Oversight of Police Intelligence: A Complex Web, but Is It Enough?

Authors

Lyria Bennett Moses, Faculty of Law and Justice, UNSW

Document Type

Article

Abstract

This article analyzes the jurisdiction, function, powers, and expertise of oversight mechanisms with reference to capacity to oversee the legality of emerging police intelligence practices such as facial recognition, social media analytics, and predictive policing. It argues that oversight of such practices raises distinct issues ranging from the general oversight of policing, given the secrecy associated with police intelligence generally, to the use of complex software in particular. It combines doctrinal analysis with analysis of interviews with policing intelligence analysts, intelligence managers, lawyers, and IT professionals in three jurisdictions: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. It brings together the roles of a variety of entities involved directly or indirectly in oversight; in particular, professional standards units, independent police and public sector oversight bodies, intelligence oversight, privacy and human rights regulators, courts, political bodies, contracting parties, and ad hoc bodies. Understanding the web of oversight as a whole, and comparing across jurisdictions, it concludes with specific proposals for reform.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Citation Information

Bennett Moses, Lyria. "Oversight of Police Intelligence: A Complex Web, but Is It Enough?." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 60.2 (2023) : 289-336.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3892
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol60/iss2/2

References

1. Jerry Ratcliffe, Intelligence-led Policing (Routledge, 2008) at 89.

2. Ibid at 8.

3. Ibid at 40.

4. See Carrie Sanders & Camie Condon, "Crime Analysis and Cognitive Effects: The Practice of Policing Through Flows of Data" (2017) 18 Global Crime 237 at 237, 241 https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2017.1323637; Carrie B Sanders, Crystal Weston & Nicole Schott, "Police Innovations, 'Secret Squirrels' and Accountability: Empirically Studying Intelligence-led Policing in Canada" (2015) 55 Brit J Crim 711 at 712. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azv008

5. See Michael T Rossler, "The Impact of Police Technology Adoption on Social Control, Police Accountability, and Police Legitimacy" in Cara E Rabe-Hemp & Nancy S Lind, eds, Political Authority, Social Control and Public Policy (Emerald, 2019) 209. https://doi.org/10.1108/S2053-769720190000031014

6. See Eli B Silverman, NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing (Northeastern University Press, 2001).

7. See Jim Bronskill, "Mounties Defend Social Profiling After Assembling Portrait of Activist," CBC News (2 January 2020), online: www.cbc.ca/news/politics/rcmp-defends-social-media-profiling-1.5413580 [perma.cc/F84X-V8ZG].

8. See Mackenzie Smith, "Police Searched for Suspects in Unapproved Trial of Facial Recognition Tech, Clearview AI," RNZ News (15 May 2020), online: [perma.cc/37LD-WRJG]; The Detail, "Blurred Lines - the Police and Facial Recognition Technology," RNZ News (17 September 2020), online: www.rnz.co.nz/programmes/the-detail/story/2018764397/blurred-lines-the-police-and-facial-recognition-technology [perma.cc/3BGS-QWLH].

9. Janet Chan & Lyria Bennett Moses, "Can Big Data Analytics Predict Policing Practice" in Stacey Hannem et al, eds, Security and Risk Technologies in Criminal Justice (Canadian Scholars Press, 2019); Shawn Singh, "Algorithmic Policing Technologies in Canada" (2021) 44 Man LJ 246 at 288.

10. See e.g. Kate Robertson, Cynthia Khoo & Yolanda Song, To Surveil and Predict: A Human Rights Analysis of Algorithmic Policing in Canada (Citizen Lab & International Human Rights Program, University of Toronto, 2020).

11. See generally Bernard E Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (University of Chicago Press, 2013).

12. See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, "Visible Policing: Technology, Transparency and Democratic Control" (2021) 109 Cal L Rev 917. See also Vicki Sentas & Camilla Pandolfini, Policing Young People in NSW: A Study of the Suspect Targeting Management Plan (Youth Justice Coalition, 2017). https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/4pcf3

13. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Canadian Charter]. See Robertson, Khoo & Song, supra note 10.

14. See Singh, supra note 9.

15. Ibid.

16. In Australia, see Lyria Bennett Moses et al, Using "Open Source" Data and Information for Defence, National Security and Law Enforcement: Legal Report (Report A) (Data to Decisions CRC & University of New South Wales Sydney, 2018). In Canada, see Robertson, Khoo & Song, supra note 10 at 77, citing R v Spencer, 2014 SCC 43 at paras 38-50.

17. See Jake Goldenfein, "Australian Police are Using the Clearview AI Facial Recognition System with No Accountability," The Conversation (3 March 2020), online: theconversation.com/australian-police-are-using-the-clearview-ai-facial-recognition-system-with-noaccountability-132667 [perma.cc/5QH2-QHYD]; Monique Mann & Marcus Smith, "Automated Facial Recognition Technology: Recent Developments and Approaches to Oversight" (2017) 40 UNSWLJ 121; Teresa Scassa, "How Clearview AI Could Violate Copyright Law" (10 March 2020), online: Centre for International Governance Innovation www.cigionline.org/articles/how-clearview-ai-could-violate-copyright-law [perma.cc/EGM8-CQPB].

18. See generally Robertson, Khoo & Song, supra note 10.

19. See Sentas & Pandolfini, supra note 12.

20. Richard V Ericson & Kevin D Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 200, 424. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442678590

21. See Mia Hartmann, "Grey Zone Creativity" in Nicolas Fyfe, Helene Gundhus & Kira Vrist Rønn, eds, Moral Issues in Intelligence-Led Policing (Routledge, 2018) 161 at 163. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315231259-9

22. Legality is an essential component of security. See Peter Gill, "Not Just Joining the Dots But Crossing the Borders and Bridging the Voids: Constructing Security Networks after 11 September 2001" (2005) 16 Policing & Society 27 at 4142.

23. See Robertson, Khoo & Song, supra note 10; Sentas & Pandolfini, supra note 12.

24. For the purposes of this article, oversight includes review. In Canada, review describes assessment of the activities of an organization against standards such as lawfulness and propriety, whereas oversight implies a more direct role in management. See Canada, Commission of Inquiry in the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities (Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006) at 499-500 [Arar Report: Policy Report].

25. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Rise of Big Data Policing: Surveillance, Race, and the Future of Law Enforcement (New York University Press, 2017) at 114.

26. Ibid at 89.

27. See The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNGAOR, 27th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/27/37 (2014) [UNHCR, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age].

28. See Garth den Heyer & Alan Beckley, "Police Independent Oversight in Australia and New Zealand" (2013) 14 Police Practice & Research 130. https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.767093

29. See Andrew Goldsmith, "The Pursuit of Police Integrity: Leadership and Governance Dimensions" (2001) 13 CICJ 185 at 197 [Goldsmith, "Police Integrity"]. See also Janet Chan, Changing Police Culture (Cambridge University Press, 1997). Contra Frank Harris, "Holding Police Accountability Theory to Account" (2012) 6 Policing 240. https://doi.org/10.1080/10345329.2001.12036225

30. See generally Lyria Bennett Moses & Louis De Koker, "Open Secrets: Balancing Operational Secrecy and Transparency in the Collection and Use of Data by National Security and Law Enforcement Agencies" (2017) 41 Melbourne UL Rev 561.

31. See Janet Chan, "Governing Police Practice: Limits of the New Accountability" (1999) 50 British J Sociology 251 at 259 [Chan, "Governing Police Practice"]. https://doi.org/10.1080/000713199358734

32. In the United Kingdom, see generally Kiron Reid, "Current Developments in Police Accountability" (2002) 66 J Crim L 172. https://doi.org/10.1177/002201830206600210

33. See generally Tobias T Gibson, "Multiple Principals and the (Lack of) Intelligence Oversight" (2017) 5 National Security LJ 239; Patrick Cronin & Stephen Reicher, "Accountability Processes and Group Dynamics: A SIDE Perspective on the Policing of an Anti‐Capitalist Riot" (2009) 39 European J Soc Psychology 237. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.544

34. See "The Law of Homegrown (Counter) Terrorism" (2010) 88 Tex L Rev 1715 at 1740-42. See also Samuel J Rascoff, "Domesticating Intelligence" (2010) 83 S Cal L Rev 575 at 583, 586.

35. See Howard L Draper, "Privacy and Police Intelligence Data Banks: A Proposal to Create a State Organized Crime Intelligence System and to Regulate the Use of Criminal Intelligence Information" (1976) 14 Harv J on Legis 1 at 72-73, 107.

36. See generally Benjamin S Mishkin, "Filling the Oversight Gap: The Case for Local Intelligence Oversight" (2013) 88 NYU L Rev 1414.

37. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 12.

38. See also Philip C Stenning, "Evaluating Police Complaints Legislation: A Suggested Framework" [Stenning, "Evaluating Police Complaints Legislation"] in Andrew Goldsmith & Colleeen Lewis, eds, Civilian Oversight of Policing (Hart Publishing, 2000) 147.

39. See Colleen Lewis, "The Politics of Civilian Oversight: Serious Commitment or Lip Service?" in Goldsmith & Lewis, eds, supra note 38, 19 at 30-35.

40. See Louise E Porter, "Beyond 'Oversight': A Problem-Oriented Approach to Police Reform" (2013) 14 Police Practice & Research 169; Arar Report: Policy Report, supra note 24 at 543-45, 555-56. https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.767096

41. See Tim Prenzler, "Civilian Oversight of Police" (2000) 40 Brit J Crim 659 [Prenzler, "Civilian Oversight"]. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/40.4.659

42. See Stephen P Savage, "Seeking 'Civilianness': Police Complaints and the Civilian Control Model of Oversight" (2013) 53 Brit J Crim 886; Barbara Attard, "Oversight of Law Enforcement is Beneficial and Needed - Both and Out" (2010) 30 Pace L Rev 1548; Lewis, supra note 39. https://doi.org/10.58948/2331-3528.1755

43. See Virginia Braun & Victoria Clarke, "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology" (2006) 3 Qualitative Research in Psychology 77; Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis (SAGE Publications, 2006).

44. See generally Norman Denzin, The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods, 3rd ed (Prentice Hall, 1989).

45. See Carrie B Sanders & Carl J Cuneo, "Social Reliability in Qualitative Team Research" (2010) 44 Sociology 325. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038509357194

46. See Lars Westfelt & Felipe Estrada, "International Crime Trends: Sources of Comparative Crime Data and Post-War Trends in Western Europe" in James Sheptycki & Ali Wardak, eds, Transnational and Comparative Criminology (GlassHouse Press, 2005) 19 at 19-20.

47. See David Landa, "Foreword" in David Moore & Roger Wettenhall, eds, Keeping the Peace: Police Accountability and Oversight (University of Canberra & Royal Institute of Public Administration Australia, 1994) vii.

48. See New Zealand Police, Code of Conduct (2022) at 7, in force under Policing Act 2008 (NZ), 2008/72, s 20.

49. See Philip Stenning, "The Idea of Political 'Independence' of the Police: International Interpretations and Experiences" [Stenning, "Political Independence"] in Margaret E Beare & Tonita Murray, eds, Police and Government Relations: Who's Calling the Shots? (University of Toronto Press, 2007) 183 at 183. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442684690-008

50. See Police Act 1998 (SA), 1998/55 [Police Act 1998]; AU09.

51. See Richard Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) at 10. This is similar to the definition that Chan offers in the specific context of policing. "Governing Police Practice, " supra note 31 at 253.

52. Contra Jean-Paul Brodeur, "Accountability: The Search for a Theoretical Framework" [Brodeur, "Accountability"] in Errol P Mendes et al, eds, Democratic Policing and Accountability: Global Perspectives (Ashgate, 1999) 125 at 152, 157 (suggesting that organizational agents are the primary focus of accountability).

53. See Mulgan, supra note 51 at 20.

54. Ibid.

55. See Janina Boughey & Greg Weeks, "Government Accountability as a 'Constitutional Value'" in Rosalind Dixon, ed, Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018) 99 at 102; Mulgan, supra note 51 at 22-23. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509918430.ch-006

56. See Stenning, "Political Independence," supra note 49 at 185.

57. See Chan, "Governing Police Practice," supra note 31.

58. See Jerry L Mashaw, "Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance" in Michael Dowdle, ed, Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 115 at 120.

59. See Andrew Goldsmith, "Necessary but Not Sufficient: The Role of Public Complaints Procedures in Police Accountability" in Philip C Stenning, ed, Accountability for Criminal Justice: Selected Essays (University of Toronto Press, 1995) 110 at 112. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442670594-008

60. See Kira Vrist Rønn, "The Professional Ethics of Intelligence" in Fyfe, Gundhus & Vrist Rønn, eds, supra note 21, 121 at 126. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315231259-7

61. On the principal-agent problem, see generally Mulgan, supra note 51. On accountability, see Attard, supra note 42 at 1548; Petter Gottschalk, Knowledge Management in Police Oversight: Law Enforcement Integrity and Accountability (Brown Walker Press, 2009) at 14-15. See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity (UN, 2011) at 5.

62. See e.g. Police Act 1998, supra note 50, s 74A.

63. See Bennett Moses & De Koker, supra note 30. See also Tony Plaff & Jeffrey Tiel, "The Ethics of Espionage" (2004) 3 J Military Ethics 1 at 12. https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570310004447

64. See Mary Seneviratne, "Policing the Police in the United Kingdom" (2004) 14 Policing & Society 329 at 330. https://doi.org/10.1080/1043946042000286056

65. Austl, Commonwealth, Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review (DPMC, 2017) at 111 [2017 Independent Intelligence Review].

66. SC 2019, c 13, Preamble ("Whereas enhanced accountability and transparency are vital to ensuring public trust and confidence in Government of Canada institutions that carry out national security or intelligence activities").

67. See UNHCR, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, supra note 27 at 37.

68. See Ferguson, supra note 25 ("[t]he architecture of surveillance also needs an architecture of accountability" at 201).

69. See Gottschalk, supra note 61 at 15; Samuel Walker, "Police Accountability: Current Issues and Research Needs" (Paper presented at Policing Research Workshop: Planning for the Future, National Institute of Justice, 28-29 November 2006) [unpublished].

70. See Goldsmith, "Police Integrity," supra note 29 at 199; David H Bayley, "Preface" in Andrew Goldsmith, ed, Complaints against the Police: The Trend to External Review (Clarendon Press, 1991) v at ix-xi.

71. See Mashaw, supra note 58 at 117-18.

72. See Stenning, "Evaluating Police Complaints Legislation," supra note 38 at 158.

73. See Tim Prenzler, "Scandal, Inquiry, and Reform: The Evolving Locus of Responsibility for Police Integrity" in Tim Prenzler & Garth den Heyer, eds, Civilian Oversight of Police: Advancing Accountability in Law Enforcement (CRC Press, 2016) 3 at 6; Prenzler, "Civilian Oversight," supra note 41; Andrew Goldsmith, "Better Policing, More Human Rights: Lessons from Civilian Oversight" in Mendes et al, eds, supra note 52, 33 at 35. https://doi.org/10.1201/b19040-3

74. See Lyria Bennett Moses, "Who Owns Information? Law Enforcement Information Sharing as a Case Study in Conceptual Confusion" (2020) 43 UNSWLJ 615. https://doi.org/10.53637/ZHNC6771

75. Chan, "Governing Police Practice," supra note 31 at 262-63.

76. AU03.

77. CA04.

78. AU21.

79. AU08; AU16; AU21.

80. AU01; AU05; AU06; AU07; AU08; AU09; AU11; AU12; AU13; AU14; AU17; AU18; AU21; NZ01; NZ02; NZ06; NZ09; NZ10; NZ12; NZ15; NZ16; NZ17.

81. AU09; AU11; NZ17.

82. AU12.

83. AU03.

84. AU20.

85. CA15 (Patrol Analyst).

86. CA02 (Intelligence Analyst).

87. AU03 (Manager).

88. AU21 (Manager).

89. CA09 (Intelligence Analyst).

90. NZ06 (Lead Intelligence Analyst).

91. NZ09.

92. NZ04; CA07.

93. See Tim Prenzler & Carol Ronken, "Models of Police Oversight: A Critique" (2001) 11 Policing & Society 151 at 152-56. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2001.9964860

94. See generally Graham Smith, "Rethinking Police Complaints" (2004) 44 Brit J Crim 15 [Smith, "Rethinking"].criminal conduct, tortious action and unacceptable policy and four functions are considered managerial, liability, restorative and accountability. It is concluded that in order to effectively and efficiently deal with the various causes of complaint, a two-tier system is required to deal with complaints that allege unprofessional behaviour and criminal conduct, and a third, separate tier, is necessary to consider complaints regarding unacceptable police policy.","container-title":"The British Journal of Criminology","DOI":"10.1093/bjc/44.1.15","ISSN":"0007-0955","issue":"1","page":"15-33","title":"Rethinking Police Complaints","volume":"44","author":[{"family":"Smith","given":"Graham"}],"issued":{"date-parts":[["2004"]]}}}],"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"} https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/44.1.15

95. See David Brereton, "Evaluating the Performance of External Oversight Bodies" in Goldsmith & Lewis, eds, supra note 38, 105 at 118-19.

96. An example of this narrow focus is the complaints form for the Independent Police Conduct Authority in New Zealand. See "Complaint to the Independent Police Conduct Authority," online (pdf ): IPCA www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=155622 [perma.cc/3LQT-XEP4] ["Complaint to IPCA"].

97. Arar Report: Policy Report, supra note 24 at 486.

98. Ibid.

99. See Angus Thompson & Pallavi Singhal, "Revealed: The Suburb-by-Suburb Targets NSW Police Use to Reach Crime Detection Goals," The Sydney Morning Herald (28 June 2020), online: www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/revealed-the-suburb-by-suburb-targets-nsw-police-use-to-reach-crime-detection-goals-20200625-p5566a.html [perma.cc/Z946-LKK8].

100. See Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, RSC 1985, c R-10, ss 45.29-45.78 [RCMP Act].

101. Ibid, ss 45.34-45.35.

102. See Canada, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, Review of the RCMP's Bias-Free Policing Model (30 March 2022), online: [perma.cc/T75A-X5BH].

103. See RCMP Act, supra note 100, s 45.75.

104. See e.g. British Columbia, "Policing Agreements," online: www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/justice/criminal-justice/policing-in-bc/publications-statistics-legislation/publications/policing-agreements [perma.cc/E3BF-MERU].

105. See RCMP Act, supra note 100, s 45.4.

106. Ibid, ss 10, 45.53(1).

107. See Police Services Act, RSO 1990, c P15, ss 21-26.9 [Police Services Act, 1990].

108. See Special Investigations Unit Act, 2018, SO 2018, c 3, Sched 4, as repealed by Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 1, Sched 5 [Special Investigations Act, 2019].

109. See e.g. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, "Systemic Reviews," online: www.oiprd.on.ca/news/systemic-reviews [perma.cc/3SCS-GLHQ].

110. Police Services Act, 1990, supra note 107, s 57.

111. See Gerry McNeilly, Casting the Net: A Review of Ontario Provincial Police Practices for DNA Canvasses (Office of the Independent Police Review Director, July 2016).

112. Comprehensive Ontario Police Services Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 1, ss 79-101, 130-46 [Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019]; Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019, supra note 108.

113. Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, supra note 112, s 161.

114. See Police Act, RSA 2000, c P-17, s 17 [Alberta Police Act]; Police Act, CQLR 2000, c P-13.1, s 128 [Quebec Police Act].

115. See Police Act, RSPEI 1988, c P-11.1, ss 4(1), 18(1) [PEI Police Act].

116. See The Law Enforcement Review Act, CCSM, c L75, s 7.2(1).

117. See Police Act, SNB 1977, c P-9.2, s 22(4)(a) [NB Police Act].

118. See e.g. Alberta Police Act, supra note 114, s 42.1(1); Quebec Police Act, supra note 114, s 143; PEI Police Act, supra note 115, ss 20(b), 21(1); The Law Enforcement Review Act, supra note 116, s 6(1); NB Police Act, supra note 117, s 1 (definition of "conduct complaint"); Police Act, RSBC 1996, c 367, s 78(1); Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Act, 1992, SNL 1992, c R-17, s 22(1); Police Act, SNS 2004, c 3, s 70; Police Act, 1990, SS 1990-91, c P-15.01, s 45. Cf Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, supra note 112, s 107.

119. See Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (Austl), 2016/61, ss 11, 51-97.

120. See Law Enforcement Conduct Commission, Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Annual Report 2018-2019 (Law Enforcement Conduct Commission, 2019). See also Sentas & Pandolfini, supra note 12.

121. See Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth), 2006/85.

122. See Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 (Vic), 2011/66.

123. See Integrity Commission Act 2009 (Tas), 2009/67, s 4 (definition of "misconduct"); Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 (WA), 2003/48, s 3 (definition of "reviewable police action").

124. See Matthew Goode, "Complaints Against the Police in Australia: Where We are Now and What We Might Learn About the Process of Law Reform, with Some Comments About the Process of Legal Change" in Goldsmith, ed, supra note 70, 115 at 147.

125. See "Australian Federal Police," online: Commonwealth Ombudsman www.ombudsman.gov.au/How-we-can-help/australian-federal-police [perma.cc/2EBY-RS5N].

126. See Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), 2009/5 [Ombudsman Act (NT)].

127. See Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), 1978/82 [Ombudsman Act (Tas)].

128. See Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), 1971/64.

129. See e.g. Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), 1976/181, ss 8-9, 13-14; Ombudsman Act (NT), supra note 126, ss 14, 31-36; Ombudsman Act (Tas), supra note 127, ss 13, 23A-27.

130. See Police Complaints and Discipline Act 2016 (SA), 2016/60.

131. See Louise Porter & Tim Prenzler, Police Integrity Management in Australia: Global Lessons for Combating Police Misconduct (CRC Press, 2012) at 160.

132. "About us" (2017), online: Independent Police Conduct Committee www.ipca.govt.nz/Site/about-us [perma.cc/P3LL-B3VK].

133. Independent Police Conduct Authority Act 1988 (NZ), 1988/2, s 12(1)(a)(ii).

134. Ibid, s 12(2).

135. Ibid, s 13.

136. See "Complaint to IPCA," supra note 96.

137. This is evident on the NZ Ombudsman's website. See "Get help (for the public)," online: NZ Ombudsman ombudsman.parliament/nz/get-help-public [perma.cc/4HZD-M3ZK]. Using the tool on this site, choose "I want to make a complaint about the police." The site indicates that the Ombudsman can help with an Official Information Act request but that complaints should be directed to the Independent Police Conduct Authority.

138. See Law Enforcement Review Board, "Categories of Police Misconduct," online (pdf): Government of Alberta www.alberta.ca/assets/documents/lerb-categories-police-misconduct.pdf [perma.cc/7PTP-K9F3].

139. CA03 (Staff Sergeant).

140. NZ01 (Intelligence Analyst).

141. See e.g. Sanders & Condon, supra note 4 at 241.

142. See Gill, supra note 22 at 45.

143. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, SC 2017, c 15, s 8(1)(b).

144. See SC 2019, c 13, s 3 [NSIRAA].

145. Ibid, ss 8(1)(b), 8(1)(d)(ii); RCMP Act, supra note 100, ss 45.53(4.1), 45.67(2.1). See also ibid, s 2 (definition of "department").

146. NSIRAA, supra note 144, ss 13-15.1. See also Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21, ss 37(5), 64(2) [Privacy Act Canada].

147. See NSIRAA, supra note 144, s 26.

148. This term comes from Jean-Paul Brodeur. High policing is characterized by the absorption of intelligence beyond any narrow domain or function, conflation of separation of powers, a focus on protecting national security, and reliance on informants. See John-Paul Brodeur, "High and Low Policing: Remarks about The Policing of Political Activities" (1983) 30 Soc Problems at 507, 513-14. For clarification, see John-Paul Brodeur, "High and Low Policing in Post-9/11 Times" (2007) 1 Policing 25 at 26-28.

149. Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 (Cth) cl 56, amending Inspector‑General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth), 1986/101 (inserting s 8(3A)).

150. See supra note 65 at 21 (Recommendation 21).

151. See Austl, Attorney-General's Department, Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community by Dennis Richardson AC (Commonwealth of Australia, December 2020), vol 1 at 80, online (pdf): www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF [perma.cc/GY5Z-ME7P]. See especially ibid, vol 3 at paras 40.93-40.104.

152. See e.g. Inspector‑General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, supra note 149, s 11(4A)

Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006, supra note 121, s 23A.

153. Police Act 1998, supra note 50, s 74A.

154. Firearms Act 2015 (SA), 2015/46, s 4(1). https://doi.org/10.1097/01.NUMA.0000469355.49071.7b

155. See Police Act 1998, supra note 50, s 74A(4).

156. See Austl, SA, Review under section 74A(4) of the Police Act 1998 for the period of 1 July 2021-30 June 2022 by the Honourable Michael David (2 August 2022).

157. NZ04.

158. See Rebecca Kitteridge, "Speech: Understanding Intelligence Remark" (Address to the Institute of Public Administration New Zealand, 18 September 2019), online: www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/speech-understanding-intelligence [perma.cc/62ZR-LTLJ].

159. NZ16.

160. NZ19.

161. See Gottschalk, supra note 61 at 17.

162. See Bennett Moses et al, supra note 16.

163. See Privacy Act Canada, supra note 146, s 4.

164. See Privacy Act 2020 (NZ), 2020/31, s 22(1(1)(b)).

165. See Privacy Act Canada, supra note 146, s 8(2)(e). Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165, s 27(3)(a) [BC Freedom of Information Act]. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c F.31, s 39(3) [Ontario Freedom of Information Act]. Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c M.56, s 29(3)(a). For other provisions that law enforcement can use to prevent disclosure, see e.g. Privacy Act Canada, supra note 146, s 5(3).

166. See e.g. ibid, s 18(1), 22(1); Exempt Personal Information Bank Order, No. 13 (RCMP), SOR/90-149 (designation of exempt banks); Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165, s 27(3) (a) [BC Freedom of Information Act]; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c F.31, s 39 (3) [Ontario Freedom of Information Act]; Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c M.56, s 29(3)(a). For other provisions that law enforcement can use to prevent disclosure, see e.g. Privacy Act Canada, supra note 146, s 5(3).

167. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Privacy Act Annual Report to Parliament 2013-14: Transparency and Privacy in the Digital Age, by Daniel Therrien, Catalogue No IP50-2014E-PDF (October 2014) at 3, online: www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-anddecisions/ar_index/201314/201314_pa [perma.cc/U9DZ-JBGD] [Privacy Act Annual Report 2013-14].

168. See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Privacy Commission, 2007-2008 Annual Report, by Jennifer Stoddart, Catalogue No IP50-2008 (4 December 2008), online: www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/ar_index/200708/200708_pa [perma.cc/Y8NR-9FKA].

169. See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, "Disclosure of information about complainant's attempted suicide in US Customs and Border Protection not authorized under the Privacy Act" (last modified 21 September 2017), online: www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-federal-institutions/2016-17/pa_20170419_rcmp [perma.cc/3MLD-6DXX].

170. See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Special Report to Parliament on the OPC's Investigation Into the RCMP's Use of Clearview AI and Draft Joint Guidance for Law Enforcement Agencies Considering the Use of Facial Recognition Technology, Catalogue No IP54-110/2021E-PDF (10 June 2021), online: www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-anddecisions/ar_index/202021/sr_rcmp [perma.cc/GKR6-F9TW] [Clearview AISpecial Report].

171. Privacy Act Annual Report 2013-14, supra note 167 at 3.

172. The Commissioner drew on powers in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. See SS 2017, c 17, s 32.

173. See Investigation Report 105-2014: Community Mobilization Prince Albert (SK OIPC, 10 November 2014) at 38.

174. See Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, Investigation Report F12-04: Use of Automated Licence Plate Recognition Technology by the Victoria Police Department, by Elizabeth Denham (15 November 2012), online: www.oipc.bc.ca/investigation-reports/1480 [perma.cc/5NGX-26VL]. Note that Victoria here refers to Victoria, British Columbia, Canada.

175. Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Commissioner Initiated Investigation into the Australian Federal Police (Privacy) (26 November 2021), [2021] AICmr 74.

176. See Gabrielle Appleby, "Horizontal Accountability: The Rights-Protective Promise and Fragility of Executive Integrity Institutions" (2017) 23 Austl JHR 168. This might change with the increased powers and penalties recently enacted in the Privacy Legislation Amendment (Enforcement and Other Measures) (Cth) [Privacy Legislation Amendment Act] and the additional resources allocated in the May 2023 budget. The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), 1988/119 is also under review. Attorney-General's Department, "Review of the Privacy Act 1988" (10 January 2022), online: Australian Government https://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/consultations/review-privacy-act-1988 [perma.cc/3DKE-3SQM].

177. Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), supra note 177, s 70(1)(g). While this section remains in place, there are increased powers under the Privacy Legislation Amendment Act, supra note 177 that post-date the analysis in this article.

178. See Clearview AI Special Report, supra note 170.

179. See Privacy Act 1993 (NZ), 1993/28, ss 96W, 96X, as repealed by Privacy Act 2020, supra note 164, s 216(1). The relevant sections of the former Act are now reflected in ss 158, 159.

180. Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), 1997/49; Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), 1979/114, ss 83-92A.

181. Statistics New Zealand, "Review of Police Crime Data" (16 February 2015), online (pdf ): New Zealand Police www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/report-of-review-ofpolice-crime-data.pdf [perma.cc/XB75-MVG4].

182. AU13.

183. CA18.

184. See "Algorithm Charter for Aotearoa New Zealand" (July 2020), online: Statistics New Zealand www.data.govt.nz/use-data/data-ethics/government-algorithm-transparency-and-accountability/algorithm-charter [perma.cc/JHR6-SUME]; Canada, Directive on Automated Decision-Making (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2019), online: www.tbs-sct.canada.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32592 [perma.cc/T9C2-HERP].

185. AU19.

186. NZ19. See e.g. Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006) at 312-16 (with recommendations including the limited mandate of RCMP with respect to "collecting and analysing information and intelligence relating to threats to the security of Canada"); Hon Neil Wittmann, Use of Force in the Calgary Police Service (Calgary Police Service, April 2018).

187. See e.g. R v Ul-Haque, [2007] NSWSC 1251 at paras 103-105.

188. AU08 (Manager).

189. CA05 (Lawyer and Lead Analyst).

190. NZ19 (Manager).

191. CA13 (Intelligence Analyst).

192. CA12.

193. See e.g. R v Brown (2003), 173 CCC (3d) 23 (Ont CA).

194. See Lyria Bennett Moses & Janet Chan, "Algorithmic Prediction in Policing: Assumptions, Evaluation, and Accountability" (2018) 28 Policing & Society 806. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.1253695

195. R v Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 SCR 326 at 340.

196. AU09 (Trainer).

197. AU01 (Manager).

198. NZ10 (Analyst).

199. CA18.

200. AU15.

201. See Bennett Moses & Chan, supra note 194.

202. See Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UNGAOR, 23rd Sess, UN Doc A/ HRC/23/40 (2013).

203. AU13 (Manager).

204. CA18 (Intelligence Supervisor).

205. NZ06 (Lead Intelligence Analyst).

206. See Public Interest Monitor Act 2011 (Vic), 2011/72.

207. AU06 (Former Manager).

208. NZ06 (Lead Intelligence Analyst).

209. See Sharon Rodrick, "Accessing Telecommunications Data for National Security and Law Enforcement Purposes" (2009) 37 Fed L Rev 375 at 410-11. https://doi.org/10.22145/flr.37.3.3

210. CA06. See Reuters, "Apple is Building an Online Tool That Lets Police Request User Data," Venture Beat (7 September 2018), online: www.venturebeat.com/2018/09/07/apple-is-building-an-online-tool-that-lets-police-request-user-data [perma.cc/86WB-SSMB].

211. See Seneviratne, supra note 64 at 331. See also Janet Ransley, Jessica Anderson & Tim Prenzler, "Civil Litigation Against Police in Australia: Exploring Its Extent, Nature and Implications for Accountability" (2007) 40 Austl & NZ J Crim 143. https://doi.org/10.1375/acri.40.2.143

212. See Tom Hughes, "Police Officers and Civil Liability: The Ties That Bind?" (2001) 24 Policing 240. For a recent example of criminal prosecution, see Scott Anderson & Andrew Culbert, "RCMP used covert search and surveillance powers before arresting high-level intelligence official," CBC News (28 October 2020), online: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/rcmp-investigation-cameron-ortis-warrants-1.5778569 [perma.cc/F92A-7CSW]. https://doi.org/10.1108/13639510110390972

213. See Ransley, Anderson & Prenzler, supra note 211.

214. See Smith, "Rethinking," supra note 94 at 19, 22.

215. See Goode, supra note 124 at 117.

216. In Australia, see Bunning v Cross (1978), 141 CLR 54 (HCA).

217. See Enever v The King (1906), 3 CLR 969 (HCA) (the State is not liable for tortious actions or omissions of individual police officers).

218. Canadian Charter, supra note 13, s 24(1); Simpson v Attorney General, [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). Note that the situation is more limited in Australia even in those jurisdictions that have a statutory bill of rights. See Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), 2006/43, s 39; Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), 2004/5, s 40C; Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), 2019/5, s 59.

219. For example, despite a recommendation of the Australian Law Reform Commission, there is no tort for serious breach of privacy. See Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, ALRC Report No 123 (Ligare for ALRC, 2014).

220. See Rechtbank Den Haag [District Court of the Hague], 5 February 2020, Nederlands Juristen Comité Voor De Mensenrechten v The State of the Netherlands, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2020:865, No C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (Netherlands). For a discussion of this decision, see Litska Strikwerda, "Predictive Policing: The Risks Associated with Risk Assessment" (2021) 94 Police J 422.

221. See Ransley, Anderson & Prenzler, supra note 211 at 147-48, 152-54.

222. See Graham Smith, "Police Complaints and Criminal Prosecutions" (2001) 64 Mod L Rev 372 at 373, 391. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.00326

223. AU16 (Manager).

224. AU08 (Manager).

225. Paul G Chevigny, "Police Accountability in Historic Perspective" in Mendes et al, eds, supra note 52, 69 at 72.

226. See Bernard D Bongiorno, "A DPP's Approach: Some Problems in the Prosecution of Police Officers" in Moore & Wettenhall, eds, supra note 47, at 37.

227. See Graham Smith, "Actions for Damages Against the Police and Attitudes of Claimants" (2003) 13 Policing & Society 413. https://doi.org/10.1080/1043946032000104481

228. See Kent Roach, "The Overview: Four Models of Police-Government Relations" [Roach, "Four Models"] in Beare & Murray, eds, supra note 49 at 16; Duncan Kerr, "Government and the Police" in Moore & Wettenhall, eds, supra note 47, 13.

229. [1968] 2 QB 118 at 135 (CA).

230. For Canada, see R v Campbell, [1999] 1 SCR 565. For Australia and New Zealand, see generally Stenning, "Political Independence," supra note 49.

231. See Lorne Sossin, "The Oversight of Executive-Police Relations in Canada: The Constitution, the Courts, Administrative Processes, and Democratic Governance" in Beare & Murray, eds, supra note 49, 96 at 129.

232. See e.g. RCMP Act, supra note 100, s 5(1); Police Services Act, 1990, supra note 107, s 17(2); Police Act 1998, supra note 50, s 6; Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), 1990/4, ss 4.6-4.8.

233. See Arar Report: Policy Report, supra note 24 at 488-89.

234. See Inquiries Act, RSC 1985, c I-11.

235. See Sossin, supra note 231 at 107, 121 (noting that this has become a norm in Canada).

236. See Lewis, supra note 39 at 36-38.

237. Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth), 2001/152, s 29.

238. Cat Barker et al, Oversight of Intelligence Agencies: A Comparison of the 'Five Eyes' Nations (Parliamentary Library of Australia, 15 December 2017), online: www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/OversightIntelligenceAgencies [perma.cc/68H6-XUUE].

239. See Kent Roach, "Review and Oversight of Intelligence in Canada: Expanding Accountability Gaps" in Zachary K Goldman & Samuel J Rascoff, eds, Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford University Press, 2016) 175.\\uc0\\u8220{}Review and Oversight of Intelligence in Canada: Expanding Accountability Gaps\\uc0\\u8221{} in Zachary K Goldman, Samuel J Rascoff & Jane Harman, eds, {\\i{}GlobalIntelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century} (New York: New York: Oxford University Press, 2016

240. For information on the jurisdiction of New Zealand select committees, see "Select Committees," online: New Zealand Parliament .

241. See Roach, "Four Models," supra note 228 at 60. https://doi.org/10.1080/0015587X.1949.9717920

242. See Mark Crowell, Police Officers' Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight Mechanisms in Ontario, Canada (PhD Thesis, University of Waterloo, 2016) [unpublished] at 1-2. See also Sossin, supra note 231 at 96-146.

243. See Stenning, "Political Independence," supra note 49 at 220-21.

244. AU01.

245. AU03.

246. See Sossin, supra note 231 at 104.

247. See Ashley Deeks, "Intelligence Services, Peer Constraints, and the Law" in Goldman & Rascoff, eds, eds, {\\i{}Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016supra note 239.

248. Unwritten understandings are particularly relevant in the context of international data sharing. For an example of the consequences of sharing information outside expectations, see Michael McKenzie, Common Enemies: Crime, Policy, and Politics in Australia-Indonesia Relations (Oxford University Press, 2018), ch 3.

249. AU08 (Manager).

250. NZ08 (Intelligence Analyst).

251. CA12 (IT Personnel).

252. Brodeur, "Accountability," supra note 52 at 148-50. https://doi.org/10.7202/045840ar

253. Ibid at 148.

254. See e.g. Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth), 2013/133, ss 26, 41(1)(g), 41(2).

255. See e.g. BC Freedom of Information Act, supra note 166, s 33; Ontario Freedom of Information Act, supra note 166, ss 42(1)(f)-(g); Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), 2000/98, Sched 1, ss 2.1(d)-(h).

256. See, e.g. Austl, Commonwealth, Department of Home Affairs, Surveillance Devices Act 2004 Annual Report 2020-21 (Australian Government, 2021), online: www.homeaffairs.gov.au/nat-security/files/surveillance-devices-act-2004-annual-report-2020-21.pdf [perma.cc/R3MP-W5GN].

257. See Christopher Parsons & Adam Molnar, "Government Surveillance Accountability: The Failures of Contemporary Canadian Interception Reports" (2018) 16 CJLT 143.

258. This is provided in annual reports of New Zealand Police. See Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (NZ), 2012/24, s 172.

259. See Adam Molnar & Ian Warren, "Governing Liberty Through Accountability: Surveillance Reporting as Technologies of Governmentality" (2020) 28 Crit Criminol 13. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-020-09490-9

260. Ibid at 21.

261. Ibid at 20-21.

262. See Austl, Commonwealth, Department of Home Affairs, Surveillance Devices Act 2004 Annual Report 2019-20 (Australian Government, 2020), online: www.homeaffairs.gov.au/nat-security/files/surveillance-devices-act-2004-annual-report-2019-20.pdf [perma.cc/73AW-Q2AW].

263. See Parsons & Molnar, supra note 257 at 165.

264. See Claudia Hillebrand, "The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight" (2012) 27 Intelligence & National Security 689. See also Jerome H Skolnick, "Democratic Policing Confronts Terror and Protest" (2005) 33 Syracuse J Intl L & Com 191 at 211. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.708521

265. See e.g. Jim Rankin et al, "Singled Out," Toronto Star (19 October 2002), online: www.thestar.com/news/gta/knowntopolice/2002/10/19/singled-out.html [perma.cc/J6G8-8Y5P].

266. See Thompson & Singhal, supra note 99.

267. See The Detail, supra note 8.

268. AU03 (Manager).

269. NZ14 (Intelligence Supervisor).

270. NZ17 (Manager).

271. Robertson, Khoo & Song, supra note 10 at 93.

272. See e.g. Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1. The Act demonstrates exemption for information obtained or prepared by an investigative body in the course of lawful investigations pertaining to the detection, prevention or suppression of crime, the enforcement of [law], or activities suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada). See e.g. ibid, s 16(3) (allows for refusal to disclose a record that contains information that was obtained or prepared by the RCMP while performing services for a province or municipality where there is an agreement with the province or municipality not to disclose); Re Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Order) (2017), F2017-81 (AB OIPC) (provincial legislation does not apply).

273. AU09; AU14.

274. CA15 (Patrol Analyst).

275. AU18 (Intelligence Analyst).

276. See Bennett Moses & De Koker, supra note 30.

277. Contra Mann & Smith, supra note 17 at 137-45.

278. AU03.

279. See "How to Watch the Watchers? Democratic Oversight of Algorithmic Police Surveillance in Belgium" (2021) 19 Surveillance & Society 228. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v19i2.14325