. In policy content terms, the CDB is redistributive and regulatory. As redistribution, it promises to be a large-scale allocation of public revenues to a broad category of individuals disproportionately living in poverty in Canada. As regulative policy, it will involve the making of rules about applications, eligibility, administration, appeals, compliance, and enforcement, among other matters.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Citation Information

Prince, Michael J.. "Stitching the Canada Disability Benefit into the Social Security System: Expectations, Patchworks, and Goals." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 61.2 (2024) : 609-638.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.4016
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol61/iss2/12

References

1 Lansdowne Professor of Social Policy at the University of Victoria.

2 “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory” (1964) 16 World Politics 677 at 688.

3 The speech opened the second session of the 43rd Parliament of Canada. See Senate, Speech from the Throne, 43-2, No SO1-1 (23 September 2020) (HE Rt. Hon. Julie Payette) online: [perma.cc/4PMR-76CK] [“Speech from the Throne”].

4 The information in this chronology derives from various sources, which are cited in footnotes 3, 6, 7, 8, 21, 33, and 34.

5 See Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Alternative Federal Budget 2023: Rising to the Challenge (CCPA, 2022); Michelle Hewitt, “Publications: The Benefit” (November 2021), online: [perma.cc/66CW-PE7J]; Inclusion Canada, “Canada Disability Benefit: A Vision and Design Outline” (July 2021), online: [perma.cc/VZF2-KWMQ] [“Inclusion Canada, 2021”]; Sally A Kimpson, Basic Income, Gender & Disability (Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund, 2021) [Kimpson, Basic Income]; Michael Prince, “COVID-19, Canadians with disabilities, and the need for major reforms” (23 June 2020), online (blog): [perma.cc/9B4J-ACWS] [Prince, “COVID-19”]; Michael Prince, “Canada Disability Benefit Part 1 – Webinar 2 – What We Want and Need” (12 November 2020), online (video): [perma.cc/JD5H-7TNT]; Sherri Torjman, Primer on a New Disability Income Benefit (Institute for Research and Development on Inclusion and Society, 2020).

6 Canada Disability Benefit Act, SC 2023, c 17 [CDBA].

7 See Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau, “Minister of Employment, Workforce Development and Disability Inclusion Mandate Letter” (16 December 2021), online: [perma.cc/SV63-G3RL> [“Mandate Letter”].

8 See House of Commons Debates, 44-1, vol 151 No 098 (20 September 2022) at 7390, 7429 (Hon. Carla Qualtrough) [“CDBA, Debate”].

9 It is the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities (called HUMA). Ibid at 7440.

10 CDBA, supra note 6, summary.

11 Ibid, preamble.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Regulatory aspects of Bill C-22 are contained in section 6 (on the obligation to provide information), section 7 (on the authority of the Minister to collect and use social insurance numbers of applicants), and section 11, which contains over twenty items on which the Governor in Council (federal cabinet) may make regulations. See CDBA, supra note 6, sections 6, 7, 11.

16 See e.g. CDBA Debate, supra note 8.

17 See James J Rice & Michael J Prince, Changing Politics of Canadian Social Policy (University of Toronto Press, 2013). For determining eligibility and benefit amounts for poverty-relief income programs, means-testing is the oldest method and takes into account material means such as personal possessions, any savings, and the resources of a person’s immediate family. Needs-testing is a characteristic of contemporary social assistance programs across all provinces and territories. It involves assessing a person’s needs and determining the gap between those needs and the ability of the person or household to meet those needs on their own resources. Income testing is a relatively more recent technique and tends to be less intrusive and discretionary in its implementation. In brief, the lower a claimant’s income, the higher the benefit amount they will receive to a specified maximum.

18 Disability supports is an umbrella term that may include access to home care, personal services, aids, devices, and equipment.

19 Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Greenwood Press, 1973) at 96-97.

20 See Catherine Cullen & Alexandra Zabjek, “Federal minister says she’s ‘shocked’ by suggestion of assisted deaths for some babies” (22 October 2022), online: [perma.cc/JL3R-NDF5].

21 Disquieting events included the announcement in the 2021 federal budget that consultations for the CDB could take three years and the snap election then called by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in the summer of 2021, shortly after Minister Qualtrough tabled the bill for the new benefit in the House of Commons. Troubling non-events for activists and advocates included the absence of any mention of the CDB in the 2021 Speech from the Throne or in the 2022 federal budget. See Department of Finance, Budget 2021: A Recovery Plan for Jobs, Growth, and Resilience (Department of Finance, 2021).

22 Of course, over the years policy analysts made recommendations on reforming disability income in Canada. See e.g. Michael Mendelson et al, A Basic Income Plan for Canadians with Severe Disabilities (The Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 2010); Michael Prince, Canadians Need a Medium-Term Sickness/Disability Income Benefit (The Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 2008); Michael Prince, Absent Citizens: Disability Politics and Policy in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2009), DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442687301; Michael Prince, Struggling for Social Citizenship: Income Security, Disabled Canadians, and Prime Ministerial Eras (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9780773598812 [Prince, Struggling for Social Citizenship]; Prince, “COVID-19,” supra note 5; Michael Prince & Yvonne Peters, Disabling Poverty, Enabling Citizenship: Recommendations for Positive Change (Council of Canadians with Disabilities, 2015); Sherri Torjman, Dismantling the Welfare Wall for Persons with Disabilities (Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 2017) [Torjman, Welfare Wall].

23 The April 2024 federal budget announced a roll out date of July 2025 for the first payments. See House of Commons, Budget 2024: Fairness for Every Generation (16 April 2024), online: [perma.cc/K38Z-HTR5].

24 Inclusion Canada, 2021, supra note 5 at 4.

25 In social assistance systems administered by provincial and territorial governments, the so-called welfare programs of last resort, asset test, and work requirements feature for various categories of recipients. Asset testing takes into account cash and savings and other fixed possessions when calculating basic eligibility and the degree of need for income support. For claimants deemed “employable” by welfare rules, work requirements can entail obligations to participate in training and skills development courses, undertake active and regular job search activities, and ideally secure gainful employment. Welfare program officials may enforce these work requirements through soft or hard methods of compliance. See Michael J Prince, “Entrenched Residualism: Social Assistance and People with Disabilities” in Daniel Béland & Pierre-Marc Daigneault, eds, Welfare Reform in Canada: Provincial Social Assistance in Comparative Perspective (University of Toronto Press, 2015) 289, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442609730-020 [Prince, “Entrenched Residualism”]; Rice & Prince, supra note 17.

26 SC 2019, c 29.

27 The market basket measure is the official poverty indicator adopted by the Government of Canada in 2019 under the Poverty Reduction Act. With this measure, Statistics Canada tracks the costs of a range of goods and services for individuals and households across the country. As currently constructed, the market basket measure does take into account additional expense for persons living with disabilities, thus underestimating the full cost of living with a disability in Canada. See Zachary A Morris & Asghar Zaidi, “Estimating the extra costs of disability in European countries: Implications for poverty measurement and disability-related decommodification” (2020) 30 J European Soc Pol’y 339, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928719891317; Craig WM Scott et al, “Disability Considerations for Measuring Poverty in Canada Using the Market Basket Measure” (2022) 163 Soc Indicators Research 389, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-022-02900-1; Statistics Canada, Housing Experiences in Canada: Persons with Disabilities, by Zach Thurston & Jeff Randle, Catalogue No 46-28-0001 (Statistics Canada, 10 June 2022).

28 See CCPA, supra note 5 at 58. The Speech from the Throne of September 2020, supra note 3 at 12, stated: “Women – and in particular low-income women – have been hit hardest by COVID-19. This crisis has been described as a She-cession.”

29 CCPA, supra note 5 at 59.

30 See Inclusion Canada, 2021, supra note 5 at 6.

31 Inclusion Canada, “Bill C-22 Passes Second Reading” online: [perma.cc/YM85-833F].

32 Ibid.

33 See Irelyne Lavery, “Why Bill C-22 will be a ‘life-saver’ for many Canadians amid possible recession” (30 October 2022), online: [perma.cc/KLQ6-MGA2].

34 Speech from the Throne, supra note 3 at 17-18. In October 2022, the federal government released an updated Disability Inclusion Action Plan, now with four pillars of financial security, employment, a modern approach to disability, and accessible and inclusive spaces. For details, see Employment and Social Development Canada, “Government of Canada releases national Disability Inclusion Action Plan” (7 October 2022), online: [perma.cc/39RY-D5LW]. An expectation is that over time, one or more additional pillars could be added to the plan to reflect related priorities. See also Mandate Letter, supra note 7.

35 See Liberal Party of Canada, “Forward: A Real Plan for the Middle Class” (September 2019) at 13-15, online: <2019.liberal.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/292/2019/09/Forward-A-real-plan-for-the-middle-class.pdf> [perma.cc/perma.cc/S974-W6QY]. Notably, the Liberal Party of Canada’s platform for the October 2019 general election had no content pertaining to a new disability income benefit. In that campaign, specific Liberal promises on disability issues were: (1) to help people with disabilities work or attend school, and (2) to double the value of the Child Disability Benefit. At the time of authoring this article (March 2023), the Child Disability Benefit had yet doubled in amount.

36 See Rice & Prince, supra note 17 at 132-34. The Canada Assistance Plan was a federal-provincial cost-sharing agreement enacted in 1966, whereby the federal government funded half the costs of certain social services and income assistance programs delivered by provinces. Persons with disabilities with inadequate levels of subsistence were a major category of recipients of these programs. In 1996, the federal government unilaterally cancelled this agreement replacing it with a reduced block funding arrangement called the Canada Health and Social Transfer.

37 The Canada Pension Plan Disability program (CPPD) is one element of the Canada Pension Plan, enacted in 1966. The CPPD is a federal-provincial income replacement benefit for working-age persons with a severe and prolonged impairment and with a significant attachment to the labour force. The original and still primary goal of the CPPD is to provide a degree of income protection to insured workers that complements private insurance, personal savings, and employment benefit programs. Administered by the federal government, it applies to all provinces except Quebec, which has its own equivalent pension plan. For more details, see Prince, Struggling for Social Citizenship, supra note 22 at 97, 101-102, 106. In 1972, as part of a package of major reforms, up to fifteen weeks of sickness benefits for working Canadians were added to the then Unemployment Insurance program. In December 2022, this benefit was extended to a maximum of twenty-six weeks under the Employment Insurance program.

38 See Prince, Struggling for Social Citizenship, supra note 22 at 41-44, 211-15.

39 There is no universal income program for the large majority of Canadians with disabilities. This is in contrast to the Old Age Security program for seniors and the Canada Child Benefit for families with children.

40 See e.g. Canadian Hemophilia Society, “Compensation Programs for Individuals with HIV or Hepatitis C” (last modified 3 April 2019), online: [perma.cc/6J34-2794].

41 As Band Councils administer these, there are in effect about six hundred programs. For details on the On-Reserve Income Assistance Program, see Government of Canada, “On-reserve Income Assistance program” (last modified 21 May 2024), online: [perma.cc/N2RC-E767].

42 Those for provincial or territorial governments are selective examples and typically not provided by all jurisdictions.

43 See Michael J Prince, “Canadian Federalism and Disability Policy Making” (2001) 34 Can J Political Science 791 at 795, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423901778092 [Prince, “Canadian Federalism”].

44 See Prince, “Entrenched Residualism,” supra note 25 at 290.

45 See John Stapleton & Stephanie Procyk, A patchwork quilt: Income security for Canadians with disabilities (November 2010) at 2, online: Institute for Work and Health [perma.cc/F87Q-2YUM]; John Stapleton & Anne Tweddle, “Disability Income in Canada: 2018-2019” (Lecture, September 2020), online: [perma.cc/M2NE-NTZ6].

46 See Prince, Struggling for Social Citizenship, supra note 22.

47 Most of these tax measures are non-refundable. They reduce the amount of tax payable for someone, but do not create a tax refund. Examples are the Disability Supports Deduction, the Disability Tax Credit, and the Medical Expenses credit. Thus, they are of little or no benefit to people with disabilities living in straitened financial circumstances with no taxable income.

48 See e.g. DisAbled Women’s Network of Canada, “More Than a Footnote: A Research Report on Women and Girls with Disabilities in Canada” (February 2019), online: [perma.cc/EB8E-UE7C] [“DAWN”]; Kimpson, Basic Income, supra note 5; Michael J Prince, “Common Differences: The Universalism of Disability and the Unevenness of Public Policy” in Daniel Béland, Gregory P Marchildon & Michael J Prince, eds, Universality and Social Policy in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2019) 121 at 121 [Prince, “Common Differences”]; John Stapleton, “How can we improve income security in a post-CERB world?” (27 August 2020), online: [perma.cc/943P-LA8L]; Stapleton & Procyk, supra note 45 at 2; Torjman, Welfare Wall, supra note 22.

49 This is not to imply there are no linkages or intended interactions among programs. They exist in the form of benefit offsets and benefit stacking, to give two kinds. The Disability Tax Credit (DTC) has become a gateway program to several other programs. See Kimpson, Basic Income, supra note 5 at 45, footnote 122. Kimpson notes that “[p]rograms that use DTC eligibility include: DTC Child Supplement, Child Disability Benefit, Canada Caregiver Credit, Canada Workers Benefit/Disability Supplement, Home Accessibility Credit, Home Buyers’ Plan, Home Buyers’ Amount, Registered Disability Savings Plan, Qualified Disability Trust, Disability-related Employment Benefits, and the COVID-19 one-time payment.” As of 1 January 2023, the new federal Multigenerational Home Renovation Tax Credit employs the DTC for eligibility purposes. In addition to these federal examples, certain provincial supports for people with disabilities also use the DTC eligibility in their program design.

50 See Eveline M Burns, Social Security and Public Policy (McGraw-Hill, 1956); Kimpson, Basic Income, supra note 5; Torjman, Welfare Wall, supra note 22.

51 See Prince, “Common Differences,” supra note 48 at 126-7.

52 For details on these and related programs, see DAWN, supra note 48; Kimpson, Basic Income, supra note 5; Torjman, Welfare Wall, supra note 22.

53 Limitations of space prohibit a fuller discussion of the relationship between democratic claims by the disability movement for “nothing without us” in policy development and on how government executives conduct federalism in Canada. See Prince, “Canadian Federalism,” supra note 43 at 809-15.

54 See Statistics Canada, Women with Disabilities, by Amanda Burlock, in Women in Canada: A Gender-based Statistical Report, Catalogue No 89-503-x (Statistics Canada, 29 May 2017); DAWN, supra note 48; Sally A Kimpson, “Uncertain subjects: Shaping disabled women’s lives through income support policy” (2020) 9 Can J of Disability Studies 77, DOI: https://doi.org/10.15353/cjds.v9i3.647 [Kimpson, “Uncertain Subjects”]; Statistics Canada, Work experiences of women with disabilities, 2021, by Christopher Schimmele, Sugn-Hee Jeon & Rubab Arim, Catalogue No 36-28-0001 (Statistics Canada, 27 October 2021), DOI: https://doi.org/10.25318/36280001202101000004-eng.

55 A similar observation applies to people identifying with other marginalized and oppressed groups in societies, e.g., Black and racialized communities, Indigenous peoples, and LGBTQ2S+ communities.

56 Ongoing notable gaps between such ideas and practices illustrate what I call déjà vu discourse in disability politics and policymaking. See Michael J Prince, “Disability Policy in Canada: Fragments of Inclusion and Exclusion” in Jeanette Robertson & Grant Larson, eds, Disability and Social Change: A Progressive Canadian Approach (Fernwood Publishing, 2016) 99.

57 Gender-based Analysis Plus is a method for collecting and reviewing data, which examines the intersection of sex and gender with such other identity factors as age, class, disability, Indigeneity, and race. The focus can be at various levels of analysis, including social attitudes and norms, public policies and programs, and organizational rules and practices. A key aim of such analysis is to alleviate or remove negative cultural, economic, health, political, and social disparities. See e.g. Government of Canada, “Gender-based Analysis Plus research checklist” (last modified 14 April 2021), online: [perma.cc/5UUQ-D86L].

58 See Francis Fong, Navigating Precarious Employment in Canada: Who is Really at Risk? (Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada, 2018); Kimpson, “Uncertain Subjects,” supra note 54; Kimpson, Basic Income, supra note 5; Prince, Struggling for Social Citizenship, supra note 22.

59 See Pamela Moss & Michael J Prince, Weary Warriors: Knowledge, Power, and the Invisible Wounds of Soldiers (Berghahn Books, 2014), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781789201109.

60 Burns, supra note 50 at 42.

61 Raymond B Blake & Jeffrey A Keshen, “Introduction” in Raymond B Blake & Jeffrey A Keshen, eds, Social Fabric or Patchwork Quilt: The Development of Social Policy in Canada (Broadview Press, 2006) 9 at 9.

62 Roy Hanes, “Social Work with Persons with Disabilities” in Steven Hick, ed, Social Work in Canada, 2nd (Thompson Educational Publishing, 2006) 297 at 311.

63 Torjman, Welfare Wall, supra note 22 at 6.

64 Kimpson, Basic Income, supra note 5 at 7.

65 CDBA, Debate, supra note 8 at 7405.

66. Ibid at 7430.

67 See e.g. ibid at 7448, 7453.

68. Ibid at 7440.

69. Ibid at 7391.

70. Ibid at 7392.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid at 7393. This relates to a long-standing concern by federal governments of provincial authorities “uploading” costs to federal programs and budgets, the counterpart concern voiced by provincial governments of Ottawa “downloading” costs unto their budgets. During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, nearly all provinces “clawed back” some or all of federal CERB payments to people on social assistance program caseloads.

73 See Sherri Torjman, The New Handshake Federalism: Caledon Commentary (Caledon Institute of Social Policy, December 1997) at 2. Torjman states that “[p]roblems often arise because Canadians with disabilities are passed back and forth between jurisdictions – from federal Employment Insurance to provincial welfare; from welfare or workers’ compensation to the Canada Pension Plan.”

74 CDBA, Debate, supra note 8 at 7395.

75 In contrast, the Registered Disability Savings Plan is an example of a program concerned with supporting future needs of an individual.

76 See CDBA, Debate, supra note 8 at 7431.

77 Ibid at 7437 (Louis), 7439 (MacDonald). See also ibid at 7431 (Jowhari).

78 Ibid at 7429 (Lamoureux).

79 Ibid at 7391 (Qualtrough). She states that “[w]e must reassure and demonstrate to families that worry about the future of their loved ones that these supports will be there when they are gone.”

80 What is not a goal for the CDB is to be partial compensation for extra non-reimbursed costs of living with a disability in our society of barriers. That function, to the degree it is addressed by governments, is the role of tax credits and of largely provincial and territorial supports, services, and benefit programs.

81 Ibid at 7448 (Samson). See also ibid at 7430 (Lamoureux), 7431 (Jowhari), 7439 (Louis).

82 Ibid at 7431 (Jowhari), 7438 (Louis). See also ibid at 7446 (Turnbull).

83 On this theme of improving the quality of life of people who will receive the CDB, see CDBA, Debate, supra note 8 at 7431-2, 7453.

84 See e.g. ibid at 7391 (Qualtrough). Minister Qualtrough, in introducing the Bill on second reading, said, “We are also at a unique point in history where the first generation of persons with more complex disabilities are outliving their parents….it also means that we must ensure there are adequate supports available to everyone throughout their entire lifetimes.”

85 Ibid at 7393 (Qualtrough). See also Angus Reid, “Survey of Canadians living with disability underlines relative poverty, other social barriers” (22 June 2021), online: [perma.cc/D3VF-KXN6]. Survey results indicated that “[n]early nine-in-10 (89%) [of] Canadians are in favour of a Canada Disability Benefit.”

86 See Mandate Letter, supra note 7. The Prime Minister’s December 2021 mandate letter to the Minister for Disability Inclusion includes direction to work on “supporting national disability organizations to build capacity and partner in efforts to eliminate systemic barriers.”

87 I thank Bonnie Brayton for her permission to use these remarks from personal correspondence. Bonnie Brayton, DisAbled Women’s Network of Canada (27 October 2022) via email [communicated to author].