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Abstract

In the most controversial corporate transaction in Canadian history, Magna repurchased all of the Class B superior voting shares from its controlling shareholder, Frank Stronach, at a 1799 per cent premium to the otherwise identical but inferior voting Class A shares, thus ending Stronach’s long reign as de jure controller of Magna. Despite this massive and unprecedented premium, the transaction generated about three billion US dollars in aggregate value, or about 40 per cent of the pre-transaction market cap of Magna. I nonetheless argue that the transaction was massively flawed from both a procedural and substantive point of view and should not have been approved by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC). The OSC has artificially and incorrectly limited its public interest powers to situations where there is an abuse of both shareholders and capital markets, as opposed to mere unfairness. But even under the ostensibly more demanding abuse standard, by flagrantly transgressing extant commercial norms, the transaction violated the reasonable expectations of Class A shareholders and should not have been approved.The transaction was also approved by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice as meeting the “fair and reasonable” standard required of a statutory arrangement. In so doing, the court followed extant jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the test itself is a historical anachronism that substantially ignores the two most important developments in Canadian corporate and securities law in the past half-century: the recognition of reasonable expectations as a source of legal rights, and a focus on the procedural propriety of the transaction as an indicium of substantive fairness.

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References

1. See e.g. Securities Act, RSO 1990 c S 5, s 130 [OSA]. The OSA creates various liabilities by securities law statutes, such as civil liability for prospectus misrepresentation.

2. See e.g. Income Tax Act, RSC, 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 227.1 (director liability for corporate failure to remit source deductions); Environmental Protection Act, RSO 1990, c E.19, ss 17, 18, 93 (directors and officers potentially personally liable for environmental pollution).

3. Under the oppression remedy, the foundation of liability is often summarized as a "fairness" standard. See e.g. BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para 58 [BCE] ("First, oppression is an equitable remedy. It seeks to ensure fairness - what is 'just and equitable'. It gives a court broad, equitable jurisdiction to enforce not just what is legal but what is fair"). See also ibid at paras 54-56, 71, 133. In turn, fairness typically (although not exclusively) turns on whether there have been breached reasonable expectations. Ibid at para 61 ("The reasonable expectations of these stakeholders is the cornerstone of the oppression remedy"); Nancy L Kortbeek, The Oppression Remedy: The "Reasonable Expectations" Test and the Economic Theory of "Incomplete Contracting" (LLM Thesis, University of Alberta Faculty of Law, 1999) [unpublished]. Moreover, the oppression remedy was designed to be primarily personal in nature, allowing minority interests to complain about the conduct of a controlling shareholder. See Robert WV Dickerson, John L Howard & Leon Getz, Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada (Information Canada, 1971). This vision has largely been achieved. See e.g. Rea v Wildeboer, 2015 ONCA 373; Malata Group (HK) Ltd v Jung, 2008 ONCA 111. Thus, the BJR will not always have application under the oppression remedy. See e.g. 2082825 Ontario Inc v Platinum Wood Finishing Inc (2009), 96 OR (3d) 467 (Sup Ct J). In that case, the court held that the existence of breached personalized reasonable expectations about how the corporation would be run made it inappropriate to have resort to the BJR. Nonetheless, even in disputes that can be characterized as personal in nature, the courts have often applied the BJR. See e.g. BCE, ibid; Ernst & Young Inc v Essar Global Fund Limited, 2017 ONCA 1014; Craig Packaging Ltd c Beaumont, 2020 QCCS 367 [Craig]. In yet other cases, a violation of the procedural elements that are at the heart of the BJR has formed the basis for a finding of oppression, but without any specific reference to the BJR. See e.g. Westfair Foods Ltd v Watt (1991), 79 DLR (4th) 48 (Alta CA). Where the BJR is invoked under the oppression remedy, it has precisely the same elements as in respect of allegations of breach of duty by directors or officers.

4. BCE, supra note 3 at paras 119, 133.

5. The one procedural factor that the regulators and courts have consistently applied in the public interest and arrangement contexts is whether shareholders have approved the transaction in question, and by how large a margin. Below, I argue that, while shareholder approval is indeed an important indicium of fairness, it should by no means be regarded as dispositive.

6. See Re Red Eagle, 2015 BCSECCOM 401 at para 87. The British Columbia Securities Commission held that it "may exercise this public interest jurisdiction under the [National Policy 62-202] to override the business judgment rule." See Ontario Securities Commission, "National Policy 62-202: Take-Over Bids - Defensive Tactics," online (pdf ): www.osc.ca/sites/default/files/2020-10/ni_19970704_62-202_unofficial-consolidation.pdf [perma.cc/XEQ3-QDK2] [National Policy 62-202]. See also Re Eco Oro Minerals Corp, 2017 ONSEC 23 at para 139. The Ontario Securities Commission held: "[W]e are not engaged in an assessment of whether conduct is oppressive to shareholders or whether a board of directors has conducted itself in accordance with the standards set out in governing corporate statutes, including the business judgment rule" (ibid). See also Re Ironside, 2006 ABASC 1930.

7. See Re Neo Material Technologies Inc (2009), 32 OSCB 6941 [Re Neo] ("[a] review of the case law supports the position that in ascertaining whether a board of directors has discharged its fiduciary obligations, the Commission must give effect to the business judgment rule" at para 103).

8. See e.g. Re Standard Trustco Ltd (1992), 15 OSCB 4322 [Trustco]. The Commission extensively canvassed the procedural failures in the decision-making process, very much along the lines of the BJR, but nowhere refers to the BJR.

9. See e.g. Re Crown Hill Capital Corp, 2013 ONSEC 32. Here, questions other than business judgment arose and thus respondents were not protected from a finding that they had violated the public interest.

10. See e.g. Re Neo, supra note 7. Respondents successfully relied on the BJR as a defence against having violated the public interest. See also Re Bison Acquisition Corp, 2021 ABASC 188. The Alberta Securities Commission found that the business judgment rule applied to certain aspects of the impugned conduct, based on both procedural and substantive factors.

11. Thus, for example, the BJR cannot be used as a defence where there has been insufficient disclosure to meet regulatory obligations, or other breaches of law. See e.g. Kerr v Danier Leather Inc, 2007 SCC 44 [Danier]; Re Anderson, 2007 ABASC 97; Re Coventree Inc, 2011 ONSEC 25 [Coventree]; Re Kapusta, 2011 ABASC 322; Re Stan, 2013 ABASC 148; Re Workum and Hennig, 2008 ABASC 363. See also Craig, supra note 3 (involving violation of the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement).

12. See Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of ) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68 at paras 64-67 [Peoples]; Chen v Sumwa Trading Co Ltd, 2018 ABQB 269 at para 40.

13. See Re Unique Broadband Systems Inc, 2014 ONCA 538 [Unique] ("[i]t must be remembered that the business judgment rule is really just a rebuttable presumption that directors or officers act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the best interests of the corporation" at para 72); Corporacion Americana de Equipamientos Urbanos SL v Olifas Marketing Group Inc (2003), 66 OR (3d) 352 at para 14 (Sup Ct J) [Corporacion]; Peel Financial Services Ltd v OMERS Realty Management Corp, [2009] OJ No 4465 (QL) at para 66 (Sup Ct J); Arkansas Teacher Retirement System v Lions Gate Entertainment Corp, 2016 BCSC 432 at paras 227-28.

14. See BCE, supra note 3 at para 24.

15. Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc (1991), 3 OR (3d) 289 at paras 48-52 (CA) [Brant] https://doi.org/10.1177/108482239100300206

Pente Investment Management Ltd v Schneider Corp (1998), 42 OR (3d) 177 at para 38 (CA) [Pente].

16. Peoples, supra note 12 at para 67.

17. UPM-Kymmene Corp v UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc (2002), 214 DLR (4th) 496 (Ont Sup Ct J), aff'd on appeal (2004), 250 DLR (4th) 526 (Ont CA) [UPM]; Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del Sup Ct 1985) [Van Gorkom]; Weinberger v UOP, Inc, 457 A.2d 701 (Del Sup Ct 1983) [Weinberger].

18. Pente, supra note 15 at para 37; Ernst & Young Inc v Essar Global Fund Ltd et al, 2017 ONSC 1366 at paras 94-96, aff'd on appeal 2017 ONCA 1014 at paras 204-11; Re First Bauxite Corporation, 2019 BCSC 89 at paras 94-96 [First Bauxite]; Greenlight Capital Inc v Stronach (2008), 91 OR (3d) 241 (Sup Ct J) [Greenlight]; Re Cara Operations Ltd, 25 OSCB 7997; Golden Star Resources Ltd v IAMGold Corp, [2004] OJ No 2869 (QL) (Sup Ct J); Re MAAX Inc (2004), 27 OSCB 4638.

19. Re The Catalyst Capital Group Inc (2020), 43 OSCB 1793 [Catalyst Capital]; Re YBM Magnex International Inc (2003), 26 OSCB 5285; Brant, supra note 15; UPM, supra note 17; Ontario Securities Commission, "Multilateral CSA Staff Notice 61-302: Staff Review and Commentary on Multilateral Instrument 61-101 Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions" (2017), 40 OSCB 6577 at 6581, online (pdf): www.osc.ca/sites/default/files/pdfs/irps/csa_20170727_61-302_sn-staff-review.pdf [perma.cc/Q8LA-UGAC] [Multilateral CSA Staff Notice 61-302].

20. Pente, supra note 15 at para 38; Brant, supra note 15. Cf CW Shareholdings Inc v WIC Western International Communications Ltd (1998), 160 DLR (4th) 131 (Ont Gen Div) [CW Shareholdings]. For a definition of director independence, see Ontario Securities Commission, "Multilateral Instrument 61-101: Protection Of Minority Security Holders In Special Transactions," s 7.1, online (pdf): www.osc.ca/sites/default/files/pdfs/irps/rule_20160509_61-101_special-transactions.pdf [perma.cc/FF93-B7FL] [MI 61-101].

21. CW Shareholdings, supra note 20 at paras 73-77; Pente, supra note 15 at paras 44-52.

22. 2538520 Ontario Ltd v Eastern Platinum Limited, 2019 BCSC 1446 at para 40. See also Pente, supra note 15 at para 38; UPM, supra note 17 ("[i]t is settled law that the duty of due care requires that where directors make decisions likely to affect shareholder welfare, their decision must be made on an informed and reasoned basis" at para 125); Poole v Phillips, 2016 ONSC 8181 at para 49; CW Shareholdings, supra note 20 at para 43; Pushka v Ontario (Securities Commission), 2016 ONSC 3041 at para 103; Unique, supra note 13 at para 72. InterOil Corp v Mulacek, 2016 YKCA 14; Gazit (1997) Inc v Centrefund Realty Corp, [2000] OJ No 3070 (QL) at paras 69, 82, 91 (Sup Ct J); TELUS Corp v CDS Clearing and Depository Services Inc, 2012 BCSC 1919 at para 210

23. Unique, supra note 13; Greenlight, supra note 18; InterOil Corp v Mulacek, 2016 YKCA 14; Gazit (1997) Inc v Centrefund Realty Corp, [2000] OJ No 3070; (QL) at paras 69, 82, 91 (Sup Ct J); TELUS Corp v CDS Clearing and Depository Services Inc, 2012 BCSC 1919 at para 210; First Bauxite, supra note 18.

24. UPM, supra note 17.

25. See authorities cited in supra note 22. Re Sterling Centrecorp Inc (2007), 159 ACWS (3d) 323 (Ont Sup Ct J); Jaguar Financial Corp v Alternative Earth Resources Inc, 2016 BCCA 193

26. BCE, supra note 3 at para 152 ("the presence of a fairness opinion from a reputable expert" is an indicium of fairness in a statutory arrangement); Corporacion, supra note 13 at para 15; Re Sterling Centrecorp Inc (2007), 159 ACWS (3d) 323 (Ont Sup Ct J); First Bauxite, supra note 18 at para 96; Jaguar Financial Corp v Alternative Earth Resources Inc, 2016 BCCA 193; Van Gorkom, supra note 17; Weinberger, supra note 17.

27. Peoples, supra note 12 at para 67; Danier, supra note 11 at para 54; Pente, supra note 15 at para 36; Renegade Capital Corp v Dominion Citrus Ltd, 2013 ONSC 1590.

28. The phrase originates in Justice Anderson's judgment in Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc. (1987), 60 OR (2d) 737 (H Ct J), aff'd Brant, supra note 15. This phrase was subsequently repeated in scores of cases. See e.g. BCE, supra note 3 at para 155; Ford Motor Co of Canada v OMERS (2006), 263 DLR (4th) 450 at para 58 (Ont CA) [Ford].

28. The phrase originates in Justice Anderson's judgment in Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc. (1987), 60 OR (2d) 737 (H Ct J), aff'd Brant, supra note 15. This phrase was subsequently repeated in scores of cases. See e.g. BCE, supra note 3 at para 155; CW Shareholdings, supra note 20 at para 57; Ford Motor Co of Canada v OMERS (2006), 263 DLR (4th) 450 at para 58 (Ont CA) [Ford].

29. BCE, supra note 3 at para 40; Peoples, supra note 12 at para 65; Danier, supra note 11 at para 54; Pente, supra note 15 at paras 36, 67.

30. Pente, supra note 15 at para 36. This wording has been endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada. See Peoples, supra note 12 at para 65; Danier, supra note 11 at para 54. It has also been endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal. See Greenlight, supra note 18 at para 42; Ford, supra note 28 at para 95.

31. See e.g. The Decision Lab, "Why do we see unpredictable events as predictable after they occur?" online: thedecisionlab.com/biases/hindsight-bias [perma.cc/QN9Z-HCFJ].

32. See e.g. Peoples, supra note 12 at para 64; Ford, supra note 28 at paras 39-40; CW Shareholdings, supra note 20 at para 60.

33. Peoples, supra note 12 at para 64.

34. See e.g. Amy Gallo, "A Refresher on Net Present Value," Harvard Business Review (19 November 2014), online: hbr.org/2014/11/a-refresher-on-net-present-value [perma.cc/94HQ-P45J]; Corporate Finance Institute, "Net Present Value," online: corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/valuation/net-present-value-npv [perma.cc/84FK-47H4]; Frank J Fabozzi, Francis Gupta & Harry M Markowitz, "The Legacy of Modern Portfolio Theory" (2002) 11 J Investing 7.

35. See e.g. Michael J Buckle, James Seaton & Stephen Thomas, "Quantitative Concepts" in CFA Institute Investment Foundations, 3rd ed (CFA Institute, 2018).

36. See e.g. Danier, supra note 11; BCE, supra note 3.

37. That is, with results (both positive and negative) on the x-axis, and probability of occurrence on the y-axis.

38. See e.g. BCE, supra note 3 at para 40; Peoples, supra note 12 at para 64.

39. See Paul Davis, "Justifiable Expectations Standard: The Basis for the Exercise of the Public Interest Power of the Ontario Securities Commission" (22 August 2014), online (pdf): McMillan LLP mcmillan.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Paul_Davis_Justifiable_Expectations_Standard.pdf [perma.cc/QY7L-A3S2] (for a comprehensive review and analysis of the public interest powers).

40. OSA, supra note 1, s 127.

41. Trustco, supra note 8.

42. Ibid.

43. Re Canadian Tire Corporation (1987), 10 OSCB 857 at para 155 [Tire], aff'd Canadian Tire Corp v CTC Dealer Holdings Ltd (1987), 35 BLR 117 (Ont Div Ct); Committee for Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v Ontario (Securities Commission), [2001] 2 SCR 132 at para 42 [Committee].

44. See e.g. Re Perpetual Energy Inc, 2016 ABASC 2 at para 23; Re Rowan (2009), 33 OSCB 91 at paras 46, 72, 101. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0319.2009.00705.x

45. See e.g. Re Cartaway Resources Corp, 2004 SCC 26 at para 58 [Cartaway]; Committee, supra note 43 at para 36.

46. Cartaway, supra note 45. See generally ibid at paras 52-62.

47. Ibid at para 4. The Court further stated: "General deterrence is both prospective and preventive in orientation. As such, it falls squarely within the public interest jurisdiction of securities commissions to maintain investor confidence in the capital markets" (ibid).

48. In some formulations, abuse is said to occur if there is harm to capital markets or investors. See e.g. Re Hecla Mining Company and Dolly Varden Silver Corporation, 2016 BCSECCOM 359 at para 89, 164. In others, abuse is said to occur if there is harm to capital markets and investors. See e.g. Re Blackwood & Rose Inc, 2014 ONSEC 12 at para 7. Sometimes, both formulations appear in a single decision. See Tire, supra note 43 at paras 130, 155, 156; Re Magna International Inc et al (2010), 34 OSCB 1290 at paras 184-85 [OSC Magna Full Reasons].

49. Committee, supra note 43 at paras 52, 58; Tire, supra note 43 at para 132; Re Biovail Corp (2010), 33 OSCB 8914 at para 382 [Biovail]; Re Federal Commerce & Navigation Ltd (1981), 1 OSCB 20C. For a comprehensive review of when the public interest has been found to have been violated, see Davis, supra note 39.

50. Tire, supra note 43 at para 155. The OSC further stated: "And it would wreak havoc in the capital markets if the Commission took to itself a jurisdiction to interfere in a wide range of transactions on the basis of its view of fairness through the use of the cease trade power under section 123" (ibid at para 154). The securities regulatory decisions are not entirely unanimous on this point, however. See e.g. Re Lindzon (1982), 42 OSCB 43C. The Commission suggested that the public interest powers were capable of addressing the issue of "fair or even handed dealings" between classes of shareholders.

51. (2010), 33 OSCB 6013 [OSC Magna Early Reasons] ("[a]buse has been characterized by Commission decisions as something more than unfairness. A transaction such as this is not abusive simply because the price proposed to be paid is considered by certain investors to be outrageous" at para 43).

52. See e.g. Committee, supra note 43 ("it is an error to focus only on the fair treatment of investors" at para 41); Re Perpetual Energy Inc, 2016 ABASC 2; Re Sears Canada Inc (2006), 35 OSCB 8781; Re ARC Equity Management (Fund 4) Ltd, 2009 ABASC 390. One outlier is Re Asbestos Corp Ltd, which can be read as suggesting that either abuse or unfairness is enough to allow for the invocation of the public interest powers. See (1994), 17 OSCB 3537 at para 79.

53. The Commission stated: "We do take some comfort from the fact that an Ontario court will, as part of the arrangement process, be determining whether the arrangement giving effect to the Proposed Transaction is fair and reasonable. Making such a determination is outside the purview of our jurisdiction as securities regulators" [emphasis added]. OSC Magna Early Reasons, supra note 51 at para 47. See also OSC Magna Full Reasons, supra note 48 at paras 184-85.

54. [1973] AC 360 (HL).

55. Ibid at para 18.

56. Tire, supra note 43 at para 158.

57. For a fuller discussion, see Jeffrey G MacIntosh, "Making Sense of the Public Interest Powers" (14 November 2021) [unpublished, on file with author].

58. See Re Leung (2008), 31 OSCB 8764 at para 15. https://doi.org/10.1142/9781848162525_0015

59. See e.g. Jeffrey Berryman, "The Compensation Principle in Private Law" (2008) 42 Loy LA L Rev 91.

60. See e.g. OSA, supra note 1, ss 130, 130.1, 131.

61. See ibid, s 134.

62. See Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co, 2002 SCC 18.

63. Cartaway, supra note 45 at paras 52-62.

64. Supra note 1, s 1.1 [emphasis added].

65. Ibid, s 2.1 [emphasis added].

66. See also Committee, supra note 43 at para 41 (explicitly referencing the fairness aspect of the regulators' public interest powers).

67. See OSC Magna Full Reasons, supra note 48 at para 185. The Commission said: "The Commission recognized in Re Canadian Tire that it should act to restrain a transaction that is clearly abusive of shareholders and of the capital markets, whether or not that transaction constitutes or involves a breach of Ontario securities law. The Commission's mandate under section 127 is not, however, to intervene in transactions under some rubric of ensuring fairness. To invoke its public interest jurisdiction, in the absence of a demonstrated breach of securities law or the animating principles underlying that law, a transaction must be demonstrated to be abusive of shareholders in particular, or of the capital markets in general. A showing of abuse is something different from, and must go beyond, a complaint of unfairness" [citations omitted].

68. John Simpson & Edmund Weiner, eds, Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 1989) sub verbo "equity."

69. Ibid [emphasis added].

70. BCE, supra note 3 at para 58. While the statutory fiduciary duty is grounded in good faith, the Court also recognized a "fair treatment" component to this duty (ibid at para 36).

71. Ibid.

72. Cf Pente, supra note 15; National Policy 62-202, supra note 6.

73. See e.g. Re Harper (2004), 27 OSCB 3937; Re MCJC Holdings Inc (2002), 25 OSCB 1133; Re Hutchinson, 2019 ONSEC 36; Re Jawhari, 2017 ONSEC 36.

74. See e.g. Coventree, supra note 11; Re Rex Diamond Mining Corp, 2008 ONSEC 18.

75. Supra note 8.

76. After Peoples, the corporate law duty of care has departed from the public interest duty of care. Supra note 12.

77. See Tire, supra note 43 at para 164. The Commission states: "Our decision to impose a cease-trading order does not depend on a finding of breach of fiduciary duty. However, an allegation of breach of fiduciary duty, and evidence which clearly concerns the conduct of those who are fiduciaries, can be important in supporting facts which otherwise would support a [public interest] order".

78. In recent years, management scholars have moved away from the view that all managerial skill sets are fungible, gravitating towards the view that different types of businesses require at least partially unique skill sets. See e.g. Alison Mackey, Janice C Molloy & Shad S Morris, "Scarce Human Capital in Managerial Labor Markets" (2014) 40 J Management 399. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206313517265

79. See e.g. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Free Rider Problem" (21 May 2003), online: plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/#LogColAct [perma.cc/E3X7-HMB5].

80. Supra note 1, s 1.1.

81. See e.g. Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C44, s 192 [CBCA]. For a comprehensive review of the law relating to arrangements, see Matthew J Cumming & Dennis H Peterson, Shareholder Remedies in Canada, 2nd ed (LexisNexis, 1960) (loose-leaf 2009 supplement), ch 18.

82. See CBCA, supra note 81, ss 192(3). While the CBCA requires that the transaction be "not practicable…under any other provision of this Act," the courts have interpreted this in a very broad fashion. See Cumming & Peterson, supra note 81 at paras 18.33-18.35.

83. Almost invariably, voting shareholders are required to approve the arrangement by a special resolution. If other classes are affected in a prejudicial manner, they too may be accorded a vote.

84. BCE, supra note 3 at para 137.

85. Ibid at para 138.

86. Ibid at para 145.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid at para 146.

89. Ibid, citing Re Canadian Pacific Ltd (1990), 70 DLR (4th) 349 (Ont H Ct J).

90. Ibid at para 146.

91. Ibid at paras 133-35.

92. Ibid at para 152.

93. Ibid at para 150.

94. Ibid at para 152.

95. BCE, supra note 3 at para 136. As noted, the applicant must also show good faith. This is often discharged simply by showing a legitimate business purpose. See Cumming & Peterson, supra note 78 ("[g]enerally, if the applicant is able to point to a legitimate business purpose for the transaction, the court will find that the application has been made in good faith" at para 18.39). However, in at least one case, the court held that the adoption of two procedural factors forming part of the BJR was evidence of good faith. See e.g. Aastra Technologies Ltd, 2014 ONSC 246. The SCC also effectively rejects the application of the BJR in its rejection of the historical "business judgment test." That test required the court to consider "whether an intelligent and honest business person, as a member of the voting class concerned and acting in his or her own interest would reasonably approve the arrangement." See BCE, supra note 3 at para 139. The Court notes that some courts have mistakenly conflated the business judgment test with the rule of deference embodied in the BJR, and applied the latter, which the Court implicitly rejects as inappropriate.

96. Peoples, supra note 12 at para 64.

97. BCE, supra note 3 at para 152.

98. Magna, "Our History," online: www.magna.com/company/company-information/facts-history/our-history [perma.cc/P98M-8XBB]. Note that, unless specifically indicated, all dollar figures are in US dollars.

99. Wayne Lilley, Magna Cum Laude: How Frank Stronach Became Canada's Best Paid Man (McClelland & Stewart, 2006) at 53ff.

100. Magna, Management Information Circular/Proxy Statement, "Arrangement Involving Magna International Inc and Open Joint Stock Company Russian Machines, The Stronach Trust and the Other Parties Named in The Plan of Arrangement" (25 July 2007) at 64, online: www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/749098/000104746907006027/a2179126zex-22_1.htm#07ZCM72105_2 [perma.cc/8ACK-JJ6F] [Magna 2007 Proxy Circular].

101. Ibid at 59.

102. Ibid at xv.

103. Ibid at 2.

104. The proxy circular for the shareholders meeting states that if Class B shareholders do not approve the repurchase of their shares, the Russian Machines share issuance would go ahead in any case. Ibid at xiv.

105. Ibid at 23-28.

106. Under the heading "Why is Magna Proposing the Arrangement?" there is no discussion at all of the share repurchase. Ibid at xi.

107. Ibid at xv. The "appropriate value" justification is repeated at 23.

108. Ibid at xv.

109. Ibid at 19-20, B-5.

110. The shares were owned by the Stronach Family Trust, which was, however, directed by Stronach.

111. Magna, Supplement to Management Information Circular/Proxy Statement, "In Connection with the Arrangement Involving Magna International Inc, Magna E-Car Systems LP, The Stronach Trust, and the Other Parties named in the Plan of Arrangement" (8 July 2010) at A-4, online: www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/749098/000119312510156076/dex221.htm [perma.cc/XU3Q-JWLJ] [Magna 2010 Proxy Circular Supplement].

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid. The high degree of voting concentration is an outlier. Amoaku-Adu, Smith and Kalimipalli found that Magna's voting leverage (the controlling shareholder's voting interest relative to equity ownership) was 66.7, which was more than twice that of any other firm in their Canadian sample. It was also an order of magnitude greater than the average (6.43). See Ben Amoako-Adu, Brian F Smith & Madhu Kalimipalli, "Concentrated Control: A Comparative Analysis of Single and Dual Class Structures on Corporate Value" (2009) 19 Applied Financial Economics 955 at 967, 971. https://doi.org/10.1080/09603100802599498

114. Magna 2010 Proxy Circular Supplement, supra note 111 at 1 (indicating that 726,829 Class B shares were to be repurchased from Stronach), 2 (indicating that the market price of the Class A shares just prior to the announcement of the arrangement was 62.53 USD). The Class A and Class B shares were identical in all but voting rights. See OSC Magna Early Reasons, supra note 51 at para 7.

115. Magna 2010 Proxy Circular Supplement, supra note 111 at 2.

116. Ibid.

117. OSC Magna Full Reasons, supra note 48 at para 255.

118. See e.g. Jason Kirby, "Call it the Frank Stronach factor," Maclean's (11 April 2014), online: www.macleans.ca/economy/business/when-paying-the-boss-to-leave-pays-off [perma.cc/SRB6-3NHK]; Tony Van Alphen, "The Frank factor," The Toronto Star (5 Dec 2009), online: www.thestar.com/business/2009/12/05/the_frank_factor.html [perma.cc/MW6U-V6PU].

119. Joe Drape, "Track Owner Files Chapter 11," The New York Times (5 March 2009), online: www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/sports/othersports/06magna.html [perma.cc/SKK3-STV6].

120. "Press Release: Magna Announces Shareholder Approval of MI Developments Spin-Off" (19 August 2003), online: www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/749098/000074909803000010/press.pdf [perma.cc/FTN5-YX2H].

121. Tim Kiladze & Jacqueline Nelson, "MI Developments seeks more distance from Magna," The Globe and Mail (8 May 2018), online: www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/streetwise/mi-developments-seeks-more-distance-from-magna/article4184783 [perma.cc/E8XW-6C7M]; Ray Paulick, "Magna: How Did We Get Here?" (17 Nov 2010), online: www.paulickreport.com/news/ray-s-paddock/magna-how-did-we-get-here [perma.cc/BG3N-59N5].

122. See e.g. Lilley, supra note 99 at 10.

123. See e.g. Mathew Ingram, "How much does Frank deserve?" The Globe and Mail (1 May 2003), online: [perma.cc/WRY9-CMCS]; The Canadian Press, "Magna pays Frank Stronach $47.3-million in 2012," Financial Post (28 March 2013), online: business.financialpost.com/transportation/magna-pays-frank-stronach-47-3-million-in-2012 [perma.cc/2EQB-GZX2].

124. See e.g. Lilley, supra note 99; Andrew Topf, "Mining CEOs make up a quarter of highest paid Canadian chiefs" (6 January 2012), online: www.mining.com/mining-ceos-make-up-aquarter-of-highest-paid-canadian-chief-execs [perma.cc/Z8T7-PGME]; Gail Kachadourian& Greg Migliore, "Magna CEO tops annual pay list" (22 May 2006), online: www.autonews.com/article/20060522/SUB/60519016/magna-ceo-tops-annual-pay-list [perma.cc/Z8T7-PGME]; William Watson, "A CEO's worth? Ask the board," Financial Post (4 January 2012), online: business.financialpost.com/opinion/william-watson-a-ceos-worthask-the-board [perma.cc/QV4G-ZRAY].

125. Pente, supra note 15 at para 38.

126. See e.g. Jay W Lorsch & Elizabeth MacIver, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America's Corporate Boards (Harvard Business School Press, 1989); Lucian A Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, "Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders" (2017) 165 U Penn L Rev 1271.

127. OSC Magna Full Reasons, supra note 48 at paras 214-27.

128. Ibid at para 224.

129. Ibid at paras 221-23.

130. Ibid at para 228.

131. Ibid at para 229.

132. According to the Commission: "The members of executive management (Mr. Walker, Mr. Galifi and Mr. Palmer) had a fundamental conflict of interest in attempting to negotiate the terms of a transaction with Mr. Stronach, who was both their boss and the controlling shareholder of Magna. Apart from the inherent conflict in negotiating a transaction with Mr. Stronach, the members of executive management of Magna may also have had a personal interest in whether or not Mr. Stronach continued in a management role at Magna and on what terms" (ibid at para 215).

133. Catalyst Capital, supra note 19 at paras 105-106.

134. Multilateral CSA Staff Notice 61-302, supra note 19 at 6581.

135. In the OSC Magna Early Reasons, the BJR received no mention. See supra note 51. In the OSC Magna Full Reasons, it makes a cameo appearance. See supra note 48 at para 137. In neither the lower court decision nor the Divisional Court appeal decision is there any mention of the BJR. See Re Magna International Inc, 2010 ONSC 4123 [Magna Lower Court]; Re Magna International Inc, 2010 ONSC 4685 [Magna Divisional Court]. Both courts consider the "business judgment test" in deciding whether the arrangement is "fair and reasonable." However, as noted by the SCC, that test is "whether an intelligent and honest business person, as a member of the voting class concerned and acting in his or her own interest would reasonably approve the arrangement." See BCE, supra note 3 at para 140. Hence it is quite different from the BJR.

136. Pente, supra note 15 at paras 33, 35, 38.

137. OSC Magna Full Reasons, supra note 48 at para 109. See also ibid at paras 105-109; Re Sears Canada Inc (2006), 25 OSCB 8766; Multilateral CSA Staff Notice 61-302, supra note 19 at 6582.

138. See e.g. The Liquidators of the Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v Edward John Coleman and John Watson Knight (1873), LR 6 HL 189; Gray v New Augarita Porcupine Mines Ltd (1952), 3 DLR 1 (PC).

139. See e.g. CBCA, supra note 81, s 120(7.1)(b) (regarding interested director and officer transactions).

140. MI 61-101, supra note 20 at part 6.1(4).

141. See e.g. Bebchuk & Hamdami, supra note 126; Lorsch & MacIver, supra note 126; Melvin A Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis (Beard Books, 2006); Bang Dang Nguyen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, "The value of independent directors: Evidence from sudden deaths" (2010) 98 J Financial Economics 550; Steven T Petra, "Do outside independent directors strengthen corporate boards?" (2005) 5 Corporate Governance 55; Christopher S Armstrong, John E Core & Wayne R Guay, "Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency?" (2014) 113 J Financial Economics 383; Jeffrey N Gordon, "The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices" (2007) 59 Stan L Rev 1465; Ronald W Masulis & Emma Jincheng Zhang, "How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions" (2019) 132 J Financial Economics 226.

142. Canadian corporate law statutes typically require a certain number of directors to be independent. See e.g. CBCA, supra note 81, s 102(2) (distributing corporations must have at least three directors, at least two of whom are not officers or employees of the corporation or its affiliates). See also National Policy 58-201, "Corporate Governance Guidelines" (2005), 28 OSCB 5383. The guidelines suggest that, as a best practice, all public corporations should have a majority of independent directors (Part 3.1), the chair of the board should be independent (Part 3.2), and independent directors should have regular meetings at which non-independent directors and members of management are excluded (Part 3.3). As well, there is a requirement that all public companies report which directors are independent, the basis for determining independence, whether a majority of directors are independent, and if not, what measures have been taken to ensure that the board exercises independent judgment. See National Instrument 58-101, "Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices" (2005), 28 OSCB 5377

Form 58-101F1. All public companies that are non-venture issuers must have an audit committee composed of at least 3 members, all of whom must be directors. See National Instrument 52-110, "Audit Committees" (2004), 27 OSCB 3252. Every member of the audit committee must be independent (ibid, Part 3.1) and the same rules apply to venture issuers, except that only a majority of directors need be independent (ibid, Part 6.1.1). Independent directors are required to play a pivotal role in a variety of interested party transactions. See MI 61-101, supra note 20.

143. See e.g. BCE, supra note 3; Pente, supra note 15; UPM, supra note 17.

144. See e.g. Anthony Garcia & Kosmas Papadopoulos, "Independent Board Leadership Matters: Evidence from Governance Practices" (9 November 2018), online: Institutional Shareholder Services www.issgovernance.com/library/independent-board-leadership-matters/ [perma.cc/6D73-QQ6Q]; Glass Lewis, "2020 Proxy Paper Guidelines: An Overview of the Glass Lewis Approach to Proxy Advice: Canada" at 4-5, online: www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Guidelines_Canada.pdf [perma.cc/73E7-2PLH].

145. Studies that associate director independence with firm value are indicative of the value that investors place on board independence. See e.g. Jigao Zhu et al, "Board hierarchy, independent directors, and firm value: Evidence from China" (2016) 41 J Corp Fin 262 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.09.009

Steven T Petra, "Do outside independent directors strengthen corporate boards?" (2005) 5 Corp Governance 55. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720700510583476

146. See e.g. CW Shareholdings, supra note 20; Corporacion, supra note 13.

147. Magna Lower Court, supra note 135 at para 75.

148. Ibid at para 143.

149. Magna 2010 Proxy Circular, supra note 111 at 12.

150. Magna Lower Court, supra note 135 at para 75.

151. See e.g. Randolph P Beatty, Susan Riffe & Rex Thompson, "The Method of Comparables and Tax Court Valuations of Private Firms: An Empirical Investigation" (1999) 13 Accounting Horizons 177 https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.1999.13.3.177

Gunter Festel, Martin Wuermseher & Giacomo Cattaneo, "Valuation of Early Stage High-tech Start-up Companies" (2013) 18 Intl J Bus 217.

152. See generally Florian Deglmann, Company valuation with trading multiples: Theoretical background and evidenced-based strategies on maximizing accuracy (PhD dissertation, University of St.Gallen, 2019), online (pdf): www.e-helvetica.nb.admin.ch/api/download/urn%3Anbn%3Ach%3Abel-1412192%3ADis4882.pdf/Dis4882.pdf [perma.cc/ZVM5-9MT2].

153. Magna Lower Court, supra note 135 at para 72.

154. See e.g. Jason Fernando, "Enterprise Value (EV) Formula and What it Means" (11 September 2022), online: Investopedia www.investopedia.com/terms/e/enterprisevalue.asp [perma.cc/4GU4-7S2R]. Cash is excluded because it does not contribute to the earning power of the company.

155. Magna Lower Court, supra note 135 at para 94.

156. OSC Magna Full Reasons, supra note 48 at para 189.

157. OSC Magna Early Reasons, supra note 51 at para 22. In its 24 June reasons, the OSC observed that "[t]he Proposed Transaction is an extraordinary transaction. We are not aware of any comparable transaction carried out in Ontario capital markets".

158. BCE, supra note 3 at para 73.

159. Ibid at paras 107-108.

160. BCE, supra note 3 at para 137.

161. This is inspired by a hypothetical discussed by Michael J Trebilcock. See The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Harvard University Press, 1993) at 85.

162. I make the simplifying assumption that the going concern value of FI is equal to its liquidation value.

163. To make things simple, there is no cargo aboard, nor is there any insurance policy written against the ship.

164. BCE, supra note 3 at para 143.

165. Ibid at paras 148-52.

166. Ibid ("[t]he distinction between the focus on legal rights under arrangement approval and reasonable expectations under the oppression remedy is a crucial one. The oppression remedy is grounded in unfair treatment of stakeholders, rather than on legal rights in their strict sense" at para 133).

167. Ibid at para 128.

168. This accords with the definition of coercion given by the lower court judge, who held that Stronach's deal was not coercive because "if not approved, the status quo will continue." Magna Lower Court, supra note 135 at para 56. The same applies in the hypothetical.

169. As expressed by the lower court: "[T]here is no evidence that the holders of the Class A Shares do not have a common economic interest. Put another way, this is not a circumstance in which conflicting interests exist among the Class A shareholders such that the Court should analyze the vote in terms of separate and distinct classes. Such a consideration would be relevant to the "fair and balanced" analysis particularly insofar as it resulted from the possibility that some of the holders of the Class A Shares were, for reasons specific to their particular situation, likely to receive materially more or less from the proposed Arrangement than the other Class A shareholders. There is no evidence, however, that such circumstances exist in the present proceeding in respect of any shareholder". Ibid at para 178. See also Magna Divisional Court, supra note 135 at para 58.

170. See Trebilcock, supra note 161; Stephen Smith, "In Defence of Substantive Fairness" (1996) 112 Law Q Rev 138; David C Rose, The Moral Foundation of Economic Behavior (Oxford University Press, 2011), ch 2.

171. See OSA, supra note 1, s 1.1(b).

172. See Oliver E Williamson & William G Ouchi, "The Markets and Hierarchies Program of Research: Origins, Implications, Prospects" in Andrew H Van de Ven & William F Joyce, eds, Perspectives on Organization Design and Behavior (John Wiley & Sons, 1981) 347 at 351; Oliver E Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (Free Press, 1975); OE Williamson, "The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes" (1981) 19 J Economic Literature 1537; Maria Moschandreas, "The Role of Opportunism in Transaction Cost Economics" (1997) 31 J Economic Issues 39.

173. On the relationship between uncertainty and the transaction costs created by opportunistic behaviour, see Marvin B Libernman, "Determinants of Vertical Integration: An Empirical Test" (1991) 39 J Industrial Economics 451 https://doi.org/10.2307/2098455

Mark Casson, "Multinational Firms" in Roger Clarke & Tony McGuiness, eds, The Economics of the Firm (Basil Blackwell, 1987) 133.

174. BCE, supra note 3 at paras 119, 133.

175. See e.g. CBCA, supra note 81, s 192(1).

176. BCE, supra note 3 at para 127.

177. Cf Davis, supra note 39. Davis argues that reasonable expectations should form the basis of the public interest powers.

178. Magna 2007 Proxy Circular, supra note 100 at 65. https://doi.org/10.1515/dkp-2007-650116

179. Ibid at 21.

180. Ibid at 19-20.

181. Ibid at 22.

182. Magna 2010 Proxy Circular Supplement, supra note 111 at 12.

183. Ibid.

184. The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Macmillan Company, 1933). While the labels "free rider" and "collective action" came later, they are apt descriptions of the problems identified by Berle and Means.

185. On free rider and collective action problems, see generally Mancur Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, 1965); K Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed (Yale University Press, 1963); JM Buchanan & G Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (University of Michigan Press, 1962).

186. See e.g. Stuart L Gillan & Laura T Starks, "The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States" (2007) 19 J Applied Corporate Finance 55 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2007.00125.x

Stephen M Bainbridge, "Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors" (UCLA School of Law Research Paper No 05-20, 2005), online: SSRN www.ssrn.com/abstract=796227 [perma.cc/47M6-QCEB]. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.796227

187. For a Canadian perspective and a discussion of the levers of pressure, see Jeffrey G MacIntosh, "Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in Canada" (1996) 26 Can Bus LJ 145.

188. See e.g. James A Brickley, Ronald C Lease & Clifford W Smith Jr, "Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments" (1988) 20 J Financial Economics 267. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90047-5

189. OSC Magna Early Reasons, supra note 51 at para 46.

190. OSC Magna Full Reasons, supra note 48 at para 190.

191. OSA, supra note 1, s 127(1) [emphasis added].

192. See CBCA, supra note 81, s 192.

193. BCE, supra note 3 at para 137.

194. Magna Lower Court, supra note 135 at para 167. See also ibid at para 170. The court said: "In these circumstances, both the evidence and common sense compel the conclusion that the outcome of the shareholder vote should be regarded as a determination by the Class A shareholders that the proposed Arrangement was sufficiently fair and reasonable to be acceptable to them". The court indicated only four circumstances in which it would not be guided by an affirmative shareholder vote: if a significant number of shareholders indicated that there was so much uncertainty that they were not able to reach a decision; if there was misleading or incomplete disclosure; if not all shareholders shared a common interest; and if there was any coercive element to the arrangement. See ibid at paras 166-82.

195. Magna Divisional Court, supra note 135 at para 57.

196. See InterOil Corp v Mulacek, 2016 YKCA 14 at para 40. This case provides a more satisfactory view of the significance of shareholder voting and its interaction with other elements of procedural propriety.

197. This list is derived from Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's work. See "Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning" (1917) Yale LJ 710. https://doi.org/10.2307/786270

198. See e.g. Rafael La Porta et al, "Law and Finance" (1998) 106 J Political Economy 1113 https://doi.org/10.1086/250042

Rafael La Porta et al, "Legal Determinants of External Finance" (1997) 52 J Finance 1131 https://doi.org/10.2307/2329518

Rafael La Porta et al, "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance" (2000) 58 J Financial Economics 3 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00065-9

Rafael La Porta et al, "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation" (2002) 57 J Finance 1147. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00457

199. "What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?" (1995) 110 QJ Economics 1047. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946648

200. Lilley, supra note 99 at 59ff.

201. MI 61-101, supra note 20 at Part 5.5(a).

202. Ibid at Part 5.7(1).

203. Where the formal valuation requirement applies, there must be an independent committee to choose the valuer. Ibid at Part 5.4(3).

204. Of course, the independent committee must be free to require whatever information it might need from any director, officer, or employee of the firm.

205. See Dickerson, Howard & Getz, supra note 3. One of the major reforms instituted by the Dickerson Committee in Canadian corporate law was the abrogation of the common law rule that shareholder approval would sanitize the actions of corporate fiduciaries. These reforms are embodied in the CBCA. See CBCA, supra note 81, ss 122(3), 242(1).

206. BCE, supra note 3 at paras 72-73, 107-108.

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