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Osgoode Home > Osgoode Digital Commons > Journals > OHLJ > Vol. 59 > Iss. 3 (2022)

 

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Abstract

This article focuses on the proposal to adapt international arbitration to business disputes involving human rights. The Business and Human Rights arbitration (BHR arbitration) proposal seeks to give local communities who are victims of multinational corporations’ human rights and environmental abuses access to justice in a specialized international BHR arbitration tribunal. Through a comparison between investor-state arbitration (ISA) and BHR arbitration, this article contends that it would be more efficient to reform ISA than to create a BHR arbitration tribunal. Reforming ISA would avoid the possible parallel arbitration systems that may arise from the duplication of international governance efforts. It would also reduce local communities’ need to resort to transnational litigation, which is procedurally complex and often unsuccessful. Therefore, the possibility of ISA reform makes the BHR arbitration proposal superfluous or, at best, limited in its potential application. Creating a new arbitral structure that is untested and fraught with procedural and substantive complexities may not be worth the trouble. Considering the parallels between the ISA and proposed BHR arbitration, and the prospect of creating a one-stop shop for business and human rights abuse, this article suggests that BHR arbitration is an unnecessary governance effort in international arbitration and a distraction from necessary ISA reform.

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References

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11. See "Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Reform Rules" (15 March 2019), Working Paper No 2, online: ICSID [https://perma.cc/ZL3X-V4L6].

12. Ibid. See also Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,

UN GAOR 72nd Sess, Supp No 17, UN Doc A/72/17 (2017) https://doi.org/10.3917/ep.072.0017

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in Investment Dispute Settlement" (2007) 26 Penn St Intl L Rev 251; Ibironke T Odumosu, ICSID, Third World Peoples and the Re-Construction of the Investment Dispute Settlement System (PhD Dissertation, University of British Columbia, 2010) [unpublished],[Odumosu, "ICSID"].

15. Laryea, supra note 8.

16. Nicolás Perrone, "The International Investment Regime and Local Communities: Are the Weakest Voices Unheard?" (2016) 7 Transnat'l Leg Theory 383 at 384 [Perrone, "Weakest Voices"] https://doi.org/10.1080/20414005.2016.1242249

Nicolás Perrone, "The 'Invisible' Local Communities: Foreign Investor Obligations, Inclusiveness, and the International Investment Regime" (2019) 112 AJIL 16 [Perrone, https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2018.92

"Invisible Local Communities"].

17. Odumosu, ICSID, supra note 14 at 309. Odumosu notes:

Participation in this sense does not need to involve formal participation or legal participatory status in the manner that such status applies to states and investors. It is sufficient that a tribunal may be willing or unwilling to consider the activities of actors that a party to a dispute settlement proceeding pleads, because of the actors' identity. Tribunals' constructions of these activities have significant impacts not only on activist groups, but also on the state parties or foreign investors that plead the incidences of resistance.

See also Odumosu, "Locating Third World Resistance" supra note 14 at 444.

18. Laryea, supra note 8. See generally Perrone, "Weakest Voices"; Perrone, "Invisible Local Communities," supra note 16.

19. See generally Gus Van Harten, Jane Kelsey & David Schneiderman, "Phase 2 of the UNCITRAL ISDS Review: Why 'Other Matters Really Matter,'" (2019) [unpublished, archived in the Osgoode Hall Law School Digital Commons].

20. See Claes Cronstedt, Jan Eijsbouts & Robert Thompson, "International Business

and Human Rights Arbitration" (13 February 2017) Working Group Paper on

Business and Human Rights Arbitration 23, online: Center for International

Legal Cooperation [https://perma.cc/4KDV-KXYT].

21. See The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration 2019, online: Center for International Legal Cooperation [https://perma.cc/PGN5-JDYC] [Hague Rules].

22. See Peer Zumbansen, "Beyond Territoriality: The Case of Transnational Human Rights Litigation" (2005) [unpublished, archived in the Osgoode Hall Law School Digital Commons]. See also Axel Marx et al, "Access to Legal Remedies for Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuses in Third Countries" (2019), online: European Parliament, Policy Department for External Relations [https://perma.cc/XKS6-KLZS].

23. This article proceeds with the argument that most business and human rights disputes are interwoven with investment issues. If ISDS is reformed in relation to local community participation, BHR arbitration will be limited to only cases where there is no existing BIT and where the issues are purely commercial.

24. United Nations Development Programme, "Programming for Justice: Access for All:

A Practitioner's Guide to a Human Rights-Based Approach to Access to Justice" (2005) at 5, online: [https://perma.cc/4PHZ-MB2A].

25. See generally Nahakul Subedi, "A Normative Dilemma on Access to Justice: Much Emphasis on ACCESS and Little on JUSTICE - Need to Revisit the Socio-Legal Interface" (2012) 6 NJA LJ 50

Garth Bryant & Mauro Cappelletti, "Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective" (1978) 27 Buff L Rev 181.

26. Laryea, supra note 8; Odumosu, ICSID, supra note 14 at 309; Odumosu, "Locating Third World Resistance" supra note 14 at 444. See generally Perrone, "Weakest Voices"; Perrone, "Invisible Local Communities," supra note 16.

27. See e.g. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, "A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration" in Karl P Sauvant with Michael Chiswick-Patterson, eds, Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (Oxford University Press, 2008) 39; Leon E Trakman, "The ICSID Under Siege" (2012) 45 Cornell Intl LJ 603; Cecilia Olivet, Natacha Cingotti, Pia Eberhardt, Winning the Debate against Pro-ISDS Voices: An Activist's Argument Guide (Transnational Institute, Friends of the Earth International and Corporate Europe Observatory, 2017); J Anthony VanDuzer, "Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation" (2007) 52 McGill LJ 681.

28. See Ayelet Banai, "Is Investor-State Arbitration Unfair? A Freedom-Based Perspective"

(2017) 10 Global Justice: Theory, Practice, Rhetoric 57; Lisa Diependaele, Ferdi De Ville & Sigrid Sterckx, "Assessing the Normative Legitimacy of Investment Arbitration: The EU's Investment Court System" (2019) 24 New Political Economy 37; "230 Law and Economics Professors Urge President Trump to Remove Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) From NAFTA and Other Pacts," online: Public Citizen [https://perma.cc/4LHL-C37W]. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2017.1417362

29. See Mehmet Toral & Thomas Schultz, "The State, a Perpetual Respondent in Investment Arbitration? Some Unorthodox Considerations" in Michael Waibel et al, eds, The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law International, 2010) at 577

Bruno Simma, "Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?" (2011) 60 The Intl & Comparative LQ 573. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589311000224

30. See Olivia Chung, "The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration" (2007) 47 Va J Intl L 953 at 956-57

Julien Fouret, "The World Bank and ICSID: Family or Incestuous Ties?" (2007) 4 Intl Org L Rev 121 https://doi.org/10.1163/157237307X217348

Sergio Puig & Anton Strezhnev, "The David Effect and ISDS" (2017) 28 Eur J Intl L 731. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chx058

31. See Susan D Franck, "The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions" (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521.

32. See Michael Wilson, "The Enron v. Argentina Annulment Decision: Moving a Bishop Vertically in the Precarious ICSID System" (2012) 43 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 347 at

372- 73; Sachet Singh & Sooraj Sharma, "Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The Quest for a Workable Roadmap" (2013) 29 Utrecht J Intl& European L 88. https://doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.bo

33. See Barnali Choudhury, "Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?" (2008) 41 Vand J Transnat'l L 775 at 808-810

Alessandra Asteriti & Christian Tams, "Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration" in Stephan W Schill, ed, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 787. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589104.003.0025

34. See e.g. Julius Cosmas, "Legitimacy Crisis in Investor-State International Arbitration System: A Critique on the Suggested Solutions & the Proposal on the Way Forward" (2014) 4 Intl J Scientific & Research Publications 1; David Schneiderman, "Legitimacy and Reflexivity in International Investment Arbitration: A New Self-Restraint?" (2011) 2 J Intl Dispute Settlement 471; Susan Franck, supra note 31. https://doi.org/10.1093/jnlids/idr010

35. See e.g. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment

Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 214-15. See also Armand de Mestral,

INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION BETWEEN DEVELOPED DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2015) at 7-23.

36. See Charles N Brower & Sadie Blanchard, "What's in a Meme? The Truth about

Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States"

(2014) 52 Colum J Transnat'l L 689

Charles N Brower, Charles H Brower II & Jeremy K Sharpe, "The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System" (2003) 19 Arb Intl 415 https://doi.org/10.1093/arbitration/19.4.415

Charles N Brower & Stephan W Schill, "Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?" (2009) 9 Chi J Intl L 471

Sergio Puig, "EMERGENCE & DYNAMISM IN INTERNATIONAL ORGAIZATIONS: ICSID, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION & INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW" (2013) 44 Geo J Intl

L 531; Daphna Kapeliuk, "THE REPEAT APPOINTMENT FACTOR: EXPLORING DECISION PATTERNS OF ELITE INVESTMENT ARBITRATORS" (2010) 96 Cornell L Rev 47; "A response to the criticism against ISDS" (17 May 2015), online (pdf): European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration [perma.cc/4XJJ-LZW4].

37. See David M Howard, "CREATING CONSISTENCY THROUGH A WORLD INVESTMENT COURT" (2017) 41 Fordham Intl LJ 1

Nicolette Butler & Surya Subedi, "The Future of International Investment Regulation: Towards a World Investment Organisation?" (2017) 64 Netherlands Intl L Rev 43. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-017-0082-5

38. See UNCITRAL, Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) Secretariat, Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), 36th Sess, UN DOC A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, 5 September 2018 at 10.

39. See Denis Côté, "Whose rights are we protecting? Ensuring the primacy of human rights over investors protections in the international legal regime" (March 2016) at 23, online

(pdf): Cooperation Canada [perma.cc/W3UX-VPR4].

40. See Roderick Abbott, Fredrik Erixon & Martina Francesca Ferracane, "Demystifying Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)" (2014) ECIPE Occasional Paper (5th) at 17. This proposal is criticized for creating an imbalanced or selective treatment between developed and developing countries. See Hugo Perezcano, "RISKS OF A SELECTIVE APPROACH TO INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION" (13 April 2016) online (pdf): Centre for International Governance Innovation

no.3.pdf> [perma.cc/K8TJ-7YTX]; Armand de Mestral, ed, Second Thoughts: Investor-State Arbitration between Developed Democracies (CIGI Press, 2017).

41. George Kahale III, "The Inaugural Brooklyn Lecture on International Business Law: ISDS: The Wild, Wild West of International Practice" (2018) 44 Brook J Intl L 1 at 10.

42. It has been noted that "investor-state arbitration may change, and is changing, but is unlikely to disappear anytime soon." See Taylor St John, The Rise of Investor-State Arbitration: Politics, Law, and Unintended Consequences (Oxford University Press, 2018) at 250.

43. Stakeholders include MNCs, states, international organizations, local communities, and non-governmental organizations. I use the term "regime" in the same way that Steven Ratner defines it: "A self-identified field of international law comprising norms to regulate a certain type of conduct and institutions to make decisions within it." See Steven Ratner, "REGULATORY TAKINGS IN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: BEYOND THE FEAR OF FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LAW" (2008) 102 AJIL 475 at 485. https://doi.org/10.2307/20456640

44. See Eric De Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 20. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107589216

45. Ibid. It has been noted that "it is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels." Sachet Singh & Sooraj Sharma, supra note 32 at 90, citing Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v UK) (1924), PCIJ (Ser B) No 3 at para 21 [Mavrommatis].

46. See Mavrommatis, supra note 45.

47. See Jeswald W Salacus, "The Emerging Global Regime for Investment" (2010) 51 Harv Intl LJ 427 at 463.

48. See Nigel Blackaby, "Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration" (2004) 1 TDM 355

Alan O Sykes, "Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy" (2005) 34 J Legal Stud 631 at 643. https://doi.org/10.1086/431781

49. 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) [ICSID Convention].

50. Gas Natural SDG, SA v Argentine Republic (2005) at 29 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Prof Andreas F Lowenfeld, Mr Henri C Álvarez,

Dr Pedro Nikken).

51. See Ursula Kriebaum, "Evaluating Social Benefits and Costs of Investment Treaties: Depoliticization of Investment Disputes" (2018) 33 ICSID Review 14 at 14 https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/six026

("Depoliticization means the transfer of such conflicts from the political arena of diplomatic protection to a judicial forum with objective, previously agreed standards and a pre-formulated dispute settlement process").

52. See Won Kidane, "CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

LAW TRENDS AND AFRICA'S DILEMMAS IN THE DRAFT PAN-AFRICAN INVESTMENT CODE" (2018) 50 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 523 at 526 ("International investment law [IIL] comes with a very old and lingering historical baggage that continues to engender doctrinal confusion and outright suspicion...[IIL] is not made by Africa, it was made for Africa as a replacement for colonial rules for the protection of capital" [emphasis in original]).

53. See M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd ed (Cambridge University Press, 2010). At inception, de Mestral notes, "very few BITs were concluded between developed states." de Mestral, supra note 35 at 3. See also Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 43 (noting that "[a] characteristic of BITs during this period was the asymmetrical economic and political relationship that existed between capital exporting and importing states. Although the obligations on the state parties to BITs were formally reciprocal, BITs were developed by capital exporting states to protect the economic interests of their nationals abroad." I use the terms "global north" (developed countries) and "global south" (developing countries) as defined by Lemuel Odeh. See Lemuel Ekedegwa Odeh, "A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL NORTH AND GLOBAL SOUTH ECONOMIES" (2010) 12 J Sustainable Development in Africa 338 at 338:

While Global North countries are wealthy, technologically advanced, politically stable and aging as their societies tend towards zero population growth the opposite is the case with Global South countries. While Global South countries are agrarian based, dependent economically and politically on the Global North, the Global North has continued to dominate and direct the global south in international trade and politics.

54. Kenneth J Vandevelde, "A Brief History of International Investment Agreements" in Karl P Sauvant & Lisa E Sachs, eds, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Oxford University Press, 2009) 4 at 5. Most treaties contain standard clauses, which explain the scope of investment, standards of treatment for investment, the scope of expropriation, and dispute settlement procedures. See Salacuse, supra note 47 at 432. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388534.003.0001

55. Joshua Karton, "Choice of Law and Interpretive Authority in Investor-State Arbitration"

(2017) 3 Can J Comp & Contemp L 217.

56. See Sergio Puig, "NO RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY: FOUNDATIONS OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION" (2014) 35 U Pa J Intl L 829 at 843-46.

57. See Yaraslau Kryvoi, "Counterclaims in Investor-State Arbitration" (2012) 21 Minn J

Intl L 216; Pierre Lalive & Laura Halonen, "On the Availability of Counterclaims in Investment Treaty Arbitration" (2011) CYIL 141. See also Brower & Blanchard, supra note 36 at 713-15.

58. See Kendall Grant, "ICSID's Reinforcement?: UNASUR and the Rise of a Hybrid Regime for International Investment Arbitration" (2015) 52 Osgoode Hall LJ 1115 at 1120 https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.2964

Susan L Karamanian, "Overstating the Americanization of International Arbitration: Lessons from ICSID" (2003) 19 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 5 at 9.

59. See generally Stephen E Blythe, "The Advantages of Investor-State Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Mechanism in Bilateral Investment Treaties" (2013) 47 Intl Law 273.

60. Beth A Simmons, "BARGAINING OVER BITS, ARBITRATING AWARDS: The Regime for Protection and Promotion of International Investment" (2014) 66 World Pol 12 at 17. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887113000312

61. See Andrea K Bjorklund, "The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration" (2009) 113 Penn St L Rev 1269 at 1271.

62. See Antonio R Parra, "ICSID AND THE RISE OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: WILL ICSID BE THE LEADING ARBITRATION INSTITUTION IN THE EARLY 21st CENTURY?" (2000) 94 Soc'y Intl L Proc 41 at 41.

63. Ibid at 42.

64. See generally Antonio R Parra, The History of ICSID, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2017). https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198767466.001.0001

65. See "Other Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms," online: ICSID [perma.cc/RNA8-JBGS].

66. Bjorklund, supra note 61 at 1271.

67. See Tomoko Ishikawa, "THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION" (2010) 59 Intl & Comp LQ 373 at 374-75. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589310000059

68. See generally Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007); Stephan W Schill, "Enhancing International Investment Law's Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach" (2011) 52 Va J Intl L 57; Stephan W Schill, ed, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010).

69. See generally Zachary Douglas, "The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration" (2003) 74 British Yearbook Intl L 151 https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/74.1.151

Bernado M Cremades & David JA Caims, "The Brave New World of Global Arbitration" (2002) 3 J World Investment 173. https://doi.org/10.1163/221190002X00085

70. See Hendrik Hugh Angus Van Harten, The Emerging System of International Investment Arbitration (PHD Thesis, London School of Economics, 2005) [unpublished] at 10-11.

71. See Choudhury, supra note 33 at 787.

72. See James Allsop, "Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration: The Importance of Recognising their Differences" (Opening Keynote Address delivered at The ICCA Congress, Sydney, 16 April 2018) [unpublished] at para 21.

73. See "Human rights must be integrated into international investment agreements" (14 November 2016), online (pdf): Business and Human Rights Resource Center [perma.cc/3DF2-T4WD] ("[T]he current international investment system gives rights to multinational corporations while doing nothing to protect the rights of people affected by foreign investment to access effective remedy. It does not sufficiently protect governments' space to pursue sustainable development policies from investors' challenges").

74. De Brabandere, supra note 44 at 51.

75. Kinda Mohamadieh, "The Future of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Deliberated at UNCITRAL: Unveiling a Dichotomy between Reforming and Consolidating the Current Regime" (March 2019) at 2, online (pdf): The South Centre

wp-content/uploads/2019/03/IPB16_The-Future-of-ISDS-Deliberated-at-UNCITRAL_ EN.pdf> [perma.cc/X8QV-SM3C].

76. It should, however, be noted that some BITs are beginning to recognize obligations for investors, although these remain limited. For example, article 7 of the 2019 Netherlands Model bilateral investment treaty (BIT) provides a specific requirement that "[i]nvestors and their investments shall comply with domestic laws and regulations of the host state, including laws and regulations on human rights." See "Netherlands model Investment Agreement" (22 March 2019), online (pdf): UNCTAD [perma.cc/6JL3-6YE9].

77. See Augustus A Agyemang, "AFRICAN COURTS, THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS" (1989) 33 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021855300007968

J Afr L 31 at 42; St John, supra note 42 at 255; Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 35 at 20; Salacuse, supra note 47 at 440-44 (noting that other reasons include: "(2) relationship building; (3) economic liberalization; (4) encouraging domestic investment; and (5) improving governance and strengthening rule of law").

78. See Susan D Franck, "Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law" (2007) 19 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev LJ 337 at 339

Jason Webb Yackee, "Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence" (2011) 51 Va J Intl L 397 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1594887

Jason Yackee, "DO BITS REALLY WORK? REVISITING THE EMPIRICAL LINK BETWEEN INVESTMENT TREATIES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT" in Karl P Sauvant & Lisa E Sachs, eds, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Oxford University Press, 2009) 379 at 381-82. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388534.003.0014

79. See Mary Hallward-Driemeier, "Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a Bit ... and They Could Bite" (2003) The World Bank Development Research Group Policy Research Working Paper No 3121 at 2. See also Andrew Newcombe, "Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law" (2007) 8 World Investment & Trade 357 at 358 (noting that an investment treaty is not concomitant to development because https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3121

"FDI flows occur within a complex framework of public and private international law").

80. As a result, some developing countries are terminating BITS with developed countries. See Diana Marie Wick, "THE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVITY OF ICSID DENUNCIATION AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE" (2012) 11 J Intl Bus & L 239

Salacuse, supra note 47 at 472-73. For example, South Africa, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador have terminated and signalled their intention to terminate BITs. See Butler & Subedi, supra note 37 at 44. Indeed, the Ecuadorian president declared that its "withdrawal from the ICSID is necessary for 'the liberation of our countries because [it] signifies colonialism, slavery with respect to transnationals, with respect to Washington, with respect to the World Bank.'" See "ICSID in crisis: Straight-jacket or investment protection?" (10 July 2009) online: Bretton Woods Project

[perma.cc/QM77-NZ2Y].

81. See Halil Kukaj & Faruk B Ahmeti, "The Importance Of Foreign Direct Investments On Economic Development In Transitional Countries: A Case Study Of Kosovo" (2016) 12:7 ESJ 288 (noting that FDI contributes to economic development in two main ways: (1) https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n7p288

"augmentation of domestic capital," and (2) "the enhancement of efficiency through the transfer of new technology, marketing and managerial skills, innovation, and best practices").

82. See Jiajia Zheng & Pengfei Sheng, "The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the Environment: Market Perspectives and Evidence from China" (2017) 5:1 Economies 1 https://doi.org/10.3390/economies5010008

Hasrat Arjjumend, "REGULATORY CHILL, CORPORATE TAKEOVER AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE" (2017) 6 Intl J Current Advanced Research 7923

David Shea Bettwy, "THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK" (2012) 11 Rich J Global L & Bus 239 at 242-43.

83. See Joshua Boone, "HOW DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAN ADAPT CURRENT BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES TO PROVIDE BENEFITS TO THEIR DOMESTIC ECONOMIES" (2011) 1 Global Bus L Rev 187 at 188

Johannes Schwarzer, "Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Anachronism Whose Time Has Gone" (December 2018), online (pdf): The South Center [perma.cc/8CHZ-T89W]. Schwarzer argues that ISA is counterproductive to developing states.

84. See Kyla Tienhaara, "Regulatory chill and the threat of arbitration: A view from political science" in Chester Brown & Kate Miles, eds, Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press, 2011). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139043809.034

85. Matthew Rimmer, "THE CHILLING EFFECT: INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, GRAPHIC HEALTH WARNINGS, THE PLAIN PACKAGING OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS, AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP" (2017) 7 Victoria UL & Just J 76 at 85. https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/pr28w

86. See Jeremy Caddel & Nathan M Jensen, "Which host country government actors are most involved in disputes with foreign investors," (2014) 120 Columbia FDI Perspectives 1. See e.g. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v the Republic of El Salvador (2016), (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Professor Dr Guido Santiago Tawil, Professor Brigitte Stern, VV Veeder Esq).

87. See Lorenzo Cotula & Mika Schröder, "Community perspectives in investor-state arbitration" (2017) at 10-19, online (pdf): International Institute for Environment and Development [perma.cc/NR3B-JWW5]. See e.g. Aguas del Tunari, SA v Republic of Bolivia (2005), (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: David D Caron, José Luis Alberro-Semerena, Henri C Alvarez) [Aguas]

Metaclad Corporation v The United Mexican States (2000), (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Professor Sir Elihu Lauterpacht QC CBE, Mr Benjamin R Civiletti, Mr José Luis Siqueiros)

Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v The United Mexican States (2003), (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Dr Horacio A Grigera Naón, Prof José Carlos Fernández Rozas, Mr Carlos Bernal Verea).

88. See e.g. Vestey Group Limited v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2016), (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Professor Horacio Grigera Naón, Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy).

89. See e.g., Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v Republic of Costa Rica (2000) at para 72,(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: L Yves Fortier CC QC, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht CBE QC, Professor Prosper Weil) (holding that "[e]xpropriatory environmental measures-no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a whole-are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the state's obligation to pay compensation remains"). But see Yannick Radi, "Philip Morris v Uruguay: Regulatory Measures in International Investment Law: To be or Not To Be Compensated" (2018) 33 ICSID Rev 74.

90. See Jason Webb Yackee, "PACTA SUNT SERVANDA AND STATE PROMISES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS BEFORE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: MYTH AND REALITY" (2009) 32 Fordham Intl LJ 1550 at 1611.

91. See Perrone, "Weakest Voices," supra note 16 at 384. See generally Odumosu, supra note 14; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, "A Law for need or a Law for Greed?: Restoring the Lost Law in the International Law of Foreign Investment" (2006) 6 Intl Environment Agreements 329 at 332. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-006-9016-0

92. See generally Mark Chinen, "Complexity Theory and the Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions" (2014) 25 Eur J Intl L 703. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chu048

93. See Perrone, "Weakest Voices," supra note 16 at 385.

94. See generally Perrone, "Invisible Local Communities," supra note 16.

95. See Cotula & Schröder, supra note 87 at 3. In such cases, investors may claim that the state failed to guarantee the physical security of their investments.

96. Ibid.

97. Francioni argues that "amicus curiae participation has become and will remain in the foreseeable future an important feature of the administration of justice in the field of foreign investments." Francesco Francioni, "Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law" (2009) 20 Eur J Intl L 729 at 740. See also Joseph (Yusuf) Saei (2017) "Amicus curious: structure and play in investment arbitration" (2017) 8 Transnat'l Legal Theory 247. https://doi.org/10.1080/20414005.2017.1385246

98. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, (ICSID, 2006) [ICSID Rules]; Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Rules has a similar provision. See UNCITRAL, Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, (UN, 2021) at 36 [UNCITRAL Rules].

99. See James Harrison, "Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Promoting Social Justice?" in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Francesco Francioni, eds, Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2009) 396 at 413 ("[t]he language and obligations of human rights is the chosen method by which a great number of amici have chosen to frame their arguments. The noise of 'social justice' is translated into the 'signal' of human rights"). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578184.003.0017

100. Dr Eric De Brabandere, "NGOs and the 'Public Interest': The Legality and Rationale of Amicus Curiae Interventions in International Economic and Investment Disputes" (2011) 12 Chi J Intl L 85 at 111, citing Francioni, supra note 97 at 742.

101. Van Harten, Kelsey & Schneiderman, supra note 19 at 4. See also Fernando Dias Simoes, "Myopic Amici: The Participation of Non-Disputing Parties in ICSID Arbitration" (2017) 42 NCJ Intl L 791.

102. Nicolette Butler, "Non-Disputing Party Participation in ICSID Disputes: Faux Amici?"

(2019) 66 Nethl Intl L Rev 143 at 172.

103. See Bernhard von Pezold and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2012) at para 57, (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Mr L Yves Fortier CC QC, Professor David AR Williams QC, Professor An Chen) [Bernhard].

104. See Harrison, supra note 99 at 415 (noting that "[t]here is no general legal principle

which gives rise to an obligation upon a tribunal to consider, either explicitly or implicitly, arguments made by an amicus curiae"). See also Bernhard, supra note 103 at para 62.

105. See Aguas, supra note 87; Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, "Chevron v Ecuador: The arbitral tribunal in Chevron v. Ecuador has heightened concerns about the legitimacy of the proceedings after it closed them off to the public" (April 2011), online: International Institute for Sustainable Development

[perma.cc/W6V6-G55E].

106. See Lucas Bastin, "Amici Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration: Eight Recent Trends" (2014) 30 Arb Intl 125 at 141. https://doi.org/10.1093/arbitration/30.1.125

107. See Bernhard, supra note 103 at para 62 ("We are of the view that the circumstances surrounding these Petitioners are such that the Claimants may be unfairly prejudiced by their participation and the Application must therefore be denied").

108. See Methanex Corporation v United States of America (2005) 44 ILM 1345 at para 35 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020782900006902

(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: William Rowley QC, Warren Christopher Esq, VV Veeder QC) [Methanex] ("Amici are not experts; such third persons are advocates (in the non-pejorative sense) and not 'independent' in that they advance a particular case to a tribunal"); Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Rules mandates that,

to qualify as amici, a non-disputing party must have a significant interest in the proceeding. See ICSID Rules, supra note 98 at 117.

109. See Eugenia Levine, "Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation" (2011) 29 BJIL 200 at 215-16.

110. See United Parcel Service of America Inc v Government of Canada (2001) at para 69, (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Dean Ronald A Cass, L Yves Fortier CC QC, Justice Kenneth Keith) [United Parcel].

111. Ibid.

112. Michelle Chan & Kanika Gupta, "Impacts of the International Investment Regime

on Access to Justice: Roundtable Outcome Document (18 October 2017) at 9, online

(pdf): UN OHCHR [perma.cc/G765-8VST].

113. Ibid.

114. See Odumosu, "ICSID," supra note 14 at 314.

115. See Odumosu, "Locating Third World Resistance," supra note 14 at 436. See also Katia Fach Gomez, "RETHINKING THE ROLE OF AMICUS CURIAE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: HOW TO DRAW THE LINE FAVORABLY FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST" (2012) 35 Fordham Intl LJ 510 at 528.

116. United Parcel, supra note 110 at para 41. The Tribunal held that "[t]he Investor and Canada are the parties whose rights and obligations are to be determined by the arbitration, and no one else's." See also Methanex, supra note 108 at para 27.

117. Case No ARB(AF)/04/01 (2009), at para 4 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrator: Andreas F Lowenfeld).

118. Odumosu, "Locating Third World Resistance," supra note 14 at 445 ("By discounting popular protests in investment dispute settlement, the state is constructed as a not-so-abstract but artificial entity without a population, viewed only as the government and territory").

119. Rajagopal condemns the oversimplification of local actors' role in social movements. He objects to the role of traditional state as the sole defender of the rights of individuals and communities. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements, and Third World Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 11-13. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494079

120. Indeed, it has been noted that "[h]istorically, investor-state arbitration emerged out of a concern to 'depoliticise' investment disputes, placing their settlement within the purview of legal adjudication. As would be expected, arbitral jurisprudence emphasises the legal, technical dimensions of disputes. But it also struggles to understand and address the inevitable political dimensions." See Cotula & Schröder, supra note 87 at 24.

121. See generally Perrone "Invisible Local Communities," supra note 16.

122. See Laryea, supra note 8; Barnali Choudhury, "SPINNING STRAW INTO GOLD: INCORPORATING THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA INTO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS" (2017) 38 U Pa J Intl L 425;

P Acconci, "Is It Time to Integrate Non-investment Concerns into International Investment Law?" (2013) 10 TDM 1.

123. UNOHCHR, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, (UN, 2011) [Guiding Principles].

124. See generally Martin Jena & Karen E Bravo, The Business and Human Rights Landscape: Moving Forward, Looking Back (Cambridge University Press, 2015).

125. UN Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights Resolution 2005/69: Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UNOHCHR, 2005,

UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 at 1.

126. See UN Human Rights Council, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, UNHRC, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4 (2011).

127. Ibid at 4; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, UNHRC, 17th Sess, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011) [Report to UNHRC].

128. See generally John Gerard Ruggie, "The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights" (2017) HKS Working Paper No RWP17-030; John G Ruggie, "Presentation of Report to United Nations Human Rights Council, Professor John G Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Business and Human Rights" (Opening Statement delivered at the UNHRC, Geneva 30 May 2011) [unpublished].

129. Report to UNHRC, supra note 127 at para 6:

The first is the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business enterprises, through appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication. The second is the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means that business enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are involved. The third is the need for greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial. Each pillar is an essential component in an inter-related and dynamic system of preventative and remedial measures: the State duty to protect because it lies at the very core of the international human rights regime; the corporate responsibility to respect because it is the basic expectation society has of business in relation to human rights; and access to remedy because even the most concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse.

See generally, John Ruggie, "REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES" (2011) 29 Netherlands Q Human Rights 224. https://doi.org/10.1177/016934411102900206

130. See Jonathan Drimmer & Lisa J Laplante, "The Third Pillar: Remedies, Reparation, and the Ruggie Principles" in Jena Martin & Karen E Bravo, eds, The Business and Human Rights Landscape: Moving Forward, Looking Back (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 316 at 323. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316155219.012

131. See "The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration" online: Center for International Legal Cooperation [perma.cc/HTL5-K4R6].

132. Claes Cronstedt, Jan Eijsbouts & Robert C Thompson, "International arbitration: remedy for victims in business and human rights disputes" (10 February 2017), online (blog): Business & Human Rights Resource Centre [perma.cc/L7AT-Q4Q4].

133. See Bruno Simma et al, "DRAFT ARBITRATION RULES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS" (2019) online (pdf): Center for International Legal Cooperation [perma.cc/B5N9-EW2N] [Draft Rules].

134. See Judge Bruno Simma et al, "The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration" (2019) online (pdf): Center for International Legal Cooperation [perma.cc/3ZXU-JFF9] [Simma, "Hague Rules"].

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid. See also Bruno Simma et al, "INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS DISPUTE: ELEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN DRAFT ARBITRAL RULES, MODEL CLAUSES, AND OTHER ASPECTS OF

THE ARBITRAL PROCESS" (2018) at 5, online (pdf): Center for International

Legal Cooperation

Elements-Paper_INTERNATIONAL-ARBITRATION-OF-BUSINESS-AND-HUMAN-RIGHTS-DISPUTE.font12.pdf> [perma.cc/2F2S-QEX2] [Simma, "Draft Elements"].

137. See Simma, "Hague Rules," supra note 134 at 13 ("[n]othing in these Rules should be read as creating new international legal obligations or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have undertaken or be subject to under international law with respect to human rights").

138. Article 1 (1) of the Hague Rules provides that "[t]he characterization of the dispute as relating to business and human rights is not necessary for jurisdiction where all the parties to the arbitration have agreed to settle a dispute under these Rules." Ibid, art 1(1).

139. Ibid at 3.

140. Ibid, art 1(2).

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid at 4.

143. Ibid, art 1(5).

144. Ibid, art 6.

145. Ibid, art 1(1).

146. For example, MNCs may object to the application of the Hague Rules where local communities cannot provide security for cost or where local communities are unable to secure the representation of legal aid or contingency fund agreement with third parties.

147. See Cronstedt, Eijsbouts & Thompson, supra note 20.

148. See Antoine Duval & Catherine Dunmore, "The Case for a Court of Arbitration for Business and Human Rights" (2018) 2 Asser Institute Intl & European L Policy Brief.

149. Simma, "Draft Elements," supra note 136 at 5.

150. Cronstedt, Eijsbouts & Thompson, supra note 20.

151. See generally Ioana Cismas & Sarah Macrory, "The Business and Human Rights Regime under International Law: Remedy without Law?" in J Summers & A Gough, eds, Non-State Actors and International Obligations: Creation, Evolution and Enforcement (Brill, 2018) at 224

Katerina Yiannibas, "The Adaptability of International Arbitration: Reforming the Arbitration Mechanism to Provide Effective Remedy for Business-related Human Rights Abuses" (2018) 36 Netherlands Q Human Rights 214 https://doi.org/10.1177/0924051918786626

Antony Crockett & Marco de Sousa, "Arbitrating Business and Human Rights Disputes: Viable for Victims?" (2018) 7 Asian Dispute Rev 104.

152. See Stephan Schill, "Editorial: The Mauritius Convention on Transparency" (2015) 16 J World Investment & Trade 201 at 203 (describing "the dominant conceptualization of investor-State dispute settlement as a form of commercial arbitration and private justice"). https://doi.org/10.1163/22119000-01602009

153. See Cronstedt, Eijsbouts & Thompson, supra note 20 at 26.

154. See Simma, "Hague Rules," supra note 134, art 19(2):

The arbitral tribunal may allow one or more third persons to join in the arbitration as a party provided such person is a party to or a third party beneficiary of the underlying legal instrument that includes the relevant arbitration agreement, unless, after giving all parties and the person or persons to be joined the opportunity to be heard, the arbitral tribunal finds that joinder should not be permitted.

155. See ibid, art 28.

156. See Stephan Schill, "Conceptions of Legitimacy of International Arbitration" in David Caron, et al, eds, Practising Virtue: Inside International Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2015) at 106. See also Report of the Launch Symposium of the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights (12 December 2019), online: Center for International Legal Cooperation https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739807.003.0007

[https://perma.cc/MDJ7-P3L5].

157. See generally Trevor CW Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (University of Toronto Press, 2013).

158. Frances Raday, "Privatizing Human Rights and the Abuse of Power" (2000) 13 Can JL & Jur 103 at 103 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0841820900002320

Hugh Collins, "On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law" (2012) LSE Law Society and Economy Working Paper No 7/2012, online:

< https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS201207_Collins.pdf> [https://perma. cc/LW55-VPKD].

159. See generally Hongling Ning & Tong Qi, "Multilateral Investment Court: The Gap between the EU and China" (2018) 4 Chines J Global Governance 154. See also, The https://doi.org/10.1163/23525207-12340035

State of the Union, 2017: A Multilateral Investment Court online: European Commission

[https://perma.cc/L4EQ-PK9M]; José Manuel Alvarez Zaráte, "Legitimacy Concerns of the Proposed Multilateral Investment Court: Is Democracy Possible?" (2018) 59 Boston College L Rev 2765.

160. See About ICSID, online: ICSID [https://perma.cc/UP7S-BCWP].

161. See Daniela Páez-Salgado & Fernando Pérez-Lozada, "New Investment Arbitration Center in Latin America: UNASUR, A Hybrid Example of Success or Failure?" (27 May 2016), online: Kluwer Arbitration

[https://perma.cc/QKR6-DL7X]. See also "South American Union of Nations Constitutive Treaty" (2009) 15 L & Bus Rev Americas 465. The constitutive countries to the UNASUR Treaty, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela, signed the treaty on 23 May 2008.

162. See Choudhury, supra note 122 at 477.

163. See Martti Koskenniemi ed, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UNGA A/CN.4/L.682 Corr.1 (13 April 2006), online: International Law Commission [ https://perma.cc/E5G3-TE8B].

164. Ibid at 11.

165. The Group gave an example of the procedural and institutional complexity arising from the dispute arising from the "MOX Plant" nuclear facility at Sellafield, United Kingdom, where three institutional procedures-an Arbitral Tribunal set up under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the compulsory dispute settlement procedure under the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), and the European Community and Euratom Treaties within the European Court of Justice (ECJ)-applied to the same facts of a case. Ibid at 12.

166. Ibid at 19.

167. See Veijo Heiskanen, "Of Capital Import: The Definition of 'Investment' in International Investment Law" in Anne K Hoffmann, ed, Protection of Foreign Direct Investments through Modern Treaty Arbitration: Diversity and Harmonisation (Swiss Arbitration Association, 2010) 51 at 53.

168. Article 1(2) provides that "[t]he parties agree that any dispute that is submitted to arbitration under these Rules shall be deemed to have arisen out of a commercial relationship or ransaction…." Hague Rules, supra note 21, art 1(2).

169. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, supra note 53 at 301. Indeed, it has been noted that BITs facilitate international commercial transactions. See Rudolf Dolzer & Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) at 12.

170. In effect, foreign investors can rely on procedural rights conferred by a treaty between the host state and their home state. See Bonnitcha, Poulsen & Waibel, supra note 7 at 71.

171. Catherine Yannaca-Small, "Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements" in International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations-A Companion Volume to International Investment Perspectives (OECD, 2008) at 101. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264042032-3-en

172. See generally Choudhury, supra note 122.

173. See Hanno Wehland, The Coordination of Multiple Proceedings in Investment Treaty Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 40, 42, 70-71. https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780199684861.001.0001

174. See Hanno Wehland, "The Regulation of Parallel Proceedings in Investor-State Disputes"

(2016) 31 ICSID Rev 576; Robin F Hansen, "Parallel Proceedings in Investor-State Treaty Arbitration: Responses for Treaty-Drafters, Arbitrators and Parties" (2010) 73 Modern L Rev 523; Charles N Brower and Jeremy K Sharpe, "Multiple and Conflicting International Arbitral Awards" (2003) 4 J World Investment & Trade 211. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00807.x

175. See Norah Gallagher, "Parallel Proceedings, Res Judicata and Lis Pendens: Problems and Possible Solutions" in Loukas A Mistelis & Julian DM Lew, eds, Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International (2006) at 329

Bernardo M Cremades, Ignacio Madalena, "Parallel Proceedings in International Arbitration" (2008) https://doi.org/10.1093/arbitration/24.4.507

24 Arb Intl 507.

176. Creating BHR arbitration tribunals that touch on investment issues exacerbates the risk of parallel proceedings, not only with ISA and other investment dispute methods but also with domestic courts. A parallel proceeding played out in the Bophal case where, notwithstanding that an Ecuadorian court found Chevron liable for environmental and human rights abuse, the Permanent Court of Arbitration discharged Chevron from obligations arising fromthe court judgment because of Ecuador's treaty breach. It is arguable that this procedural maneuvering is one of the reasons why the Bophal community is without legal remedy since 1984. See Apoorva Mandavilli, "The World's Worst Industrial Disaster is Still Unfolding," The Atlantic (10 July 2018), online: [https://perma.

cc/KPH9-FZUQ].

177. Contra Debadatta Bose, "David R Aven v Costa Rica: The Confluence of Corporations, Public International Law and International Investment Law," Case Comment, (2020) 35 ICSID Rev 20. https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/siaa010

178. See Jan Ole Voss, The Impact of Investment Treaties on Contracts between Host States and Foreign Investors (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) at 281. See generally Gilles Cuniberti, "Parallel Litigation and Foreign Investment Dispute Settlement" (2006) 21 ICSID Rev 381 https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/21.2.381

Vaughan Lowe, "Res Judicata and the Rule of Law in International Arbitration" (1996) 8 African J Intl & Comp L 38

Jamie Shookman, "Too Many Forums for Investment Disputes? ICSID Illustrations of Parallel Proceedings and Analysis" (2010) 27 J Intl Arbitration 361. https://doi.org/10.54648/JOIA2010021

179. See Jose Antonio Puppim De Oliveira et al, "Corporations and the 'Governance Gaps' for Sustainable Development: An Exploratory Analysis" (2018) 1 Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings 17291. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2018.17291symposium

180. See Emmanuel Gaillard, "Abuse of Process in International Arbitration" (2017)

32 ICSID Rev 17.

181. See generally Diana Rosert, The Stakes are High: A Review of the Financial Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2014).

182. Cismas & Macrory, supra note 151 at 237.

183. The ICSID Convention expressly states that arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention (supra note 49 art 44).

184. Article 1(1) of the Hague Rules states "[t]he characterization of the dispute as relating to business and human rights is not necessary for jurisdiction where all the parties to the arbitration have agreed to settle a dispute under these Rules." Hague Rules, supra note 21, art 1(1).

185. See Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (17 August 2021), online: United Nations Human Rights Council [https://perma.cc/6GCJ-RNQJ].

186. Choudhury, supra note 122 at 463.

187. Ibid.

188. Ibid.

189. Double-hatting is a situation where arbitrators play multiple roles as counsel, arbitrators, expert witness in ad-hoc arbitral proceedings. See e.g. Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Runar Hilleren Lie, "The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration" (2017) 20 J Intl Econ L 301 https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgx018

Yves Dezalay & Bryant G Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago Press, 1996) at 20

Sergio Puig, "Social Capital in the Arbitration Market" (2014) 25 Eur J Intl L 387 https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chu045

Tom Ginsburg, "The Culture of Arbitration" (2003) 36 Vand J Transnat'l L 1335. See also Amr A Shalakany, "Arbitration and the Third World: Bias under the Scepter of Neo-Liberalism" (2000) 41 Harv Intl LJ 419 at 430. Shalakany argues that arbitration may be another form of imperialism.

190. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 189 at 10. See also Catherine A Rogers, "The Vocation of the International Arbitrator" (2005) 20 Am U Intl L Rev 957. Rogers describes the market for international arbitration as a closed system that is difficult for newcomers to penetrate.

191. Ibrahim FI Shihata, "Obstacles Facing International Arbitration" (1986) 4 Intl Tax & Bus Lawyer 209 at 209. See also Guillaume Aréou, "Expected Challenges and Opportunities of Investment Arbitration in Africa" (7 February 2019), online (blog): Kluwer Arbitration [https://perma.cc/5VVT-8PD3].

192. Anthea Roberts, "DIVERGENCE BETWEEN INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION" (2012) 106 Am Soc'y Intl L Proc 297 at 300. https://doi.org/10.5305/procannmeetasil.106.0297

193. The UWGIII was entrusted with a three-pronged mandate: "(i) to identify and consider concerns regarding ISDS; (ii) to consider whether reform was desirable in light of any identified concerns; and (iii) if the Working Group were to conclude that reform was desirable, to develop any relevant solutions to be recommended to the Commission." See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UN, 50th Sess, UN Doc A/72/17 (2017) at para 264. See also Lorenzo Cotula & Brooke Guven, "Investor-state arbitration: an opportunity for real reform?" (7 December 2018) online (blog): International Institute for Environment and Development [perma.cc/53ZN-GAEE].

194. "Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform" online: United

Nations Commission on International Trade Law [perma.cc/U789-DSJX].

195. Possible reform of Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS): Comments by the Government of Indonesia, UNCITRAL WGIII, 37th Sess, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.156

(2018) at para 7.

196. See Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS): Submission from the European Union and its Member States, UNCITRAL WGIII, 37th Sess, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.159/Add.1 (2019) at paras 28-29.

197. See UNCITRAL Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Submission from the Government of Ecuador, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.175 (17 July 2019), at para 24, online: .

198. Ibid at para 25.

199. Ibid at para 26.

200. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Seventh Session (1-5 April 2019), UN Doc A/CN.9/970, online: at para 18 [UNCITRAL, Working Group III].

201. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 98. Article 4 provides that "[a]fter consultation with the disputing parties, the arbitral tribunal may allow a person that is not a disputing party, and not a non-disputing Party to the treaty ("third person(s)"), to file a written submission with the arbitral tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute." See also United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor State Arbitration, online: [https://perma.cc/2H7A-9HPX].

202. UNCITRAL, Working Group III, supra note 200.

203. Ibid.

204. The 43rd UWGIII session is slated to hold in Vienna on 5-16 September 2022. See Working Group III: Investor -State Dispute Settlement Reform, online: < https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state>.

205. See Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, International Institute for Environment and Development, and International Institute for Sustainable Development, Third Party Rights in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Options for Reform, (15 July 2019), online: UNCITRAL [https://perma.cc/AZ7C-WJZR].

206. See Letter from independent human rights experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council, REF OL ARM 1/2019 (7 March 2019), online: [https://perma.cc/C8Y3-CSC5] ["Letter REF OL ARM 1/2019"].

207. Ibid at 6.

208. Gustavo Becker, "Business and Human Rights Arbitration: A Potential Procedural Remedy for Transnational Human Rights Litigation Involving European and Latin Parties" (8 March 2021), online (blog): .

209. Lisa E Sachs, et al, "The Business and Human Rights Arbitration Rule Project: Falling Short of its Access to Justice Objectives" (September 2019), online: Columbia Center

on Sustainable Investment

cgi?article=1151&context=sustainable_investment_staffpubs> [https://perma.

cc/5R7K-KNWX] at 7.

210. See generally Youseph Farah, "Improving Accountability through the Contractualisation of Human Rights" (2013) 2 Business and Human Rights Review 11.

211. Andrew I Chukwuemerie, "Arbitration and Human Rights in Africa" (2007) 7 Afr Hum Rts LJ 103 at 104.

212. See Crockett & de Sousa, supra note 151 at 110.

213. This is notwithstanding Article 1(2) of the Draft Rules provision that "[t]he parties agree that any dispute that is submitted to arbitration under these Rules shall be considered to have arisen out of a commercial relationship or transaction for the purposes of Article I of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards." It is submitted that parties cannot contract out of mandatory national statutes relating to arbitrability-a fact acknowledged by Article 1(4) which provides that "[t]hese Rules shall govern the arbitration except that where any of these Rules is in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail."

214. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, "The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World Viewpoint" (1989) 6 J Intl Arb 7 at 15. https://doi.org/10.54648/JOIA1989032

215. See e.g. Loukas A Mistelis and Stavros L Brekoulakis, eds, Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 6.

216. See generally Akinwumi Ogunranti, "Separating the Wheat from the Chaff: Delimiting Public Policy Influence on the Arbitrability of Disputes in Africa" (2019) 10 J Sustainable Dev L and Pol'y 105. https://doi.org/10.4314/jsdlp.v10i1.6

217. See José E Alvarez, "Is Investor-State Arbitration 'Public'?" (2016) 7 J Intl Dispute Settlement 534. https://doi.org/10.1093/jnlids/idw019

218. Julie A Maupin, "Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach" (2014) 54 Va J Int L 367 at 367.

219. See Zachary Douglas, supra note 69. See also Farah, supra note 210 at 13.

220. Abhisar Vidyarthi, "Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights: What Lies Ahead?"

(September 2020), online (blog): Columbia Law School .

221. See Christopher Smith, "The Appeal of ICSID Awards: How the AMINZ Appellate Mechanism Can Guide Reform of ICSID Procedure" (2013) 41 Ga J Intl & Comp L

567. See also Matthew H Kirtland, Katie Connolly & Jacob Smit, "A Comparison of

the Enforcement Regimes under the New York and Washington Conventions" (2018) online: Norton Rose Fulbright [https://perma.cc/L957-6S6M] at 4.

222. By way of revision or interpretation of an award. However, either party can also request an annulment of an award through an independent ad-hoc panel. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, "ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules"

(Washington, 2006) at arts 50-52. https://doi.org/10.1026/0012-1924.52.1.50

223. They are enforced in contracting states as final judgments. See ibid at art 54(1).

224. See Amazu A Asouzu, "African States and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Some Key Issues" (1999) 15 Arb Intl 1 at 28. https://doi.org/10.1093/arbitration/15.1.1

225. Wick, supra note 80 at 279.

226. See Letter REF OL ARM 1/2019, supra note 206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajo.2019.10.018

227. Ibid. See also Nicholas J Diamond & Kabir AN Duggal, "Adding New Ingredients to an Old Recipe: Do ISDS Reforms and New Investment Treaties Support Human Rights?" (2021) 53 Case W Res J Intl L 117.

228. Commentary to Principle 25 of the Guiding Principles provides that "[r]emedy may include apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation and punitive sanctions (whether criminal or administrative, such as fines), as well as the prevention of harm through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition." On the power of ISA tribunals to make nonpecuniary orders, see generally Christoph Schereuer, "Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration" (2004) 20 Arb Intl 325 https://doi.org/10.1093/arbitration/20.4.325

Patrick J Rodriguez, "International Contractualism Revisited: Non-Pecuniary Remedies under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard" (2018) 18 Chicago J Intl L 673. See also Antoine Goetz and others v Republic of Burundi I, ICSID Case No ARB/95/3 (where, in an interim award, the tribunal gave the sovereign a choice of non-pecuniary relief or pecuniary obligation, holding that Burundi can either "give an adequate and effective indemnity to the claimants" or "return the benefits of the free zone to them"). See also Steven K Davidson & Michael J Baratz, "Enforcing Non-pecuniary Obligations in an ICSID Award" (3 August 2021), online (blog): [https://perma.cc/QTC4-ZYXA].

229. See Tomoko Ishikawa, "Restitution as a 'Second Chance' for Investor-State Relations: Restitution and Monetary Damages as Sequential Options" (2016) 3 McGill J

Disp Resol 154.

230. See Iris Ng Li Shan, "On the Path to Justice: Exploring the Promise and Pitfalls Of the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration" (2020) 2 ITA in Rev 54 at 58.

231. Permanent Court of Arbitration, online:

Optional-Rules-for-Arbitration-of-Disputes-Relating-to-the-Environment-and_

or-Natural-Resources.pdf> [https://perma.cc/9AXX-53Y9].

232. See Li Shan, supra note 230 at 58.

233. In half the cases, both parties were private entities, while the other three cases involved a public limited company, a public-owned private company, or a government agency as respondent. See Tamar Meshel, "Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment: Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)" in Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), online: [https://perma.cc/KT3D-MYKV].

234. See Florencia Villaggi & Benjamin Guthrie, "Arbitration, Business, and Human Rights" (14 July 2021), online: Corporate Counsel Business Journal [perma.cc/A562-F5K9].

235. See William W Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, "Private Litigation in a Public

Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations" (2010) 35 Yale J

Intl L 283 at 284.

236. Blythe, supra note 59 at 277. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190080280.002.0007

237. Although Ecuador and Bolivia have exited the IIA completely, with South Africa also exiting, a vast majority of countries still sign bilateral treaties. Therefore, a reform may be a way to reduce the ICSID legitimacy crisis. See Choudhury, supra note 122 at 477.

238. See Laryea, supra note 8 at 2866.

239. Ibid.

240. Ibid. See also Lorenzo Cotula & Terrence Neal, "UNCITRAL Working Group III: Can Reforming Procedures Rebalance Investors Rights and Obligations?" (March 2019)

online (pdf): The South Center [perma.cc/E2YG-B5PJ].

241. See Lorenzo Cotula, "Business and human rights in investment treaties: What

progress? (11 November 2011), online (pdf):

UN%20FORUM%20SERIES%20-%20Business%20and%20human%20rights%20in%20 investment%20treaties_%20What%20progress_.pdf> [perma.cc/WCG2-4R9A].

242. Ibid.

243. See Lorenzo Cotula & Nicolas M Perrone, "Reforming Investor-state Dispute Settlement: What about Third-party Rights" (February 2019), online (pdf): International Institute for Environment and Development [perma.cc/E9JS-PCN8].

244. See Laryea, supra note 8 at 2866.

245. For further challenges of BHR arbitration, see Cismas & Macrory, supra note 151 at 224; Yiannibas, supra note 151 at 214; Crockett & de Sousa, supra note 151 at 104; Center for International Legal Cooperation, supra note 132. See also International Law Association Study Group on Business and Human Rights (Draft Final Report, 23 July 2019) at 8-9.

246. See Odumosu, "Locating Third World Resistance," supra note 14 at 436. Odumosu notes:

[O]f course, the point is not that regulatory measures adopted in response to domestic pressure should automatically trump investment protection, rather, the suggestion is that in view of the increased incidence of cases where domestic pressure is pleaded as (one of) the factor(s) that triggered the adoption of legal rules, there is a dire need for the development of an international investment regime that engages Third World resistance and acknowledges that just as it (investment dispute settlement) shapes peoples' lives, domestic resistance also shapes and informs its realm.

247. Ibid at 437.

248. See Hisham Ababneh, A MODEL BIT FOR DEVELOPMENT: The Example of Jordan

(SJD Thesis, University of Pittsburg School of Law, 2017) [unpublished] at 311 ("[t]

he solution to the current state-of-affairs is not one related to the ISDS process itself, but rather is related to the broad and unqualified provisions of BITs"); Indeed, it has been noted that "…developing countries generally have less bargaining power and might be subject to unfavorable liability provisions in bilateral or multilateral investment treaties designed by the capital and technology exporting states." See Hanson Hosein, "UNSETTLING: Bhopal and the Resolution of International Disputes Involving an Environmental Disaster" (1993) 16 Boston College Intl & Comp L Rev 285 at 309.

249. See e.g., Howard Mann, "RECONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: ITS ROLE IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT" (2013) 17 Lewis &

Clark L Rev 521.

250. However, the case of Urbasersa v Argentina suggests that the Tribunal could rely on "external" sources of law, which include international human rights instruments to enforce human rights obligations in BITs. See Patrick Abe, "Counterclaims Based on International Human Rights Obligations of Investors in International Investment Arbitration: Fallacies and Potentials of the 2016 ICSID Urbaser v. Argentina Award" (2018) 1 Brill Open L 61. https://doi.org/10.1163/23527072-00101003

251. Trakman, supra note 27 at 605.

252. See Lorenzo Cotula, "Business and Human Rights in Investment Treaties: What Progress?" (11 November 2015), online (blog): London School of Economics: UN Forum Series

[https://perma.cc/753V-DFF3].

253. Article 23 of the Model BIT specifically provides that "[w]ithout prejudice to national administrative or criminal law procedures, a Tribunal may, in deciding on the amount of compensation [to award to an investor following a breach of the BIT by the host State], take into account non-compliance by the investor with its commitments under the UN Guiding Principles on Businesses and Human Rights, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises." Antony Crockett, "Going Dutch-A Model for Rebalancing Investment Treaties to Address Human Rights Concerns?" (24 May 2018), online

(blog): Herbert Smith Freehills [https://perma.cc/SS4C-L7F4].

254. Article 31 provides that "[t]he Parties agree to encourage investors to conduct their investment activities in compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and to participate in the United Nations Global Compact." Draft Version 130515, online:

.

255. See Tarcisio Gazzini, "The 2016 Morocco-Nigeria BIT: An Important Contribution to the Reform of Investment Treaties" (2017) 3 Investment Treaty News Q 3.

256. (ECOWIC) (July 2018), online: West Africa Competitiveness Programme [https://perma.cc/535D-58UQ].

257. UNCTAD, (19 December 2008), online: [https://perma.

cc/KLD9-XQ9P].

258. Article 15(1) of the SADC Model BIT states:

Investors and their investments have a duty to respect human rights in the workplace and in the community and State in which they are located. Investors and their investments shall not undertake or cause to be undertaken acts that breach such human rights. Investors and their investments shall not assist in, or be complicit in, the violation of the [sic] human rights by others in the Host State, including by public authorities or during civil strife." Also, Article 18(2) of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT similarly provides that "[i]nvestors and investments shall uphold human rights in the host state.

Naomi Briercliffe & Olga Owczarek, "Human-Rights-Based Claims by States and 'New Generation' International Investment Agreements" (1 August 2018), online (blog): Kluwer Arbitration [https://perma. cc/A5BN-GC2L].

259. See Eyal Benvenisti, "Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders" (2013) 107 Am J Intl L 295 at 296. https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.2.0295

260. See Laryea, supra note 8 at 2872.

261. Ibid at 2871-2872.

262. Simma, "Hague Rules," supra note 134 at 106-107.

263. Li Shan, supra note 230 at 62.

264. See Choudhury, supra note 122 at 463-75. Choudhury notes that there are a number of avenues through which human rights obligations can be incorporated into IIAs. They include use of preambles or objectives, substantive obligations, human rights chapters, and alternative remedies (negotiation and consultation).

265. Laryea, supra note 8 at 2869. Laryea notes:

There are several ways by which an investor's consent to arbitrate may be obtained. These include: (1) ad hoc, case by case, consent (i.e., giving consent when requested by an HSC after a dispute has arisen); (2) voluntarily making a standing offer of consent to all HSCs, which may be accepted by the act of initiating arbitral proceedings; (3) making a standing offer of consent to all HSCs in an investment contract between the investor and the host state, if there was such a contract; (4) a declaration in the host state's law that all foreign investors are deemed to have consented to arbitration initiated by HSCs; and (5) a declaration in a mandatory domestic licensing or authorization regime for foreign investors and investments stating that they have consented to arbitration proceedings initiated by HSCs.

266. See Cismas & Macrory, supra note 151 at 224; Yiannibas, supra note 151 at 214; Crockett & Sousa, supra note 151 at 104.

267. It may be argued that investors who are truly committed to corporate social responsibility may be open to consent to an investment arbitration as a form of corporate accountability. However, this approach may not be appealing to some MNCs that exploit most developing countries' weak domestic legal systems and wide unaccountability.

268. It is acknowledged that ISA also performs substantive roles in the shaping of the ICSID regime because these proceedings determine whether states are liable and assess damages, sometimes in the billions of dollars. These decisions have contributed substantially to the legitimacy concerns regarding IIAs.

269. Kidane refers to investors and arbitrators as the two most important players. See Kidane supra note 52 at 579. This section focuses on these two.

270. See Aron Broches, "Settlement of Investment Disputes" in Aron Broches, Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID and Other Subjects of Public and Private International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) 161 at 163. The depoliticization theory is grounded in Article 27(1) and (2) of the ICSID Convention which provides that a state shall not give diplomatic protection to its nationals in cases where parties agree to submit the dispute to an arbitration panel. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004640757_011

271. Andreas F Lowenfeld, Separate Opinion on the Award in Corn Products International, Inc. v United Mexican States, (18 August 2009) ICSID Case no ARB(AF)/04/1, at para 1.

272. See generally St John, supra note 42.

273. See generally Milan Babic, Jan Fichtner & Eelke M Heemskerk, "States Versus Corporations: Rethinking the Power of Business in International Politics" (2017) 52 Intl Spectator 20. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2017.1389151

274. Lauge N Skovgaard Poulsen, "The Politics of Investment Treaty Arbitration" in Thomas Schultz & Federico Ortino, The Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2020) 740 at 747. https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198796190.003.0031

275. See David Kotz, "Globalization and Neoliberalism" (2002) 12 Rethinking Marxism 64. https://doi.org/10.1080/089356902101242189

276. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 5. Sornarajah notes that "[t]he interplay of various economic, political and historical factors shaped and continues to shape and continues to shape the development of international law on foreign investment.".

277. See Perrone, "Invisible Local Communities," supra note 16 at 21. See also Jorge Daniel Taillant & Jonathan Bonnitcha, "International Investment Law and Human Rights" in Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W Gehring & Andrew Paul Newcombe, eds, Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Kluwer Law International, 2011) 53 at 59. Taillant and Bonnitcha note that "[t]he public interest in terms of the social, environmental, or economic negative externalities of large foreign investments, was simply not part of the objectives pursued in the evolution of...[the] investment legal framework".

278. See Bonnitcha, Poulsen & Waibel, supra note 7 at 233.

279. Ibid at 202-205. China is an example of countries that is increasingly becoming a capital exporter. See e.g. Trakman, supra note 27 at 624. Similarly, developing countries continue to enter into BITs with one another. This means that the narrative between developing and developed countries are changing.

280. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services (2004) at 19. UNCTAD noted that "outward FDI from developing countries is becoming important." See also Rainer Geiger, "Multilateral Approaches to Investment: The Way Forward" in José E Alvarez, Karl P Sauvant et al, eds, The Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (Oxford University Press, 2011) 153 at 155. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199793624.003.0012

281. See Wenhua Shan, "From North-South Divide to Private-Public Debate: Revival of the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law" (2007) 27 Nw J Intl L & Bus 631 at 650 (noting that "[m]ounting cases against the U.S. government before…[NAFTA] tribunals, has put the United States, a long-time unreserved advocate

of investment liberalism, on defense, and forced it to re-examine investment treaties and treaty-based arbitration for the first time in history from a defendant's position").

282. See Anthea Roberts, "Investment Treaties: The Reform Matrix" (2018) 112 AJIL 191 https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2018.61

Karl P Sauvant, Geraldine McAllister with Wolfgang Maschek, eds, Foreign Direct Investment from Emerging Markets: The Challenges Ahead (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) at 3 https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230112025_1

Stephan W Schill, "Tearing down the Great Wall - The New Generation Investment Treaties of the People's Republic of China" (2007) 15 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L 73.

283. Bonnitcha, Poulsen & Waibel, supra note 7 at 230.

284. See Fabio Bertoni, Stefano Elia & Larissa Rabbiosi, "Outward FDI from the BRICs: Trends and Patterns of Acquisitions in Advanced Countries" in Marin Marinov & Svetla Marinova, eds, Emerging Economies and Firms in the Global Crisis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 47 https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137277473_3

John Matthews, "Dragon Multinationals: New Players in 21st Century Globalization" (2006) 23 Asia Pacific J Management 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-006-6113-0

285. Karl Sauvant, "Emerging Markets and the International Investment Law and Policy Regime" in Robert Grosse & Klaus E Meyer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Management in Emerging Markets (Oxford University Press, 2019) 127 at 151. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190683948.013.7

286. Indeed, it has been noted that "[t]he United States and Europe can no longer assume that they have the political and economic power to set the rules of the game." Sonia E Rolland, "The BRICS' Contributions to the Architecture and Norms of International Economic Law" (2013) 107 Am Soc'y Intl L Proc 164 at 169. https://doi.org/10.5305/procannmeetasil.107.0164

287. See e.g. Catherine A Rogers, "The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators" (2013) 12 Santa Clara J Intl L 223.

288. See Gus Van Harten, "Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration" (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 211 at 215. Van Harten notes that "there is not, and probably never will be, conclusive empirical evidence of the presence or absence of systemic bias in investment arbitration." See also Peter Nunnenkamp, "Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Are Arbitrators Biased in Favor of Claimants?" (February 2017), Kiel Policy Brief 105 online: Kiel Institute for the World Economy [https://perma.cc/YLH3-BJZ8]. https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1036

289. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, supra note 27 at 42; Anthea Roberts, "Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States" (2010) 104 Am J Intl L 179 at 207, n 134. https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.104.2.0179

290. See generally Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice; How Law firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom, Helen Burley, ed,

(Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute, 2012).

291. Ibid at 8.

292. See UNCITRAL Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) - Draft Code of Conduct: Note by the Secretariat (9 November 2020) UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.201, online: .

293. See Katia Fach Gómez, Key Duties of International Investment Arbitrators: A Transnational Study of Legal and Ethical Dilemmas (Springer, 2019) at 18. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98128-4

294. See Silvia Steininger, "What's Human Rights Got to Do With It, An Empirical Analysis of Human Rights References in Investment Arbitration" (2018) 31 LJIL 33 at 51. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156517000528

295. See Martin Dietrich Brauch, "Toward a Code of Conduct for Investment Adjudicators: Can Ethical Standards Salvage ISDS" (19 September 2019), online (blog): International Institute for Sustainable Development [https://perma.cc/HQJ3-ZLWX].

296. Hague Rules, supra note 21, art 11(c).

297. Bonnitcha, Poulsen & Waibel, supra note 7 at 259.

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