Social Rights and Transformative Private Law

Authors

Edward Béchard-Torres, Lincoln Alexander School of Law, Toronto Metropolitan University

Document Type

Article

Abstract

Although constitutional social rights continue to attract much scholarly attention, their role in shaping private law is often overlooked. This neglect has led some scholars to underestimate social rights’ transformative potential. This article considers social rights’ influence over contract and property law in India, Colombia, and South Africa—three leading jurisdictions of the Global South. It argues that social rights can promote redistributive outcomes and inspire important shifts in private law’s values and modes of reasoning. However, it cautions that the depth of this transformation will depend on how judges choose to cross the public– private divide. One tradition rejects any role for social rights in the private sphere. Another approach is comfortable imposing positive social duties, but only on firms that resemble the state. One notch further along, there are approaches that prefer maximum flexibility and pragmatism, but which fail to invest much effort in elaborating legal doctrine or a theory of relationships. The final method integrates constitutional aspirations into private law. Integration transforms private law’s modes of reasoning and offers the clearest language for confronting private domination and inequality. However, it can also threaten wide swaths of private law and risk a legitimacy crisis for the judiciary. This article charts each of these paths of influence. It considers the legal environments that foster each path, as well as their normative dynamics, internal limits, and shortcomings. This effort is meant to mirror developments in the literature on comparative public law, where scholars have mapped diverging strategies for enforcing social rights in litigation against the state. More fundamentally, this article aims to recentre private law in discussions of how social rights participate in transformative constitutionalism.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Citation Information

Béchard-Torres, Edward. "Social Rights and Transformative Private Law." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 60.2 (2023) : 373-417.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3894
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol60/iss2/4

References

1. Mark Tushnet thus writes of the private law's role in creating "conditions of unconstitutionality." See "Dialogue and Constitutional Duty" in Tsvi Kahana & Anat Scolnicov, eds, Boundaries of State, Boundaries of Rights: Human Rights, Private Actors and Positive Obligations (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 94 at 98. See also Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, "State Action & A New Birth of Freedom" (2004) 92 Geo LJ 779 at 779-80. On the role of private law in managing access to vital goods, see Helen Hershkoff, "Transforming Legal Theory in the Light of Practice: The Judicial Application of Social and Economic Rights to Private Orderings" in Varun Gauri & Daniel Brinks, eds, Courting Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 268.

2. These ideas were at the heart of legal realists' critique of the public-private distinction, and subsequently influenced the critical legal studies movement. See e.g. Duncan Kennedy, "The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!" (1991) 15 Leg Stud Forum 327 at 327-45; Joseph William Singer, "Legal Realism Now" (1988) 76 Calif L Rev 465 at 475,482-92, citing Robert Hale, "Coercion and Distribution in Supposedly Non-Coercive States" (1923) 38 Poli Sci Q 470 [Hale, "Coercion and Distribution"] and Robert Hale, "Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty" (1943) 43 Colum L Rev 603.

3. See Dennis M Davis & Karl Klare, "Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law" (2010) 26 SAJHR 403. https://doi.org/10.1080/19962126.2010.11864997

4. See Roberto Gargarella, "Inequality and the Constitution: From Equality to Social Rights" in Philipp Dann, Michael Riegner & Maxim Bönnemann, eds, The Global South and Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2020) 235 at 246-49. See also Roberto Gargarella, "Equality" in Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, eds, Comparative Constitutional Law in Latin America (Edward Elgar, 2017) 176 at 176, 183, 188-94. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198850403.003.0010

5. Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Harvard University Press, 2018) at 216. In a similar but less critical vein, David Landau and Rosalind Dixon write recently that "courts are often less interested (or less able) in using social rights to promote social transformation than is commonly assumed." See "Constitutional Non-Transformation: Socioeconomic Rights Beyond the Poor" in Katherine Young, ed, The Future of Economic and Social Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2019) 110 at 110. See also Rosalind Dixon & Julie Suk, "Liberal Constitutionalism and Economic Inequality" (2018) 85 U Chicago L Rev 369 at 395-97."publisher":"Harvard University Press","publisher-place":"Cambridge","title":"Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World","author":[{"family":"Moyn","given":"Samuel"}],"issued":{"date-parts":[["2018"]]}},"locator":"216"},{"id":474,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/local/vQeHM8vO/items/T2SKYB62"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/vQeHM8vO/items/T2SKYB62"],"itemData":{"id":474,"type":"chapter","container-title":"The Future of Economic and Social Rights","event-place":"Cambridge","page":"110","publisher":"Cambridge University Press","publisher-place":"Cambridge","title":"Constitutional Non-Transformation: Socioeconomic Rights Beyond the Poor","author":[{"family":"Landau","given":"David"},{"family":"Dixon","given":"Rosalind"}],"editor":[{"family":"Young","given":"Katherine"}],"issued":{"date-parts":[["2019"]]}},"locator":"110","prefix":"in a similar but less critical vein, David Landau and Rosalind Dixon write recently that \"courts are often less interested (or less able

6. "Can Rights Combat Economic Inequality?" (2020) 133 Harv L Rev 2017.

7. These three jurisdictions have long been at the centre of the study of social rights enforcement. See e.g. Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, "Introduction" in Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, ed, Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa and Colombia (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 1.

8. Dann, Riegner & Bönnemann, supra note 4 at 20-23. For an examination of this tradition's resonance in the "Global North," see Michaela Hailbronner, "Transformative Constitutionalism: Not Only in the Global South" (2017) 65 Am J Comp L 527. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avx016

9. Karl Klare, "Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism" (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 at 150. https://doi.org/10.1080/02587203.1998.11834974

10. See Heinz Klug, "Transformative Constitutionalism as a Model for Africa?" in Dann, Riegner & Bönnemann, eds, supra note 4, 141 at 146.

11. Klare, supra note 9 at 153-54. See also Marius Pieterse, "What Do We Mean When We Talk About Transformative Constitutionalism" (2005) 20 S Afr Pub L 155; Hailbronner, supra note 8 at 540-41.

12. On this point, I draw on the classifications of modes of legal thought outlined by Duncan Kennedy. See "Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000" [Kennedy, "Three Globalizations"] in David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds, The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 19 (distinguishing between classical legal thought, socially oriented legal thought, and contemporary legal thought).

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13. For a recent collection of contributions to this emerging field, see Poul F Kjaer, ed, The Law of Political Economy: Transformation in the Function of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2020). See also Jebediah Britton-Purdy et al, "Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis" (2020) 129 Yale LJ 1784.

14. For more on these distinctions, see Stephen Gardbaum, "Horizontal Effect" [Gardbaum, "Horizontal Effect"] in Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2016) 600 at 601; Hershkoff, supra note 1 at 282-86; Cheryl Saunders, "Constitutional Rights and the Common Law" in András Sajó & Renáta Uitz, eds, The Constitution in Private Relations: Expanding Constitutionalism (Eleven International, 2005) 183 at 183-84, 214.

15. See especially César Rodríguez-Garavito & Diana Rodríguez-Franco, Radical Deprivation on Trial: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in the Global South (Cambridge University Press, 2015); Malcolm Langford, César Rodríguez-Garavito & Julieta Rossi, "Introduction: From Jurisprudence to Compliance" in Malcolm Langford, César Rodríguez-Garavito & Julieta Rossi, eds, Social Rights Judgments and the Politics of Compliance: Making it Stick (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 3; Katharine G Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012); Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton University Press, 2008); Rosalind Dixon, "Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited" (2007) 5 ICON 391. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316673058.002

16. See e.g. Manoj Mate, "Public Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of India" in Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A Kagan, eds, Consequential Courts (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 262 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139207843.013; S Muralidhar, "India: The Expectations and Challenges of Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights" in Malcolm Langford, ed, Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 102 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511815485.007; Nick Robinson, "Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court" (2009) 8 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 1."ISBN":"978-1-139-20784-3","language":"en","note":"DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139207843.013","page":"262-288","publisher":"Cambridge University Press","publisher-place":"Cambridge","source":"DOI.org (Crossref

17. See generally Muralidhar, supra note 16; Jayna Kothari, "Social Rights Litigation in India: Developments of the Last Decade" in Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal Gross, eds, Exploring Social Rights (Hart, 2007) 171; Shylashri Shankar & Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Courts and Socioeconomic Rights in India" in Daniel Brinks & Varun Gauri, eds, Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 146. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511511240.006

18. Gardbaum, "Horizontal Effect," supra note 14 at 608. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1949-8594.1914.tb16179.x

19. Ibid.

20. See The Constitution of India (1950), arts 12-13 [Indian Constitution].

21. See Gardbaum, "Horizontal Effect," supra note 14 at 602-603.

22. See People's Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India, [1982] 3 Supreme Court Cases 235 (India) (recognizing that certain specific rights are subject-less, and are "indubitably enforceable against everyone"). See also Indian Constitution, supra note 20, arts 23-24; Stephen Gardbaum, "Positive and Horizontal Rights: Proportionality's Next Frontier or a Bridge Too Far?" in Vicki Jackson & Mark Tushnet, eds, Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 221 at 223.

23. See Gardbaum, "Horizontal Effect," supra note 14 at 602-603; Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society v District Registrar, [2005] 5 Supreme Court Cases 632 (India) ("[t]he fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution are normally enforced against State action or action by other authorities who may come within the provision of Article 12 of the Constitution").

24. See John Rawls, "The Basic Structure as Subject" in Alvin Goldman & Jaegwon Kim, eds, Values and Morals (Springer, 1978) 47 at 54-55 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7634-5_4; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993) at 283. Rawls writes that [t]he difference principle holds, for example, for income and property taxation, for fiscal and economic policy. It applies to the announced system of public law and statutes and not to particular transactions or distributions, nor to the decisions of individuals and associations, but rather to the institutional background against which these transactions and decisions take place (ibid). See also Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986) at 295-312. Note that several authors suggest that, properly interpreted, the Rawlsian basic structure does indeed require some measure of redistribution through the private law. See e.g. Samuel Scheffler, "Distributive Justice, the Basic Structure and the Place of Private Law" (2015) 35 Oxford J Leg Stud 213 https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqu030; Kevin Kordana & David Tabachnick, "Rawls and Contract Law" (2005) 73 Geo Wash L Rev 598; Kevin Kordana & David Tabachnick, "The Rawlsian View of Private Ordering" (2008) 25 Social Philosophy & Policy 288.nor to the decisions of individuals and associations, but rather to the institutional background against which these transactions and decisions take place\\uc0\\u8221{} https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052508080278

25. See e.g. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 63; Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 36 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660643.001.0001; Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, "Mischief and Misfortune" (1995) 41 McGill LJ 91 at 112; Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2009) at 35. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674054516

26. Aditi Bagchi, "Distributive Justice and Contract" in Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 193 at 194. See also Melvin Eisenberg, "Theory of Contracts" in Peter Benson, ed, Theory of Contract Law: New Essays (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 206 at 257 (rejecting redistribution in contract law as "completely haphazard"); Eric Posner, "Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom of Contract" (1995) 24 J Leg Stud 283 at 284. https://doi.org/10.1086/467961

27. See Ernest Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 63-64. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665815.001.0001

28. See especially Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, "Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income" (1994) 23 J Leg Stud 667 [Kaplow & Shavell, "Less Efficient"] https://doi.org/10.1086/467941; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, "Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income" (2000) 29 J Leg Stud 821 https://doi.org/10.1086/468095; Ronen Avraham, David Fortus & Kyle Logue, "Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell" (2004) 89 Iowa L Rev 1125 at 1126. See also Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 3rd ed (Addison-Wesley, 2000) at 112.

29. Kaplow & Shavell, "Less Efficient," supra note 28 at 674-75. See also Lee Anne Fennell & Richard McAdams, "The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics" (2016) 100 Minn L Rev 1051 at 1065.

30. See Gardbaum, "Horizontal Effect," supra note 14 at 613; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, "The Constitutionalisation of Indian Private Law" in Choudhry, Khosla & Mehta, eds, supra note 14, 680 at 680-83 (writing that these new procedures' "long-term effects on India's private law edifice have been devastating").

31. See Indian Constitution, supra note 20, art 32.

32. Shyam Divan, "Public Interest Litigation" in Choudhry, Khosla & Mehta, eds, supra note 14, 662 at 668-78; Mate, supra note 16 at 264-65, 271-73, 281; Muralidhar, supra note 16 at 108-109; SP Sathe, "Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience" (2001) 6 Wash UJL & Pol'y 29.

33. See Balganesh, supra note 30 at 686-88; Gardbaum, "Horizontal Effect," supra note 14 at 613.

34. See Balganesh, supra note 30 at 692-93.

35. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, "Codifying the Common Law of Property in India: Crystallization and Standardization as Strategies of Constraint" (2015) 63 Am J Comp L 33. https://doi.org/10.5131/AJCL.2015.0002

36. See Balganesh, supra note 30 at 683-85.

37. See especially Francis Coralie Mullin v Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, [1981] 2 Supreme Court Reports 516 (India).

38. Scheffler, supra note 24 at 214.

39. For a recent articulation of this idea, see Hanoch Dagan, A Liberal Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 2021) at 23, 244 [Dagan, Liberal Theory].

40. See generally Robert Hale, Freedom Through Law: Public Control of Private Governing Power (Columbia University Press, 1952); Hale, "Coercion and Distribution," supra note 2. See also Terry Skolnik, "Homelessness and Unconstitutional Discrimination" (2019) 15 JL & Equality 69 at 74-79; Christopher Essert, "Property and Homelessness" (2016) 44 Phil & Pub Aff 266 at 275-76; Jeremy Waldron, "Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom" (1991) 39 UCLA L Rev 295 at 304, 315, 397 (on the threat that homelessness in particular poses for freedom).

41. See Hanoch Dagan, "The Utopian Promise of Private Law" (2016) 66 UTLJ 392 at 411. https://doi.org/10.3138/UTLJ.3558

42. See especially Fennell & McAdams, supra note 29 at 1056.

43. See e.g. Anthony Kronman, "Contract Law and Distributive Justice" (1980) 89 Yale LJ 472 at 502-510; Bruce Ackerman, "Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy" (1971) 80 Yale LJ 1093 at 1097-98, 1102-19, 1186-88; Duncan Kennedy, "The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing: 'Milking' and Class Violence" (1987) 15 Fla St UL Rev 485 at 497-506; Duncan Kennedy, "Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power" (1982) 41 Md L Rev 563 at 613 [Kennedy, "Distributive and Paternalist Motives"]; Avraham, Fortus & Logue, supra note 28 at 1144-48; Fennell & McAdams, supra note 29 at 1061; Rashmi Dyal-Chand, "Sharing the Cathedral" (2013) 46 Conn L Rev 647.

44. [1995] 5 Supreme Court Cases 482 (India).

45. [1995] 3 Supreme Court Cases 42 (India).

46. See Hindi Vidya Bhavan Society v State of Maharashtra, [2005] 4 Bombay Court Reporter 676 (Bombay HC, India). See also Ravneet Kaur v The Christian Medical College (1997), [1998] All India Reporter Punjab & Haryana 1 (Punjab & Haryana HC, India).

47. [1996] 2 Supreme Court Cases 549 at 553 [Chameli].

48. See Jean Thomas, Public Rights, Private Relations (Oxford University Press, 2015) [Thomas, Private Relations]; Jean Thomas, "Our Rights, But Whose Duties? Re-conceptualizing Rights in the Era of Globalization" [Thomas, "Whose Duties"] in Kahana & Scolnicov, eds, supra note 1, 6. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107588943.002

49. Thomas, "Whose Duties," supra note 48 at 22.

50. Ibid at 21. See also Thomas, Private Relations, supra note 48 at 20.

51. Thomas, "Whose Duties," supra note 48 at 23.

52. See e.g. William Novak, "The Public Utility Idea and the Origins of Modern Business Regulation" in Naomi Lamoreaux & William Novak, eds, The Corporation and American Democracy (Harvard University Press, 2017) 139. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674977686-006

53. [2014] ZACC 12.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid at paras 56, 59, 64.

56. Ibid at paras 52-54.

57. Ibid at para 66.

58. Ibid at para 67.

59. See Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO, [2011] ZACC 13 at paras 57-58.

60. [2020] ZACC 12 [Pridwin].

61. Ibid at para 179.

62. Ibid at paras 85, 179-80, 200.

63. Ibid at paras 152, 198, 207-208.

64. Decreto 2591 de 1991 por el cual se reglamenta la acción de tutela consagrada en el articulo 86 de la Constitución Politíca [Decree 2591 of 1991 of the Colombian Congress for the Implementation of Article 86 of the Constitution], arts 42(1)-(3), 42(8).

65. See e.g. Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 29 August 2013, Serrano c el Fondo Nacional de Vivienda, Decision T-583/13 (Colombia) [Serrano]; Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 10 March 1999, Posada c CoopDesarollo, Decision SU-157/99 (Colombia).

66. See generally Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 12 December 2011, Bermúdez Hernéandez c Empresas Públicas de Medellín ESP, Decision T-928/11 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 3 October 2011, Ortiz c Junta Administradora del Acueducto JUAN XXIII, Decision T-740/11 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 14 February 2013, Ramírez Torres c el Complejo Carcelario, Decision T-077/13 (Colombia).

67. See Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 8 June 2012, Orbes Benavides c la Secretaría de Educación Departamental de Nariño, Decision T-428/12 (Colombia).

68. See Jimena Murillo Chávarro, "Access to Effective Remedies for the Protection of Human Rights in Essential Public Services Provision in Colombia" in Marlies Hesselman, Antenor Hallo de Wolf & Brigit Toebes, eds, Socio-Economic Human Rights in Essential Public Services Provision (Routledge, 2017) 256 at 267.

69. See Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 27 July 2010, Tapia Ahumada c Salud Total EPS, Decision T-603/10 (Colombia) [Tapia Ahumada].

70. See e.g. Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 13 December 1999, Acosta Hormechea c la Sociedad de Acueducto y Aseo de Barranquilla, "AAA" SA, ESP, Decision T-1016/99 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 26 October 1994, Jimenez c la Secretaría de Educación de Cundinamarca, Decision T-467/94 (Colombia); Serrano, supra note 65.

71. Thomas, "Whose Duties," supra note 48 at 20 [footnotes omitted], citing Onora O'Neill, "The Dark Side of Human Rights" (2005) 81 Intl Affairs 427 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00459.x; Joseph Raz, "Human Rights Without Foundations" in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, eds, The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 321.

72. Thomas, Private Relations, supra note 48 at 19.

73. Ibid at 20-21.

74. Ibid at 20.

75. Cass Sunstein, "Incompletely Theorized Agreements" (1995) 108 Harv L Rev 1733 https://doi.org/10.2307/1341816; Stephen A Smith, "Intermediate and Comprehensive Justifications for Legal Rules" in Simone Degeling, Michael Crawford & Nicholas Tiverios, Justifying Private Rights (Hart, 2020) 63. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509931989.ch-004

76. Aditi Bagchi, "Distributive Injustice and Private Law" (2008) 60 Hastings LJ 105 at 108 (suggesting that social rights are held not against any single person, but rather against every other member of a political community, and derivatively against the state).

77. Pridwin, supra note 60 at para 183.

78. See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another, [2011] ZACC 33 [Blue Moonlight].

79. See David Bilchitz, "A Chasm Between Is and Ought? A Critique of the Normative Foundations of the SRSG's Framework and Guiding Principles" in Durya Deva & David Bilchitz, eds, Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 107 at 125-26. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139568333.009

80. Ibid at 126-27.

81. Ibid at 129-30. See also David Bilchitz, "Do Corporations Have Positive Rights Obligations?" (2010) 125 Theoria 1 https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2010.5712502; David Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 72-74. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552160.001.0001

82. Direct application of constitutional norms is indeed a regional trend. On one author's count, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Uruguay all recognize direct horizontal effect. See Willmai Rivera-Perez, "What the Constitution Got to Do With It: Expanding the Scope of Constitutional Rights Into the Private Sphere" (2012) 3 Creighton Intl & Comparative LJ 189 at 198.

83. See Political Constitution of Colombia, 1991, arts 1 and 95 (2) [Colombian Constitution]. See also Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 5 June 2003, Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empleados de Distribuidoras de Drogas c Banco de Bogotá, Decision T-468/03 (Colombia).

84. See e.g. Yira López-Castro, "Viviendo bajo un contrato: La constitucionalización del derecho contractual" (2016) 13 Revista Jurídicas 82 at 87-88.

https://doi.org/10.17151/jurid.2016.13.1.6

85. Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 26 June 2003, Huelsz c Juzgado 13 Civil de Circuito de Bogotá, Decision T-520/03, s 3.3.1 (Colombia) [Huelsz]; Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 18 July 2017, José c el Banco Citibank Colombia SA, Decision T-463/17, s 2.1 (Colombia) [José].

86. See Mariana Bernal-Fandiño, "El principio de solidaridad como límite a la autonomía privada" (2016) 13 Revista Jurídicas 60 at 64-67. Compare López-Castro, supra note 84 at 91 (suggesting that although the constitutionalization of contract law, contract solidarity, and the social function of private rights are often discussed together, they remain formally distinct doctrines).

https://doi.org/10.17151/jurid.2016.13.2.5

87. See Colombian Constitution, supra note 83, arts 13 (equality), 16 (liberty), 33 (freedom of association), 333 (freedom to pursue economic activity and private initiatives). See also Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 23 May 2003, Franco Velez c Granahorrar, Decision T-423/03 (Colombia); Bernal-Fandiño, supra note 86 at 64.

88. Colombian Constitution, supra note 83, art 86.

89. Decreto 2591 de 1991 por el cual se reglamenta la acción de tutela consagrada en el articulo 86 de la Constitución Politíca [Decree 2591 of 1991 of the Colombian Congress for the Implementation of Article 86 of the Constitution], supra note 64.

90. Ibid, arts 42(1)-(3), 42(8).

91. Ibid, art 42(4).

92. Ibid, arts 42(5), 42(9).

93. Huelsz, supra note 85, s 1.2.2; Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 7 July 2006, Cuervo Cruz c La Previsora SA, compañía de Seguros, Decision T-517/06 (Colombia), s 2 [Cruz].

94. For its extensive use in litigating consumer insurance disputes, see Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 16 February 1998, Ortiz c Compañía de Seguros Bolívar SA, Decision T-032/98 (Colombia); Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 10 February 2000, Ramirez Bernal c Pan American de Colombia, Compañía de Seguros de Vida, Decision T-118/00 (Colombia); Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 6 November 2001, X c Aseguradora Solidaria de Colombia, Decision T-1165/01 (Colombia) [Aseguradora Solidaria]; Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 24 February 2003, Salazar Potes c Compañía Suramericana de Seguros de Vida SA, Decision T-171/03 (Colombia); Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 26 September 2012, Portillo Linares c BBVA Seguros De Vida Colombia, Decision T-751/12 (Colombia); Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 12 February 2016, Hernandez Herrera c BBVA Seguros de Vida Colombia SA, Decision T-058/16 (Colombia) [Hernandez Herrera]; Huelsz, supra note 85.

95. Daniel Bonilla, "Liberalism and Property in Colombia: Property as a Right and Property as a Social Function" (2011) 80 Fordham L Rev 1135 at 1135-36, 1141-49 (describing a civil law and liberal property system as an "ideologically coherent machinery that [historically] prioritized the principle of autonomy over equality and solidarity." On Colombian civil law's traditional reputation for formalism, see Jorge Esquirol, "The Turn to Legal Interpretation in Latin America" (2011) 26 Am U Intl L Rev 1031 at 1036; Alfredo Fuentes-Hernández, "Globalization and Legal Education in Latin America: Issues for Law and Development in the 21st Century" (2002) 21 Penn State Intl L Rev 39; David Landau, "The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence: A New Approach to Modeling Judicial Behavior in Latin America" (2005) 37 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 687 at 689, 709-710.see Jorge Esquirol, \\uc0\\u8220{}The Turn to Legal Interpretation in Latin America\\uc0\\u8221{} [2011] 26:4 Am U Int\\uc0\\u8217{}l L Rev 1031 at 1036; Alfredo Fuentes-Hern\\uc0\\u225{}ndez, \\uc0\\u8220{}Globalization and Legal Education in Latin America: Issues for Law and Development in the 21st Century\\uc0\\u8221{} [2002] 21:1 Penn State Int\\uc0\\ u8217{}l L Rev 39; David Landau, \\uc0\\u8220{}The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence: A New Approach to Modeling Judicial Behavior in Latin America\\uc0\\u8221{} [2005] 37 Geo Wash Int\\uc0\\u8217{}l L Rev 687 at 689, 709\\ uc0\\u8211{}710.","plainCitation":"Daniel Bonilla, "Liberalism and Property in Colombia: Property as a Right and Property as a Social Function" (2011

96. MC Mirow, "Borrowing Private Law in Latin America: Andrés Bello's Use of the Code Napoléon in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code" (2001) 61 La L Rev 291.

97. See generally Esquirol, supra note 95 at 1032.

98. Esquirol also highlights the role of American legal education and international development programs in prompting the region-wide shift away from formalism. See supra note 95.

99. For a review of the implications of the Colombian Constitution on private relationships, see Bernal-Fandiño, supra note 86 at 60-61. For a review of the Colombian Constitution's implications for property, see Bonilla, supra note 95. See also Esquirol, supra note 95 at 1041 (noting a region-wide shift from an "unrelentingly formalist Latin American practice" to "post-legal-realist reconstructive theories of liberal law"); José Luis Benavides, "Contencioso contractual en Colombia: Flexibilidad del control e inestabilidad del contrato" (2006) 18 Revista Derecho del Estado 183 at 183 (discussing the wider shift in the self-conception and role of the judge in contractual disputes).

100. Rivera-Perez, supra note 82 at 205-206, citing Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 18 September 1992, Marin c Alberto Galeano, Rector del IDEM José Maria Bravo Márquez de la ciudad de Medellín, Decision T-524/92 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 30 June 1993, Pastrana c La Empresa de Productos Quimicos del Huila SA, "Proquimhul", Decision T-251/93 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 5 November 1993, Camelo c la sociedad Servientrega Ltda, Decision T-507/93 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 31 January 1994, Acosta De León c Bernal Leal, Decision T-028/94 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 26 October 1994, Bonilla c la Asociacion de Usuarios del Acueducto Regional "Velu", Decision T-463/94 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 28 August 1995, Rojas c Francisco Próspero de Vengoechea Fleury, Decision T-379/95 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 4 March 1997, Quintero c del Señor Miguel Avila Peña, en su calidad de administrador de la Comunidad del Cerrejón Central, Decision T-100/97 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 30 July 1997, Escalante Ramírez c Diocesis De Cúcuta, T-351/97 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 19 July 2001, Ariza c Juzgado 1 Penal Municipal de Soacha, Decision T-767/01 (Colombia); Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 8 March 2004, Escobar c la Cooperativa Coopserp, Decision T-222/04 (Colombia).

101. Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 30 May 2003, Rendón c Colseguros EPS, Decision T-448/03 (Colombia).

102. Ibid, s 6.

103. Tapia Ahumada, supra note 69, s 2.4.3.1; Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 16 February 2012, Hurtado Torres c Capresoca Eps S, Decision T-081/12 at para 16 (Colombia).

104. See e.g. Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 5 November 2009, Jesús Mira Rúa c Uno A Aseo Integrado SA con vinculación de EPS Comfenalco Antioquia, Decision T-797/09 (Colombia); Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 4 June 2008, Castro Cuartas c Salud Total EPS, ARS, SA, Decision T-573/08 (Colombia); Tapia Ahumada, supra note 69; Torres, supra note 103.

105. Torres, supra note 103 at para 16.

106. Ibid, citing Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 15 December 1993, Cordoba Romaña c el Hospital San José de Turbo, Antioquia, Decision T-597/93 (Colombia).

107. See Huelsz, supra note 85.

108. See Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 15 June 2010, Velasquez Ramirez c Refinancia SA, Decision T-448/10 (Colombia) [Ramirez] (forced displacement); Corte Constitutional [Constitutional Court], Bogotá, 25 February 2005, Sandra c Banco Conavi, Decision T-170/05 [Sandra] (illness); José, supra note 85