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From Democratic Peace to Democratic Distinctiveness: A Critique of Democratic Exceptionalism in Peace and Conflict Studies

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Abstract: Over the last two decades or so, there has been a “democratic turn” in peace and conflict research, i.e. the peculiar impact of democratic politics on a wide range of security issues has attracted more and more attention. Many of these studies are inspired by Immanuel Kant’s famous essay on “Perpetual Peace”. In this article, we present a critical discussion of the “democratic distinctiveness programme” that emerged from the Democratic Peace debate and soon spread to cover, among other issues, institutionalized cooperation, trade relations, and arms control.

As our review makes clear, research so far has been based on an overly naïve reading of a “Kantian peace”. In particular, the manifold forms of violence that democracies have exerted, have been treated either as a challenge to the Democratic Peace proposition or as an undemocratic contaminant and pre-democratic relict. In contrast, we argue that forms of “democratic violence” should no longer be kept at arm’s length from the democratic distinctiveness programme but instead should be elevated to a main field of study.

While we acknowledge the benefits of this expanding research programme, we also address a number of normative pitfalls implied in this scholarship such as lending legitimacy to highly questionable foreign policy practices by Western democracies. We conclude with suggestions for a somewhat more self-reflective and “critical” research agenda of a “democratically turned” peace and conflict studies. IR research in this field might benefit from drawing on the Frankfurt school tradition and from incorporating insights from democratic theory and empirical studies on the crisis of democracy.
Keywords: democracy, international security, peace, war, trade, international institutions, Immanuel Kant

JEL classification: F51, H56

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FROM DEMOCRATIC PEACE TO DEMOCRATIC DISTINCTIVENESS. A CRITIQUE OF DEMOCRATIC EXCEPTIONALISM IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

Anna Geis & Wolfgang Wagner*

I. THE “DEMOCRATIC TURN” IN PEACE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH

Over the last two decades or so, there has been a “democratic turn” in peace and conflict research, i.e. the peculiar impact of democratic politics on a wide range of security issues has attracted more and more attention. Although the notion that democracy is a force for good has a long and eminent tradition, peace and conflict research has hardly pursued this line of thinking until Michael Doyle’s famous piece on “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs” (Doyle 1983). Doyle’s article triggered the debate on the so-called ‘Democratic Peace’ which attracted attention by a wider IR audience interested in the liberalist challenge to structural, neorealist theorizing. However, even more significant than the ‘Democratic Peace’ debate per se seems to us what John Owen aptly called a “democratic distinctiveness programme” (Owen 2004: 605) that has subsequently emerged from the Democratic Peace debate. Thus, two and a half decades after the publication of Doyle’s article, democratic politics has become the centre of gravity for a wide range of research in

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1 A notable exception is Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1972) whose influence has been limited to the German-speaking political science community.
peace and conflict research. Put in the positivist parlance that dominates this research area, democracy has become an obvious independent variable in developing explanations for a growing number of empirical puzzles.

In the following paragraphs we will sketch what we consider a striking but not yet fully acknowledged development in recent peace and conflict research, namely the growing prominence of democratic politics in the study of international conflict more broadly. Previously distinct areas of research, e.g. on the impact of economic interdependence and international institutions on peace, have undergone a “democratic turn” and thus been brought under the umbrella of the democratic distinctiveness programme. As a consequence, a “democratic caveat” has been added to the commercial and institutional peace, i.e. the peaceful benefits of commerce and international institutions are understood to be reaped especially, if not exclusively by democracies (cf. Russett/Oneal 2001).

Whereas the democratic turn in research on the commercial and institutional peace tends to contribute to an overall rosy picture of democracies in international relations, other scholars have argued for an inclusion of “democratic violence”, i.e. armed force exerted by democracies, into the democratic distinctiveness programme. Previously attributed to remaining pockets of un- or pre-democratic institutions and culture, democratic violence has been increasingly understood as an intrinsic flipside of democratic peacefulness. Although the incorporation of democratic violence into the democratic distinctiveness programme is a welcome step towards a more nuanced and self-critical study of democratic politics and international conflict, we argue that further critical reflection is needed.

Research on democratic exceptionalism does not only provoke sceptical observations from a scientific point of view but it entails a number of normative pitfalls with serious political consequences. We will address three caveats in the conclusion: the “uncritical” use of the term “democracy”, the danger of lending legitimacy to democratization by war and of introducing (or reinforcing) an unsettling dichotomy between democracies and non-democracies into international political discourses in order to confer questionable privileges to the club of democracies. Against this backdrop, we plead for a more self-critical study of democratic security politics and strategies which is sensitive to ambivalences,
tensions, contradictions and paradoxes of democratic principles, norms and practices.

II. THE CORE OF DEMOCRATIC DISTINCTIVENESS: THE “DEMOCRATIC PEACE” DEBATE

The starting point of the “democratic distinctiveness programme” is the famous finding that democracies have rarely if ever waged war against each other. This finding introduced democracy as a cause of peace even though it only applied to the limited realm of relations between established democracies. With few exceptions, the subsequent “Democratic Peace Debate” (Brown/Lynn-Jones/Miller 1996) was a textbook example of positivist “normal science” with proponents and critics sharing common criteria for assessing each other’s arguments. Even though democracy is an inherently contested concept (Buchstein 2004), the datasets provided by POLITY and, to a lesser extent, Freedom House soon found widespread acceptance in quantitative analyses, not the least because they were unsuspicious of manipulation in favor of the Democratic Peace (Russett/Oneal 2001: 97). As a consequence, “democracy” in the context of the Democratic Peace became to be defined in terms of institutional constraints and political rights.

The early stages of this debate focused on the statistical significance of the empirical findings (cf. Spiro 1994; Russett 1995) and the control of possibly confounding explanatory variables. Methodological disputes about the appropriateness of statistical techniques have resurfaced ever since but have not again amounted to a serious challenge of the core findings. Rather, the Democratic Peace seems to have become a popular

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3 See for example Barkawi/Laffey (1999, 2001).
4 The POLITY IV Project Dataset Users’ Manual defines a “mature and internally coherent” democracy as a political system in which „(a) political participation is fully competitive, (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial” [http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2006.pdf; page 14].
illustration for methodological disputes and has benefited from the resulting methodological refinements.

The issue of “omitted variable bias” goes to the very heart of inter-paradigm debate and has been heavily contested respectively. Indeed, proponents of competing schools of thought have made great efforts to demonstrate that their theoretical tool kit better accounts for the absence of war between democracies. Since neo-realism was at least then the most prominent theoretical alternative to the liberal theories of the Democratic Peace, its proponents were particularly eager to demonstrate that the Democratic Peace is better attributed to international power politics than to regime type (cf. Farber/Gowa 1995).

Democratic Peace scholars have taken up the challenge and incorporated control variables to fend off allegations of omitted variable bias. Power ratios, alliances and levels of trade have become standard controls of any statistical analysis. At the same time, scholars moved beyond the analysis of wars (i.e. conflicts with a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths) to the examination of “Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs)” more broadly.5 The inclusion of interactions involving the threat, display, or actual use of force was also welcome mainly for methodological reasons because MIDs are, by definition, less rare events than wars. The changing conceptualization of the dependent variable also brought about a re-framing of the central research question: instead of inquiring into the law-like (near) absence of wars between democracies, scholars now aimed to demonstrate that democratic dyads have a significantly lower probability of MIDs. The confirmation of these core hypotheses in a number of more sophisticated statistical analyses added to the success story of the Democratic Peace (cf. Bremer 1992; Maoz/Russett 1993).

To be sure, the search for explanatory variables was no monopoly of quantitative approaches but included a considerable number of case studies as well. For example, John Owen (1994) and James Lee Ray (1995) used process-tracing to demonstrate the crucial importance of democratic norms and institutions. Following the editor of an impressive

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5 The concept of MIDs is introduced in Gochman/Maoz (1984). Prominent studies of the Democratic using MIDs as dependent variables include Maoz/Abdolali (1989) and Maoz/Russett (1993).
collection of case studies, however, the evidence from case studies was rather mixed: “domestic politics in general, and the democratic process in particular, crucially affect war and peace decision making, though not always in ways that are consistent with the democratic peace theory” (Elman 1997b: 474).

Arguments that the Democratic Peace was better explained by previously omitted variables have continued to this day. Indeed, the widespread confidence in its core finding has made the Democratic Peace an attractive trophy in any inter-paradigm debate. It is telling, however, that the recent challenges have come from within the liberal or Kantian paradigm itself. For example, Erik Gartzke has argued that developments in economic activity, such as the integration of capital markets, better account for the absence of war among democracies. As a consequence, the discussion of omitted variables has by and large become a debate among proponents of a liberal paradigm which has replaced the debate between liberals and adherents of a power-based, realist paradigm.

Even though the bulk of studies has confirmed the explanatory power of democracy for the level of violent conflict between states, the search for a theoretical account has not been completed (cf. Müller/Wolff 2006). Due to the simultaneous debate on the limits of rational choice theories and the merits of sociological approaches in IR (cf. Fearon/Wendt 2002), distinct rationalist and constructivist explanations have been developed, pitting democratic institutions against democratic norms.

Democratic institutions have been regarded as rendering government policy responsive and accountable to a citizenry which is pictured as eager to preserve their lives and property and thus to abhor war. In a more formal vocabulary, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith have argued that democracies are characterized by large “selectorates” (the proportion of society selecting the leadership). Because political leaders’ staying in power thus depends on a broad winning coalition, they are better off providing public goods (such as peace and economic growth) instead of private goods. An early wave of institutionalist theorizing also argued that “institutional

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constraints - a structure of division of powers, checks and balances - would make it difficult for democratic leaders to move their countries into war” (Russett 1993: 38). More recently, scholars have de-emphasized the constraining effects of domestic institutions and have instead highlighted that elections, open political competition and free media improve a government’s ability to send credible signals of its resolve (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1999).

An alternative, “constructivist” account has emphasized democratic norms and culture instead of democratic institutions (cf. Doyle 1983; Russett 1993; Maoz/Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Risse-Kappen 1995; Weart 1998). From this perspective, decision-makers “will try to follow the same norms of conflict resolution as have been developed within and characterize their domestic political processes” (Russett 1993: 35). Since democracies are characterized by peaceful conflict resolution, they will prefer negotiation over the use of force in international politics as well. This pacifist preference, however, only translates into peaceful relations with other democracies (Risse-Kappen 1995). In conflicts with non-democracies, democracies are according to advocates of the Democratic Peace forced to resort to realist strategies lest they risk being attacked (cf. Russett 1993: 30-8; Maoz/Russett 1993: 625).

The significance of the Democratic Peace for International Relations not only derives from a successful defence against a wide range of criticisms and its subsequent celebration as an example of progress in IR research (cf. Chernoff 2004; Ray 2003) but also from changes in Western democracies’ post-Cold War security strategies to which it contributed. Referring to central ideas of the Democratic Peace, the Clinton administration adopted the concept of “democratic enlargement” as a foreign policy strategy apt to foster international peace (as well as to serve US national interests). The subsequent George W. Bush administration elevated “democracy” to function as linchpin of their National Security Strategies (in critique Smith 2007). However, the use of the Democratic Peace as a legitimating strategy for the Iraq war caused embarrassment in

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8 A recent critique of this argument provide Hellmann/Herborth (2008) who demonstrate at several “fisheries wars” between Western democracies how mature, interdependent democracies escalated their conflicts into militarized interstate disputes instead of seeking accommodating solutions.
III. FROM THE “DEcratched and...2008] FROM DEMOCRATIC PEACE TO DEMOCRATIC DISTINCTIVENESS  7

the Democratic Peace community (cf. Owen 2005; Russett 2005) and triggered a debate on scholarly responsibility (Ish-Shalom 2006). We will come back to this issue in the conclusion of our paper in more detail.

III. FROM THE “DEMOCRATIC PEACE” TO A “KANTIAN PEACE”

The success of the Democratic Peace inspired two closely interwoven developments in peace and conflict research. First, “Kantian protests” (MacMillan 1995) notwithstanding, Immanuel Kant was widely celebrated as the intellectual godfather of the Democratic Peace, and “Perpetual Peace” became a source of inspiration and authority (cf. Baum 2008). As a consequence, research on the pacifying effects of trade and international institutions gained new momentum as these venerable research traditions became subsumed under a “Kantian peace” (Oneal/Russett 1999; Russett/Starr 2000; Russett/Oneal 2001). Second, students of peace and conflict added more and more items to the list of what distinguishes democracies from other regimes in international (security) politics. These two developments were closely related because the renaissance of commercial peace- and institutional peace-studies soon made a “democratic turn”, i.e. democracy was identified as a favourable context condition. We will address these two developments in turn.

A. COMMERCIAL PEACE

The commercial peace thesis has a long and well-known tradition9 but did not figure prominently until the 1990s when it gained momentum in the wake of the Democratic Peace debate. Although Kant’s third definitive article in “Perpetual Peace” (1795) speaks of cosmopolitan law and universal hospitality, and the “spirit of commerce” is only mentioned in a supplement, the commercial peace thesis was quickly incorporated as one

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9 The works of Adam Smith, Richard Cobden, Norman Angell and Joseph Schumpeter may be regarded as milestones in that tradition (for an overview cf. Doyle 1997: 230-50).
of three legs in a “Kantian triangle” (cf. Oneal/Russett 1999). Most proponents of the commercial peace have drawn on expected utility-models and developed an “economic deterrence argument” (Levy 2002: 356) according to which the anticipation of a disruption in trade deters political leaders from escalating conflicts.10 However, constructivist theorizing has also been present in the commercial peace literature. Drawing on Karl Deutsch’s work on security communities, Bruce Russett stressed that “economic exchange becomes a medium for communicating perspectives, interests, and desires on a broad range of matters not the subject of economic exchange, and that these communications form an important channel for conflict management” (Russett 1998: 374; cf. also Doyle 1997: chap. 8).

Although several studies found support for the thesis that economically significant trade between states reduces the risk of armed conflict between them (e.g. Polachek 1980; Oneal/Russett 1997), a large number of scholars reported lasting doubts since the findings remained vulnerable to changes in concepts, data measurement or time periods studied (Mansfield/Pollins 2003: 21). As a consequence, scholars called for the identification of context conditions for the commercial peace (cf. Schneider/Barbieri/Gleditsch 2003).

Among the context conditions suggested are the level of economic development (cf. Hegre 2003), the institutionalization of trade relations (cf. Mansfield/Pevehouse 2003) and – most significant in the context of this paper – the regime type of the states engaged in trade. Christopher Gelpi and Joseph Grieco (2003, 2008) in particular have argued that democracies “react to greater trade integration with a reduced propensity to initiate militarized disputes with their partners” (2003: 2). Drawing on the selectorate theory, Gelpi and Grieco argue that democratic institutions entail incentives for leaders to provide public goods whereas for leaders in non-democracies it often appears rational to provide private benefits to

10 A reformulation of the expected utility-argument along the lines of James Fearon’s informational theory of conflict can be found in Morrow (1999) and Gartzke/Li/Boehmer (2001). According to these scholars, “[t]rade flows could reduce the risk of escalation by increasing the range of costly signals of resolve in a crisis. A greater range of available costly signals increases the efficiency of signalling between the disputants, increasing the chance that they will reach a peaceful settlement” (Morrow 1999: 481).
members of a small winning coalition. Following the standard economic argument about the effects of trade, Gelpi and Grieco maintain that leaders in democracies have particularly strong incentives to seek growth by fostering trade. Moreover, once a state has established high levels of trade with another country, democratic leaders can be expected to be vulnerable to possible interruptions of trade flows because missed growth opportunities may damage their prospects of being re-elected. As a consequence, democracies but not other regime types are expected to avoid armed conflict with states to which they have close economic relations. Gelpi and Grieco find robust support for this expectation for the period 1950-1992.

The commercial peace can also be expected to be particularly strong among democracies because democracies tend to trade disproportionately among themselves. Harry Bliss and Bruce Russett (1998: 1128-9) listed several reasons for especially high levels of trade among democracies: First of all, leaders in democracies “need be less concerned that a democratic trading partner will use gains from trade to endanger their security than when their country trades with a nondemocracy”; furthermore, companies will “prefer to trade with those in states with whom relations are reliably peaceful” and where the rule of law precludes expropriations. Finally, shared norms “help reduce trade interference from embargoes and boycotts”. Further empirical studies found that democracies have a higher probability to conclude preferential trade agreements (Mansfield/Milner/Rosendorff 2000, 2002) and that democratization in developing countries is associated with trade liberalization (Milner/Kubota 2005).

Taken together, the incorporation of the commercial peace into a “Kantian peace programme” has given a new impetus to the debate about economic interdependence and peace. Moreover, inconclusive empirical results have led to a search for context conditions which in turn has brought commercial peace research closer to the democratic distinctiveness programme. It is interesting to note that the revitalized commercial peace debate has, at least so far, hardly been taken up by policy circles. Although peace may seem an attractive selling point for further trade liberalization in a public climate of widespread scepticism, economic considerations have clearly dominated public discourse. In contrast to the institutional peace debate (see next section), the democratic turn in commercial peace
studies has also no discernible legitimating function for current policies, even though it could be used to justify a turn from global to regional, inter-democratic trade regimes. Notwithstanding the merits of commercial peace research, its misleading equalization with Kant’s third definitive article has discouraged a more comprehensive exploration of Kant’s cosmopolitan law in peace and conflict studies (cf. Franceschet 2000: 283, 295).11

B. INSTITUTIONAL PEACE

While there have always been countless studies on the contribution of a particular international institution to the management of a particular conflict, early large-n studies could not find any significant effect of membership in international institutions on the level of conflict between states (cf. especially Singer/Wallace 1970). This corresponded to a reading of Kant according to which his “federation of free states” is rather a result of than a cause for peace (cf. Moravcsik 1996). However, in the aftermath of the Democratic Peace debate a new wave of studies on the “institutional peace” emerged.

Again, a broad range of causal mechanisms has been put forward to explain the pacifying effect of international institutions: They may reduce uncertainty by conveying information (Russett/Oneal/Davies 1998; Bearce/Omori 2005; Haftel 2007), they may act as mediators in a conflict (Haftel 2007) or, as in collective security institutions, even coerce norm-breakers (Russett/Oneal/Davies 1998). Drawing on Fearon’s rationalist theory of war, Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) emphasize that institutions enable signaling and help to make commitments more credible. Finally, from a constructivist perspective, institutions may contribute to peace by creating trust (Bearce/Omori 2005), by generating narratives of mutual identification (Diez/Stetter/Albert 2006) and by

11 Kant’s cosmopolitan law is virtually absent from the Democratic or “Kantian” peace debate as discussed here but has instead been widely acknowledged by philosophers and political theorists who discuss his merits for concepts of a “cosmopolitan democracy”. We cannot deal with this issue here but see for example Archibugi (1995), Franceschet (2000) and the critical review by Eberl (2008).
socializing states into norms of peaceful conflict resolution (Russett/Oneal/Davies 1998).

In spite of a much later take-off than the commercial peace-debate, the courses of the two debates have shown striking similarities: Whereas several studies found evidence in support of an institutional peace, others failed to do so suggesting that the institutional peace thesis is vulnerable to changes in specification and measurement. The subsequent search for context conditions again led to a “democratic turn”, i.e. the regime type of the member states was identified as an important qualification of the institutional peace thesis.

 Democracies have been considered to have both particular inclinations and capacities to establish and maintain international institutions (Russett/Oneal 2001: 173). To a large extent, explanations for these particular features of democracies’ foreign policies have drawn on causal mechanisms familiar from explanations for the Democratic Peace and the commercial peace. For example, the selectorate theory holds that democracies tend to establish and maintain international institutions for the same reasons that they tend to avoid costly wars or promote trade: because democratic leaders face incentives to provide public goods, they will establish and maintain international institutions which help to do so. From a constructivist point of view, in contrast, democracies tend to cooperate among themselves for the same reason they maintain peaceful relations and high levels of trade: A common set of values fosters trust and overcomes otherwise prominent relative gains concerns, etc.

 Democracies are not only considered to be especially interested in international cooperation; they are also regarded to be particularly capable to establish and maintain international institutions. Again, the causal mechanisms that make democracies “reliable partners” (Lipson 2003) are familiar from the Democratic Peace. Most importantly, the checks and balances, transparency and openness characteristic of decision-making in democracies also contribute to their capability to establish and maintain international institutions (Ikenberry 2001). Because entering into an

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12 Russett/Oneal/Davies (1998) and Oneal/Russett/Berbaum (2003) found that there is a significant effect of international institutions on peace whereas Bennett/Stam (2004) and Gartzke/Li/Boehmer (2001) found no supporting evidence.
international commitment requires the consent of parliaments, courts, interest groups etc., defection becomes less likely once such consent has been achieved (Cowhey 1993; Martin 2000). Moreover, free media and a vital civil society make the detection of defection likely which in turn helps to mitigate problems of monitoring characteristic of collective action problems (cf. Zangl 1999). From a constructivist perspective, one may add that democracies’ esteem for the rule of law extends to the honouring of international (legal) commitments (Gaubatz 1996).

In another analogy to commercial peace-research, scholars of the institutional peace have argued that democracies cooperate disproportionately among themselves and that “interdemocratic institutions” (i.e. international institutions composed of democracies) are particularly effective in reaping the pacifying effects of cooperation. According to Hasenclever and Weiffen (2006), interdemocratic institutions are particularly suited to block escalation pathways between states that have been identified as typical steps to war. Because of democracies’ record as reliable partners, interdemocratic institutions are distinctively effective (1) in taming power competition by setting standards and verification schemes for appropriate defence policies; (2) in preventing the recourse to strategies of unilateral self-help by integrating domestic actors into international cooperation and (3) in averting an overall polarization of interstate relations by insulating “islands of cooperation” from more disputed domains.

A number of empirical findings have supported the notion of a “democratic turn” in the institutional peace-debate: Cheryl Shanks, Harold Jacobson and Jeffrey Kaplan reported already in 1996 that „free states belonged on average to more IGOs than those that were partly free or unfree” (Shanks/Jacobson/Kaplan 1996: 609). More recently, this finding has been confirmed by Jon Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom and Kevin Warnke (2004) who have listed those ten states that hold the most memberships in international organizations for 1965, 1985 and 2000: all three lists comprise exclusively democratic states. In a similar vein, Edward Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse demonstrate that “democratization is a potent impetus to IO membership” because “[e]ntering IOs can help

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13 In the terminology suggested by James Fearon, the “audience costs” of defection are higher in democracies than in other regimes.
leaders in transitional states to make a credible commitment to sustain
democratic reform” (2006: 139 and 140 respectively). In the realm of
security institutions, Brett Ashley Leeds found that democratic states are
less likely to violate alliance commitments (Leeds 2003). Most
importantly, in a study covering the period between 1885 and 2000, Jon
Pevehouse and Bruce Russett have provided empirical evidence that IGOs
have the more pacifying effects the more democratic their member states
are (Pevehouse/Russett 2006).

Notwithstanding mounting empirical evidence, we consider the
democratic turn in the institutional peace problematic in two, interrelated
respects: First, in a similar vein as John MacMillan had already in 1995
voiced a perceptive “Kantian protest”, here once again such a protest
against an allegedly Kantian reading of inter-democratic institutions seems
warranted. Doyle, Russett and many others understand Kant’s “federation
of free countries” as a plea for interdemocratic cooperation as a nucleus of
an expanding security community. However, there is considerable
evidence drawn from Kant’s comprehensive writings that he imagined his
federation of “free” states as comprising independent, sovereign states, but
not necessarily exclusively liberal democratic states (MacMillan 1995:

Since “Perpetual Peace” is an obvious source of authority reaching out
beyond the scholarly community (cf. Desch 2007/8: 11), this dispute is
related to the second problem of the democratic turn, namely the
assignment of legitimacy to inter-democratic institutions such as NATO
and the EU. Such a democratic turn has potentially dramatic consequences
as it weakens security institutions with mixed membership such as the
United Nations or OSCE that were designed to foster peaceful cooperation
among all member states, whether democracies or not. At the same time,
institutions exclusively composed of democracies appear not only
particularly capable but also legitimized to act on behalf of an otherwise
“ineffective” international community (Ikenberry/Slaughter 2006: 7). Just
as the Democratic Peace lent dubious legitimacy to interventionist security
doctrines (cf. Ish-Shalom 2006; Desch 2007/8), the democratic turn in
institutional peace analysis may attribute legitimacy to military

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14 See Doyle (1983: 226-7), Pevehouse/Russett (2006: 972); from a quite different
theoretical perspective see also Desch (2007/8: 13)
interventions that, like the Kosovo campaign in 1999, lacks a clear basis in international law but enjoys the support of (most) democracies and of the international institutions they have formed. We will elaborate on this point in the conclusion of this paper.

**IV. DEMOCRATIC DISTINCTIVENESS AND THE USE OF FORCE**

**A. DEMOCRACIES BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND DEMOCRATIC WAR**

The emergence of a “democratic distinctiveness programme” has been most obvious with regard to the treatment of “democratic violence”, i.e. the use of force by democratic states. To be sure, even proponents of the so-called monadic Democratic Peace theory who assume that “democracies are more peaceful in general” (cf. Benoit 1996) never claimed that democracies do not fight wars; they only claim that democracies fight wars less frequently than other regimes. With some notable exceptions such as Michael Doyle (1983), John MacMillan (2004) and John Owen (1994, 1997), however, proponents of the Democratic Peace hardly analyzed the violence emanating from (liberal) democratic states in terms of its (liberal) democratic distinctiveness. If “democratic violence” surfaced at all, it was either presented as a challenge to the Democratic Peace proposition or treated as an un-democratic contaminant and pre-democratic relict.

For example, in his study on US covert actions against elected governments during the Cold War period, David Forsythe argued that these actions at first glance seem inconsistent with the liberal analyses of inter-democratic relations. At closer look, however, covert actions appear to be possible only because “the decisions are not taken in the open, subject to the full range of checks and balances and popular participation” (1992: 393). Likewise, Ernst Otto Czempiel (1996) argued that wars by democracies such as the one fought by the United States in Vietnam point to a lack of democratic control even in otherwise mature democracies. In a similar vein, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, who demonstrated the
enhanced risks of nationalist violence and war-proneness of democratizing regimes during their transition phase (Mansfield/Snyder 2005), do not question the democratic peace between mature, consolidated democracies but only “seek to introduce a note of caution into the policy prescriptions of those who would seek to use the democratic peace to justify an overly broad campaign of democracy promotion in the developing world that insufficiently reflects the special local conditions” (2005: 283). Notwithstanding vast differences in theoretical approaches and methods, these studies regard consolidated democracies as inherently peace-prone and attribute their aggression to pockets of un- or pre-democratic institutions and culture.

The use of force by democracies figured more prominently in the more wide-spread dyadic variants of Democratic Peace research. The statement “democracies rarely if ever fight one another but are as war-prone as other regime-types” clearly captures the democratic “Janus face”, i.e. their capabilities and inclination for acting as peaceful as well as militant forces in world politics (Risse-Kappen 1995). However, since the Democratic Peace research originated in the refutation of central Realist assumptions about international politics, the “positive” puzzle of peaceful relations between consolidated democracies remained the primary focus of research for long (cf. Hellmann/Herborth 2008: 505). Academic and political attention for “democratic” or “liberal” wars then grew considerably in the light of an increased “democratic interventionism” after the end of the Cold War.15

Partly backed by a revived UN Security Council, partly self-empowered, multi-party Western military actions were interpreted and legitimated in the West as so-called “humanitarian interventions” or as international law enforcement missions; they were officially fought in the name of restoring peace, of punishing lawbreakers and eliminating the foes of humanity, and of protecting human rights and promoting democracy (Brock 1999, 2006; Müller 2004). Democratic interventionism could thus be read as the violent manifestation of a liberal world ordering and governance project, attempting – but often failing – to export Western forms of rule, statehood

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and democracy (cf. Blaney 2001; Duffield 2001; Geis/Brock/Müller
2006).

Against this backdrop, parts of recent research on the use of force by
Western liberal democracies investigate into inherently democratic or
liberal contexts of this violence: Are liberal democracies inclined to
special types of war? To which extent is this violence motivated and/or
justified by (ambiguous) liberal-democratic norms and values? To what
extent do democratic institutions induce the diversionary use of force? Do
democracies form special kinds of alliances and security communities that
are dependent on demarcation and distinction processes against an
“other”? Are their modes of warfare distinct from other regime-types, and
do they possess a special effectiveness in war? In the following we will
briefly deal with these aspects of a “democratic war” as the flip-side of a
“democratic peace”, which implies that the very same features that are
responsible for peace among democracies are to be held accountable for
democracies’ distinct record of using military force. 16

B. AMBIVALENCE OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

One of the central assumptions of Democratic Peace is that democratic
institutions prevent self-interested governments from rushing to war since
they circumscribe their scope of action, involve many actors and generate
publicity, hence provide transparency and slow down the decision-making
process. In contrast to this, researchers of the diversionary use of force
have been discussing for a long time that democratic institutions might
also create specific incentives for governments to start a war. The
diversionary-use-of-force-thesis builds on the “rally around the flag
effect” according to which the incumbent government’s popularity soars in
the face of an external threat. 17 An unpopular government may thus be

16 We have dealt extensively with these points elsewhere, see Geis/Brock/Müller (2006)
and Geis/Müller/Wagner (2007). For an earlier suggestion to establish a research agenda
on democracy and war see Chan (1993).

17 The rally-around-the-flag effect was “discovered” by Kenneth Waltz (1967) and has
been confirmed in a vast number of empirical studies ever since (cf. in particular Mueller
1970 and 1973 as well as, most recently, Eichenberg/Stoll/Lebo 2006).
tempted to provoke and escalate international crisis in order to divert attention away from domestic problems. However, the diversionary-use-of-force-thesis has remained highly contested as empirical studies have yielded an ambiguous picture. In a recent attempt to integrate the diversionary use of force into the Democratic Peace agenda, Oneal and Tir (2006) conclude that economic conditions do indeed affect democracies’ (not autocracies’) likelihood to use force but that sufficiently low economic growth rates are too rare to negate the Democratic Peace.

Rationalist variants of Democratic Peace research model political elites as well as citizens in democracies as cost-sensitive and risk-averse actors which leads to the assumption that citizens are usually war-averse, shying away from the material and humanitarian costs of war, and that governments, interested in their re-election, will take these peaceful preferences into consideration. It has been criticized that this assumption is blind to reality since there are a number of instances where a majority of citizens – whether due to conviction or manipulation – was in favour for a military action and where reluctant governments were put under public pressure (cf. Reiter/Stam 2002: 144-63; Rosato 2003: 594-5). In his analysis on democracies losing “small wars”, Gil Merom (2003) found „inherent peaceful proclivities only in a minority of the citizens“ (Merom 2003: 45; cf. Evangelista/Reppy 2008: 180-2).

Citizens’ war aversion is context-dependent, since rational calculations and moral beliefs with regard to the use of force can be influenced by two factors both of which have acquired a new salience since the 1990s: First, the procurement of technologically advanced new weapons systems and the enhancing of military effectiveness can delude the population into thinking that “bloodless” wars and swift victories are possible and that expected benefits will excel the costs (Schörnig 2007a, b). As we will discuss in more detail below, the democratic principles of casualty aversion and force protection provide incentives for a special “Western way of war” (Shaw 2005; Müller/Schörnig 2008). Second, the moral aversion against the use of force can be influenced by references to “good” reasons for a military action such as protecting human rights; a war that can be portrayed as a fight for one’s own values does not necessarily

contradict the “democratic peace” as such but rather points to the existence of its flipside of a democratic (or liberal) war.

C. THE AMBIVALENCE OF LIBERAL NORMS

In particular since the end of the Cold War liberal justifications have been playing an increasing role in legitimating Western use of force (cf. Hasenclever 2001; Freedman 2005).19 Already in 1983 Michael Doyle had pointed out that liberal democratic states fight wars for liberal purposes (Doyle 1983: 230), but public justifications do not have to be equivalent with the „true“ motives of a war-fighting government since such motives can be traced back to – in the liberal’s eye - less “noble” reasons such as geopolitical aggrandizement or satisfying domestic particular interest groups. The public normative underpinning of Western military actions has lent new impulses to a much older debate, predominantly conducted in political theory and philosophy, on the ambivalence of liberalism, i.e. on various strands of liberal thought which can be divided into more self-restrained and more interventionist approaches to international politics. A new wave of Kant readings is an indicator of this revived debate; given the complexity, partial “blind spots” and contradictions of his works, it can hardly surprise that interpretations of Kant differ considerably in the question whether he was a staunch advocate of non-intervention or whether he developed liberal justifications for forcible interventions into non-democratic regimes.20

The debate on the ambivalence of norms takes issue with the civilizing effects of liberal norms and values and sets forth the contradictions and tensions between several norms, which can foster the use of force. In international politics such tensions can, for example, result from the

19 This is not to say that such liberal justifications have not been used before, see for example the analysis by Mark Peceny (1999) on US interventions in the 20. century, which demonstrates how political elites justified such missions by references to security concerns as well as liberal values.
decoupling of procedural and substantial norms and can lead to questionable foreign policy strategies: On the one hand democracies seek to protect their popular sovereignty and reject tight regulation by international law, on the other hand they engage in the global promotion of liberal norms such as human rights and democracy, partly by force (Brock 1999, 2006). The ambivalence of liberal democratic norms compels to decide between several goods, in case of the so-called humanitarian intervention (Holzgrefe/Keohane 2003) without UN mandate this decision involves the question whether one is allowed to kill people and violate international law in order to save other people.

Liberal democratic institutions and political cultures build on assets of different strands of liberal thought, as has often been demonstrated at the example of the US political culture which contains normative structures that foster interventionist, missionary driving forces as well as a self-restrained, “isolationist” approach to the outside world, restricting itself to regard the own country as a shining example but not attempting to convert others (cf. Desch 2007/8). This pluralisation (or at times: polarization) of political culture is no distinct feature of the United States since several Western political cultures exhibit pluralist normative structures rooted in different traditions of liberal thought (Müller 2004; Müller/Wolff 2006). Since cultures provide and circumscribe the universe of acceptable justifications for the use of force in a society, much depends on the interpretations of the ruling political coalitions. Left-liberal, liberal, conservative or socialist parties can cite quite different “legacies” of the own culture and can refer to quite different norms rendering the use of force appropriate or inappropriate for their own country (cf. MacMillan 2004). Hence it is crucial for Democratic Peace and Democratic War research to scrutinize the ambivalent norms of a political culture and the (controversial) references to these norms by elites in order to establish whether the cultural structuration follows predominantly “pacifist” or “militant” lines (Müller 2004).

Political cultures can also be read in terms of dominant self-images and images of an “other” in a liberal society, the fiction of a “nation’s” unity and a distinct identity has to be permanently constructed and reproduced. With regard to the peace- or war-proneness of a democracy it is revealing to study such constructions of self and other more closely since the existence of strong enemy images lends more legitimacy to a country’s
militancy. Such analyses of “othering” and identity politics abound in critical and “postmodern” security studies and should be acknowledged by Democratic Peace research since they provide a counterpart to overly optimistic Democratic Peace accounts about a rational and peaceful democratic public (Geis 2006). Liberal thought has dealt with the “enemies” of progress and civilianization from the very beginning, a recent rediscovery of Kant’s figure of the “unjust enemy” reminds of these seeds of illiberalism and self-empowerment to interventionism contained within liberalism itself (Müller 2006; Desch 2007/8). For such interpretations of Kant the logical distance from Königsberg to Kandahar is not too far since democratic peace between civilized lawful regimes and democratic war against evil terrorists in Afghanistan root in the same liberal thinking.

To be sure, Kant’s hostis iniustus as foe of humankind is one extreme representation of a liberal’s “other”, but the tendency to denigrate non-liberal “others” has been a notorious trait of liberal imperialism throughout history. In the past as well as in the present, liberalism has often been criticized for an inherent imperialism (cf. Barkawi/Laffey 2001; Jahn 2005) which manifests itself not only in a sense of superiority towards other cultures and regimes but also in the violent „civilianization“ of others in the name of democracy, freedom and progress. Under the cover of universalism Western democracies seek to impose their concepts of the political, economic and cultural organization of life upon the illiberal „other“. The recent Iraq war which the US and Great Britain have also justified with the aim of regime change underlines that such liberal ordering claims are no remains of the past. From this perspective, “rogue states” impede the progress of civilianization, they pose a threat to other state’s physical and normative security and must be forced to change their regime.

Since the end of the Cold War, Western democracies usually have not conducted their military missions (be it full-fledged wars, peace enforcement or other missions involving armed forces) on their own, but rely on the contribution of NATO, ‘coalitions of the willing’ or most recently, the European Union. The integration of democracies’ military capabilities within international security organizations has raised the issue

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21 See, among many others, Campbell (1992).
whether their development into security communities with a shared collective identity is contingent upon the existence or construction of a dangerous “other” outside (Risse-Kappen 1995; cf. Dembinski/Hasenclever/Wagner 2004). Dynamics of inclusion/exclusion and the “search” for (new) threats in order to stabilize and discipline the “inside” can aggravate international conflicts instead of defusing them (cf. Williams/Neumann 2000; Williams 2001).

D. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND WARFARE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

The peace-proneness of democracies that Democratic Peace research ascribes to them is not only qualified by the ambivalences of democratic accountability and liberal norms but also by democracies’ military capabilities and effectiveness once fighting started. Dan Reiter and Allan Stam in particular have brought this classical topic of military academies into the remit of the democratic distinctiveness programme. In „Democracies at War“ (2002), Reiter and Stam argue that democracies have won more than three quarters of their wars since 1815. In contrast to Realist orthodoxy, Reiter and Stam do not trace military effectiveness back to the usual „hard“ factors such as economic power or number of troops and material, nor to the joint fighting power of alliances, but to two distinct democratic mechanisms, „the skeleton and spirit of democracy“ (2002: 9): Since democratic leaders are dependent upon the majority consent of their citizens and since political decisions are deliberated in the public, governments will only decide to wage a war if the prospects to win are well established (cf. also Gelpi/Griesdorf 2001). Furthermore, Reiter and Stam ascribe superior abilities, training and motivation to soldiers in democracies the roots of which lie in a special liberal-democratic political culture which puts a premium upon individual initiative and performance. This cultural appreciation for the individual and his/her capacities ensures the selection of a competent and able military leadership and motivates the individual soldiers to effective fighting.

Reiter’s and Stam’s book triggered a debate on the solidity of the data and the plausibility of the explanations of such a „democratic triumphalism“
(Desch 2002; Brooks 2003; Biddle/Long 2004). Although the main thesis has thus remained controversial, it is again democratic distinctiveness that has been placed at the centre of a debate that used to be a home ground for military historians and scholars highly sceptical of the public’s interference into military politics.

„Democracies at War“ also casts a dark shadow on normative explanations of the Democratic Peace. Reiter and Stam (2002: 144-63) demonstrate in empirical cases that majorities of citizens have opted in favour of war – even in the absence of imminent danger – and the governments followed them in that (cf. Rosato 2003: 595). However, public support typically lasts only a short time and quickly drops once casualties mount (Reiter/Stam 2002: 164-92).

“Casualty aversion” as a putatively distinctive trait of democratic publics (cf. Smith 2005) has recently directed researchers’ attention to peculiarities of Western democracies’ armament strategies and modes of warfare. The latest „revolution in military affairs”, which has been advanced by the US in particular and which utilizes the advancements in information and computer technologies for the armed forces, has been debated in this context (O’Hanlon 2000; Möller 2002). Extensive reconnaissance, an improved integration of different weapons systems and a higher speed and precision of weapons are the goals of this „revolution“ in arms technology; the reduction of costs and risks is its central motive (Müller/Schörning 2002). The use of such weapons leads democratic publics to believe in short successful military missions with few casualties, although the reality of warfare departs from this (Shaw 2005): Though democracies have improved the protection of their own soldiers since the end of the Cold War, the killing of civilians still occurs at a frequency that challenges “humanitarian” claims to spare the lives of non-combatants. In addition, Western soldiers operating in recent missions such as Afghanistan or Iraq are frequently targeted by asymmetric means of warfare. As these missions have made clear, the technological ‘revolution’ in warfare is of very limited use for fighting in “small wars” against guerrilla groups or terrorists.

22 See, for example, Müller/Schörning (2002, 2008), Petrova (2008), Schörning (2007a, b), Watts (2008) and the comprehensive study by the military sociologist Martin Shaw on the “Western way of warfare” (2005).
While „casualty aversion“ is a central concept for the utilitarian as well as the normative-cultural causal mechanism of the Democratic Peace, there are three problems with it: First, it is not quite clear to what extent it really exists – nevertheless political leaders dread it and attempt to hedge themselves against the risk of losing votes at home (Schörnig 2007a: 100-4). It is, of course, impossible to establish a fixed threshold or any other approximation of number of fatalities in a particular war beyond which a democratic public or significant groups within a society will start to oppose the war openly and demand a withdrawal. A recent study suggests that a democratic public is rather averse to defeat than to casualties, i.e. as long as the majority of citizens can discern a clear (and “right”) goal of a mission and are confident that this goal is attainable, they will support this mission (cf. Gelpi/Feaver/Reifler 2005/6). Second, it is questionable whether the sensitivity to casualties is a distinct feature of liberal democratic societies since the esteem for human life can be assumed to exist in individuals of autocratic societies as well (Evangelista/Reppy 2008: 172) – albeit with the decisive difference that people’s grievance at casualties will not be displayed as publicly and their wish for the withdrawal of soldiers would not be voiced openly in an autocracy (Müller/Schörnig 2008: 194). Third, casualty aversion of a democratic public is usually founded on a norm hierarchy of casualties, putting a country’s own civilians on top of this hierarchy, followed by one’s own soldiers, and only in the third place come civilians of the opponent country, while their soldiers rank lowest in the concern about victims of violence (Schörnig 2007a: 97; Watts 2008: 54-5).

Hence in „Western ways of warfare“ the protection of the own forces and risk minimization take absolute priority over the protection of the local civilians (Shaw 2005), resulting in a number of legitimacy and credibility problems for liberal democracies, especially in “humanitarian interventions”. However, the concern for the adversary’s civilians – whose killing is often cynically labelled “collateral damage” – has also been growing in recent years due to increased media observation of Western warfare and due to NGO campaigning against harmful warfare strategies on non-combatants (Petrova 2008; Watts 2008: 56).

The recent surge of research on democratic violence is a welcome amendment to the Democratic Peace literature as it highlights the “dark sides” of democratic politics for international security that are closely
interwined with the bright sides of inter-democratic peace and cooperation. Although many findings remain contested and subject to further study and revision, the extension of the democratic distinctiveness programme to various aspects of democratic violence promises to sketch a much more comprehensive and accurate picture of democratic politics’ impact on international security.

V. CONCLUSION: THE PITFALLS OF AN EXPANDING DEMOCRATIC DISTINCTIVENESS PROGRAMME

Scholarly interest in the peculiar impact of democratic politics on (international) security has reached beyond the more established fields of democratic peace and violence discussed above. Thus, in the realm of intrastate violence, an agenda of a “democratic civil peace” has been developing. In an early study, Krain and Myers found that “non democracies are more civil war prone than democracies” (1997: 114) and Rudolph Rummel concurred that democracy reduces the occurrence of intense violence within states (Rummel 1997). In a more comprehensive study, Hegre et al. (2001) found that both democracies and harshly authoritarian states have few civil wars. However, the democratic civil peace is not only more just than the autocratic peace but also more stable because autocracies are less stable than democracies and regime change are frequently accompanied by domestic violence.

As a review of contemporary conflict studies shows, there are in principle no limits in extending the democratic distinctiveness programme to ever further aspects of (international) security. While civil-military relations and intelligence cooperation have been suggested as objects of future research (George/Bennett 2005: 58; Doyle 1996: 365-6), the examination of arms control policies (Müller/Becker 2008), terrorism (Abrahms 2007) and internal security cooperation (Wagner 2003) has already begun. Taken together, a multitude of studies suggests that the theoretical tool kit developed to explain the (near) absence of war between democracies can be useful to address an ever broader range of (security) issues in international politics. To be sure, research on the economic, power-related or cultural causes of conflict has certainly not been replaced by the
democratic distinctiveness agenda but for almost any puzzle in peace and conflict research, the distinct impact of democratic politics has become an obvious point of departure. The democratic distinctiveness programme has therefore been celebrated as a “powerful paradigm” (Doyle 1996: 364) or “progressive research programme” in the Lakatosian sense (Ray 2003).

However, although the rise of this programme has fostered collaboration across previously unconnected areas of research, a new form of “democratic triumphalism” that often comes with it is highly problematic. In the remainder of this paper we address both research-related and normative problems.

From a scholarly point of view, research on democratic exceptionalism will have to provide much more in-depth case studies which trace the influence of specific democratic institutions and norms in detail. While there have been calls in earlier Democratic Peace research for such a “qualitative turn” (e.g. Risse-Kappen 1995; Elman 1997a), the response up to date seems inadequate. This also implies conducting more comparative case studies of non-democratic cultures and decision-making processes if democratic “distinctiveness” is really to be established. It is, for example, obvious that the unsettled issue of casualty aversion needs to be addressed in a comparative perspective (cf. Watts 2008). It is also to consider whether some of the norms that are regarded as “democratic” (and as such held responsible for a democratic peace or democratic war) should not more precisely be identified as “liberal” norms (cf. Owen 1997; MacMillan 2004). Much of democratic distinctiveness research, conducted by “Western” scholars, tends to equate democracy with liberal democracy.

The last point leads us to a number of normative pitfalls which entail serious political consequences. There are at least three caveats which need to be addressed by scholars investigating democratic exceptionalism: first, the “uncritical” use of the term “democracy”; second, the danger of lending legitimacy to democratization by war; and third, the moral and institutional privileging and self-empowerment of liberal democracies in world politics:

23 Authors of this paper included. Researching into democratic distinctiveness ourselves, we do certainly not pretend to have solved the problems addressed in the conclusion.
First, most research relies on the widely used democracy indices by POLITY and Freedom House, and does not reflect any further that the “content” of democracy is controversial, and that “democracy” remains a contested concept (Buchstein 2004). Virtually ignored are, among others, radical democratic readings of Kant’s idea of a republic as has for example been proposed by Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1996). Such readings scathe the lacking democraticness of real existing democracies and postulate much more transparency and citizens’ participation in foreign policy.24 Czempiel had rightly pointed out that Democratic Peace research did not incorporate insights from democratic theory and did not problematize the practices of real existing “democracies”. This caveat has up to date not been adequately heeded (cf. also Ish-Shalom 2006). In addition, most research is disinterested in current debates on the gradual erosion of democratic conditions and principles through processes of globalization and the internationalization of politics. Since democratic distinctiveness seems to be contingent upon stable domestic conditions, research would benefit from considering the debates in democratic theory and empirical studies on the crisis of democracy.25

Second, the finding that democracies do not fight each other has had a tremendous impact on the foreign policies of Western democracies. After the end of the Cold War, consecutive US administrations have made the promotion of democracy a key strategy of their foreign policy. Democratic peace theory has become democratic practice, with explicit references to scholarly writings by politicians (Grayson 2003; Ish-Shalom 2006; Büger/Villumsen 2007). As far as democracies promote the spread of their regime type by peaceful means, one might not want to object too heavily against this foreign policy strategy, but things look quite different if the “democratic peace” is used as legitimating cover for democratization by war (cf. Grimm/Merkel 2008). Proponents of forcible democratization of

24 There are some Democratic Peace studies that have opened up the “black box” of democracy and distinguish different institutional types of democracies or parliamentary oversight powers, see e.g. Elman (2000) and Dieterich/Hummel/Marschall (2007). Such approaches, however, remain within the established lines of institutionalist readings of democracy. In contrast, we are hinting here at ‘radical’ critiques of existing democracies. For a comprehensive treatment of radical democratic readings of Kant see Eberl (2008)
25 See, for example, Colin Crouch’s work on „post-democracy“ (2004). That Democratic Peace research lacks sensitivity for the faults of the capitalist dynamics in international relations has been set forth in Barkawi/Laffey (2001).
key countries could be found in the Clinton and in particular the Bush administration (Smith 2007), and it is well known that the Iraq war has partly been justified with the aim of regime change and of triggering a democratic “domino effect” in the Middle East. The disaster of the Iraq war and scathing critique of such “illiberal liberalism” (Desch 2007/8) has in the meantime probably defused such ambitions, but the idea of a “democratic intervention” as such has obviously not been completely discredited, at least if it follows a “humanitarian intervention” (Merkel 2008).

It is important to note that calls for forcible democratization have found little support in the Democratic Peace research community. However, Dan Reiter and Allen Stam are a notable exception. They concluded their book on democracies at war (2002) with some considerations on US foreign policy in the 21st century, in particular the desirability of peaceful and forcible democracy promotion. Underlining that the spread of democracy is desirable because it “advances the human condition by protecting freedom and directly serves the American national interest by helping sustain a peaceful, more prosperous world” (2002: 203), they did not hesitate to declare: “(...) complete pessimism is unwarranted; military force can promote social stability and the advance of democracy. We urge policy-makers to be willing to use force for this end if the conditions for success, especially a society that enjoys the proper institutional, cultural, and economic conditions, seem to be present” (2002: 204). To be sure, the bulk of Democratic Peace scholars has been rather critical of forcible democratization, and notably Bruce Russett complained that Democratic Peace research has been wrongfully exploited and perverted by politicians (Russett 2005: 396). Whatever the explicit position on forcible democratization Democratic Peace scholars take, the question remains in which indirect ways Democratic Peace research has nevertheless contributed to pave the intellectual ground for democratic wars.

Third, as indicated above (section 3.2), democratic distinctiveness research conveys the impression that cooperation between democracies (such as NATO and EU) is especially stable and beneficial while cooperation in heterogeneous settings (such as the United Nations) might be laborious and ineffective. The thrust of the democratic distinctiveness programme, and the democratic turn in institutional peace research in particular lends legitimacy to a worldview that divides the population of states along the
binary lines of democracies and non-democracies and ascribes higher morality and credibility as well as institutional privileges to the group of democracies.

The propagation of a liberal international law in recent years which allots more (interventionist) rights to democracies and the growing support for a “concert of democracies” as a new counter-part to an ineffective United Nations Security Council are more than troubling developments, reinforcing the classification into first- and second-class regimes. The large bipartisan “Princeton Project on National Security” pleads for such a “concert of democracies” as the “institutional embodiment and ratification of the ‘democratic peace’” (Ikenberry/Slaughter 2006: 25). In the same vein, Robert Kagan explicitly votes for such a “concert of democracies” as a complement to the United Nations: “If successful, it could help bestow legitimacy on actions that democratic nations deem necessary but autocratic nations refuse to countenance – as NATO conferred legitimacy on the intervention in Kosovo. In a world increasingly divided along democratic and autocratic lines, the world’s democrats will have to stick together.” (Kagan 2008: 98). Remarkably enough, the very same people who pretend to regret that the world is increasingly divided along the regime type line, contribute actively to constructing such a division and even reinforcing it. And once again, such ideas have travelled from academe into politics, so is for example the Republican presidential candidate John McCain currently voicing the idea of a “league of democracies” in his election campaign.

So, where do these caveats leave us, if we do not want to discard a democratic distinctiveness research altogether? There is no easy way out of probing a democratic exceptionalism and at the same time having to avoid reinforcing a political dichotomy of regime types in world politics. Modest as it may sound, we plead for introducing more self-criticism and self-reflection into research and for refraining from constructing overly

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26 See, for example, Feinstein/Slaughter (2004), in critique of a liberal international law see Reus-Smit (2005) and Smith (2007: chap. 6). A noteworthy argument for the privileging of democracies in international law is given by Buchanan and Keohane (2004: 19): They find democracies to meet their “standard for comparative moral reliability” and believe that “when democracies violate cosmopolitan principles, they are more likely to be criticized by their citizens for doing so, and will be more likely to rectify their behavior in response.”
complacent images of “our” own policies vis-à-vis other states. Special capacities of democracies to foster peace need to be contrasted with their equally tremendous capacities to use force. As we have argued above, democratic peace and democratic war might be closer linked than is obvious at first glance; both pertain to the liberal legacy and in this sense render the way from Kant’s Königsberg “perpetual peace” to today’s NATO-led “war on terror” in Kandahar a rather short one.

Not only with regard to the core of the democratic distinctiveness programme, decisions of war and peace, but also to all other security issue areas we therefore suggest to investigate into the ambivalences, contradictions, tensions and paradoxes of democratic principles, norms and institutions (cf. Müller 2004). Taking recourse to the Frankfurt school tradition and drawing from other fields of research on democracy such as democratic theory and comparative politics would enable us to get a more balanced picture of democracies’ record in security-related issues and to be cautious against overly optimistic concepts of civilianizing global politics. What is required, in other words, is a critical theory of democratic peace (Müller/Schörnig 2008: 189; cf. Hasenclever/Wagner 2004: 469; Geis 2006; Geis/Müller/Wagner 2007). The progressivist philosophy of history which underlies ‘classic’ Democratic Peace research (Rengger 2006) is a questionable foundation of democratic distinctiveness studies.
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