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A Skeptical Optimist’s Perspective on Canada Getting to Proportional Representation as an Electoral Reform

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A Skeptical Optimist’s Perspective on Canada Getting to Proportional Representation as an Electoral Reform (Submission to the House of Commons Special Committee on Electoral Reform (ERRE) Following Author’s Appearance on Thursday, September 2, 2016)

Craig Scott, Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University; former Member of Parliament for Toronto-Danforth and Official Opposition Critic for Democratic and Parliamentary Reform

Thank you for inviting me to present to the Committee in person on September 2. As I indicated at the time, the invitation came too late for me to prepare any submission in advance. In the result, I feel that I had the opportunity to weigh in on a number of points, given the length of the Committee session – so, I do not feel the need to reiterate much of what was already said.

Instead, I will use this submission largely for several supplementary purposes, as follows:

1. to comment on some concerns that I have with the Library of Parliament background paper (something about which I meant to write to the Committee two months ago when I first noticed the problems);
2. to comment briefly on the MMM (mixed-member majoritarian) option;
3. to include the chart that I referenced verbally, on the “deceptive majorities” that Alternative Vote can produce;
4. to comment on a particular approach to the referendum issue; and
5. to suggest one consultation technique that the Committee could use on the road.

1. Some problematic categorizations and assumptions in the Library of Parliament Background Paper

At risk of sounding overly concerned with minutiae, I would like to put on record a couple of concerns about the Library of Parliament Background Paper entitled “Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform in Canada and Elsewhere: An Overview.” I wish to emphasize that, as with all of the Library’s work assisting committees (and from which I benefited so often while an MP), I greatly appreciate the paper and believe it is very useful. I hesitated to bring my concerns forward, but, on balance, I am worried that people coming to this issue with limited information will be left with erroneous impressions unless clarifications are made.

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1 The session can be viewed here on ParlVu: http://parlvu.parl.gc.ca/XRender/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20160901/-1/25476?useragent=Mozilla/5.0
First and second concerns

The first two concerns relate to categorization of different electoral systems. These are as follows:

1. Presenting MMP inaccurately as not being a proportional system

The Background Paper chooses to focus on the “mixed” nature of Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) representation rather than its “proportional” nature. In so choosing, MMP has not been put in the section called “Proportional Representation” but, rather, in another section called “Mixed Electoral Systems” alongside another mixed system that does not produce proportionality, namely, Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM).

The brief discussion of MMP then only occurs after a discussion of MMM where it is made clear that MMM “will not compensate for any disproportionality” arising from local MP elections. The Paper then refers to the “attempt to compensate” (my emphasis) for disproportionality of an MMP system.

With the foregoing in mind, I am very concerned that the effect of the various ways MMP is positioned in the Background Paper will subliminally suggest to many readers that MMP is not a proportional representation system when it is in fact a fully proportional system. Indeed, MMP is designed to compensate for disproportionality – versus the notion that there is an “attempt” to do so.

Keep in mind that each of these MMP and MMM sections has an “Advantages and Disadvantages” sub-section. By definition (because of the categorization), MMP is not associated with the benefits of proportional representation because it is not even in the proportional representation section. To make matters worse, the “Advantages and Disadvantages” sub-section of the “Mixed Systems” section goes further and attempts – very inaccurately – to lump MMP and MMM together by saying that each is a “compromise” (in not fully respecting proportionality) and each produces “fairly proportional” results. This is quite simply wrong: MMP and MMM have very different relationships to proportionality, with MMP being a proportional system in purpose and MMM being only semi-proportional in purpose.

I am even more concerned that the treatment of MMP and MMM as essentially the same will validate MMM far beyond what it merits. Keep in mind that the trigger for this whole parliamentary exercise was the Liberal Party’s promise in its platform: “We will make every vote count.” While MMP is designed to do that, MMM is not designed to do so – and cannot do so, even by chance results. I will return to MMM later in this submission.

2. Further confusion created by treating SNTV as a fully proportional system

To some extent, a second choice adds insult to injury. The Background Paper inexplicably slots Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV) into the “Proportional Representation” system. It is true that Single Transferrable Vote (STV) deserves to be described as a proportional
representation system as long as the multi-member ridings are not so small as to render STV only semi-proportional (as has happened in Ireland with its small three to four-member ridings) – and STV is placed in the proportional representation section. But, no student of electoral systems would say SNTV is a proportional system. This is quite simply a clear error in the Library of Parliament paper.

SNTV is actually a form of multi-member First Past the Post (the candidates with the most votes win) and not at all oriented towards proportionality -- any impact on this front is a matter of mitigation of disproportionality (because, with multi-member districts, at least one or two non-dominant party candidates will usually be elected) in a way that is, however, very unpredictable in its extent. The Law Commission of Canada categorized it generously as, at best, “semi-proportional”.

This is not to say SNTV has no virtues. Just as First Past the Post in single member districts can sometimes be a vehicle for concentrated minority communities being able to elect members from their community because of three-way and sometimes four-way races, SNTV has arguably a better potential to prevent undue domination that occurs when dominant groups (whether political or ethno-cultural) are able to carry all the seats in an area at the same time. This virtue is not, however, an endorsement but only an effort to show fairness toward SNTV. The bottom-line remains that SNTV is not a proportional system and cannot make good on an “We will make every vote” count philosophy and Liberal Party promise.

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I realize the above two concerns may come across to some as picky or even ‘academic’, but I believe that categories presented as authoritative can take on a life of their own and help to channel the way people think and talk about an issue. The last thing the committee process needs is people erroneously repeating in an off-hand and assumed way that MMP is not a proportional system or that MMM is as proportional as MMP, while wasting their time under the illusion that SNTV is a (fully) proportional system.

It will spare committee members and witnesses from the need to try to correct these misperceptions during committee proceedings themselves if the Background Paper were made more accurate – not to mention avoiding creating confusion when the Committee goes on the road.

3. Third concern

I also have a third concern – the signals about the necessary nature of MMP lists in the Background Paper. The fact this concern is placed third is not an indication of its importance. In fact, the failure of the Ontario Citizens Assembly to endorse flexible or open lists was, along with list seats coming from a province-wide pool (versus from sub-provincial regions), one of the reasons for resistance to the proposed version of MMP in the Ontario referendum (apart from the non-support for the proposal from the provincial Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties, and the active hostility from influential media).
I realize that the brief discussion of MMP in the Background Paper can of course only do so much in describing variations on a system. However, my concern here is to make sure that the Committee is clear with people in its consultations and decision-making that MMP need not involve only closed lists for electing regional MPs as is the case in New Zealand, Germany and Scotland, three of the most common examples of MMP. Unfortunately, the diagram in the Background Paper shows only a closed list – which means that parties’ lists of candidates (and the order of the candidates on that list) cannot be changed by the voter: each voter votes for their preferred party and thereby votes for that party’s list of candidates.

However, flexible and open list systems are possible (and exist elsewhere, for example, in Bavaria’s version of MMP and indeed were also recommended for Scotland in the review of its model by the Arbuthnott Commission in 2006.) Under such lists, voters have the option to indicate their preferred candidate on their preferred party’s list (flexible list) or must indicate their preferred candidate (open list). In either case, when a candidate’s name is ticked in a closed-list system, that vote acts simultaneously as a vote for the candidate’s party for purposes of determining the party’s share of votes and thus of seats.

Note here that the leading report for purposes of the federal level in Canada is the Law Commission of Canada’s 2004 report, Voting Counts: Electoral Reform in Canada, and the Law Commission gives detailed reasons for preferring a flexible list over a closed list. In the last Parliament, the NDP made clear on multiple occasions that it believes also that a flexible list is desirable and I understand Fair Vote Canada also is against closed lists.

My only purpose here, in relation to this third concern, is to ask the Committee to take careful note of this concern when it comes to presenting institutional-design choices to Canadians. It was clear during the September 2 session that the different forms of lists were already on the radar screen of the Committee, so in some respects I am expressing this third concern out of an excess of caution.

At the same time, I left the September 2 session deeply worried that it was clear there was some confusion on the part of some members, who seemed to think “closed lists” referred to some form of anti-democratic creation of lists by parties without the kinds of nomination contests and votes that parties currently use for deciding who candidates will be for our single member constituencies. That is, “closed” is being understood not just as meaning the voters cannot modify the lists (they vote for the people on their preferred list in the order they appear) – which is the true meaning of “closed list” – but also meaning that, at the front end, party members cannot vote for who will be on the lists and the order in which they will appear – which is not at all what “closed list” refers to. In fact, the Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister has actively tried to create this misimpression in at least one social-media post. Without commenting further on the dubious propriety of the Chief of Staff making himself an active player of this sort, and undermining the Minister and the Committee in the process, the point is that there is already enough confusion out there about “closed lists” that there is an independent political reason not to use closed lists – namely, to avoid the choice of “closed lists” being exploited disingenuously in a campaign against the model, using false arguments about what “closed” means.
I end by thanking the analysts again, through you, for their excellent work, and hope they accept the expression of my concerns in the constructive spirit intended.

2. Mr. DeCourcey’s Question: MMM as one option for the public

During the September 2 session, Mr. DeCourcey asked a question that I now realize I did not fully follow at the time. I think he was seeking to describe MMM but using descriptive language I did not fully follow. It may well be that the erroneous organization of the Library of Parliament Background Paper discussed above (wherein MMP and MMM are treated as virtually interchangeable in terms of proportionality) could be at the root of Mr. DeCourcey’s question.

If I now understand correctly, he wondered what I thought about presenting to Canadians both MMM and MMP as two possible models. My answer (after first answering a second question from Mr. DeCourcey at greater length) was simply that, as long as different models presented to the public are proportional, I would be supportive. If I had fully followed what he was suggesting to be presented alongside MMP as being MMM, I would have added: “...but MMM does not satisfy that requirement.” So, I wish to make clear that, by my answer on September 2, I did not intend to endorse MMM – which, as discussed above, is a non-proportional system or, at best, semi-proportional.

All I would say is that, if MMM is presented as a model by the Committee, it must be fairly and firmly stated that it is not a truly proportional system and that its proportionality layer can at best correct the disproportionality produced by the local-riding elections to a limited extent. Unlike MMP, the regional-list elections are not designed to compensate for the disproportionality of the local-riding elections in a major way but, rather, to offer only a partial corrective. Indeed, what MMM tends to be designed to do (e.g. in Japan where it has operated since 1994) is make “false majorities” less extreme while at the same time making majorities still probable for a certain kind of brokerage party that hits around 40% of the popular vote; this goal is presumably as much in the interest of the current Liberal Party of Canada as it has been for the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan.

It is, however, fair to point out that a properly designed MMM system would not worsen the proportionality situation in the way Alternative Vote would. Also, if at least one-third to two-fifths of the seats were allocated by a purely PR method, then it would at least diminish governing majorities somewhat (to the point that it could in some cases lower the governing party’s seat count below the 50% threshold) and, most meaningfully, would prevent the ridiculous 100% (or near 100%) sweeps of seats in regions that have plagued almost every election in Canada. As the Law Commission of Canada noted, using a formula of two-thirds of locally-elected seats and one-third of seats
allocated proportionately to the popular vote, the 2000 federal election run under 2/3-1/3 MMP would have reduced the Liberals’ false majority of 172 seats to (still) a false majority of ‘only’ 161 seats. Taking Ontario as a regional example in 2000, the Liberals received 100 of 103 seats but, under the 2/3-1/3 MMM model, would have received 15 less; these 85 seats would still have been far more seats than warranted by the popular vote, but at least some more non-Liberal voices would have entered the House of Commons than under our first-past-the-post system. Applying that 2/3-1/3 MMM model to Atlantic Canada during the 2015 election, the Liberals 32/32 seat result would have been reduced to around 27 seats, thereby allowing four or five non-Liberal voices; under MMP, by contrast, the Liberals would have gotten only 21 (still more than their share of the popular vote, but much closer to that percentage than under MMM).²

In any event, if MMM is presented as an alternative to MMP as a non-proportional system with a proportionality layer, much depends on the split (between local seats and regional seats) before one can know exactly how disproportionate MMM would still be. It would be a travesty, for example, if the Pepin-Robarts recommendation of a mere 18% of seats to be elected proportionally were to be proposed; such a proposal would allow some Committee members (and party back-room messaging operations) to use the word “proportional representation” to describe (one element of) the proposal at the price of misrepresenting the outcome (virtually unchanged from the current system). When the Pepin-Robarts proposal was applied by the Law Commission to the 2000 election, the Liberals’ 52% seat haul (on 44% of the vote) went down a mere 1% to 51%. Even making the seat split 50/50 under MMM would only result in semi-proportionality of result.

The Law Commission agreed with the New Zealand electoral reform commission view that MMM is more of a palliative than a substantive reform to the electoral system and went on to conclude that “this is not an attractive option in terms of fairness to parties” and thus to voters for those parties. I agree completely and emphasize, again, that MMM cannot be presented to Canadians as anything other than majoritarian in its nature and central purpose versus MMP’s co-purpose (alongside local representation) of proportionality.

There is a reason MMM ends with *Majoritarian* in contrast to MMP ending with *Proportional*.

² The MMM result is calculated as follows. The Liberals would win the full two-thirds of local seats (no differently from winning 100% of the seats in October 2015), so consider that 21 seats. Then, the Liberals would, I assume, take around 55% of the 11 proportional seats (the Liberals’ popular vote varied between 51% in New Brunswick and 64% in Newfoundland), being 6 seats. Add 6 to 21 and one gets 27.

The MMP result is calculated as follows. Again, the Liberals would win the full two-thirds of local seats, so again that is 21 seats. If the Liberals took around 55% of the vote in Atlantic Canada, it would be entitled to 17.6 seats (treat as 18). So, even under an MMP using a 2/3-1/3 formula, the Liberals would have received 4 more seats than merited, but at least all 11 of the remaining compensatory seats would go to the other parties. This example is a good illustration as to why the German system of a 50/50 split of local and compensatory seats is far more faithful to the value of proportional representation than the Law Commission’s 2/3-1/3 split. This is why I stated during my appearance that, in my view, 60/40 is the highest one should go in terms of local seats (60%) if one wants to take proportionality seriously.
3. “Deceptive majorities” under Alternative Vote

During my presentation, I first noted the obvious number-one downside of Alternative Vote (ranked ballots in single member districts), namely, that not only does AV not improve proportionality of electoral results but also it can easily make disproportionality worse. After the October 2015 election, the CBC’s Eric Grénier estimated that the Liberals’ 184 seats would have grown by 30 seats to 224 seats; thus, under our current First Past the Post system, the Liberals received 54% of the seats from only 39.5% of the vote, but, under Alternative Vote, that 39.5% of the vote would have generated 66% of the seats. It is completely inconsistent with the Liberal Party’s top-line platform promise – “We will make every vote count.” – not only to replace the winner-take-all First Past the Post (FPTP) with another winner-take-all system (Alternative Vote) but also to replace it with a winner-take-all system that is even worse than FPTP in the distortions it creates in the make-up of the House of Commons (again, Alternative Vote).

I also explained how Alternative Vote supporters sometimes try to make it look like AV counts every vote; they will say something like, “AV counts not just first preferences but also second preferences” and leave the impression that this somehow means everyone’s vote is counted equally. Such claims – whether made mistakenly or craftily – are wrong. AV does not count every vote, or voter, equally, given two facts. One, the vote that is counted for some is not their first preference.

Two, and even more significantly, these second preferences are taken from the poorest-performing candidate’s voters, one by one until these second preferences push a candidate over the threshold of 50% of the votes through first preferences and second preferences combined. It is almost never the case that the second preferences of people voting for the two top candidates would be counted (with a rare exception being, for example, a situation in which one of the top two candidates dropped to third place due to the redistribution of second preferences from the bottom, and then in turn has her voters’ second preferences counted). Thus, when the Liberal Party’s campaign platform promised as their top-line commitment that “[w]e will make every vote count”, it is impossible to meet that commitment by replacing First Past the Post with Alternative Vote.

In the context of the actual promise by the Government when running for office and assuming some value is placed on proportional representation, there is no other conclusion than that, on the basis of fairness alone, an Alternative Vote system has zero legitimacy as a replacement for our current First Past the Post system.

That said, as I noted in my presentation, the Liberal Party may be prepared to make a case for what it is about Alternative Vote that has some value despite its distorting effects. This could allow Alternative Vote possibly to be considered as part of a proportional system,
namely, under the UK Jenkins Commission MMP+ proposal – whether as a matter of principle or simply as a political compromise. I remind the Committee that the Jenkins’ model is still MMP, but AV is used rather than First Past the Post to elect the local-riding MPs; as I noted on September 7, because of the extra anti-proportionality distorting effects of AV, great attention would need to be paid to the split (between the percentage of local-riding seats and regional-list compensatory seats) to ensure the local-riding results do not swamp the capacity of the compensatory seats to counteract the disproportionality generated by using AV at the local-riding level.

However, the rest of my remarks on Alternative Vote were intended to make clear that it would be a misrepresentation to over-sell Alternative Vote as part of MMP+ by pitching AV’s supposed “majoritarian” character, wherein “majoritarian” comes along with a claim such as: “Under AV, no MP can be elected without receiving a majority of her riding’s votes.” The first, and well-known, critique of such “majoritarian” language is that, in ridings not won by a candidate receiving over 50% of the first preferences, “a majority” is actually a *compromise* majority in that it includes some people’s second preferences.

But the second problem is that the majoritarian claim is made despite the fact that an Alternative Vote compromise majority can also be a *deceptive* majority. I indicated to the Committee that I had created a chart that demonstrates how easily one can come up with plausible scenarios whereby the winner under Alternative Vote would actually lose if all voters’ second preferences were counted and not just those from a certain number of candidates’ voters from the bottom up. The chart attached as an appendix shows two scenarios using the same first preference votes in each scenario with the difference between the scenarios being a variation on the second preferences of the voters.

Under Scenario 1, candidate “A” wins under Alternative Vote – nudging over the 50% threshold by 1 vote thanks to second preferences of the voters of the worst-performing candidate “E” – but Candidate “B” has much more support in the riding if combined first and second preferences is the currency of measurement (as Alternative Vote holds out is the case); “B” receives 774 (out of 1000) combined first and second preferences compared to the winner “A”’s 551, but “B” nonetheless loses. Under Scenario 2, “B” wins under Alternative Vote while “A” is the better consensus candidate if one adds together the total number of first and second preferences, with (losing) “A receiving 685 combined votes to (winning) “B”’s 611.

The demonstration in my appendix chart shows not just the deceptiveness of the claim that an AV winner has won with a majority but that this deceptiveness occurs precisely because Alternative Vote itself operates not just as a winner-take-all system but also as, in effect, a First Past the Post system whenever no one candidate gets 50% + 1 of first preferences. It is First Past the Post because the count stops once the first candidate gets 50% + 1 through adding lower preferences from the bottom; if one let the horse race continue until all second preferences were counted (i.e. if there were a second post to pass), the winner might well be different. In operating in this arbitrary way, Alternative Vote actually turns in on itself with a self-contradiction: its rationale (beyond the superficial and inaccurate “majority” claim) is that it is a system that purports to identify the most consensual candidate (in the absence of anyone winning outright with 50% + 1 first
votes) through using lower preferences but, if you followed AV’s own logic, the most consensual candidate could easily be someone other than the Alternative Vote winner.

4. An ex post referendum at the time of a future election

David McLaughlin testified in the same session as I did. Alongside advocating MMP based on the extremely thorough process in New Brunswick, he is in favour of a referendum. Notably, he also stated his view that it would be acceptable if a referendum were held once Canadians have had a chance to experience a new system (versus having to imagine and then embrace a new system, sight unseen). I believe this is the most sensible of the positions on the place of a referendum in this debate. I would have no objection if the new system were made operative in time for the 2019 election, with a legislated commitment to test the system against experience two or three cycles down the road.

I would go further and suggest that such a future referendum could well be held at the same time as a general election. This would save $300 million or so in referendum costs at the same time as increasing the chances of an appropriately high voter turn-out. To do this, the Referendum Act would need to be amended as it currently prohibits referenda that coincide with general elections.

As an important aside, it bears mentioning that holding a referendum between now and 2019 faces another hurdle. There is no way that the current Referendum Act can be used for a referendum in this day and age, for the reason that it is locked into a deeply problematic financing system that pre-dates all of the reforms that apply to elections. Actors with deep pockets can fund Yes or No campaigns to their heart’s content, and that includes not just corporations (and unions) but also political parties themselves. In this context, the use of a referendum to deep-six electoral reform would be close to a certainty.

5. The Committee on the road

Apart from the ideas I threw the Committee’s way (persuading TV networks, especially CBC, to hold at least one televised town hall with the Committee; carrying out institutional-design sessions of the Committee members in full public view, perhaps alongside citizen participants), I also mentioned a method I used on occasion when conducting an Electoral Reform Tour in 2013-2014.

For some of those sessions, I opened the session by asking participants to take some minutes to rank 15 criteria/principles for evaluating electoral systems. This captured the ‘before discussion’ views of people, and then, at the end of the session, I asked the attendees to revisit the ranking to see if the session had induced any reflection that caused them to change the order in some respect. (More usually, I asked
folks to do it only at the very end, for reasons of time.) Although this method has limited utility if the context is a town hall when a most participants arrive with a predisposition in favour of a similar form of electoral reform (e.g. proportional representation), I believe it has some potential as a valuable technique for the Committee given its sessions should attract a wider range of starting points. Not only would it show where people are (on their own steam) but it would allow the Committee to get some sense of what kind of reflection its sessions are producing.

For the Committee’s possible interest, I copy below the criteria I used:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What criteria do you think are most important in determining whether an electoral system is good for Canada?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRITERION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness in the sense of proportionality (number of seats in the House of Commons reflects a party’s percentage of the popular vote)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct election of an MP for each constituency (who is then accountable to constituents while MP and at next election)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Ability of voters to exercise choice so as to allow a voter to vote for a local MP of one party and also cast a separate vote for another party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Ability of voters to exercise choice so as to allow voters to rank individual candidates on a list in accordance with preferences (1, 2, 3,..)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity with a country’s electoral traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of system to generate one-party majorities, with the result that government parties do not have to cooperate with other parties to get legislation passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of system to promote more consensual, cooperative and cross-party law-making in the House of Commons, as the result of it being rare for a single party to win 50% of the seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplicity of the ballot, producing ease of voting for the voter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ I then calculated averages and median scores for each criterion to see what the over-all support level was and to get a collective ranking for each session. Another more direct, and perhaps more statistically useful method, could be to ask participants to rate each criterion on a scale of 1 to 10 in importance (specifying, of course, whether “1” or “10” is the most positive rating).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How easy is it for voters to understand the mechanisms used to count votes and allocate seats?</th>
<th>For example, should voters be able to follow the math as to how seats are allocated (e.g. how proportionality calculations are made)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voter knowledge about contending candidates and parties</td>
<td>So there is enough information in advance of voting to exercise an informed choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track record of the electoral system in other jurisdictions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing degree of expert support, including from citizens who have been given the opportunity to engage and reflect on the best system for Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficial impact on voter turnout and on increasing citizen engagement with Parliament more generally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The views of parties and of sitting MPs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the change in system by the population at large, e.g. a clear electoral mandate or a referendum result</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Appendix on next page)
## APPENDIX – 1000 voters, 5 candidates: Two Alternative Vote “Deceptive Majority” Scenarios

### Scenario 1
(“A” wins under AV but “B” has more 1\(^{st}\) + 2\(^{nd}\) votes in total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>1(^{st})-place votes</th>
<th>2(^{nd})-place votes of each candidate’s voters</th>
<th>Combined 1(^{st})+2(^{nd}) in total (not just from the bottom candidates)</th>
<th>1(^{st})-place votes</th>
<th>2(^{nd})-place votes of each candidate’s voters</th>
<th>Combined 1(^{st})+2(^{nd}) in total (not just from the bottom candidates)</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (WINNER under AV w/ 501 1(^{st}) and 2(^{nd}) place votes)(^4)</td>
<td>450 (45%)</td>
<td>275 for B 75 for C 100 for E</td>
<td>Total = 551 (450 1(^{st}) + 50 from B’s voters + 51 from E’s voters)</td>
<td>450 (45%)</td>
<td>200 for no one 100 for B 50 for C 50 for D 50 for E</td>
<td>Total=685 (the most) (450 1(^{st}) + 200 from B’s voters + 15 from C’s voters + 10 from D’s voters + 10 from E’s voters)</td>
<td>A (Loses under AV despite 685 voters voting for “A” vs. only 611 for winner “B”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Loses under AV despite 774 voters voting for “B” vs. only 551 for winner “A”)</td>
<td>350 (35%)</td>
<td>50 for A 150 for C 150 for D</td>
<td>Total = 774 (the most) (350 1(^{st}) + 275 from A’s voters + 75 from C’s voters + 74 from D’s voters)</td>
<td>350 (35%)</td>
<td>200 for A 50 for C 50 for D 50 for E</td>
<td>Total=611 (350 1(^{st}) + 100 from A’s voters + 60 from C’s voters + 60 from D’s voters + 41 from E’s voters)</td>
<td>B (WINNER under AV w/ 511 1(^{st}) and 2(^{nd}) place votes)(^5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>75 (7.5%)</td>
<td>75 for B</td>
<td>Total = 300 (75 + 75 + 150)</td>
<td>75 (7.5%)</td>
<td>15 for A 60 for B</td>
<td>Total = 175 (75 + 50 + 50)</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>74 (7.5%)</td>
<td>74 for B</td>
<td>Total = 224 (74 + 150)</td>
<td>74 (7.5%)</td>
<td>10 for A 60 for B</td>
<td>Total = 174 (74 + 50 + 50)</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>51 (5%)</td>
<td>51 for A</td>
<td>Total = 151 (51 + 100)</td>
<td>51 (5%)</td>
<td>10 for A 41 for B</td>
<td>Total = 151 (51 + 50 + 50)</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Scenario 2
(“B” wins under AV but “A” has more 1\(^{st}\) + 2\(^{nd}\) votes in total)

4 The winning 501 is calculated as follows: 450 1\(^{st}\)-place votes + 51 2\(^{nd}\) place votes transferred from last-place “E”’s voters.

5 The winning 511 is calculated as follows: 350 1\(^{st}\)-place votes + 41 2\(^{nd}\) place votes transferred from last-place “E”’s voters in Round 1 of redistributing votes from the candidate doing the worst + 60 2\(^{nd}\) place votes transferred from the voters of the next worse performing candidate (“D”) in Round 2 of redistributing votes + another 60 2\(^{nd}\) place votes transferred from the voters of the next worse performing candidate (“C”) in Round 3 of redistributing votes.