The Dialogical Language of Law

Authors

Julen Etxabe, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia

Document Type

Article

Abstract

We live in a dialogical world. The normative environment around us is many-voiced. Legal activities like drafting, negotiating, interpreting, judging, invoking, and protesting the law take place in dialogical encounters, all of which presuppose entrenched forms of social dialogue. And yet, the dominant modes of thinking about the law remain monological. How can we bring our legal conceptions into alignment with the dialogical world in which we live?

The present article follows in the footsteps of a Bakhtinian dialogical theory of language that challenges the roots of contemporary positivist conceptions of law and language underpinning large swathes of legal academia and the legal profession—including recent approaches to legal interpretation called corpus linguistics. Against this backdrop, the article aims to develop a richer and more textured dialogical jurisprudence to encompass the various aspects, activities, and genres where legal language is employed.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Citation Information

Etxabe, Julen. "The Dialogical Language of Law." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 59.2 (2022) : 429-515.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3783
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol59/iss2/5

References

1. Mikhail M Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel" in Michael Holquist, ed, The Dialogic Imagination (University of Texas Press, 1981) 259 at 294 [Bakhtin, "Discourse"].

2. Alton L Becker, Beyond Translation: Essays Toward A Modern Philology (University of Michigan Press, 1995) at 287. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.13805

3. Ann-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2005). https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400825998

4. On the significant work done by Indigenous scholars, see Christine Black, The Land is the Source of the Law: A Dialogic Encounter with Indigenous Jurisprudence (Routledge, 2011); Irene Watson, Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law (Routledge, 2015); John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism (University of Toronto Press, 2016); Gordon Christie, Canadian Law and Indigenous Self-Determination: A Naturalist Analysis (University of Toronto Press, 2019). On the internal pluralism of law, see Kirsten Anker, Declarations of Interdependence: A Legal Pluralist Approach to Indigenous Rights (Ashgate, 2014).

5. The most poignant exposition of this critique can be found in Bakhtin's close collaborator Valentin Voloshinov's book, which has been sometimes attributed to Bakhtin (see infra notes 25, 26). See Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, translated by Ladislav Matejka & I R Titunik (Harvard University Press, 1973) [Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language].

6. According to Desmond Manderson, the discussion of Bakhtin has been thin and often simply gestural, even in a field of study as attentive to language as law and literature. See "Mikhail Bakhtin and the Field of Law and Literature" (2016) 12 L Culture & Humanities 221 at 222-23. One early and significant exception is Peter Goodrich, who can be considered a precursor of sociolinguistic and discourse analysis. See Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistic, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis (MacMillan, 1987) [Goodrich, Legal Discourse]. For a socio-legal approach to Bakhtin, see Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (Routledge, 2015). For other attempts to bring Bakhtinian ideas to law, see e.g. Charles Hersch, "Bakhtin and Dialogic Constitutional Interpretation" (1994) 18 Leg Stud F 33

Robert Rubinson, "The Polyphonic Courtroom: Expanding the Possibilities of Judicial Discourse" (1996) 101 Dick L Rev 3.

7. Legal positivism is a longstanding tradition starting with Bentham and Austin that gained momentum in the twentieth century with the major works of Hans Kelsen and HLA Hart.

8. Though not exactly identical, for the most part I will use legal positivism and analytical jurisprudence interchangeably. To be sure, it is possible to be a legal positivist and not an analytical philosopher, and vice versa. For important exponents of the Italian school, see Anna Pintore & Mario Jori, eds, Law and Language: The Italian Analytical School, translated by Zenon Bankowski, Simona Stirling & Anna Pirrie (Deborah Charles, 1997). In the Spanish-speaking world, see Manuel Atienza & Juan Ruiz Manero, A Theory of Legal Sentences (Kluwer Academic, 1998).

9. See Brian Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Oxford University Press, 1993). Hart himself appeared to find important lessons in JL Austin, though it is unclear whether he internalized them (see infra note 176). Joseph Raz too appears to have borrowed from Austin, though with questionable effect (see infra note 328). I do not wish to engage in a sustained argument about ordinary-language philosophy, although in one important sense, the path of analytical philosophy runs contrary to ordinary-language philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle, Wittgenstein, Paul Grice, and Austin, who did not mean to simplify philosophical problems by bringing them down to ordinary language, but rather intended to show that ordinary language was already fecund ground for philosophical investigation. At any rate, legal positivists who attend to ordinary language (e.g., the speech-act theory of John Searle) emphasize the rule-governed character of language and hence the qualities of language that are system-like (see infra note 175 and section VIII, below).

10. See Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Hart, 2001) [Dickson, Evaluation]. See also Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law (Princeton University Press, 2011).

11. Andrei Marmor mentions another core positivist commitment, namely, the idea that

law is essentially a means or instrument that can be put to good or bad uses. See "Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral" [Marmor, "Still Descriptive"] in Law in the Age of Pluralism (Oxford University Press, 2007) 125 at 128. For a general critique of the instrumental view of law, see Brian Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195338478.003.0005

12. Jules L Coleman has argued somewhat contentiously that the separability thesis (staunchly defended by Hart) is not central to legal positivism. See "Legal Directives and Moral Reasons" (Lecture delivered at Princeton University, 6 November 2008), online (pdf): lapa.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/COLEMANLegal_Directives_and_Moral_Reasons.pdf. Likewise, John Gardner argued that the positivists only agree on the sources thesis, whereby the criteria to decide whether a norm is legally valid depend on its sources, not its merits. See Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 21.

13. For a thorough critique, see Margaret Martin, Judging Positivism (Hart, 2014).

14. For a similar argument addressed to the field of analytical jurisprudence, see Costas Douzinas & Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice (Hart, 2005).

15. See Dickson, Evaluation, supra note 10.

16. On the assumptions of the "new realists" see Julen Etxabe, "Law as Politics: Four Relations" (2020) 16 L Culture & Humanities 24. For the argument that socio-legal scholars "forget" about language, see Marianne Constable, "Genealogy and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law" (1994) 19 Law & Soc Inquiry 551 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1994.tb00770.x

Marianne Constable, "Thinking Nonsociologically about Sociological Law" (1994) 19 Law & Soc Inquiry 625. https://doi.org/10.1086/492477

17. See e.g. Andrei Marmor, The Language of Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) [Marmor, Language of Law].

18. For powerful critiques of positivism, see Peter Fitzpatrick, Sociology of Law and Crime: The Mythology of Modern Law (Routledge, 1992); Scott Veitch, Law and Irresponsibility: On the Legitimation of Human Suffering (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); Marianne Constable, Just Silences: The Limits and Possibilities of Modern Law (Princeton University Press, 2005). See also Panu Minkkinen, Thinking Without Desire: A First Philosophy of Law (Hart, 1999). For a deconstructive and feminist perspective, see Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (Routledge, 1992).

19. On space, see Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere (Routledge, 2015). On the senses, see Sheryl N Hamilton et al, eds, Sensing Law (Routledge, 2017). On sound, see James EK Parker, Acoustic Jurisprudence: Listening to the Trial of Simon Bikindi (Oxford University Press, 2015). On movement, see Olivia Barr, A Jurisprudence of Movement: Common Law, Walking, Unsettling Place (Routledge, 2016). On materiality, see Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology, translated by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young (Stanford University Press, 2008). See also Hyo Yoon Kang & Sara Kendall, "Contents, Introduction & Contributors" (2019) 23 Text Culture 1. On performance, see Marett Leiboff, Towards a Theatrical Jurisprudence: Space, Materiality, and the Normative (Routledge, 2020). For an excellent compendium, see Margaret Davies, Law Unlimited: Materialism, Pluralism, and Legal Theory (Routledge, 2017).

20. Writing in 1984 and again in 1987, Peter Goodrich was able to correctly pinpoint that despite the central importance of language for legal theory and legal practice, there was virtually no coherent or systematic account of the relation of law to language. Even worse, he considered, the occasional incursions of modern jurisprudence into the field had been exercises aimed at asserting or defending the positivistic view of law. See Peter Goodrich,

"Law and Language: An Historical and Critical Introduction" (1984) 11 JL & Soc'y 173 at 181 [Goodrich, "Law and Language"]; Goodrich, Legal Discourse, supra note 6 at 1. The voluminous literature on law and language since Goodrich's diagnosis may require qualifying his statement, but as this article seeks to demonstrate, it cannot entirely dispel it. On the language of law, see Peter M Tiersma & Lawrence M Solan, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Language (Oxford University Press, 2012); Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith, eds, Law and Language, vol 15 (Oxford University Press, 2013). On language as a material, embodied, and gestural-i.e., "multimodal"-practice, see Gregory Matoesian & Kristin Enola Gilbert, Multimodal Conduct in the Law: Language, Gesture and Materiality in Legal Interaction (Cambridge University Press, 2018). For a concise and helpful introduction to the various trends in law and language scholarship, see Penelope Pether, "Language" in Austin Sarat, Matthew Anderson & Catherine O Frank, eds, Law and the Humanities: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 315.

21. For a Heideggerian approach noting the musicality of language, see Mark Antaki, "No Foundations?" (2014) 11 No Foundations: An Interdisciplinary J L & Justice 61.

22. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 94 [translation slightly modified].

23. The prestige of Bakhtin as a literary theorist is underscored by his monographs on Dostoevsky. See Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, ed & translated by Caryl Emerson, vol 8 (University of Minnesota Press, 1984) [Bakhtin, Dostoevsky]; Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, translated by Helene Iswolsky (Indiana University Press, 1984) [Bakhtin, Rabelais]; Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Bildungsroman and Its Significance in the History of Realism (Toward a Historical Typology of the Novel)" in Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist, eds, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, translated by Vern W McGee (University of Texas Press, 1986) 10 [Bakhtin, Late Essays]. On Bakhtin as social theorist, see Michael Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique: M.M. Bakhtin and The Theory of Ideology (Routledge, 1992). See also Ken Hirschkop, Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic for Democracy (Oxford University Press, 1999). On Bakhtin's early phenomenological works, see Augusto Ponzio & Susan Petrilli, Philosophy of Language, Art and Answerability in Mikhail Bakhtin (Legas, 2000). Of the extensive bibliography on Bakhtin, see especially Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle, translated by Wlad Godzich, vol 13 (University of Minnesota Press, 1984) [Todorov, The Dialogical Principle]; Craig Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture, and Politics (Pluto Press, 2002) [Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle]; Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World, 2nd ed (Routledge, 2002); Frank Farmer, ed, Landmark Essays on Bakhtin, Rhetoric, and Writing, vol 13 (Routledge, 1998). For an excellent brief introduction, see Alastair Renfrew, Mikhail Bakhtin (Routledge, 2015).

24. See especially Mikhail M Bakhtin, "The Problem of Speech Genres" in Bakhtin, Late Essays, supra note 23, 60 [Bakhtin, "Speech Genres"]; Mikhail M Bakhtin, "The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analysis" in Bakhtin, Late Essays, supra note 23, 103 [Bakhtin, "Text"].

25. The problem of authorship is a vexed one since the Soviet linguist Vyacheslav Ivanov raised the idea that Bakhtin was behind these writings. Bakhtin spoke reluctantly about the subject, but when challenged acknowledged that he wrote three books for his friends: Voloshinov (Freudianism (1927)) and Philosophy of Language (1929)) and Medvedev (The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship (1928)). See Sergey Bocharov, "Conversations with Bakhtin" (1994) 109 PMLA 1009 at 1013-14. In a letter to V.V. Kozhinov, dated 10 January 1961, Bakhtin wrote that these books were written in the "closest creative contact" and are based on a "common conception of language," which nevertheless does "not diminish the independence and originality of each" (ibid at 1016). Bakhtin continued: "To this day I hold to the conception of language and speech that was first set forth, incompletely and not always intelligibly, in these books, although the concept has of course evolved in the past thirty years" (ibid).

26. Even considering that Bakhtin wrote the core ideas of the books, attributing every statement to him is not a straightforward issue, because Bakhtin admitted that he did not write these books as he would have had they been published under his own name. See ibid at 1015, 1017. Moreover, we cannot exclude that Voloshinov or Medevedev finished or adapted the texts along the patterns of this "common conception of language" (ibid at 1017).

27. In typical dialectical fashion, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language situates its own conception of language between two antagonistic trends: abstract objectivism and individualistic (or expressive) subjectivism. Whereas Saussure is the leading figure in the objective trend, subjectivism finds its roots in Romanticism and the work of Wilhelm

von Humboldt (with Hamann and Herder as predecessors). See Wilhelm von Humboldt,

'On Language': On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and its Influence on the Mental Development of Human Species, ed by Michael Losonsky, translated by Peter Heath (Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 49. For Humboldt, language is activity and unceasing process of creation (energeia) realized in individual speech acts, rather than ready-made product (ergon). In this subjectivist trend, the laws of language creativity are the laws of individual psychology. Some of the best well-known linguists in Bakhtin's time were Karl Vossler and his school (e.g., Leo Spitzer). Vosslerites rejected positivism and the premises of Cartesian rationalism and argued that the vital feature of speech does not consist in the grammatical forms, which are shared and stable but in stylistic concretization of these abstract forms that individualize any given utterance. See Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 51. Bakhtin found much to admire in Vossler, but Bakhtin's different focus on the social, historical, and dialogical dimensions of language, together with his rejection of psychologism, makes his conception of language noticeably different. For a recent, masterful reconstruction and defence of the expressive view of language see Charles Taylor, The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity (Belknap Press, 2016). Taylor's book has the great virtue of showing how the objectivist position remains alive in contemporary analytic philosophy, cognitive theory, and pragmatism.

28. According to Saussure, "In separating language [langue] from speaking [parole] we are at the same time separating: (1) what is social from what is individual; and (2) what is essential from what is accessory and more or less accidental." See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed by Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye in collaboration with Albert Riedlinger, translated by Wade Baskin (Philosophical Library, 1959) at 14.

29. Ibid. Saussure states that "[t]he linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image" (ibid at 66). The first he calls signified [signifié] and, the second, signifier [signifiant]. See ibid at 67. Their link is arbitrary because the bond between one and the other is unmotivated or without natural connection (i.e., it could be represented just as well by any other sequence). See ibid at 65-70.

30. Ibid at 20. "[I]ndeed," Saussure writes, "the science of language is possible only if the other elements are excluded" [pas mêlés]" (ibid at 15).

31. Ibid. The comparison is not fanciful, for "of all comparisons that might be imagined, the most fruitful is the one that might be drawn between the functioning of language and a game of chess" (ibid at 88). See also Section VIII, below.

32. Saussure, supra note 28 at 23.

33. Ibid at 113, 110.

34. Ibid. According to Saussure, "Language is characterized as a system based entirely on the opposition of its concrete units" (ibid at 107). Hence, the often-repeated statement about which much has been made by post-structuralism that "in language there are only differences" (ibid at 120).

35. Ibid at 14.

36. Chess is one of the favourite metaphors of HLA Hart (see Section VIII, below).

37. Most famously, see Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (1934), 2nd revised & enlarged German ed, translated by Max Knight (University of California Press, 1967).

38. Supra note 28 at 88.

39. Ibid at 111.

40. Ibid at 122, 113.

41. Ibid at 91, 99-100.

42. See e.g. Norberto Bobbio, A Theory of the Legal Order (Giappichelli, 1960).

43. Supra note 28 at 9. For a criticism, see Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 78-82.

44. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 66.

45. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 288.

46. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 82.

47. Ibid at 68.

48. Ibid at 94.

49. Ibid at 68.

50. On reification as the conversion of a human concept into an external thing, whereby a reified law is said to "strive," "desire," "make claims," "aspire," et cetera, see Desmond Manderson, Songs Without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of Law and Justice (University of California Press, 2000) at 160ff. See also Davies, supra note 19 at 30 (arguing that "[l]aw does not do anything or say anything itself, and it is not even an identifiable thing-all these are shorthands for the actions of human beings enmeshed in material contexts who use an imaginary of law to relate and engage") [emphasis in original].

51. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 81.

52. See also Boris Gasparov, Beyond Pure Reason: Ferdinand de Saussure's Philosophy of Language and Its Early Romantic Antecedents (Columbia University Press, 2013) at 117.

53. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 78 [emphasis added]. In Nietzschean vein, Voloshinov writes: "Despite the vast differences in cultural and historical lineaments from the ancient Hindu priests to the modern European scholar of language, the philologist has always and everywhere been a decipherer of alien, 'secret' scripts and words," that is,

"always and everywhere priests" (ibid at 74).

54. Goodrich, Legal Discourse, supra note 6 at 33. See also Harold J Berman, "The Origin of Western Legal Science in the European Universities" in Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard University Press, 1983) 120.

55. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 270. For grammar as a project of political uniformization at the service of Empire, see the fascinating account of Ivan Illich

about Antonio de Nebrija's project to build the first grammar of any modern European tongue (Castilian) in 1492, offered to Queen Isabella. See Ivan Illich, "Vernacular

Values" in Lawrence J Trudeau, ed, Literature Criticism From 1400 To 1800: Volume 251

(Gale, 2016) 148. https://doi.org/10.1002/tl.20206

56. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 270.

57. Ibid at 270.

58. Robert M Cover, "The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative" (1983) 97 Harv L Rev 4. For an explanation, see Julen Etxabe, "The Legal Universe after Robert Cover" (2010) 4 Law & Humanities 115 at 125-29.

59. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 19. Voloshinov states that:

[T] he word is the most sensitive index of social changes, and what is more, of changes still in the process of growth, still without definitive shape and not as yet accommodated into already regularized and fully defined ideological systems…The word has the capacity to register all the transitory, delicate, momentary phases of social change [emphases in original].

The word "refracted," is a term employed both by Voloshinov and by Bakhtin. See ibid at 24; Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 302, 324, 332.

60. See Bakhtin, "Text," supra note 24 at 127. Bakhtin speaks of "[t]he microworld of

the word" (ibid).

61. For an attempt to bypass it, see Donna Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in The Chthulucene (Duke University Press, 2016).

62. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 276.

63. Ibid at 281. For a discussion, see Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 78-80. For terminology, see Todorov, The Dialogical Principle, supra note 23.

64. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 88.

65. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 80.

66. This is related to what, borrowing from Friedrich Waissman, Hart called the "open texture of language." For a discussion, see Brian Bix, "H.L.A. Hart and the 'Open Texture' of Language" (1991) 10 Law & Phil 51. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00144295

67. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 102.

68. Ibid at 100.

69. Ibid. As Voloshinov writes, "Meaning is the effect of interaction between speaker and listener produced via the material of a particular sound complex" (ibid at 102-03

[emphasis omitted]).

70. Ibid at 86. Throughout the article I have tried to avoid the use of gendered English, including slight adjudgment to some of the translations, except when this could not be done without substantial alteration. See the text accompanying infra notes 83 and 156, below.

71. Ibid at 80.

72. Ibid at 102 [emphasis added].

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid. Bakhtin explains that dialogical interaction comprises not only face-to-face encounters but all sorts of verbal and non-verbal communication, including bodily gestures (e.g., raising a fist, raising the eyebrow) and tone (e.g., higher or lower pitch, warm or stern timbre). Communication can also occur silently between participants who are at a distance from one another. For example, a book, which is a "verbal performance in print," is also an element of such communication (ibid at 95).

75. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 279.

76. Ibid at 280.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Most current statutory interpretation has moved from trying to decipher what the legislature intended, towards a more objective determination of the public meaning of the legislative text, often called the "communicative content" of the legislative text. For a critique of such communicative models in jurisprudence, see Mark Greenberg, "Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Interpretation" in Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 217. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572380.003.0010

80. Todorov, The Dialogical Principle, supra note 23 at 55. Two additional elements are "context" and "contact (ibid at 54).

81. Ibid at 56 [translation slightly modified].

82. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 368.

83. Ibid at 293-94 [emphasis added].

84. Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle, supra note 23. See also Craig Brandist, "The Official and the Popular in Gramsci and Bakhtin" (1996) 13 Theory Culture & Society 59. https://doi.org/10.1177/026327696013002004

85. Rudolph von Jhering, The Struggle for Law, 5th German ed, translated by John J Lalor

(Callahan & Co, 1879). More recently, Foucault criticizes Habermas for having forgotten power relations in his communicative model. See Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power" (1982) 8 Critical Inquiry 777 at 786-87 . https://doi.org/10.1086/448181

86. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 294.

87. Ibid.

88. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 85.

89. Ibid at 78.

90. The social dimension also separates Bakhtin from the subjectivist (or expressivist) school of Vossler. See supra note 27.

91. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 71.

92. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 93.

93. See supra note 27.

94. See M M Bakhtin & P N Medvedev, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics, translated by Albert J Wehrle (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) at 120 [Medvedev, The Formal Method].

95. Valentin Voloshinov, "Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art" (1926), in Neal H Bruss, ed, Freudianism: A Critical Sketch, translated by I R Titunik (Indiana University Press, 1987) at 100 [Voloshinov, "Life and Art"].

96. Ibid at 105.

97. Ibid.

98. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 95.

99. "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 60 [emphasis in original]. For Bakhtin, "[t]he wealth and diversity of speech genres are boundless, because the various possibilities of human activity are inexhaustible, and because each sphere of activity contains an entire repertoire of speech genres" (ibid).

100. For the improbable, crucial, legal significance of a simple adverb such as "nevertheless," see Otto Preminger, The Anatomy of a Murder (Columbia Pictures, 1959).

101. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 81 [emphasis in original].

102. Ibid at 91.

103. Ibid at 69.

104. Ibid at 93.

105. Ibid at 73. On the key differences between utterances and sentences, see Tzvetan Todorov, "Theory of the Utterance" in The Dialogical Principle, supra note 23, 41. See also Susan Petrilli, "Communication, Dialogue, and Otherness in Mikhail Bakhtin's Metalinguistics" (2008) 1 Russian J Communication 266. https://doi.org/10.1080/19409419.2008.10756716

106. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 73.

107. Ibid at 74.

108. Ibid at 82.

109. Ibid at 74.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid at 72.

112. Ibid at 76 [emphasis in original].

113. Ibid at 71.

114. Ibid at 83.

115. Ibid at 84.

116. Ibid at 95. According to this, even the cry of a nursing infant is addressed to someone. See Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 87.

117. Ibid [emphasis added].

118. Voloshinov, Life and Art, supra note 95.

119. On attunement, see Becker, supra note 2.

120. Thomas Kent "Hermeneutics and Genre: Bakhtin and the Problem of Communicative Interaction" in Frank Farmer, ed, supra note 23, 33 at 42.

121. "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 95.

122. In an incomplete text published posthumously, Bakhtin alludes briefly to the figure of the "superaddresee,"-a "third" whose absolutely just and responsive understanding is presumed. See Bakhtin, "Text," supra note 24 at 126. There is no need to presuppose a metaphysical entity here, which is why Michael Holquist's interpretation of the superaddressee as "the a priori of all speech" and the closest to "something like a God concept in Bakhtin" cannot be accepted. See Bakhtin, Late Essays, supra note 23 at xviii. Bakhtin is clear that "[t]he aforementioned third party is not any mystical or metaphysical being (although, given a certain understanding of the world, he can be expressed as such)" (Bakhtin, "Text," supra note 24 at 126-27). Rather, "he is a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance, who, under deeper analysis, can be revealed in it" (ibid). In different historical times, this superadressee has acquired different ideological forms: God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, and the court of history or science. This is not an a priori condition existing outside discourse. For obvious reasons, too, the addressee has nothing to do with the "reading public" located outside the work. See Voloshinov, "Life and Art," supra note 95 at 114-15.

123. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 96-97.

124. "No word lacks tact" (Medvedev, The Formal Method, supra note 94 at 95).

125. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 86. I thank James Boyd

White for the image.

126. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 281.

127. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 68.

128. Although this is not a terminology employed by Bakhtin, it may be practical here to distinguish between hearing and listening.

129. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 69.

130. Ibid.

131. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 282.

132. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 68.

133. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 102. See also Bakhtin, "Text," supra note 24 at 125.

134. See Marianne Constable, Our Word is Our Bond: How Legal Speech Acts (Stanford University Press, 2014) at 33. Stanley Cavell's "passionate utterances" are neither constative nor performative but focus on the "you." A passionate utterance such as "I insult you" or "I seduce you"-or even "I persuade you"-does not do what it says in the same way as the performative "I promise…" does and requires a hearer who is attuned to it in a particular way. See Stanley Cavell, "Performative and Passionate Utterances" in Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow (Belknap Press, 2005). For the importance of the auditory sense in law, see Parker, supra note 19.

135. Maurizio Lazzarato, "Mikhail Bakhtin's Theory of the Utterance," translated by Arianna Bove (2009), online: https://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_lazzarato6.htm.

136. Ibid.

137. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 281.

138. See infra notes 167-168 and accompanying text. See also infra note 282. For a theory of

"plain" or "literal" meaning based on a "universal" or "baseline" context that remains largely invariant across competent speakers of a given language-system, see Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-based Decision-making in Law and in Life (Oxford University Press, 1991).

139. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 68-70. For an attempt to develop a more complex differentiation, see Erving Goffman, Forms of Talk (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981) 124 (distinguishing between "animator," "author," and "principal").

140. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 70.

141. MM Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity" in Michael Holquist & Vadim Liapunov, eds, Art and Answerability (University of Texas Press, 1990) at 225 [emphasis in original] [Bakhtin, Art].

142. See MM Bakhtin, Toward the Philosophy of The Act (University of Texas Press,1993) https://doi.org/10.7560/765344-004

at 36 [Bakhtin, Act]. In this text dating to 1919-1921 and published posthumously,

the emotional-evaluative relation with the objects of experience acquires an

ontological-existential dimension that transforms mere possibility into the actuality of being-as-event (ibid at 32-45). In this view, "[e]verything that is actually experienced…has an emotional-volitional tone and enters into an effective relationship to me within the unity of the ongoing event encompassing us" (ibid at 33). By contrast, an indifferent attitude cannot "generate sufficient power to slow down and linger intently over an object, to hold and sculpt every detail and particular in it, however minute" (ibid at 64 [emphasis in original]). Answerability underlies what Bakhtin calls the "non-alibi in Being," that is, that I cannot excuse or relieve myself from the responsibility of the act (ibid).

143. Medvedev, The Formal Method, supra note 94 at 127.

144. Ibid at 125. As Bakhtin writes:

Insofar as we abstractly separate the content of a lived-experience from its actual experiencing, the content presents itself to us as something absolutely indifferent to value qua actual and affirmed value…Yet in order to become really actualized and thus made into a participant in the historical being of actual cognition, [it]…must enter into an essential interconnection with an actual valuation (Bakhtin, Act, supra note 142 at 33).

145. Medvedev, The Formal Method, supra note 94 at 123.

146. Voloshinov, "Life and Art," supra note 95 at 98.

147. Medvedev, The Formal Method, supra note 94 at 121. On what this "accustoming" might mean, see Alton Becker's notion of "attunement," which also requires coming to terms with the silences and the unsaid in language. See supra note 2.

148. Medvedev, The Formal Method, supra note 94 at 122.

149. Arguably, "[i]ntonation always lies on the border of the verbal and the nonverbal, the said and the unsaid." Voloshinov, "Life and Art," supra note 95 at 102.

150. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 87.

151. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 85.

152. Ibid at 86. The story is told in Xenophon's Anabisis (ca 370 BC) and the sea they saw was the black sea, which symbolized the possibility of returning home. See Xenophon in Seven Volumes, translated by Carleton Lewis Brownson (Harvard University Press, 1924), s I(IV).

153. The scene is described in Voloshinov, "Life and Art," supra note 95 at 99-105.

154. Ibid at 104.

155. Ibid at 102.

156. Ibid at 103 (gendered language in the English translation).

157. Ibid at 98.

158. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 90.

159. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 87.

160. Ibid at 105.

161. Ibid at 103, 105.

162. Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 84.

163. For the description of the style of Grotius, see Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro,

The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World (Simon & Schuster, 2017) at 12.

164. Bakhtin conceives the possibility of neutrality (or abstraction) only at the level of grammatical sentences. See "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 82. But, of course, we do not speak in sentences, but in utterances.

165. Schauer, supra note 138; Marmor, Language of Law, supra note 17. See also Marmor & Soames, supra note 79. More broadly, see also Scott Soames, Philosophical Essays, Vol. 1. Natural Language: What it Means and How to Use It (Princeton University Press, 2008) [Soames, Philosophical Essays].

166. For Marmor's discussion on "pragmatic enrichment," see Language of Law, supra note 17. See also S Soames, "Interpreting Legal Texts: What is, and What is not, Special about the Law" in Philosophical Essays, supra note 165, 403. For the notion of pragmatic implicatures, see Paul Grice, "Logic and Conversation" in Studies in the Way of Words (Harvard University Press, 1991) 22.

167. See e.g. Schauer, supra note 138. See Marmor, supra note 17.

168. Marmor, supra note 17 at 27, 12. See also Hrafn Asgeirsson, "Authority, Communication and Legal Content" in The Nature and Value of Vagueness in Law (Hart, 2020) 6.

169. See Soames, Philosophical Essays, supra note 165 at 2. This theory can also be called "representational," for "to know the meaning of a sentence is to know the way in which uses of it represent the world to be" (ibid).

170. See Atienza & Manero, supra note 8, with accompanying bibliography.

171. For a pragmatist critique of legislative intent from the perspective of the audience, see Barbara Baum Levenboook, "Soames, Legislative Intent, and the Meaning of a Statute" in Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind, eds, Pragmatism, Law and Language (2013) 40.

172. This is not to say that positivists do not consider different kinds of rules. For a typology, see Atienza & Manero, supra note 8.

173. Hart's legal theory-and in particular his most crucial rule of recognition-is in fact addressed to legal officials whose acceptance alone suffices. A thinner understanding of ordinary people's engagement with the law is hardly imaginable. HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 116 [Hart, The Concept of Law].

174. For some of these categories, see Brian G Slocum, "Ordinary Meaning and Empiricism" (2019) 40 Stat L Rev 13 at 21-24. https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmy028

175. See e.g. Marmor, Language of Law, supra note 17 at 23. See in particular John R Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press, 1969). Searle emphasized that speech acts depend upon the realization of a series of underlying rules, characteristically performed by uttering certain expressions in accordance with them (ibid at 37). Therefore, while potentially divergent, speech-act theory remains largely compatible with the idea of language as a system of signs. In fact, Searle described his contribution explicitly in Saussurean terms, as a study not of "parole" but of "langue" (ibid at 17).

176. See Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 173. Hart claimed to be following JL Austin's "sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perceptions of phenomena" (ibid at 14). He also considered Austin's work on performatives to be of permanent value for analytic jurisprudence. See Matthew H Kramer, "Hart and the Metaphysics and Semantics of Legal Normativity" (2018) 31 Ratio Juris 396 at 406. Kramer has criticized Hart's overemphasis on semantics in his account of legal interpretation but maintains that Hart was well attuned to the pragmatics of legal discourse in his overall theorizing about the law (ibid at 403). Kramer's account does not satisfactorily explain why Hart's underlying conception of language could be so different in both instances. https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12223

177. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5.

178. Bakhtin, "Text," supra note 24.

179. See MM Bakhtin, The Dialogical Imagination (University of Texas Press, 1981). Michael Holquist has also published his own book on Bakhtin entitled Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World, 2nd ed (Routledge, 2002).

180. For a slightly different categorization distinguishing between ontological, epistemological, and metalinguistic understandings of dialogue, see Frank Farmer, "Introduction" in Frank Farmer, supra note 23, xi.

181. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 72, 95.

182. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 276-77.

183. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 72-74.

184. See especially Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 273ff. See also Bakhtin, Dostoevsky, supra note 23; Bakhtin, Rabelais, supra note 23.

185. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 271.

186. For some of these attempts, see J Cartwright, "Harmonisation Projects: Lessons from the European Experience?" (2018) 2 Latin American L Studies 163.

187. For a view criticizing the implicit assumption, see J B White, "The Language of 'Concepts': A Case Study" in Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (The University of Chicago Press, 1990) 22 at 31 [White, Justice as Translation].

188. For a thorough philosophical overview of the ethics of translation, see François Ost, Traduire: Défense et illustration du multilinguisme (Fayard, 2009).

189. Bakhtin contrasts these with the Socratic notions of truth, where truth is meant to emerge collectively in an interactive process. See Bakhtin, Dostoevsky, supra note 23 at 110. The dialogic notion of truth (and the human thinking about truth) has been productively picked up by Hannah Arendt. See "Introduction into Politics" in Jerome Kohn, ed, The Promise of Politics (Schocken Books, 2005) 93.

190. Bakhtin, Dostoevsky, supra note 23 at 292 ("Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness"). "Monologue is finalized and deaf to the other's response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge it any decisive force" (ibid at 293). It pretends to be the last or "ultimate word" (ibid). See also White, Justice as Translation, supra note 187 at 29 (for whom this form of rationality is "structurally coercive").

191. George Kamberelis & Karla Dannette Scott, "Other People's Voices: The Coarticulation of Texts and Subjectivities" (1992) 4 Linguistics & Education 359 at 365. https://doi.org/10.1016/0898-5898(92)90008-K

192. See Bakhtin, "Text," supra note 24 at 124. See also Boris Gasparov, Speech, Memory and Meaning: Intertextuality in Everyday Language (De Gruyter Mouton, 2010) at 12. Gasparov writes, "What dialogism means is that every act of speech, of any genre and mode, bears an imprint of the 'other'-whether the 'other' is directly present or implied, known to the speaker directly or constructed" (ibid).

193. Bakhtin, Dostoevsky, supra note 23 at 184.

194. Ibid at 195.

195. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 279.

196. This is the term employed in Todorov, supra note 23. See also Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology (Hill and Wang, 1968).

197. Kamberelis & Scott, supra note 191 at 367 [emphasis in original].

198. The term "intertextuality" was coined by Julia Kristeva in her seminal article. See "Word, Dialogue and Novel" in Leon S Roudiez, ed, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (Columbia University Press,1980) 64. For an influential development, see Norman Fairclough, "Intertextuality in Critical Discourse Analysis" (1992) 4 Linguistics & Education 269. Bakhtin's preferred term is "dialogical relations." See e.g. Bakhtin, "Text," supra note 24 at 121.

199. In the glossary of The Dialogic Imagination, voice is defined as "the speaking personality, the speaking consciousness. A voice has will or desire behind it, its own timbre and overtones." See Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 434. However, terms like "personality," "consciousness," "will," and "desire" would require further explanation. For Bakhtin, the voice is embodied and materially palpable in the language (or discourse) and not somewhere outside it. See Renfrew, supra note 23 at 82.

200. "Text," supra note 24 at 124. These types of relations "constitute a special type of semantic relations, whose members can only be complete utterances…behind which stand (and in which [they] are expressed) real or potentially real speech subjects, authors of the given utterances" (ibid).

201. Ibid at 117.

202. Ibid.

203. For the example, see Bakhtin, Dostoevsky, supra note 23 at 183.

204. Ibid.

205. Bakhtin, "Text," supra note 24 at 125.

206. Ibid.

207. Bakhtin, Dostoevsky, supra note 23 at 184.

208. Bakhtin, "Text," supra note 24 at 124.

209. Obviously, it is also possible for Socratic dialogue to work in a more constraining and "coercive" way.

210. "Text," supra note 24 at 125.

211. See the discussion in Bakhtin, Dostoevsky, supra note 23 at 185-203.

212. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 135 [emphasis omitted]. For the full example, see Fiodor Dostoevsky, "Skverny anekdot [A Nasty Story]," Vremya (1862) 11.

213. Voloshinov, Philosophy of Language, supra note 5 at 134.

214. See 2005 ECHR 681 at para 82 [Hirst]. Article 3 of Protocol 1 states: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure that the free expression of the opinion of the public in the choice of the legislature" (ibid). The Court concluded that the blanket ban exceeded any acceptable margin of appreciation and was disproportionate.

215. Ibid at para 50.

216. Ibid at para 44.

217. Ibid at para 75 [citations omitted].

218. Colin Murray, "Playing for Time: Prisoner Disenfranchisement under the ECHR after Hirst v United Kingdom" (2011) 22 KLJ 309 at 312. Cf Plaxton & Hardy, "Prisoner Disenfranchisement: Four Judicial Approaches" (2010) 28 BJIL 101 at 119. https://doi.org/10.5235/096157611798456771

219. Hirst, supra note 214 at para 59.

220. 2002 SCC 68 [Sauvé].

221. Hirst, supra note 214 at para 75.

222. Ibid.

223. Sauvé, supra note 220 at para 26, McLachlin CJ.

224. The ECtHR's perception of its institutional position and the relationships it seeks to maintain with Member States within the Council of Europe play a key role in interpreting the ECtHR's supposed "acceptance" of the UK's aims: It is one thing to refrain from declaring the government aims illegitimate and another thing to say that it "accepts" them. See generally Hirst, supra note 214; Sauvé, supra note 220. Cf Plaxton & Hardy, supra note 218 at 119 (arguing that the court "display[s] a staunch deference to the state's own appreciation of the limits on the right"). Moreover, in light of the fact that later in the same judgment the ECtHR declared that the UK law was in breach of the Convention, it seems more appropriate to consider the ECtHR's maneuvers here as a tactical retreat. Be that as it may, the ECtHR's judgment demands a dialogical reading beyond the purely propositional or declaratory.

225. The example was first raised by Hart in 1958. See "Positivism and the Separation of

Law and Morals" (1958) 71 Harv L Rev 593 at 611. It was famously debated by Lon Fuller. See "Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart" (1958) 71 Harv L Rev 630 at 662-63. https://doi.org/10.2307/1338226

226. Ibid at 663.

227. Kramer, supra note 176. Some positivist authors still defend the semantic theory of meaning. See e.g. Schauer, supra note 138. Schauer argues that linguistic symbols carry meaning independent of the communicative goals of the users of those symbols on particular occasions.

228. Legal positivists have a fondness for certain kind of examples: vehicles, cricket, chess-but not war, poverty, politics, or religion. Examples are never neutral (I thank Peter Goodrich for reminding me of this crucial point).

229. Roderick A MacDonald & Jason MacLean, "No Toilets in Park" (2005) 50 McGill

LJ 721 at 723-27.

230. Ibid at 724.

231. See Steven Winter, "Frame Semantics and the 'Internal Point of View'" in Freeman & Smith, eds, Law and Language (Oxford University Press, 2013).

232. Marianne Constable & Linda Ross Meyer, "No rule for the application of rules" in Baudouin Dupret, Julie Colemans & Max Travers, eds, Legal Rules in Practice: In the Midst of Law's Life (Routledge, 2021) 29 at 35.

233. See "The Grammar of Customary Law" (2009) 54 McGill LJ 579 at 588-89. As Webber writes, "[S]tatements of norms…are always approximations, distillations, interpretations, that are perennially subject to further evaluation and refinement as a result of experience" (ibid at 588).

234. According to MacDonald & MacLean, "the interpreter is not merely an exegete," that

is, someone who must reproduce the meaning of the rule, but "an agent engaged in constituting both the meaning of the sign and his or her own relationship to it." Supra note 229 at 725-26.

235. There have been some important attempts in the Anglo-American world. See e.g. Bix, supra note 9; Schauer, supra note 138; Timothy Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford University Press, 2000). See also Asgeirsson, supra note 168.

236. See e.g. Duncan Kennedy, Critique of Adjudication: Fin de Siècle (Harvard University Press, 1998); Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in the Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Harvard University Press, 1982). On differànce, see Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Chicago University Press, 1978) [Derrida, Writing]. For Derrida's understanding of language as trace, opposed to its "presence" in consciousness, see also Jacques Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon: Introduction to the Problem of the Sign in Husserl's Phenomenology (Northwestern University Press, 2011); Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 40th ed, translated by G Spivak (Johns Hopkins University, 2016).

237. For a good short introduction into corpus linguistics, see Clark Cunningham & Jesse Egbert, "Analyzing legal discourse in the United States" in Eric Friginal & Jack Hardy, eds, Routledge Handbook of Corpus Approaches to Discourse Analysis (Routledge, 2020) 462. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429259982-27

238. See e.g. Stefan Gries & Brian Slocum, "Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics" (2017) 2017 BYUL Rev 1417.

239. Stephen Mouritsen, "Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning" (2011) 13 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 156 at 180.

240. See Cunningham & Egbert, supra note 237.

241. 18 USC, c 96 (1970); Clark Cunningham et al, "Plain Meaning and Hard Cases" (1994) 103 Yale LJ 1561. https://doi.org/10.2307/797094

242. Mouritsen, supra note 239 at 162.

243. Thomas Lee & Stephen Mouritsen, "Judging Ordinary Meaning" (2018) 127 Yale LJ 788.

244. Ibid at 836-44, 859-62.

245. For a criticism along these lines, see Carissa Byrne Hessick, "Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law" (2017) 6 BYUL Rev 1503. For an empirical criticism of the reliability

of corpus methodology, see Kevin Tobia, "Testing Ordinary Meaning" (2020) 134

Harv L Rev 706.

246. Mouritsen, supra note 239 at 204.

247. See Evan Zoldan, "Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity" (2020) 50 Seton Hall L Rev 401. For an insightful critique, see Anya Bernstein, "Legal Corpus Linguistics and the Half-Empirical Attitude" 106 Cornell L Rev 1397. See also Lawrence Solan, "Corpus Linguistics as a Method of Legal Interpretation: Some Progress, Some Questions" (2020) 33 Intl J Sem L 283. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09707-8

248. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 243 at 843. The admission seems damning, for if the rule prohibiting vehicles in the park ultimately depends on circumstances as random as

the physical and spatial characteristics of the park, one wonders, what is to be gained

with the corpus?

249. Not that the prisoner's pain is irrelevant-far from it, the prisoner's pain helps to explain why the prohibition of cruel punishment matters-but the task before the judge is not to empirically verify the pain of the prisoner.

250. Clark Cunningham & Charles Fillmore, "Using Common Sense: A Linguistic Perspective on Judicial Interpretations of 'Use a Firearm'" (1995) 73 Wash L Rev 1159. See also Bernstein, supra note 247. Bernstein argues that "turning to an empirical method can distract legal interpreters from the inquiry they are charged with resolving" (ibid at 22).

251. This is what Neal Goldfarb calls the "slice-and-dice" approach to meaning. See "A Lawyer's Introduction to Meaning in the Framework of Corpus Linguistics" (2017) 2017 BYUL Rev 1359 at 1390. As Bernstein argues, "legal corpus work routinely fails to even discuss issues of speaker, audience, and genre" (supra note 247 at 39-40).

252. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1. See Patrick Hanks "Do Word Meanings Exist?" (2000) 34 Computers & Humanities 205 at 210-11. As lexicographer (and former chief editor of Current English Dictionaries at Oxford University Press) Patrick Hanks writes:

[M]eanings are events, not entities….It is a convenient shorthand to talk about 'the meanings of words in a dictionary', but strictly speaking these are not meanings at all. Rather, they are 'meaning potentials'-potential contributions to the meanings of texts and conversations in which the words are used, and activated by the speaker who uses them.

253. See also Bernstein, supra note 247 at 49 (arguing that "[m]eaning is not a fact, [but]…a social activity").

254. See James Boyd White, "Constituting a Culture of Argument: The Possibilities of American Law" in When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community (University of Chicago Press, 1984) 231.

255. For the concept of the legal scene, see Julen Etxabe, "Jacques Rancière and the Dramaturgy of Law" in Mónica López Lerma & Julen Etxabe, eds, Rancière and Law (Routledge, 2018) 17.

256. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 282.

257. Smith v United States, 508 US 223 (1993) [Smith]; Bailey v United States, 508 US 223

(1995) [Bailey]; Muscarello v United States, 508 US 223 (1998) [Muscarello]. For the first corpus linguistic analysis, see Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 250. For more recent analyses, see Gries & Slocum, supra note 238; Goldfarb, supra note 251; Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 243.

258. Supra note 257.

259. Federal Criminal Code, USC § 924(c)(1)(Title 18). This provision imposes an enhanced mandatory sentence of five years for anyone who "uses or carries a firearm" during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime-and 30 extra years if the weapon is a machine gun or is fitted with a silencer.

260. Smith, supra note 257 at 240, O'Connor J.

261. Ibid at 225.

262. Ibid at 240.

263. As the majority writes, "It creates a grave possibility of violence and death in either capacity" (ibid).

264. Becker, supra note 2 at 287.

265. Mouritsen explains that when searching for the term "enterprise" in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statute, he excluded certain uses from the count "with an eye to treating the ordinary meaning of enterprise as a fresh linguistic question, rather than a long-decided legal one." Supra note 239 at 196.

266. On the memory of language, see Boris Gasparov, Speech, Memory, and Meaning: Intertextuality in Everyday Language (De Gruyter, 2010).

267. While generally associated with the common law, civil law and non-Western traditions also show a "threaded nature," as shown by Baudouin Dupret and Jean-Noël Ferrié in their ethnomethodological study of the interplay between secular and Shari'a law in Egypt. See "The Practical Grammar of Law and its Relation to Time" in Baudouin Dupret, Michael Lynch & Tim Berard, eds, Law at Work: Studies in Legal Ethnomethods (Oxford University Press, 2015) 27. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190210243.003.0002

268. Law's Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986).

269. See Alexandre Lefebvre, The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza (Stanford University Press, 2008). See also Sara Ramshaw, Justice as Improvisation: The Law of the Extempore (Routledge, 2013).

270. See Julen Etxabe, See Julen Etxabe, The Experience of Tragic Judgment (Routledge, 2013) [Etxabe, Tragic Judgment]. Cf Cunningham and Fillmore, who analyze the legislation history-i.e., the successive phases of legislative changes and reform-"as if it were a coherent discourse over time." Supra note 250 at 1163.

271. Bailey, supra note 257 at 143.

272. Ibid at 148.

273. Ibid. In one of the two petitions consolidated in Bailey, the police found a pistol in the defendant's trunk.

274. Ibid at 150, O'Connor J.

275. This position can also be mediated by several legal constructs (or, rather, by the Supreme Court's interpretation of them), such as the "average person on the street," the "reasonable member of Congress," the "normal speaker of English," the "reasonable hearer." For some of these categories, see Slocum, supra note 174 at 21-24.

276. The scene is not merely a cognitive process in the mind of the interpreter. Nor does it allude just to the need of creating coherent narratives of events. See e.g. Bernard S Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence (Deborah Charles, 1988). Rather, the scene encapsulates the interpreter and brings the interpreter in.

277. Supra note 257 at 150. Ginsburg J, dissenting, citing United States v Bass,

404 US 336 (1971).

278. Supra note 257 at 143, Ginsburg J, dissenting.

279. Slocum, supra note 174 at 14. See also Schauer, supra note 138.

280. Muscarello, supra note 257. Justice Breyer argued that "the word 'carry' in its ordinary sense…keeps the same meaning whether one carries a gun, a suitcase, or a banana" (ibid at 131 [emphasis added]).

281. Ibid. Justice Breyer seeks to isolate the word "carry" independently of any context, as if the word existed in a Platonic world of pure concepts. Surely, carrying a gun or carrying a banana have different normative consequences and are therefore not the same action: There is a reason why the statute talks about guns and not bananas.

282. See e.g. William Eskridge Jr, "The New Textualism" (1990) 37 UCLA L Rev 621. This approach is often associated with textualism, brought to prominence by Justice Scalia. New textualism is, however, not the province of conservative scholars

it has been repurposed by liberal constitutional scholars like Akhil Amar, Lawrence Lessig, and Jack Balkin. See e.g. James Ryan, "Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism" (2011) 97 Va L Rev 1523.

283. On this idea of transparency, see Paul Kahn, Making the Case: The Art of the Judicial Opinion (Yale University Press, 2016).

284. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd ed (Continuum, 1975).

285. Bailey, supra note 257 at 143, O'Connor J.

286. The Concept of Law, supra note 173 at 240.

287. "Hart's Methodological Positivism" (1998) 4 Leg Theory 427. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325200001105

288. Ibid at 438.

289. Ibid at 444.

290. These alternatives correspond to the ethical, socio-legal, and conceptual variants of legal positivism respectively.

291. See Tom Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism, reprinted ed (Routledge, 2016)[Campbell, Legal Theory]. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315238715

292. See Jeremy Waldron, "Normative (or Ethical) Positivism" in Jules Coleman, ed, Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to 'The Concept of Law' (Oxford University Press, 2001) 411. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198299080.003.0012

293. This is called the "prescriptive separation thesis" (Campbell, Legal Theory, supra note 291 at 3). See also Waldron, supra note 292 at 411.

294. Campbell, Legal Theory, supra note 291 at 2; Waldron, supra note 292 at 418.

295. See Brian Tamanaha, "Socio-Legal Positivism and a General Jurisprudence" (2001) 21 Oxford J Leg Stud 1. Tamanaha seeks a "conventionalist" account, where law "lacks https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/21.1.1

any inherently necessary qualities" and instead is "whatever we attach the label law to"

(ibid at 15, 18).

296. See "Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis" (1998) 4 Leg Theory 381 at 395, n 26 (arguing that the criticisms purporting to show that Hart, contrary to his own reflections on the matter, did not engage in or faithfully execute a descriptivist methodology, fall short of undermining the very possibility of a descriptive jurisprudence). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325200001099

297. Marmor, "Still Descriptive," supra note 11 at 125.

298. Jules L Coleman, "Negative and Positive Positivism" (1982) 11 J Leg Stud 139 at 147. https://doi.org/10.1086/467696

299. On direct and indirect evaluations, see Julie Dickson, Evaluation, supra note 10 at 51-57. The distinction is less stable than Dickson makes it appear, for "what is driving [the decision about] the importance of certain feature of the law is…[that it] has a bearing upon,

or is ultimately relevant to, answering directly evaluative questions" (ibid at 61).

300. For the imaginative character of this endeavour, see William MacNeil, Novel Judgements: Legal Theory as Fiction (Routledge, 2012).

301. Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2019) at 324.

302. Ibid at 324-5.

303. Ibid at 325.

304. Ibid.

305. Ibid at 326.

306. According to Postema, such abstract concepts and definitions "may capture only a small part of the body of beliefs and attitude which constitute the practice and shape the concept" (ibid at 324).

bid at 325.

308. Supra note 233 at 605.

309. Ibid at 604.

310. Supra note 295 at 31.

311. See William Ewald, "Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What was it Like to Try a Rat?" (1995) 143 U Pa L Rev 1889. https://doi.org/10.2307/3312588

312. See Henry S Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas, 10th ed (Henry Holt, 1906) at 6-7. As Maine critically observed in 1861, "the farther we penetrate into the primitive history in thought, the farther we find ourselves from a conception of law which at all resembles a compound of the elements which [legal positivists] determined" (ibid at 7). See also Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (Basic Books, 1983). For Geertz, this suggests that "[l] ike sailing, gardening, politics, and poetry, law and ethnography are crafts of place: they work by the light of local knowledge" (ibid at 167). For the methodological challenges of understanding law in ancient societies, see Julen Etxabe, "Introduction: Writing a Cultural History of Law in Antiquity" in Julen Etxabe, ed, Cultural History of Law in Antiquity

(Bloomsbury, 2019) at 1.

313. The critical question for any theory of law, then, is not whether it is evaluative or not,

but what exactly does it enable us to see? And what does it obscure? What ontologies

(textual, material, sensorial) are taken as fundamental, and which are downplayed? What epistemologies and forms of reasoning (analytical-cognitive, experiential, metaphorical) are considered, and which are excluded? What affective and aesthetic registers are highlighted? What chronotopes and spatial configurations are imagined-or ignored?

314. By morally neutral, Marmor means that "the theory need not take a stance on any particular moral or political issues, nor is it committed to any moral or political evaluations" ("Still Descriptive," supra note 11 at 125).

315. Ibid at 143.

316. Ibid at 147.

317. Bakhtin, Act, supra note 142.

318. Raz attributes this view to Kelsen, but Raz's reading of Kelsen is more a development of his own project. On Kelsen's normativity, see James W Harris, "Kelsen's 'Pallid Normativity'" (1996) 9 Ratio Juris 94. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.1996.tb00229.x

319. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press, 1979) at 154 [Raz,

Authority of Law].

320. Ibid at 134-35, 153-59. For an explanation, see also Julie Dickson, "Interpreting Normativity" [Dickson, "Interpreting Normativity"] in T Endicott, Joshua Getzler & Edwin Peel, eds, Properties of Law: Essays in Honour of Jim Harries (Oxford University Press, 2006) 22. See also Raz, Authority of Law, supra note 319. See also Gerald Postema, "The Normativity of Law" in Ruth Gavison, ed, Issues of Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart (Clarendon Press, 1987) 81 at 81, 83ff.

321. The example might be stretched, as in religious law more than anywhere, it matters who the persons of adviser and advisees are. On Islamic law, see Lawrence Rosen, The Justice of Islam: Comparative Perspectives on Islamic Law and Society (Oxford University Press, 2000).

322. Raz, Authority of Law, supra note 319 at 140, 156, citing Kelsen, supra note 37.

323. Ibid at 141.

324. Ibid at 156.

325. Ibid at 153.

326. Ibid at 153, 156. Raz states that they are "parasitic on full-blooded normative

statements" (ibid at 159).

327. See Dickson, "Interpreting Normativity," supra note 320.

328. By speaking of statements that are simultaneously detached (non-evaluative) and normative (i.e., evaluative though not in a "full-blooded" sense), the impression is hard to avoid that Raz wants to have the cake and eat it too. See Roger A Shiner, Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought (Oxford University Press, 1992). Shiner argues that even though Raz adopts the language of J.L. Austin to speak about the normative "force" of the statement, he assumes the possibility of a declarative statement which stands by itself and to which "force" is added later on, which Austin explicitly rejected. In Austin, "What makes a use of language 'normative' is that someone uses a given locution to perform the illocutionary act of making a normative judgment" (ibid at 143). Therefore, if detached legal statements do not have full normative force, they are not normative (ibid at 145).

329. Joseph Raz, "Authority, Law and Morality" (1985) 68 Monist 295 at 296. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198568335

330. Raz, Authority of Law, supra note 319 at 150-51. Raz believes that the validity of the rule is the same as its existence (the rule exists if it is valid and the rule is valid if it exists). Further, a rule is valid if it is binding, that is, if it has the normative consequences it purports to have. See ibid at 149-50, 153.

331. Ibid at 152.

332. Ibid.

333. Ibid. For Raz, rules are to be distinguished from the propositions or imperatives (the "deontic content") contained therein. In this view, rules "are not statements nor prescriptions….They are things the content of which is described by some normative statements" (ibid at 148).

334. Timothy Endicott, "Law and Language" (15 April 2016), online: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-language/.

335. On the importance of receptivity, see Jennifer Nedelsky, "Receptivity and Judgment" (2011) 4 Ethics & Global Politics 231. See also Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Chicago University Press, 2015) https://doi.org/10.3402/egp.v4i4.15116

Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future (MIT Press, 2006) at 199-210. On attunement as a form of justice, see Richard Dawson, Justice as Attunement: Transforming Constitutions in Law, Literature, Economics and the Rest of Life (Routledge, 2014). See also Becker, supra note 2.

336. Dickson, "Interpreting Normativity," supra note 320 at 39.

337. Ibid at 38.

338. See Section V, above.

339. See Barry Wimpfheimer, "Codes" in Julen Etxabe, ed, A Cultural History of Law in Antiquity, vol 1 (Bloomsbury, 2019) 59. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474206570.ch-004

340. On the creativity of Biblical interpretation, see Bernard M Levinson, "The Right Corale": Studies in Biblical Law and Interpretation (Mohr Siebeck, 2008).

341. See Raz, Authority of Law, supra note 319. Raz claims that "there may be no one who has such a belief" (ibid at 157) [emphasis added]. It is one thing to say that the statement does not represent beliefs of any single individual; another quite different thing is to say there is no need for anyone whatsoever to hold any such belief. Either I am missing something here, or the argument is seriously inadequate.

342. Ibid. Raz seems to be conscious of this. He writes that "there is normally no point in making statements from a point of view unless in relation to a society in which people are often ready to make the full-blooded statements. If there is nobody whose point of view it is, why should we be interested in it?" (ibid at 159). But the issue is not one of interest, but of ability: How do we know we have correctly identified their obligations if there is actually no one "whose point of view it is"?

343. For a critique, see Luís Duarte D'Almeida, "Legal Statements and Normative Language" (2011) 30 Law & Phil 167. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-010-9089-3

344. Neil MacCormick, "Comment" in Ruth Gavison, ed, Issues of Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart (Clarendon Press, 1987) 105 at 109.

345. Ibid [emphasis in original].

346. Ibid [emphasis in original].

347. Ibid [emphasis in original].

348. Neil MacCormick calls this the "hermeneutic point of view." H.L.A. Hart (Stanford University Press, 1981). Echoing Raz, MacCormick thinks that "normative statement may be made either from the internal point of view or from the hermeneutic point of view"

(ibid at 39 [emphasis in original]), the former requiring both volition (will) and cognition

(understanding), the latter only understanding (not volition). See Neil MacCormick,

"Appendix" in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 1978). See especially, ibid at 288ff [MacCormick, "Appendix"]. For MacCormick, the hermeneutic perspective comes determined by "the understanding, not the will of the speaker" (ibid at 291 [emphasis in original]). However, this distinction is not without its problems: it presupposes that the mind can be divided up into divided elements, and in particular that cognitive and volitional elements may be systematically distinguished. It presupposes also that understanding the nature of rules and of rule following behavior is in particular a state of mind without a volitional dimension (Shiner, supra note 328 at 146).

349. See Bakhtin, Act, supra note 142. As Bakhtin writes, "An event can be described only participatively" (ibid at 32).

350. The British authorities received two different warrants because the first one was defective. On the legal vicissitudes surrounding the case, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).

351. United Kingdom High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division (Divisional Court), 'In the Matter of an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjicendum. Re: Augusto Pinochet Duarte'" (1999) 38 ILM 68 at para 79 [Habeas Corpus]. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020782900012882

352. Ibid.

353. Ibid.

354. Some of these arguments would involve discussing the 1948 Genocide Convention and its transposition to the UK in 1969 and the 1984 Convention Against Torture (UK 1988). The discussion would also need to interpret the key historical precedents of Nüremberg and the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Furthermore, it would need to acknowledge the rule of immunity as not absolute, and that the final decision on immunity could have been left to the Spanish authorities.

355. For an interesting case study in the context of Apartheid in South Africa, see David Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and The Apartheid Legal Order (Hart, 1998). On disobedience more generally, see Candice Delmas, A Duty to Resist: When Disobedience Should be Uncivil (Oxford University Press, 2018).

356. There is obviously an added component on the ability of the judge to make his

statement effective, but the question facing both the judge and the scholar would not substantially differ.

357. The Lord Chief Justice (Lord Bingham) explained the rationale for immunity to be "a rule of international comity restraining one sovereign state from sitting in judgment on the sovereign behavior of another." Habeas Corpus, supra note 351 at para 63.

358. It should be stressed that my objection has nothing to do with the Humean capital sin of deriving an "ought" from an "is." In a Bakhtinian understanding of language, these categorical distinctions do not hold.

359. This sense of detachment as disavowal brings it closer to the way "detachment" is understood in psychoanalysis as denial, deflection, and displacement (I thank Peter Goodrich for this remark).

360. For a more recent example, see Andrei Marmor, "How Law Is Like Chess" [Marmor,

"Chess"] in Law in the Age of Pluralism (Oxford University Press, 2007) 153. See also

Arie-Jan Kwak, "What's in a Game? Legal Positivism as 'Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral'" (2017) 2017 L & Method 1.

361. Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 173 at 56. And before him, the leading Danish legal philosopher, see Alf Ross, On Law and Justice, ed by Jakob VH Holtermann, translated by Uta Bindreiter (Oxford University Press, 2019) at 20-24. If one can doubt that Hart had read Saussure, Carnap, and Wittgenstein, there is no doubt that Hart had read Ross.

362. Saussure, supra note 28 at 88.

363. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed by PMS Hacker & Joachim Schulte, 4th ed, translated by GEM Anscombe (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), ss 197, 205 ("But isn't chess defined by its rules?" wondered Wittgenstein, suggesting that "chess is the game it is by virtue of its rules").

364. Rudolf Carnap, Logical Syntax of Language, translated by Amethe Smeaton

(Routledge, 2001) at 5.

365. See Saussure, supra note 28 at 88.

366. On the importance of this ludic element, see Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of The Play-Element in Culture (Routledge, 1949) at 76-88. On the lack of "play" in structural thinking, see Derrida, Writing, supra note 236 at 278-93.

367. Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 173 at 288, n 54.

368. Ibid at 140.

369. Ibid at 89.

370. Ibid at 4.

371. See Fernando Atria, On Law and Legal Reasoning (Hart, 2002).

372. Searle, supra note 175 at 33-34 [citations omitted].

373. Marmor, "Chess," supra note 360 at 166.

374. Ibid at 170.

375. Ibid. Marmor suggests that the rules of particular games are to be read against the background of deeper conventions about playing competitive games in general, thus making a distinction between "surface" and "deep" conventions in law too. For a theory of law developed along the lines of deep and surface layers, see Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate, 2002).

376. Marmor, "Chess," supra note 360 at 172.

377. Manuel Atienza and Juan Ruiz Manero write that "[l]egal sentences are…the most elementary units of law; but those pieces acquire full meaning only when their contribution to the shape and functioning of the law is well understood" (supra note 8 at xi). In their

"taxonomy of the types of [legal] sentences," law is "seen as langue…and not as parole (ibid [emphasis in original]).

378. Norberto Bobbio, "The Science of Law and the Analysis of Language" [Bobbio, "The Science of Law"] in Pintore & Jori, supra note 8, 21 at 43 [emphasis in original].

379. Ibid.

380. In an insightful and quite congenial article, Ingo Venzke associates law's grammar with Chomsky's structural linguistics (and his theory of generative grammar) more than with Saussure. See "Is Interpretation in International Law a Game?" in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor, eds, Interpretation in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 352. While there are important differences between Saussure and Chomsky, I simply wish to point out their structural similarities.

381. Bobbio, "The Science of Law," supra note 378 at 43.

382. Ibid.

383. Ibid at 41. Interestingly, the emphasis on law's grammar is not exclusive to legal positivism. From a critical perspective in international law, expressing an underlying linguistic theory closer to Chomsky, Martti Koskenniemi argues that "how international lawyers argue... can be articulated in a limited number of rules that constitute the 'grammar'-the system of production of good legal arguments." See From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Argument (Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 568.

384. Goodrich, "Law and Language," supra note 20 at 181. See also Goodrich, Legal Discourse, supra note 6 at 35ff.

385. Most expressively, see Cover, supra note 58.

386. Ibid at 8 [citations omitted].

387. Marmor, "Chess," supra note 360. Marmor has acknowledged that "the specific conventions we happened to have may matter to us, sometimes a great deal" (ibid at 169), and therefore "[t]here are political and moral values associated with rules of recognition" (ibid at 170), but this significance is not well captured by the chess metaphor.

388. See Bakhtin, "Speech Genres," supra note 24 at 60 ("The wealth and diversity of speech genres are boundless because the various possibilities of human activity are inexhaustible, and because each sphere of activity contains an entire repertoire of speech genres").

389. Moreover, the idea of a basic grammar of law implies that there are neutral standards for distinguishing correct and incorrect uses of legal language. But no yardstick of legal-linguistic competence exists that could ever serve as referent across the board. Once we give up the idea of legal language as a matter of manipulating certain basic rules (or grammar), we may more easily accept that we can never know it all. See James Boyd White, "Legal Knowledge" (2002) 115 Harv L Rev 1396.

390. As, for instance, in Niklas Luhmann's system-theoretical approach and in studies of Artificial Intelligence and algorithmic decision-making. See Law as a Social System, translated by Klaus A Ziegert (Oxford University Press, 2004).

391. See Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Harvard University Press, 1991). On the importance of sociolinguistics, see Goodrich, Legal Discourse, supra note 6. For an ethnographically-oriented critique, see Dell Hymes, "Speech and Language: On the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Speakers" (1973) 102 Daedalus 59. From a feminist perspective, see Penelope Pether, "Critical Discourse Analysis, Rape Law and the Jury Instruction Simplification Project" (1999) 24 S Ill ULJ 53.

392. See Judith Shklar, Legalism: An Essay on Law, Morals and Politics (Harvard University Press, 1964) at 105-106. Shklar argues that "law and legal systems are not games but social institutions, and they do not exist in the social vacuum of a game....Unlike games [different legal orders] cannot be isolated, nor do they have simple purposes, a clear beginning, or an end" (ibid). See also Venzke, supra note 380, 352 at 354. Venzke rejects the analogy of legal interpretation to a game particularly "if that game is anything like chess" (ibid).

393. For various temporalities of law and judgment, see Etxabe, Tragic Judgment, supra note 270.

394. As Wittgenstein wrote referring back to his earlier views on meaning produced as a calculus according to definite rules, "[a] picture held us captive. And we could not get outside of it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably" (supra note 363, s 115 [emphasis in original]).

395. See more recently, Mark Greenberg, "How Facts Make Law" in Scott Hershovitz, ed, Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin (Oxford University Press, 2005) 225 at 225-26; Mark Greenberg, "Hartian Positivism and Normative Facts: How Facts Make Law II" in Hershovitz, ibid, 265.

396. "Against Legal Pragmatism: Greenberg and the Priority of the Moral" in Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind, eds, Pragmatism, Law, and Language (Routledge, 2014) 269 at 277.

397. Ibid at 279.

398. Ibid at 280.

399. Ibid.

400. Ibid.

401. Some legal positivists in the Kelsenian orbit are able to see this clearly. For instance, Uberto Scarpelli pointed out that "legal positivism...presupposes a prior political choice in favor of certain definition of law as the object of description." Pintore & Jori, supra note 8 at 5. Scarpelli believed that legal positivism "does not lead to knowing the law as it is, law as fact, real law, but only knowing how the formal aspect of law can and must be when certain premises are accepted." Enrico Pattaro, "Towards a Map of Legal Knowledge" in Pintore & Jori, supra note 8, 85 at 107.

402. As Kelsen argued on the basis of a Kantian epistemology, cognition thus "produce[s] the object of legal science by means of the...presupposition of what law must be like for the science of law to be possible" (Goodrich, Legal Discourse, supra note 6 at 37-38). This was the exact point of departure for Saussure as well: "[W]hat language must be like for a science of language to be possible" (ibid at 23 [emphasis in original]). Followers of HLA Hart may object that Hart's project of "sociological jurisprudence" does not share the neo-Kantian transcendental premises of Kelsen, but, as we have seen in section VI, Hart's "concept" is not an empirically verifiable fact, but a theoretical construct.

403. Davies, supra note 19.

404. Although with different association, the analogy between law and water exists also in the etymology of the archaic written form of the Chinese character of fà. See Alain Supiot, Governance by Numbers: The Making of a Legal Model of Allegiance, translated by Saskia Brown (Bloomsbury, 2017) at 63. See also Yan Lianke, Hard Like Water, translated by Carlos Rojas (Grove Press, 2021).

405. James Boyd White, "Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life" (1985) 52 U Chicago L Rev 684 at 695-96. https://doi.org/10.2307/1599632

406. Tom Campbell, "Democratic Aspects of Ethical Positivism" in Tom D Campbell and Jeffrey Goldsworthy, eds, Judicial Power, Democracy and Legal Positivism (Ashgate, 2000)

3 [Campbell, "Ethical Positivism"]. See generally Campbell, Legal Theory, supra note 291; Waldron, supra note 292. For a good appraisal of the implied political philosophy, see Martin Krygier, "Ethical Positivism and the Liberalism of Fear" in T Campbell & J Goldsworthy, eds, supra note 406 59.

407. Campbell, Legal Theory, supra 291 at 125.

408. This aspiration "depends upon the analytical thesis that law can be conceptually, argumentatively, and operationally separated from morality," as well as upon "the sociological thesis that…laws are administered in a rule-deferential manner." (ibid at 2).

409. Campbell, "Ethical Positivism," supra note 406 at 4.

410. Francis J Mootz III, "Corpus Linguistics and Vico's Lament: Against Vivisectional Jurisprudence" (2020) 20 Nevada LJ 845 at 846.

411. Campbell, Legal Theory, supra note 291 at 3.

412. Parliaments are not coterminous with democracy and examples abound of Parliaments disappointing or frustrating democratic aspirations. Alternatively, the judiciary serves important democratic functions against abuses of majoritarian politics and of the executive. On the judiciary as a democratic counter-power in a contemporary context where the traditional separation of powers has morphed into executive-driven forms of government, see Panu Minkkinen, "'Enemies of the People'? The Judiciary and Claude Lefort's 'Savage Democracy'" in Matilda Arvidsson, Leila Brännström & Panu Minkkinen, eds, Constituent Power: Law, Popular Rule and Politics (Edinburgh University Press, 2020) 27. https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474454971.003.0003

413. For an excellent elaboration of the problem and options for responding, see Jeremy Webber, "A Judicial Ethic for a Pluralistic Age" in Omid A Payrow Shabani, ed, Multiculturalism and Law: A Critical Debate (University of Wales Press, 2007) 67.

414. Patrick Glenn, "Persuasive Authority" (1987) 32 McGill LJ 261.

415. An interesting example occurs in the Hirst case cited above where a British judge cites the supporting opinion of the Canadian Court of Appeal's upholding of the disenfranchisement of prisoners. The latter decision was later reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada, which was eventually picked up by the European Court of Human Rights and used as an argument, in refracted manner, against the UK legislation. See Hirst, supra note 214 at paras 35-36.

416. Bakhtin, "Discourse," supra note 1 at 294.

417. This is the main tenet of the hermeneutical tradition of Gadamer, Ricoeur, Taylor, MacIntyre, and others. See also Jeanne Gaakeer, Judging from Experience: Law, Praxis, Humanities (Edinburgh University Press, 2019).

418. I do not mean to suggest that the relationship between judges and society is likewise one of "friendship," or that we should simply trust judges to do their job. Vigilance is certainly constantly required, but the object of vigilance should not be aimed primarily at whether a particular judge has followed some formal rules or text, abstractly considered.

419. See Jennifer Nedelsky, "Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law" (1997)

42 McGill LJ 91.

420. See White, Justice as Translation, supra note 187 at 113.

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