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Abstract

Over the past decade, corporate developers have increasingly sought to conclude Impact and Benefit Agreements (“IBAs”) with Indigenous groups when undertaking resource projects on traditional lands. Despite this development, significant concerns have been raised about the nature and scope of Indigenous consent, as well as the substantive deficiencies within IBAs. However, less has been written about how legal principles derived from contract law would apply to IBAs in the event of a dispute before an arbitrator or a judge. This article therefore considers the ways in which specific contractual principles can be reconceptualized for IBA disputes. First, it examines the relationship between IBAs, self-determination, and contract law itself. Second, it explores how such agreements depart from traditional commercial contracting: IBAs exist in the shadow of constitutional dynamics and legal pluralism, while balancing a range of sociocultural purposes that cannot be reduced to commercial norms. Third, the article analyzes how principles relating to contractual interpretation and good faith can be applied to give effect to the careful equilibrium at the heart of an IBA. Ultimately, the article concludes that IBAs are, in effect, sui generis contracts that differ in fundamental ways from ordinary forms of contracting. Consequently, adjudicators must adopt a tailored approach to contract law principles that incorporates Indigenous perspectives and that remains sensitive to the dynamics of IBAs.

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References

  1. Logan Stack is an associate at Conway Baxter Wilson LLP/s.r.l. The author wishes to thank Professor Helge Dedek for his invaluable support, the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful feedback, and the members of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal's Editorial Board for their hard work throughout this process.
  2. See Globe Staff, “Wet’suwet’en Chiefs, Blockades and Coastal GasLink: A Guide to the Dispute over a BC Pipeline” (14 January 2020), online: The Globe and Mail [perma.cc/CEU5-VSHF]; Lee Wilson, “Road Blocks Go Up on Wet’suwet’en Territory to Stop Coastal GasLink from Drilling” (29 September 2021), online: ATPN News < www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/wetsuweten-territory-road-block-coastal-gaslink-natural-gas-pipeline> [perma.cc/PA34-VKPW]; Simon Little, “RCMP arrest 5 amid renewed tensions along northern B.C. gas pipeline route” (29 March 2023), online: Global News [perma.cc/G7T5-7E6Y]. For a discussion of the potential for friction with the Indigenous-led Cedar LNG project that relies on the Coastal GasLink pipeline, see also Justine Hunter, “B.C. approves Indigenous-led Cedar LNG project, announces new ‘energy action framework’” (14 March 2023), online: The Globe and Mail < www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/british-columbia/article-bc-approves-indigenous-led-cedar-lng-project-announces-new-energy> [perma.cc/87HN-VS5T].
  3. See CBC News, “Demonstrators show support for Kaska Nation in fight over Yukon mine project” (17 April 2023), online: [perma.cc/C9ZG-QRC3]; Sara Connors, “Canada, Yukon fail to consult over proposed mine says Kaska Nation” (12 April 2023), online: APTN [perma.cc/Q9CF-6J4F].
  4. See e.g. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: Calls to Action (The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015) [TRC Calls to Action]; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295 (Annex), UNGAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 49, Vol III, UN Doc A/61/49 (2008) 15 [UNDRIP]; Peter Zimonjic, “The reconciliation project is making progress – but not quickly enough for many,” CBC News (30 September 2022), online: [perma.cc/Q9CF-6J4F]. While primarily discussed in terms of Indigenous-Crown relations, there is a role to play for other institutions, including universities and, notably, private actors: see TRC Calls to Action, art 92.
  5. For a critical examination of the shift in corporate practices, see e.g. Tyler McCreary, “Historicizing the Encounter Between State, Corporate, and Indigenous Authorities on Gitxsan Lands” (2016) 33 Windsor YB Access Just 163 at 188-95, DOI: ; see also Dianne Lapierre, Corporate Rationales for the Use of Impact and Benefit Agreements in Canada’s Mining Sector (MA Thesis, University of Guelph, 2008) [unpublished]. The precise number remains difficult to identify given the use of confidentiality clauses. However, there appear to be over 400 agreements of varying scope in the mining sector alone. See Ken S Coates & Blaine Favel, Understanding FPIC (Macdonald Laurier Institute, 2016) at 6; Government of Canada, “Lands and Minerals Sector – Indigenous Mining Agreements” (23 July 2020), online: [perma.cc/7UPQ-22ZQ].
  6. See e.g. Brad Gilmour & Bruce Mellett, “Impact and Benefit Agreements in the Resolution of Project Issues with First Nations” (2013) 51 Alta L Rev 385 at 390-98, DOI: ; Northwest Territories, Legislative Assembly, “Survey of Impact Benefit Agreements” Tabled Document, 18-3, No 334-18(3) (11 Feb 2019) [Northwest Territories]; Irene Sosa & Karyn Keenan, “Impact Benefit Agreements Between Aboriginal Communities and Mining Companies: Their Use in Canada” (Oct 2001) at 9-17, online (pdf): Canadian Environmental Law Association [perma.cc/X5WF-7TAN]; Geneviève Motard, “Les dimensions collectives des ententes sur les répercussions et les avantages: bémol sur le discours du contrat privé” (2019) 60 C de D 395 at 436, DOI: .
  7. See Gilmour & Mellett, supra note 6 at 390-91; Ghislain Otis, “Les droits ancestraux des peuples autochtones au carrefour du droit public et du droit privé: le cas de l’industrie extractive” (2019) 60 C de D 451 at 458, DOI: . See also Collaboration Agreement Between the Northern Village of Pinehouse and Kineepik etis Lock Inc. and Cameco Corporation and Areva Resources Canada Inc, December 12, 2012, art 5 [Pinehouse Agreement]. As noted, the scope of the Indigenous communities’ support for the project varies widely depending on the agreement. See Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Impact and Benefit Agreements as Monitoring Instruments in the Minerals and Energy Industries” (2020) 7 Extractive Industries & Society 1338 at 1339, DOI: [O’Faircheallaigh, “Monitoring Instruments”].
  8. See McCreary, supra note 5.
  9. See e.g. Ken J Caine & Naomi Krogman, “Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full? A Power Analysis of Impact and Benefit Agreements in Canada’s North” (2010) 23 Organization & Envt 76 at 79, DOI: < https://doi.org/10.1177/1086026609358969>; Chris Hummel, “Behind the Curtain, Impact Benefit Agreement Transparency in Nunavut” (2019) 60:2 C de D 367, DOI: < https://doi.org/10.7202/1060981ar>; Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Indigenous Women and Mining Agreement Negotiations: Australia and Canada” in Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, ed, Gendering the Field: Towards Sustainable Livelihoods for Mining Communities (ANU E Press, 2011) 87 [O’Faircheallaigh, “Indigenous Women and Mining Agreement Negotiations”]; Emilie Cameron & Tyler Levitan, “Impact and Benefit Agreements and the Neoliberalization of Resource Governance and Indigenous-State Relations in Northern Canada” (2014) 93 Studies in Political Economy 25, DOI: .
  10. By “contract law,” the article intends to refer to the body of rules and principles regulating agreements between parties. In the common law provinces, this area is largely a product of common law development, rather than legislation: Angela Swan, Jakub Adamski & Annie Y Na, Canadian Contract Law, 4th ed (LexisNexis Canada, 2018) at 11. That being said, many of the arguments made in this article, properly adapted, remain relevant in the civil law: for contractual interpretation, see arts 1425-32 CCQ; for good faith, see arts 6, 7, 1375, 1434 CCQ.
  11. See e.g. Cameron & Levitan, supra note 9 at 37-40; Kaitlin Ritchie, “Issues Associated with the Implementation of the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Aboriginal Peoples: Threatening the Goals of Reconciliation and Meaningful Consultation” (2013) 46 UBC L Rev 397 at 409; Bernard J Roth, “Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Major Project Development in an Era of Evolving Section 35 Jurisprudence” (2018) 83 SCLR (2d) 169 at para 25.
  12. For an example of the multifaceted purposes of IBAs, see The Raglan Agreement, Makivik Corporation, Qarqalik Landholding Corporation of Salluit, Northern Village Corporation of Salluit, Nunatulik Landholding Corporation of Kangiqsujuaq, Northern Village Corporation of Kangiqsujuaq & Société Minière Raglan du Québec Ltée, 25 Jan 1995, s 2.1 [Raglan Agreement].
  13. See e.g. Hummel, supra note 9 at 371-73, 385-93; Jocelyn Fraser & Andre Xavier, “Corporate Social Responsibility in the Mining Sector in Canada” in Eduardo G Pereira, Rochelle Spencer & Jonathon W Moses, eds, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Local Content Policies and CSR: Developments in the Extractives Sector (Springer Nature Switzerland, 2021) 579 at 582, DOI:
  14. This article therefore operates in parallel to discussions surrounding the establishment of Indigenous judicial institutions and the protection of Indigenous legal traditions. See e.g. Douglas Sanderson, “Commercial Law and Indigenous Sovereignty: It’s a Nice Idea, but How Do You Build it in Canada” (2012) 53 Can Bus LJ 92, DOI: < https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1933805>; Hadley Friedland, “Waniskā: Reimagining the Future with Indigenous Legal Traditions” (2016) 33:1 Windsor YB Access Just 184, DOI: ; Aaron Mills, Karen Drake & Tanya Muthusamipillai, “An Anishinaabe Constitutional Order” in Justice Patrick Smith, ed, Reconciliation in Canadian Courts: A Guide for Judges to Aboriginal and Indigenous Law, Context and Practice (Ottawa: National Judicial Institute, 2017) 260. Further, this article recognizes that the perception of IBAs differs between Indigenous communities and within each community; it therefore seeks to provide a nuanced analysis of this form of agreement that properly reflects such diversity.
  15. See Tegan Brock, Maureen G Reed & Katherine J Stewart, “Indigenous Community Participation in Resource Development Decision-Making: Practitioner Perceptions of Legal and Voluntary Arrangements” (2021) 283 J Envtl Management 1 at 2, DOI: .
  16. See e.g. Adam J Wright, “Impact and Benefit Agreements: The Role of Negotiated Agreements in the Creation of Collaborative Planning in Resource Development” (MSc, University of Guelph, 2013) [unpublished]; on the potential of IBAs, see Jason MacLean, “Impact Benefit Agreements, Transparency, and Sustainability” in Iboronke Odumosu-Ayanu & Dwight Newman, eds, Indigenous-Industry Agreements, Natural Resources and the Law (Routledge, 2021) 136 at 141-43, DOI: < https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429505638-9>; for a summary of more optimistic perspectives, see also Thomas Gunton, Eric Werker & Sean Markey, “Community Benefit Agreements and Natural Resource Development: Achieving Better Outcomes” (2021) 73 Resources Pol’y 1 at 2, DOI: .
  17. For more on IBAs as governance tools, see Neil Craik, Holly Gardner & Daniel McCarthy, “Indigenous – Corporate Private Governance and Legitimacy: Lessons Learned from Impact and Benefit Agreements” (2017) 52 Resources Pol’y 379, DOI: .
  18. See e.g. Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2017 SCC 41 at para 59.
  19. See UNDRIP, supra note 4, art 19 [UNDRIP]. For Canadian statutes, see e.g. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, SC 2021, c 14; Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, SBC 2019, c 44. On the subject of the implementation of UNDRIP, see e.g. Shari Narine, “New BC bills welcomed, but UNDRIP implementation moving at a snail’s pace” (19 November 2021), online: Toronto Star < www.thestar.com/news/canada/2021/11/19/new-bc-bills-welcomed-but-undrip-implementation-moving-at-a-snails-pace.html?rf> [perma.cc/3VFL-SDV8]; Sarah Cox, “UN Committee Rebukes Canada for Failing to Get Indigenous Peoples’ Consent for Industrial Projects” (15 January 2021), online: The Narwhal [perma.cc/X2AQ-EFR3].
  20. See McCreary, supra note 5 at 191; Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, “Indigenous Peoples, International Law, and Extractive Industry Contracts” (2016) 109 AJIL Unbound 220 at 222, DOI: < https://doi.org/10.1017/S2398772300001483>; Caine & Krogman, supra note 9 at 85.
  21. Viviane Weitzner, “‘Dealing Full Force’: Lutsel K’e Dene First Nation’s Experience Negotiating with Mining Companies” (2006) at 30 online (pdf): I-Portal: Indigenous Studies Portal [perma.cc/P89J-J368]. Other Indigenous groups may be more actively supportive of development projects, and a spectrum of viewpoints may be expressed both between communities and within them; nevertheless, it is clear that, for many groups, the pressures to conclude IBAs lead them to express contractual consent to projects that many in the community oppose.
  22. See UNDRIP, supra note 4, art 10-11, 25-26, 29, 32. At the same time, there are obstacles to fully realizing UNDRIP’s potential: see e.g. Pratyush Dayal, “As Saskatoon explores UNDRIP implementation, Indigenous voices want more from federal and provincial leaders,” CBC News (18 November 2021), online: [perma.cc/96C6-PFFS].
  23. See Yahey v British Columbia, 2018 BCSC 123 at para 40.
  24. See e.g. Sam Szoke-Burke & Eric Werker, “Benefit Sharing, Power, and the Performance of Multi-Stakeholder Institutions at Ghana's Ahafo Mine” (2021) 71:101969 Resources Policy 1. See also Jonathan Boron & Sean Markey, “Exerting Sovereignty Through Relational Self-determination: A Case Study of Mineral Development In Stk’emlupsemc te Secwépemc Territory” (2020) 15:4 J Rural & Community Development 151 at 153-55; Cameron & Levitan, supra note 9.
  25. See e.g. Arielle Dylan, Bartholemew Smallboy & Ernie Lightman, “‘Saying No to Resource Development is Not an Option’: Economic Development in Moose Cree First Nation” (2013) 47 J Can Studies 59 at 69-70, DOI: .
  26. See Craik, Gardner & McCarthy, supra note 17 at 384.
  27. See O’Faircheallaigh, “Monitoring Instruments,” supra note 7.
  28. See Dayna N Scott, “Extraction Contracting: The Struggle for Control of Indigenous Lands” (2020) 119 South Atlantic Q 269 at 270-71, DOI: . The role of contract law in the face of inadequate remedies will be touched on in s II(B).
  29. Common law principles of contract therefore apply. See e.g. Meadowbank Mine Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreement, Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited & Kivalliq Inuit Association, 2011, art 3.10 [Meadowbank Mine IIBA]; Canim Lake Band Forest & Range Consultation and Revenue Sharing Agreement, Canim Lake Band & British Columbia, 2015, s 16.11; Pinehouse Agreement, supra note 7, art 11.2.
  30. See e.g. Scott, supra note 28 at 280-81, 292; Gunton, Werker & Markey, supra note 16. A smaller subset has prioritized Indigenous resurgence, encouraging Indigenous communities not to participate in engagement processes that reproduce capitalist models. See Boron & Markey, supra note 24 at 152. The relationship between IBAs and the broader reconciliation project can be subjected to similarly diverging lenses: On the one hand, IBAs might appear to provide autonomy and resources that better prepare Indigenous communities in their interactions with the Crown and non-Indigenous institutions; thus, they could be said to facilitate Indigenous engagement in the larger process of reconciliation. On the other hand, the privatization of public law disputes and the dependencies created by IBAs can further entrench the status quo while precluding avenues of resistance that could otherwise lead to meaningful progress in reconciling Indigenous and settler systems.
  31. See Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Explaining Outcomes from Negotiated Agreements in Australia and Canada” (2021) 70:101922 Resources Policy 1 at 4, DOI: .
  32. See Katie DeRosa, “$2.4‑billion Cedar LNG project on Haisla-owned land near Kitimat gets B.C. approval,” Vancouver Sun (14 March 2023), online: [perma.cc/MXY3-KHW8]. Such initiatives could allow Indigenous groups to play an active role in every stage of the process, rather than seeking to secure participation and benefits from a project managed by a settler corporation. At the same time, they do not assuage concerns as opportunities to further self-determination remain tied to resource development, which can involve other trade-offs: see Matt Simmons, “B.C.’s latest LNG approval sends mixed messages about commitments to climate and Indigenous Rights,” The Narwal (26 March 2013), online: [perma.cc/5J54-WZP7]. For agreements between Indigenous governments and their federal or provincial counterparts, see the recent agreement between British Columbia and Blueberry River First Nations, as well as those reached with other Treaty 8 groups: Derrick Penner, “Blueberry River First Nation eyes restoration, limited development in land agreement with B.C.,” Vancouver Sun (18 January 2023), online: [perma.cc/6BUG-2RYH].
  33. To that end, recent proposals to give Indigenous communities a percentage of resource revenues may constitute a step back, given that they risk presenting financial benefits as a substitute for environmental, social and cultural safeguards, and as a way to undermine efforts to increase Indigenous decision-making authority. See Brett Forester, “Poilievre's First Nations consultation pledge garners mixed reviews, call for 'more substance',” CBC News (26 January 2023), online: [perma.cc/8F3U-7XP6].
  34. Michael Murphy, “Indigenous Peoples and the Struggle for Self-Determination: A Relational Strategy” (2019) 8 Can J of Human Rights 67 at 70; Boron & Markey, supra note 24 at 157.
  35. Some participants disappointed by the outcomes provided by IBAs have also raised concerns about external consultants and counsel. See Craik, Gardner & McCarthy, supra note 17 at 384.
  36. “IBA Community Toolkit: Negotiation and Implementation of Impact and Benefit Agreements” (2015), online: The Gordon Foundation [perma.cc/N8SE-LVXT].
  37. See e.g. Woodward & Company, Benefit Sharing Agreements in British Columbia: A Guide for First Nations, Business, and Governments (Woodward & Company, 2009), online (pdf): Government of British Columbia [perma.cc/H9N7-U44F].
  38. See e.g. O’Faircheallaigh, “Monitoring Instruments,” supra note 7; Mary M Cascadden, Best Practices for Impact Benefit Agreements: A Case Study of the Mary River Project (MRM Dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 2018) [unpublished].
  39. First Nations of Québec and Labrador Sustainable Development Institute, “Centre of Expertise on Impact and Benefits Agreements,” online: [perma.cc/5PWA-JFF6]; British Columbia Assembly of First Nations, “New First Nations centre coming to B.C. to give economic development guidance” (11 October 2022), online: [perma.cc/QM7V-8SYQ].
  40. See e.g. Odumosu-Ayanu, supra note 20 at 223; Sosa & Keenan, supra note 6 at 18.
  41. See e.g. Corporation Makivik c Québec (Procureur général), 2014 QCCA 1455 [Corporation Makivik]; Québec (Attorney General) v Moses, 2010 SCC 17 [Moses].
  42. See Lone Wandahl Mouyal, “Corporate social responsibility in the light of contract law: On impact benefit agreements in Greenland” in Vibe Ulfbeck, Anders Møllmann & Bent Ole Gram Mortensen, eds, Responsibilities and Liabilities for Commercial Activity in the Arctic: The example of Greenland (Routledge, 2016) 50 at 65.
  43. The number of IBA disputes that have occurred, and how they have been brought to adjudicators, is difficult to estimate given the confidentiality of many agreements and dispute processes.
  44. See e.g. Arbitration Act, SO 1991, c 17, s 31.
  45. See e.g. John D McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 3rd ed (Irwin Law, 2020) at 971, 1090; Ralph Cunnington, “The Assessment of Gain-Based Damages for Breach of Contract” (2008) Mod L Rev 559 at 559, DOI: ; Scott, supra note 28 at 283.
  46. Although federal and provincial legislatures have developed environmental assessment processes that may be influenced by the conclusion of agreements with the affected community, they have generally not sought to regulate the form of the negotiations or the substance of the resulting IBAs. In this regard, Inuit IBAs stand as an exception, although the NLCA still confirms that the common law of contract applies: see Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (1993), art 26.9.1, online: [perma.cc/493T-68GY] [NLCA].
  47. 2021 SKQB 195 [Nexgen].
  48. 2011 NLTD 44 [NCC].
  49. Nexgen, supra note 47 at para 92.
  50. NCC, supra note 48 at para 30.
  51. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 35 [Haida].
  52. Ibid at para 39.
  53. Ibid at para 53.
  54. Ibid.
  55. See e.g. McCreary, supra note 5 at 188; Coates & Favel, supra note 5 at 17-18.
  56. See Scott, supra note 28 at 286-87, 289-92.
  57. For a comparison between the provincial approaches, see e.g. Rachel Ariss, Clara MacCallum Fraser & Diba Nazneen Somani, “Crown Policies on the Duty to Consult and Accommodate: Towards Reconciliation?” (2017) 13 MJSDL at 28-31.
  58. See Adam J Wright, Impact and Benefit Agreements: The Role of Negotiated Agreements in the Creation of Collaborative Planning in Resource Development (MSc Major Research Paper, University of Guelph, 2013) at 36; Gilmour & Mellett, supra note 6 at 398-99. See also Courtney Fidler & Michael Hitch, “Impact and Benefit Agreements: A Contentious Issue for Environmental and Aboriginal Justice” (2007) 35 Envts 49 at 59. However, sometimes IBAs are only concluded after state approvals, especially for smaller projects. See e.g. the statements of the CEO of Merit in Cathryn Atkinson, “Osoyoos band signs first official mining agreement” (14 May 2008), online: The Globe and Mail [perma.cc/U8JV-NDMJ].
  59. See Cameron & Levitan, supra note 9 at 37-40; Wright, supra note 58 at 26; Ariss, Fraser & Somani, supra note 57 at 41-42; Roth, supra note 11 at paras 25-26.
  60. Cameron & Levitan, supra note 9 at 38.
  61. See Scott, supra note 28 at 278-79.
  62. Public Policy Forum, “Sharing in the Benefits of Resource Developments: A Study of First Nations-Industry Impact Benefits Agreement” (2006) at 11, online (pdf): Public Policy Forum [perma.cc/5AK7-YYVS].
  63. See Cameron & Levitan, supra note 9 at 37.
  64. Omri Rozen, "Status Quo Sorrows: The Failures of Energy Project Consultations and Reconciliatory Paths Forward" (2021) 12 Western J Leg Studies 31 at 43, citing Gibson & O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 36 at 30, DOI: .
  65. This blending of public and private responsibilities is far from a novel feature in Indigenous-settler interactions. Rather, it is arguably the latest step in a process of dispossession wherein private actors played an integral role. Indeed, early on in Canada’s colonial history, companies such as the Hudson’s Bay Company were empowered to conduct trade and regulate the surrounding territory: see McCreary, supra note 5 at 174-75.
  66. At the same time, there is the possibility that decisions affecting economic benefits derived from IBAs linked to Aboriginal and Treaty rights can trigger the duty to consult: Ermineskin Cree Nation v Canada (Environment and Climate Change), 2021 FC 758, appeal dismissed in 2022 FCA 123 but only due to Coalspur’s discontinuance of the appeal in light of the mootness of a related appeal. However, even in such a case, the IBA regime has altered the way in which Crown decisions are scrutinized; it may even be decisions to restrict resource development that lead to a breach.
  67. On timing, see e.g. Wright, supra note 58 at 36; Gilmour & Mellett, supra note 6 at 398-99. See also Fidler & Hitch, supra note 58 at 59.
  68. 2018 ONSC 4316.
  69. Ibid at para 25.
  70. Ibid at para 71.
  71. To use the terminology of Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33 at paras 9-10.
  72. See Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Understanding Corporate-Aboriginal Agreements on Mineral Development” in Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh & Saleem Ali, eds, Earth Matters: Indigenous Peoples, The Extractive Industries and Corporate Social Responsibility (Routledge, 2008) 67 at 72-74 [O’Faircheallaigh, “Understanding Corporate-Aboriginal Agreements”], DOI: .
  73. See e.g. Chantelle Bellrichard, “Benefits agreement asks First Nation to discourage members from hindering B.C. pipeline project” (9 August 2019), online: CBC News [perma.cc/KVE8-7HMR].
  74. See Pinehouse Agreement, supra note 7, art 5.
  75. Whale Tail Project Inuit Impact & Benefit Agreement, Kivalliq Inuit Association and Agnico Eagle Mines Limited, 15 June 2017, s 3.1.6 [Whale Tail IIBA].
  76. See Sosa & Keenan, supra note 6 at 10.
  77. See Gilmour & Mellett, supra note 6 at 390-91; Northwest Territories, supra note 6 at 12.
  78. O’Faircheallaigh, “Understanding Corporate-Aboriginal Agreements,” supra note 72 at 72.
  79. Confidentiality clauses may also influence the nature of public discussions. See generally Hummel, supra note 9.
  80. Although IBAs do not define the scope of Aboriginal rights, they can have long-term effects on community members’ ability to exercise them. See Otis, supra note 7 at 457-58.
  81. For example, theories of efficient breach that take a narrow view of the morality of contracting are highly inappropriate. For more on this theory and its general criticisms, see Nina CZ Khouri, “Efficient Breach Theory in the Law of Contract: An Analysis” (2002) 9 Auckland UL Rev 739.
  82. See Sosa & Keenan, supra note 6 at 16-17.
  83. Ibid; Gilmour & Mellett, supra note 6 at 394; Michael William Hitch, Impact and Benefit Agreements and the Political Ecology of Mineral Development in Nunavut (PhD Dissertation, University of Waterloo, 2006) at 185 [unpublished]; The Mary River Project Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreement, Qikiqtani Inuit Association & Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation, 22 Oct 2018, art 8.8 [Mary River IIBA].
  84. See Thierry Rodon, Isabel Lemus-Lauzon & Stephan Schott, “Impact and Benefit Agreement (IBA) Revenue Allocation Strategies for Indigenous Community Development” (2018) 47 Northern Rev 9 at 18, 24, DOI: < https://doi.org/10.22584/nr47.2018.002>.
  85. See Motard, supra note 6 at 433, 436-37.
  86. See e.g. Ben Bradshaw, Courtney Fidler & Adam Wright, “Impact and Benefit Agreements & Northern Resource Governance: What We Know and What We Still Need to Figure Out” in Chris Southcott et al, eds, Resources and Sustainable Development in the Arctic (Routledge, 2019) 204 at 206, DOI: .
  87. Andre M Xavier & Marcello Veiga, “Supra-Regulatory Agreements in Canada – Private Contracts Between Companies and Indigenous Communities Without Governmental Participation: Are These Effective Practices Towards Sustainability?” (2009) (Paper delivered at the Encontro de ANPAD, São Paulo, September 2009) at 1; Craik, Gardner & McCarthy, supra note 17 at 379-80.
  88. See e.g. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 207.
  89. See Barkhuizen v Napier, [2007] ZACC 5 (SAFLII) at paras 28-29.
  90. Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd, [2012] ZACC 30 (SAFLII) at para 71 [Everfresh].
  91. See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, No 108, s 39(2); see also Elsabé van der Sijde, The role of good faith in the South African law of contract (LLM Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2012) [unpublished] at 16-17. Note also that ubuntu was referenced in the interim constitution, although it was later removed: see Andrew Hutchison, “Good Faith in Contract: A Uniquely South African Perspective” (2019) 1 J Commonwealth L 227 at 241-42.
  92. Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at para 92 [Hill].
  93. See e.g. Southwind v Canada, 2021 SCC 28 at para 55.
  94. See Hill, supra note 92 at para 96; Watkins v Olafson, [1989] 2 SCR 750 at 760.
  95. See also Motard, supra note 6, who complements this article’s analysis by focusing on the collective, political, and intergenerational nature of the benefits provided within IBAs.
  96. See Scott, supra note 28 at 275.
  97. Fidler & Hitch, supra note 58 at 59; Wright, supra note 58 at 22. See also Woodward & Company, supra note 37 at I-5. Note, however, that there have been ongoing debates about the concept of “social license.” See e.g. Kristen van de Biezenbos, “The Rebirth of Social License” (2019) 14 MJSDL 154.
  98. See e.g. Northwest Territories, supra note 6 at 8-9. But see O’Faircheallaigh, “Understanding Corporate-Aboriginal Agreements,” supra note 72 at 77, on the gap between the obligations contained within IBAs and their actual enforcement.
  99. Diavik Diamonds Project Environmental Agreement, 8 March 2000, s 4.9(b)(i) (Diavik Diamond Mines Inc, Dogrib Treaty 11 Council, Lutsel K’e Dene Band, Yellowknives Dene First Nation, North Slave Métis Alliance, Kitikmeot Inuit Association, Government of Canada, and Government of the Northwest Territories).
  100. See Mary River IIBA, supra note 83, arts 15.5.2(e), 16.3.
  101. See Raglan Agreement, supra note 12, s 11.2.
  102. See e.g. Regional Indigenous Land Use Agreement for Small Scale Mining, 2009, schedule 3, s 7 (Dja Dja Wurrung People and Prospectors & Miners’ Association of Victoria) [Dja Dja Wurrung Agreement].
  103. See e.g. Mary River IIBA, supra note 83, arts 11.12, 11.2; Raglan Agreement, supra note 12, s 5.5; Motard, supra note 6 at 436.
  104. See e.g. Sosa & Keenan, supra note 6 at 16; O’Faircheallaigh, “Indigenous Women and Mining Agreement Negotiations,” supra note 9 at 95-96.
  105. See Rodon, Lemus-Lauzon & Schott, supra note 84 at 13-14. See also Sandra Gogal, Richard Riegert & JoAnn Jamieson, “Aboriginal Impact and Benefit Agreements: Practical Considerations” (2005) 43 Alta L Rev 129 at 151-52.
  106. Qikiqtani Inuit Association v Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation (2017) [QIA Arbitration].
  107. Raglan Agreement, supra note 12, s 2.1 [emphasis added].
  108. Ibid, ss 4, 8-10, 12.
  109. However, this depends on the particular context. For a brief review of contract law trends, see McCamus, supra note 45 at 23-27.
  110. Nexgen, supra note 47 at para 92.
  111. Indeed, the nature of the injunction sought by the plaintiff fit uneasily with the rights that it had been accorded via the preliminary agreement to negotiate (ibid at paras 95-96).
  112. For a more thoughtful (albeit still imperfect) approach, see QIA Arbitration, supra note 106.
  113. See Nexgen, supra note 47 at para 91.
  114. On the subject of confidentiality clauses, see Hummel, supra note 9 at 371. The relative absence of public conflict could suggest that the outcomes of IBAs have been positive; however, it could also reflect the dispute resolution provisions in most Canadian IBAs, which often prioritize committee deliberation followed by mediation and private arbitration.
  115. Swan, Adamski & Na, supra note 10.
  116. First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd, [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194; Sebastien Grammond, “Reasonable Expectations and the Interpretation of Contracts across Legal Traditions” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 345 at 347.
  117. McCamus, supra note 45 at 26.
  118. Resolute FP Canada Inc v Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 60 at para 142.
  119. Regarding contractual interpretation, see e.g. Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp, 2014 SCC 53 at para 47 [Sattva Capital].
  120. The evolution of the doctrine of unconscionability is one such example: see Uber Technologies Inc v Heller, 2020 SCC 16 at para 54.
  121. See e.g. Ian R Macneil, “Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know” (1985) 1985 Wis L Rev 483; Scott Baker & Albert Choi, "Contract's Role in Relational Contract" (2015) 101 Va L Rev 559.
  122. See e.g. Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 at para 69 [Bhasin].
  123. See e.g. Teal Cedar Products Ltd v Rainforest Flying Squad, 2021 BCSC 605; Foxgate Developments Inc v Jane Doe, 2022 ONSC 7035.
  124. See Coastal GasLink Pipeline Ltd v Huson, 2019 BCSC 2264 at para 139.
  125. See Sattva Capital, supra note 119 at para 55.
  126. See e.g. Gogal, Riegert & Jamieson, supra note 105 at 130-43; Dianne Lapierre, Corporate Rationales for the Use of Impact and Benefit Agreements in Canada’s Mining Sector (MA Thesis, University of Guelph, 2008).
  127. TRC Calls to Action, supra note 4, art 92; UNDRIP, supra note 4, art 32. See also Mouyal, supra note 42 at 50-52.
  128. See Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 122(1.1)(b).
  129. See Craik, Gardner & McCarthy, supra note 17 at 383.
  130. See e.g. Odumosu-Ayanu, supra note 20 at 224; Sosa & Keenan, supra note 6 at 18.
  131. See e.g. QIA Arbitration, supra note 106.
  132. IBAs, if properly enforced, might help to shift the parties’ interactions towards recognizing their interdependence and promoting relational engagements based on reciprocity. On the subject of relationality, see e.g. Alan Hanna, “Reconciliation through Relationality in Indigenous Legal Orders” (2019) 56 Alta L Rev 817 at 828-839, DOI: ; Kirsten Manley-Casimir, “Toward a Bijural Interpretation of the Principle of Respect in Aboriginal Law” (2016) 61 McGill LJ 939 at 968-70, DOI: ; John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (University of Toronto Press, 2010), ch 3 [Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution].
  133. McCreary, supra note 5 at 191.
  134. James (Sákèj) Youngblood Henderson, “Ayukpachi: Empowering Aboriginal Thought” in Marie Batiste, ed, Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision (UBC Press, 2000) 248 at 262, DOI: < https://doi.org/10.59962/9780774853170-022>.
  135. See also Cheryl Knockwood, “Rebuilding Relationships and Nations: A Mi’kmaw Perspective of the Path to Reconciliation” in John Borrows et al, Braiding Legal Orders: Implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019) 111 at 112-14.
  136. See e.g. McCamus, supra note 45 at 805-13.
  137. Sattva Capital, supra note 119 at para 47.
  138. Ibid at para 57.
  139. See e.g. Keephills Aggregate Company Limited v Riverview Properties Inc, 2011 ABCA 101 at para 13: “The law does not license a judicial exploration of the negotiations of the parties in pursuit of the agreement that the court assumes would best balance the parties’ respective interests.”
  140. See e.g. Moses, supra note 41; Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 [Little Salmon]; First Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v Yukon, 2017 SCC 58 [Nacho Nyak Dun].
  141. Constitution Act, 1982, s 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
  142. However, for an innovative argument that the benefits contained within IBAs deserve constitutional protection, see Roth, supra note 11 at paras 36-41.
  143. Corporation Makivik, supra note 41 at paras 58-68.
  144. See e.g. Meadowbank Mine IIBA, supra note 29, Schedule K.
  145. See e.g. Dwight Newman, “Contractual and Covenantal Conceptions of Modern Treaty Interpretation” (2011) 54 SCLR 475, DOI: .
  146. See Moses, supra note 41 at para 7.
  147. See ibid at paras 6-7; Little Salmon, supra note 141 at para 12. See also Janna Promislow & Alain Verrier, “Judicial Interventions in Modern Treaty Implementation: Dispute Resolution and Living Treaties” (2019) 6:2 Northern Public Affairs 52 at 54.
  148. See e.g. Newman, supra note 145 at 484-85.
  149. Nacho Nyak Dun, supra note 140 at paras 37-38.
  150. [1980] 1 SCR 888 at 901.
  151. For an overview of this principle of construction, see McCamus, supra note 45 at 719-22.
  152. See Sattva Capital, supra note 119 at para 47.
  153. See Little Salmon, supra note 140 at para 10.
  154. See QIA Arbitration, supra note 106 at paras 108-12.
  155. Ibid at para 218.
  156. Ibid at para 220.
  157. This reflects the guidance in the modern treaty context that agreements should not be interpreted in an ungenerous manner: Little Salmon, supra note 140 at para 10.
  158. For a sampling of consultation-related obligations, see e.g. Whale Tail IIBA, supra note 74, ch 8.3.3; Raglan Agreement, supra note 12, s 11.7; Meadowbank Mine IIBA, supra note 29, Schedule L3; Pinehouse Agreement, supra note 7, Schedule F17.
  159. Corporation Makivik, supra note 41 at paras 76-79.
  160. IFP Technologies (Canada) Inc v EnCana Midstream and Marketing, 2017 ABCA 157 at para 83.
  161. See McCamus, supra note 45 at 805-13.
  162. Sattva Capital, supra note 119 at para 58, citing Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98 at 114.
  163. Whale Tail IIBA, supra note 75, s 2.2.2.
  164. Mary River IIBA, supra note 83, art 1.11.
  165. Gina Starblanket & Heidi Stark, “Towards a Relational Paradigm – Four Points for Consideration: Knowledge, Gender, Land, and Modernity” in Michael Asch, John Borrows & James Tully, eds, Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings (University of Toronto Press, 2018) 175 at 179, DOI: .
  166. Bhasin, supra note 122 at para 69.
  167. Saul Litvinoff, “Good Faith” (1997) 71 Tul L Rev 1645 at 1668. Although the aforementioned article focuses on the civil law context, the distinction between good faith and fiduciary duties is also present in the common law. See Paul Daly, “La bonne foi et la common law: l’arrêt Bhasin c Hrynew” in Jérémie Torres-Ceyte, Gabriel-Arnaud Berthold & Charles-Antoine M Péladeau, eds, Le dialogue en droit civil (Les Éditions Thémis, 2018) 89.
  168. See Bhasin, supra note 122 at para 69. See also Daniele Bertolini, “Toward a Framework to Define the Outer Boundaries of Good Faith in Contractual Performance” (2021) 58 Alta L Rev 573.
  169. See Northwest Territories, supra note 6 at 8-9, 13.
  170. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp v Hydro‑Québec, 2018 SCC 46 at para 67 [Churchill Falls].
  171. See e.g. Bhasin, supra note 122 at para 69. See also Paul S Davies, “The Basis of Contractual Duties of Good Faith” (2019) 1 J Commonwealth L at 26-27; Nicholas Reynolds, “Two Views of the Cathedral: Civilian Approaches, Reasonable Expectations, and the Puzzle of Good Faith's Past and Future” (2019) 44 Queen's LJ 388; David Campbell, “Good Faith and the Ubiquity of the Relational Contract” (2014) 77 Mod L Rev 475, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12075.
  172. See Wastech Services Ltd v Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District, 2021 SCC 7 at paras 102-03 [Wastech]. Although the contract was characterized as relational, this did not appear to play a significant role in the analysis.
  173. See Bertolini, supra note 168 at 602-08.
  174. Ibid at 619.
  175. See e.g. O’Faircheallaigh, “Monitoring Instruments,” supra note 7.
  176. Bertolini, supra note 168 at 607.
  177. Vincent Karim, Les obligations, 5th ed (Wilson & Lafleur, 2020) at para 183 [translated by author].
  178. Gateway Realty v Arton Holdings (1991), 106 NSR (2d) 180 at para 38 (SC (TD)); Bhasin, supra note 122 at para 38.
  179. See Wastech, supra 172 at para 76.
  180. Ibid at para 73.
  181. Bhasin, supra note 122 at para 70.
  182. Churchill Falls, supra note 170 at para 125.
  183. See Wastech, supra note 172 at para 93.
  184. Bhasin, supra note 122 at para 69.
  185. See e.g. Gibson & O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 36.
  186. Given the risks that the parties will reach an impasse, Gilmour and Mellett (supra note 6 at 399) suggest that developers should continue to advance the regulatory approval process and be prepared to complete that process without an IBA. This means ensuring that all matters involving consultation with the First Nation are fully documented so that the proponent can demonstrate to the regulatory and government authorities what steps were taken to understand and reasonably resolve concerns.
  187. See e.g. Nicholas Reynolds, “The New Neighbour Principle: Reasonable Expectations, Relationality, and Good Faith in Pre-Contractual Negotiations” (2017) 60 Can Bus LJ 94 [Reynolds, “The New Neighbour Principle”]; Swan, Adamski & Na, supra note 10 at 333-53; Shahram Aryan & Bagher Mirabbasi, “The Good Faith Principle and Its Consequences in Pre-Contractual Period: A Comparative Study on English and French Law” (2016) 9:2 J Politics & L 232, DOI: .
  188. See Martel Building Ltd v Canada, 2000 SCC 60 at para 73 [Martel].
  189. See Reynolds, “The New Neighbour Principle,” supra note 187 at 116.
  190. See e.g. McDonald v Brookfield Asset Management Inc, 2016 ABCA 375 at 57-58; Larizza v Royal Bank of Canada, 2018 ONCA 632 at 13-15; Algo Enterprises Ltd v Repap New Brunswick Inc, 2016 NBCA 35 at para 13. See also Bhasin, supra note 122.
  191. See CM Callow Inc v Zollinger, 2020 SCC 45 [Callow]; Wastech, supra note 172.
  192. See e.g. Karim, supra note 178 at paras 272-76.
  193. See e.g. 3746292 Manitoba Ltd et al v Intact Insurance Company et al, 2018 MBCA 59 at para 22; Bhasin, supra note 122 at para 23; ICBC v Hosseini, 2006 BCCA 187 at para 54-59.
  194. See e.g. Daly, supra note 168.
  195. (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 2749 (WL Can) at para 34 (CA) [Cornell Engineering]. See also Amertek Inc v Canadian Commercial Corp, 2005 CarswellOnt 2784 (WL Can) at para 113 (CA).
  196. Reynolds highlights the importance of reasonable expectations and reliance within tort law. See Reynolds, “The New Neighbour Principle,” supra note 188 at 98-110.
  197. [1992] 2 AC 128 at 129.
  198. Ko v Hillview Homes Ltd, 2012 ABCA 245 at para 136 [Hillview].
  199. Martel, supra note 188 at para 62.
  200. See e.g. Mary River IIBA, supra note 83, art 2.1.1. The article observes that: Underlying the provisions of this Agreement is the principle of mutual benefit, collaboration and consultation for both Inuit and the Company from the Project. Benefits for Inuit shall include financial participation, a comprehensive training strategy, target levels of Inuit employment, capacity building, business opportunities and Inuit content considerations in contracting. To the extent that Inuit achieve these benefits the Company will then be able to rely on efficient, high quality Inuit Firms, a well-trained local work force, Project support and stability.
  201. See e.g. Cornell Engineering, supra note 196 at para 32; Daly, supra note 167 at 2.
  202. Martel, supra note 188 at para 68.
  203. For more on the question of sovereignty within Canadian jurisprudence, see generally Robert Hamilton & Joshua Nichols, “The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa Nation and the Foundation of the Duty to Consult” (2019) 56 Alta L Rev 729, DOI: ; John Borrows, “The Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia” (2015) 48 UBC L Rev 701; Ryan Beaton, “De Facto and De Jure Crown Sovereignty: Reconciliation and Legitimation at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2018) 27 Const Forum Const 25, DOI: https://doi.org/10.21991/cf29371.
  204. Martel, supra note 188 at para 70.
  205. Hillview, supra note 198 at para 134.
  206. For example, in Cree traditions, recourse might be had to the concept of miyo-wicehtowin, which requires individuals and groups to “conduct themselves in a manner such that they create positive good relations in all relationships”: Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, supra note 132 at 85.
  207. Callow, supra note 191 at para 91.
  208. Haida, supra note 51 at para 42.
  209. See e.g. Didier Lluelles & Benoît Moore, Droit des obligations, 3rd ed (Éditions Thémis, 2018), at para 249.3.
  210. For an analysis of potential monitoring instruments, see O'Faircheallaigh, “Monitoring Instruments,” supra note 7. See also Caine & Krogman, supra note 9 at 84. See also Scott, supra note 28 at 282. Scott recognizes the risk that promised benefits may not be delivered to First Nations, highlighting that

    [t]he order in which the parties deliver their ‘goods’…clearly matters in the real world of extraction contracting. In the context of most IBA negotiations, the company benefits first and performs later; that is, the First Nation agrees to acquiesce or stay silent through regulatory proceedings (if not stand on a stage and shake hands in front of cameras), and the cheques begin rolling in later.

  211. See e.g. Diavik Diamonds Project Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement, Diavik Diamond Mines Inc, Government of the Northwest Territories & Aboriginal Signatories and Parties, 2 Oct 1999, Appendix A6; Mary River IIBA, supra note 83, art 4.2.3; Pinehouse Agreement, supra note 7, art 4.2, Schedule E, s 10(c).

  212. Wastech, supra note 172 at para 62.

  213. Ibid at para 63.

  214. Whale Tail IIBA, supra note 75, s 11(e)(i).

  215. Pinehouse Agreement, supra note 7, art 11.17(a).

  216. Wastech, supra note 172 at para 4.

  217. It is also consistent with an effort to reconcile the normative perspectives of the developer and the Indigenous group within the agreement. For example, in an agreement with the Anishinabek, adjudicators’ analysis of good faith could acknowledge the perspectives that informed the bargain, including Anishinabek conceptions of stewardship. As Borrows (supra note 132 at 78-79) has explained:

    The Anishinabek people have a number of legal principles that guide their relationship with other living beings in a conservationist mode...The Anishinabek have strong legal traditions that convey their duties relative to the world. These are stewardship-like concepts (bimeekumaugaewin) and apply to their use of land, plants, and others. Principles of acknowledgement, accomplishment, accountability, and approbation are embedded in the Anishinabek creation epic and associated stories.

    On the issue of good faith, this might entail a tailored understanding of the other party’s legitimate interests, which extend beyond the parties themselves to the broader relationships within the ecosystem in which development is taking place: see Aimée Craft, “Navigating Our Ongoing Sacred Legal Relationship with Nibi (Water)” in John Borrows et al, eds, Braiding Legal Orders: Implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019) 101 at 106. Craft highlights that in Anishinaabe law, when considering the impact of our actions, we do not think in terms of parties with a direct interest, but rather we evaluate the many combinations of relationships within a broader web of relationships that exist within Creation.

  218. Churchill Falls, supra note 170 at para 35.

  219. See Meadowbank Mine IIBA, supra note 29, art 5.1.

  220. Ibid, art 5.3. See also Mary River IIBA, supra note 83, art 22.7.

  221. Ibid, art 22.4.

  222. This context is therefore different from the circumstances of Churchill Falls, supra note 170. In that case, the contracting party sought to ground the recognition of an implied duty to renegotiate a long-term contract in the requirements of good faith. See ibid at para 105. This proposition was rejected by the Supreme Court as beyond even the broad approach to good faith accepted in the civil law. See ibid at para 105. In contrast, many IBAs expressly include renegotiation clauses, and therefore require courts merely to assess the good faith exercise of contractual discretion, as they would with any provision. See Wastech, supra note 172 at para 58 (confirming that “the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith is well-established”).

  223. James Tully, “Reconciliation Here on Earth” in Michael Asch, John Borrows & James Tully, eds, Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Settler Relations and Earth Teachings (University of Toronto Press, 2018) 83 at 87, DOI: .

  224. Wastech, supra note 172 at para 76.

  225. See e.g. Bhasin, supra note 122 at para 70; Wastech, supra note 172 at para 74.

  226. See Wastech, supra note 172 at paras 74 (Kasirer J), 131 (Brown and Rowe JJ, concurring).

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