Document Type
Article
Abstract
In recent years a number of scholars have debated the economic efficiency of takeover-bid legislation and of permissible defensive tactics taken by the management of takeover target corporations. This article reviews and comments on this literature and draws attention to a number of empirical questions raised by the debate. It concludes that the important outstanding issues are: i) the degree to which takeover rules interfere with the deterrence of management inefficiency, and ii) the cost of allocating assets to their most highly-valued uses through competitive bidding as opposed to the likelihood and cost of retransfers of assets after takeovers without competitive bidding.
Citation Information
Gillen, Mark R..
"Economic Efficiency and Takeover Bid Regulation."
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
24.4 (1986)
: 919-959.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1856
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol24/iss4/7