The Resilience of Métis Title: Rejecting Assumptions of Extinguishment

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For many years, the Crown disputed Métis title claims by contending that any previously existing Métis rights, including title, had been extinguished. We argue, however, that this is not the case in at least some areas of the Métis homeland. In this chapter, we review the three means by which Aboriginal rights can be extinguished in Canadian law: by surrender, by legislation prior to 17 April 1982, and by constitutional amendment. This chapter builds on our previous work, in which we argue that historical Métis land use patterns can satisfy the test for Aboriginal title. The relevant case law here is Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, a Supreme Court of Canada decision from 2014. Once the Métis show that their occupation of their traditional homeland is sufficient, continuous, and exclusive, the next step is to demonstrate that their title to land has not been extinguished. Focusing on Manitoba, we take this step, and thus further strengthen the argument in support of Métis title.

We do not endorse the jurisprudence pertaining to, or the existence of, the doctrine of extinguishment. Both have been thoroughly and deftly critiqued elsewhere. Our goal is to supplement this critique by highlighting the historical and legal reasons for questioning the applicability of this doctrine to Métis title claims.
Three Means of Extinguishment

Extinguishment by Legislation
In Canadian law, Aboriginal rights, including title, could be extinguished unilaterally by competent legislation prior to 17 April 1982, when section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, came into effect. After that point, legislation could no longer extinguish Aboriginal rights and title. Therefore, Aboriginal rights can now be extinguished only by surrender or by constitutional amendment, both of which are discussed below. Here, we examine whether Métis rights have been extinguished by legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Sparrow established the current test for the extinguishment of Aboriginal rights by legislation: legislation must exhibit a clear and plain intention to extinguish the right at issue. The onus of meeting this test is on the party claiming that the right has been extinguished. In articulating the test, the court affirmed the standard for extinguishment expressed by Justice Hall in Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia. It rejected the standard expressed by Justice Judson in Calder, which was that legislation that is merely inconsistent with the continued existence of an Aboriginal right is sufficient to extinguish the right. Elsewhere in his decision in Calder, Hall J explained that because Aboriginal rights are legal rights, they can be extinguished only by surrender or by competent legislation, and that the legislation must be specific. This is a high threshold. Courts have rarely concluded that legislation met the “clear and plain intention” test and was thus effective in extinguishing Aboriginal rights or title.

For the purpose of effecting an extinguishment, competent legislation means either federal or Imperial legislation. With respect to federal legislation, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada established in Delgamuukw that the government has “the exclusive power to extinguish aboriginal rights, including aboriginal title.” The court cited section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provides that the federal government has legislative jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.” This principle applies equally to Métis title, given the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), according to which Métis are “Indians” for the purposes of section 91(24) and thus within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal government. With respect to Imperial legislation, a majority of the court held in R v Sappier; R v Gray that “during the colonial period, the power to extinguish aboriginal rights rested with the Imperial Crown.”
The evisceration of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity as applied to Aboriginal rights in *Tsilhqot'in* does not alter the requirement that legislation be federal in order to extinguish Aboriginal rights. It is true that *Tsilhqot'in* stands for the proposition that Aboriginal rights, including title, no longer lie within the core of Ottawa's jurisdiction pursuant to section 91(24). However, this proposition pertains to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, which provided only one of two independent rationales for the federal legislation requirement in *Delgamuukw*. The other rationale rests on a pith and substance analysis, which is unaffected by *Tsilhqot'in*'s removal of Aboriginal rights from the core of section 91(24). The majority in *Delgamuukw* explained that although provincial laws of general application can apply to section 91(24) Indians and Indian land *proprio vigore* (of their own force), a provincial law of general application could not apply *proprio vigore* so as to extinguish Aboriginal rights. To meet the test for extinguishment discussed above, the provincial law, of necessity, would not be a law of general application. That is, any provincial law that meets the high threshold of *Sparrow*'s clear and plain intention test would thereby be in relation to Indians and Indian lands under section 91(24) and would thus be ultra vires. In other words, the pith and substance of the provincial legislation would be in relation to section 91(24), even though the legislation would not touch on the core of the section after *Tsilhqot'in*.

As a result, when assessing the possible extinguishment of Métis rights, absent a delegation of authority by the Imperial Parliament, we can exclude provincial and colonial legislation from the analysis. From the Métis perspective, this is one of the victories of *Daniels*, which was overlooked by those who questioned the value of a mere declaration that the Métis are “Indians” under section 91(24).

An exhaustive examination of all federal and Imperial legislation from the late eighteenth century to 1982 is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, the only potentially relevant statutes of which we are aware are the *Manitoba Act, 1870*, and the *Dominion Lands Act*. The former sets out a process by which the Indian title of the Métis in the original postage-stamp-sized province of Manitoba would be extinguished, and the latter does the same for the Métis in the northwest but outside the original province. Section 31 of the *Manitoba Act* states,

And whereas, it is expedient, towards the extinguishment of the Indian Title to the lands in the Province, to appropriate a portion of such ungranted lands, to the extent of one million four hundred thousand acres thereof, for
the benefit of the families of the half-breed residents, it is hereby enacted, that, under regulations to be from time to time made by the Governor General in Council, the Lieutenant-Governor shall select such lots or tracts in such parts of the Province as he may deem expedient, to the extent aforesaid, and divide the same among the children of the half-breed heads of families residing in the Province at the time of the said transfer to Canada, and the same shall be granted to the said children respectively, in such mode and on such conditions as to settlement and otherwise, as the Governor General in Council may from time to time determine.29

Section 125(e) of the *Dominion Lands Act*, as amended in 1879, states,

The following powers are hereby delegated to the Governor in Council:

... To satisfy any claims existing in connection with the extinguishment of the Indian title preferred by half-breeds resident in the North-West Territories outside the limits of Manitoba, on the fifteenth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy, by granting lands to such persons, to such extent and on such terms and conditions, as may be expedient.30

Given the constitutional status of the *Manitoba Act, 1870*, section 31 prima facie falls within the category of constitutional amendments, which are discussed below. The test for extinguishment by means of legislation and for extinguishment by means of constitutional amendment, though, is one and the same.32 At first glance, both provisions might appear to satisfy *Sparrow’s* clear and plain intention test; they explicitly state that their purpose is to extinguish the Indian title of the Métis. They might seem not only to meet but to exceed the threshold for extinguishment, according to which the legislature’s intention must be clear and plain but need not be express.33 As Paul Joffe and Mary Ellen Turpel rightly recognize, though, these provisions contemplate, but do not actually legislate, an extinguishment of Métis title.34 In other words, the intention exhibited in these provisions is not to extinguish Métis title directly, but rather to allow for an extinguishment on the occurrence of certain future events. More specifically, section 31 of the *Manitoba Act, 1870*, outlines a process for distributing 1.4 million acres to the children of Métis heads of families, the purpose of which was to extinguish Métis title. Similarly, section 12(e) of the *Dominion Lands Act* gives the governor-in-council the power to extinguish Métis
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title by granting land. The office of the superintendent general of Indian affairs seems to have recognized the accuracy of this interpretation when it issued a report in 1906 stating that the Aboriginal title of the “Indians and half-breeds” in a certain portion of Saskatchewan and Alberta had not yet been extinguished; the report recommended making a treaty with the Indians and settling the claims of the Half-breeds. If section 12(e) had already extinguished the Aboriginal rights of the Métis, the 1906 report would have been redundant and therefore unnecessary with respect to the Métis. Thus, sections 31 and 12(e), in and of themselves, do not satisfy the clear and plain intention test, as they only allude to another means for future extinguishment. The analysis, then, requires an examination of the events and actions undertaken to implement these provisions. The issuance of scrip was a method of implementing both section 31 and section 12(e).

Sections 31 and 12(e), as well as the issuance of scrip, have been the subject of various instances of litigation, none of which is determinative of the issue of the extinguishment of Métis title. In *Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v Canada (Attorney General)*, the trial judge concluded, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that the purpose of section 31 was not to extinguish the Indian title of the Métis. At first glance, this appears to be a victory for the Métis. This conclusion, however, was the position advanced by the Crown in attempting to counter the Métis claimants’ argument that the language of section 31 constituted an admission that the Métis of the Red River in 1870 held Indian title. The trial judge and the Court of Appeal rejected the position of the claimants and held that the language of extinguishment in the section was used as a matter of political expediency, “to make palatable to the Opposition the grant of land and thereby ensure passage of the Act.” At the same time, the Court of Appeal made the incongruous statement that the ability of the Métis of the Red River “to claim Aboriginal title was lost (or at least seriously impeded) through” the enactment of the section. This statement is not determinative of the significance of the section, as it is not based on an application of Sparrow’s clear and plain intention test. In fact, no level of court in *Manitoba Metis Federation* applied the Sparrow test to section 31. It was not necessary to do so, because the claim advanced in *Manitoba Metis Federation* was for breach of fiduciary duty, not for Aboriginal title.

In *R v Morin and Daigneault*, a judge of the Saskatchewan Provincial Court held that the scrip issued to the Métis for the sake of implementing
a later version of section 12(e) of the Dominion Lands Act was not effective in extinguishing the Métis claimants’ Aboriginal right to fish. The Dominion Lands Act makes no mention of fishing rights and thus did not meet the clear and plain intention test for extinguishing them. The question whether scrip extinguished the Aboriginal title of the Métis claimants, however, was not before the court. This question is at issue in Morin v Canada. According to Jean Teillet, this is the only claim to date seeking a declaration that the Métis have Aboriginal title. Teillet reports, however, that the proceedings in this case are currently stayed.

We argue below that the nature of the events and actions surrounding sections 31 and 12(e) is such that the analysis that best upholds the honour of the Crown and facilitates reconciliation is one viewed through the lens of a potential surrender, rather than extinguishment by legislation or constitutional amendment.

Extinguishment by Surrender
Just as the federal government has jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal rights, so too does it have jurisdiction to accept a surrender of Aboriginal rights, which undoubtedly includes Métis rights after the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Daniels. Thus, any supposed surrender made solely to a provincial government can be excluded from the analysis.

Historical Treaties
History provides little evidence of extinguishment of Métis rights through surrender by treaty. Although individuals of mixed ancestry were occasionally admitted into treaty, Métis collectives in Canada did not generally execute historical land surrender treaties, with only one possible exception, discussed below. Those Métis who entered into a treaty on an individual basis did not thereby extinguish the Aboriginal rights of their descendants. As the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Powley explains, extinguishment depends, at least in part, on whether the Métis community collectively adhered to a treaty. The federal government attempted to avoid treaty making with Métis collectives whenever possible, preferring instead to deal with the Métis as individuals by issuing scrip to them pursuant to the Dominion Lands Act. The one exception is the 1875 Half-breed adhesion to Treaty 3, which was signed by the “Half-breeds” at Rainy River and Rainy Lake in northwestern Ontario. The claim that the “Half-breeds” who signed the adhesion constituted a “Métis” community is contested. If the
community were Métis, the question arises as to whether the adhesion extinguished its rights and title.

The federal and provincial governments take the position that the numbered treaties, given their written text, effected an extinguishment by surrender of Aboriginal rights, including title, and replaced those rights with the hunting, fishing, and other rights set out in the treaties.\textsuperscript{55} Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada thus far have been consistent with this interpretation, including with respect to Treaty 3.\textsuperscript{56} Indigenous peoples, in contrast, have long disputed the Crown’s interpretation.\textsuperscript{57} Both the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission explain that Indigenous peoples understood and still understand treaties as agreements to share the land on a nation-to-nation basis, not as “extinguishments” or “surrenders” of “rights.”\textsuperscript{58} This interpretation is based on oral agreements and Indigenous legal institutions such as the exchange of wampum belts.\textsuperscript{59} It is supported not only by Indigenous traditions, but also by the research of non-Indigenous scholars.\textsuperscript{60} Regardless of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions applying the Crown’s interpretation, this issue is far from settled.\textsuperscript{61} It engages the question of whether land is a part of our community with which we are in a relationship and to which we owe responsibilities, or a form of property over which we exercise rights. In other words, this issue goes to the heart of the difference between Indigenous constitutional and legal orders, on the one hand, and Western constitutional and legal orders, on the other.\textsuperscript{62} This is the very issue that must be addressed if reconciliation is to be possible. Not surprisingly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in its final report, devoted considerable attention to Indigenous understandings of the treaties and also called on the federal government, on behalf of all Canadians, to renew or establish treaty relationships in accordance with the principles of mutual recognition and mutual respect.\textsuperscript{63} Thus, dismissing an Indigenous understanding of the numbered treaties is not an option for those who value reconciliation.

\textit{Modern Agreements}

In many instances, Canada has acted as if Métis title were adequately extinguished, which would make any modern agreements with the Métis, for the purposes of extinguishing title, unnecessary.\textsuperscript{64} But in comprehensive land claims processes in the Northwest Territories, the federal government has seemed to presume that some Métis title claims are outstanding. Although the apparent method of extinguishment through scrip was practised in both the north and south, when the comprehensive land claims processes were
initiated in the Northwest Territories, so too were land claims with Métis groups, both inside and outside of Dene claims negotiations. As Larry Chartrand notes, both the Sahtu Dene and Métis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement and the Northwest Territory Métis Nation Agreement-in-Principle presume that scrip did not sufficiently extinguish Métis title so as to leave it an ongoing burden on the Crown. Yet, the historical factors by which Métis title was supposedly extinguished through scrip in the Northwest Territories do not differ markedly from their counterparts in the southern areas where the federal government presumes that Métis title was extinguished by the same scrip policy via the Dominion Lands Act.\textsuperscript{65}

In each of these situations, the Métis were issued scrip, while also currently rejecting the claim that scrip was sufficient to extinguish their title. In essence, Chartrand argues that “the experience in the Northwest Territories demonstrates that the federal government is prepared to include Metis communities as eligible for the comprehensive claims process.”\textsuperscript{66} However, it has not extended the same treatment to Métis communities south of the 60th parallel, even though its policy toward them was the same. Chartrand suggests that the main reason for this was jurisdictional. The lack of provincial jurisdiction north of the 60th parallel precluded government inaction based on denial-of-jurisdiction arguments. As Chartrand notes, the decision in Daniels that the Métis are within federal jurisdiction now precludes those same arguments south of the 60th parallel.\textsuperscript{67} Chartrand concludes that “there are Metis claims south of 60° to lands and resources that are arguably no different in kind than those in the north and should be equally acknowledged. Consequently, the existence of Metis specific modern treaties in the north offers a solid precedent for the promotion of Metis treaties in other parts of Canada.”\textsuperscript{68} Modern agreements in the north, though proposing to extinguish Métis title, have in fact recognized its continued existence.

Ottawa’s willingness to negotiate with the Métis in the north on issues of land rights and title that it claims to have already extinguished through scrip grants generations ago is evidence that it may also be having doubts about the efficacy of the extinguishment of Métis title.

\textit{Section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870}

Section 31 of the \textit{Manitoba Act, 1870}, is quoted above on pages 73–74. In this provision, the Canadian government recognizes the existence of Métis “Indian title” in Rupert’s Land in 1870 for the purposes of extinguishment. In the House of Commons on 2 May 1870, Sir John A. Macdonald stated that these 1.4 million acres would constitute a “reservation” for “the purpose
of extinguishing the Indian title and all claims upon the lands within the limits of the province.” Sir George-Étienne Cartier also argued in the House that, like treaties with the Indians, a large Métis land reserve was necessary “for the purpose of extinguishing the claims of half-breeds.” The act was seen as facilitating the Métis “extinguishment of the Indian Title to the lands in the Province,” through the appropriation of “ungranted lands, to the extent of one million four hundred thousand acres thereof, for the benefit of the families of the halfbreed residents.” The act and the statements of Macdonald and Cartier seem to assume that there was a Métis share of “Indian title” to extinguish.

Section 31 should be analyzed within the framework of a potential surrender, not as a potential extinguishment by constitutional amendment. As discussed below, the section is not a unilateral constitutional provision; rather, it reflects a bilateral agreement between two parties that was reached after extensive negotiations, which resulted in modifications to the initial position of each side. Analyzing section 31 as a surrender better reflects the agency of the parties, which in turn is more likely to uphold the honour of the Crown and to promote reconciliation. In that decision, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the Métis plaintiffs failed to establish that the Crown owed a fiduciary duty to the Métis when implementing section 31. Nonetheless, the majority held that the section is a constitutional obligation, which engages the honour of the Crown and which the Crown failed to implement diligently. According to the court, this constitutional obligation is analogous to a treaty promise, has a treaty-like history and character, establishes solemn promises that “are no less fundamental than treaty promises,” and is the result of negotiations aimed at reconciling Métis Aboriginal rights with the Crown’s claim to sovereignty. Given the treaty-like and bilateral nature of section 31, it is more appropriate to analyze it as a surrender than as a unilateral constitutional amendment.

The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ontario (Attorney General) v Bear Island Foundation establishes a contentious yet not overturned principle pertaining to extinguishment by surrender. In this case, the Temagami First Nation argued that it had never signed the Robinson-Huron Treaty, which purports to cover its traditional territory, and hence its Aboriginal rights remained unextinguished. The court rejected this argument and held that regardless of whether any representative of the Temagami First Nation actually signed the Robinson-Huron Treaty in 1850, the Aboriginal rights of
the nation were surrendered when it subsequently received treaty payments and was assigned a reserve. In other words, if an Aboriginal nation receives the benefits of a surrender, it is held to the burden of the surrender. We contend that the inverse of this proposition should also be true: if an Aboriginal nation does not receive the benefits of a surrender, it should not be held to the burden of the surrender. Given the severe consequences of the *Bear Island* principle — including the total loss of Aboriginal rights potentially without any negotiation or legislative expression whatsoever — fairness and the honour of the Crown require the protection of Aboriginal rights by the inverse of the principle. We argue below that the Métis did not receive the benefits of section 31, and thus they should not be held to the burdens of the section. That is, it did not effect an extinguishment by surrender of Métis title.

After years of delay, the federal government did eventually distribute section 31 lands as individual grants ranging from 160 to 240 acres, a process that was reproduced in the scrip commissions that followed. Whereas at first glance, scrip and the section 31 grants may appear to complete the exchange of Métis Indian title for individual land grants, this process departed drastically from the manner in which the Métis originally agreed to extinguish their Indian title in the *Manitoba Act, 1870*. As part of that agreement, the Métis leadership expected to be in control of the distribution of the section 31 lands through a committee of its own making that was authorized by the Canadian executive for this purpose. This committee was also to exercise some level of continued jurisdiction over the lands into the future, to protect them from sale to non-Métis speculators and settlers. Therefore, the implementation of a scrip system at the hands of the federal government was a substantial unilateral change, which undermined the principal agreements represented in the *Manitoba Act, 1870*. If section 31 was never properly implemented, its extinguishment of the Indian title of the Red River Métis is also questionable. Furthermore, since the Métis received little benefit from the distribution of these grants, they hardly reflect fair compensation for the extinguishment of title.

To fully appreciate the depth of the *Manitoba Act, 1870*, we must go beyond the text of the document. Although section 31 suggests that the land was to be chosen and distributed by the lieutenant governor of Manitoba, this language obscures the complex negotiations and oral agreements that provide the basis for a more robust interpretation of the meaning behind the section. In the winter of 1870, the Provisional Government of Assiniboia sent three delegates to Ottawa to negotiate with the Canadian
government. Their purpose was to arrive at a satisfactory agreement that required, among other things, the protection of current Métis landholdings at Red River. Over the course of several weeks, the negotiators met with Macdonald and Cartier, agreeing on what would later become the *Manitoba Act, 1870*. Since the act was the result of a protracted and meticulous negotiation process between representatives of the Métis-controlled provisional government and the Government of Canada in April and May 1870, Canada’s faithfulness to the agreement is vital if Canada now claims that Métis title was extinguished. If we are to respect the interpretation of Métis contemporaries, we can view section 31 as an agreement where the Métis would extinguish their share of Indian title in the new province in exchange for a federally recognized reserve, as well as other political concessions. The sole surviving account of the negotiations is from Abbé Noël-Joseph Ritchot, the appointed representative of the Métis at Red River. In his journal, he recorded that the original agreement was that section 31 lands would be under the control of the new provincial legislature, “which could pass laws to ensure the continuance of these lands in métis families.” When this was later altered to place the lands under the federal legislature’s control, Ritchot wanted assurance that they would be protected as if under provincial control. The agreed-to compromise was that the lands would be overseen by a committee created “as soon as might be [possible] after the Bill should be passed” via an executive order from the Privy Council. Through this oversight committee, the Métis would be in control of the entire reserve selection and distribution process – from selecting the reserve lands, to dividing and distributing them, to enacting laws through the local legislature to prevent outsiders from acquiring them. Even though Ritchot complained that the Manitoba Bill did not refer to this committee, both Macdonald and Cartier reassured him that the verbal understandings of the act would inform its interpretation and implementation.

That the Métis were willing to extinguish their share of Indian title is clearly articulated in this agreement. What is less clear, however, is whether the distribution of the 1.4 million acres did extinguish the Métis share of the title to what is now southern Manitoba. The verbal agreement was not implemented. Instead, a scrip system was employed as a means to extinguish the title of individual claimants. In Manitoba, the federal government did not begin the distribution of these lands until 1876. Since the safety and social position of the Métis had declined significantly in the six years following the passage of the *Manitoba Act, 1870*, compounded with administrative delays, Métis families often chose to leave Manitoba. The scrip
system offered them quick cash in exchange for severely discounted land grants in the 1.4-million-acre Métis reserve. So transitory was the benefit to Métis families that scrip could not have amounted to realistic compensation for the value of Métis title to southern Manitoba. Ultimately, Métis title was not extinguished through a negotiated agreement given ascent by the *Manitoba Act, 1870*. It was purportedly extinguished through policy that differed significantly from the agreement that gave rise to section 31.

From this policy, Métis lands flowed quickly into the hands of speculators and Canadian settlers. Fraudulent dealing also dispossessed Métis families of the land grants that were intended for their children, but four times between 1881 and 1885 the Manitoba Legislative Assembly passed retroactive statutes to legalize all “irregular” sales of Métis lands and to protect the often powerful interests who were implicated in the dispossession. Due to these delays and irregularities, the Supreme Court held in *Manitoba Metis Federation* that

> We conclude that s. 31 of the *Manitoba Act* constitutes a constitutional obligation to the Métis people of Manitoba, an Aboriginal people, to provide the Métis children with allotments of land ... [A]s a solemn constitutional obligation to the Métis people of Manitoba aimed at reconciling their Aboriginal interests with sovereignty, it engaged the honour of the Crown. This required the government to act with diligence in pursuit of the fulfillment of the promise. On the findings of the trial judge, the Crown failed to do so and the obligation to the Métis children remained largely unfulfilled.

If the original purpose of this agreement were to extinguish the Métis share of Indian title in southern Manitoba by an agreed-on process, the Crown ultimately failed to act honourably in its desire to do so. Because the Métis derived so little benefit from this unilateral shift in policy, which ended their dream of a substantial land base in Manitoba, it is difficult to argue that the implementation of section 31 of the *Manitoba Act, 1870*, resulted in the meaningful extinguishment of Métis title on the terms originally agreed to by the Métis at Red River. The result is that, even among the most vocal critics of the existence of Métis title, there is general consensus that “it does not appear that the Métis derived much benefit from s. 31 of the *Manitoba Act*.” It is therefore our position that Métis Aboriginal title was not surrendered via the *Manitoba Act, 1870*, and that Métis title persists in what has become southern Manitoba.
Scrip Issued Pursuant to the Dominion Lands Act

The question of whether scrip issued under the *Dominion Lands Act* extinguished Métis title has been addressed exhaustively elsewhere. We will add only the following arguments: This issue should be analyzed as a potential extinguishment by surrender rather than as a potential extinguishment by legislation. If the issuance of scrip constitutes the former and not the latter, an analysis of whether the legislation authorizing scrip exhibits the requisite clear and plain intention is insufficient to answer the extinguishment question. It will be necessary to apply the principles pertaining to extinguishment by surrender, including the principle – supported by recent jurisprudence – that only the collective can make a surrender, given that Aboriginal rights are collective rights. Scrip could not extinguish Aboriginal rights, including title, because it was issued on an individual basis, not a collective one.

Just as section 31 and the events surrounding its implementation are best analyzed as a potential surrender, so too is the scrip issued under the *Dominion Lands Act*. As discussed above, with one possible exception, the government dealt with Métis interests in land by issuing scrip, whereas it entered into what it saw as land surrender treaties with First Nations. The issuance of scrip should be analyzed as a potential surrender because from the perspective of the Canadian government, the purpose of scrip was analogous to that of the land surrender treaties. For example, in 1889 with the adhesion to Treaty 6, scrip commissioners began to accompany treaty commissioners and issued scrip to Métis individuals at the same time as the treaty commissioners entered into treaties with First Nations. The court in *Morin and Daigneault* concluded that “the impression given to the Indian and Métis population was that you had to make a choice and it made little difference whether you were Indian or Métis and whether you took treaty or scrip.” Granted, the choice between scrip and treaty had significant consequences in terms of colonial constructions of one’s identity and the identity of one’s descendants. The court’s point here, though, is that Canadian officials intended both scrip and treaties to serve the same purpose – to extinguish outstanding claims to land. Thus, just as treaties are categorized as potential surrenders, scrip should be as well.

If the acceptance of scrip is a potential surrender, then assessing extinguishment requires applying the principles pertaining to extinguishment by surrender and not merely those pertaining to extinguishment by legislation. A key principle regarding extinguishment by surrender is that it must be made by the collective.
In a report written for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Joffe and Turpel argue persuasively that scrip transactions could not have extinguished the Aboriginal title of the Métis, as title is a collective right, but scrip was issued to and accepted by individuals who did not have the capacity to extinguish collective rights.\textsuperscript{100} Decisions released after the publication of Joffe and Turpel's report confirm the principles underlying their argument. The Supreme Court of Canada in \textit{Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd.} concluded that Aboriginal rights are collective in nature and are held by the “Aboriginal group.”\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Tsilhqot’in} confirmed that Aboriginal title is a “collective title,” held not only for the present members of the Aboriginal community in question, but for all succeeding generations as well.\textsuperscript{102} The Supreme Court of Canada in \textit{Powley} confirmed that to extinguish Aboriginal rights, a surrender must be made by the collective, and that this principle applies just as much to the Métis as to First Nations.\textsuperscript{103} In \textit{R v Blais}, the Supreme Court of Canada contrasted the scrip process with the treaty process and noted that the Métis were dealt with on an individual basis, whereas treaties with First Nations were concluded on a collective basis.\textsuperscript{104} Similarly, the court in \textit{Morin and Daigneault} confirmed that Métis scrip recipients were dealt with as individuals, not as a collective.\textsuperscript{105} Thus, if the Métis can establish Aboriginal title, any extinguishment argument based on the issuance of scrip will not be compelling.

**Extinguishment by Constitutional Amendment**

Aside from section 31 of the \textit{Manitoba Act, 1870}, three other constitutional amendments or potential constitutional amendments are worth addressing: the natural resources transfer agreements (NRTAs), the Charlottetown Accord, and the Canada–Métis Nation Accord.

The three NRTAs (one for each of the Prairie provinces) have constitutional status by virtue of the \textit{Constitution Act, 1930}\textsuperscript{106} Each contains the following provision: “the laws respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the Indians within the boundaries thereof.”\textsuperscript{107} In \textit{R v Horseman}, the Supreme Court of Canada held that this statement, combined with Alberta’s legislation regulating trafficking in wildlife, extinguished the Treaty 8 right to hunt for commercial purposes in Alberta.\textsuperscript{108} This conclusion does not affect the hunting or fishing rights of the Métis, as the court held in \textit{Blais} that the Métis are not Indians for the purpose of this provision of the NRTAs.\textsuperscript{109} The Supreme Court of Canada's conclusion
in Daniels that the Métis are Indians for the purpose of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, does not alter the principle from Blais.\textsuperscript{110} Thus, the NRTAs do not effect an extinguishment of Métis rights.\textsuperscript{111}

Despite Canada’s assumption that Métis title was previously extinguished, its actions could suggest that it doubts the efficacy of that extinguishment. In 1992, the Métis Nation and the Government of Canada agreed to the Métis Nation Accord as a component of the Charlottetown Accord constitutional amendment package. Both parties agreed to pursue comprehensive land claims and self-government negotiations, which meant that the relevant provinces (with the exception of Alberta) would “make available their fair share of Crown lands for transfer to Métis self-governing institutions.”\textsuperscript{112} These lands and their subsequent governance would be organized as a “land negotiation process” between Canada, the provinces, and representatives of the Métis Nation.\textsuperscript{113}

In Canada, these kinds of comprehensive land claims processes have almost exclusively concerned lands and Indigenous peoples where title is unextinguished or extinguishment was questionable. Presumably, such negotiations would not have been necessary if the Crown were confident that it had legitimately extinguished Métis title across the West. More recently, on 13 April 2017, the Métis National Council and the five provincial Métis organizations signed an agreement in principle with the federal government to “advance reconciliation of the rights, claims, interests and aspirations of the Métis Nation and those of all Canadians.”\textsuperscript{114} Although the agreement does not mention land claims in particular, it is nonetheless cognizant that “outstanding claims against the Crown” may still exist, and it establishes a new “Permanent Bilateral Mechanism” to address them.\textsuperscript{115} Again, this accord would probably be unnecessary if the government had extinguished Métis title to the satisfaction of its own institutions and citizens.

Ottawa’s conduct with the Métis Nation Accord shows that there are cracks in its confidence regarding Métis extinguishment. Although there remains resistance among Canadian governments to acknowledging that Métis title persists, there is also a growing realization that Métis lands and rights are live issues that must be dealt with in more substantive ways. Métis title and its unsuccessful extinguishment require a level of attention and dialogue previously missing, and if the Métis Nation Accord and more recent negotiations are any indication, the future lies not in denying Métis title, but in negotiating the terms for its recognition.
Conclusion
With the failure of Canada to extinguish Métis title through surrender, legislation, or constitutional amendment, it is therefore logical and just to assume that Métis title to the Métis homelands persists. Whereas Manitoba Métis in 1870 may have been willing to surrender their share of title to their homelands, they were willing to do so only under certain circumstances and with a guarantee that these rights would be fairly compensated with a large land reserve. It is unjust to assume that if the Crown did not fulfill its end of the bargain, the Métis should be held to theirs. If Métis title were not successfully extinguished through any of these means, the Crown possesses substantial and ongoing obligations to the Métis people. Both the honour of the Crown and the principle of reconciliation require that these obligations be addressed. Indeed, this would have profound implications for the current state of Métis-Canada relations. It would necessitate a substantial redress and recognition of Métis lands (alongside the lands of other Indigenous peoples) and it would entail good faith negotiations between the two parties to rectify the current situation. The recognition that Métis title is unextinguished, far from ushering in an era of uncertainty and contention, could also be the opportunity to rectify historical and contemporary injustices, providing the moral imperative to build better relations with one another. This outcome, however, is dependent on good faith actions from Canadian political and juridical leaders, grounded in a deep analysis of historical events, which contradict the colonial imagination that has for so long shaped Métis-Canada relations.

NOTES
1 See, for example, Catherine Bell, “Métis Constitutional Rights in Section 35(1),” Alberta Law Review 36 (1997–98): 181, explaining that “twentieth-century federal policy ... has maintained that whatever rights [Métis] may have had were effectively terminated through the scrip distribution system.”
2 The Métis Nation’s homeland encompasses much of the three Prairie provinces, west into northern British Columbia, east into parts of Ontario, north into the Northwest Territories, and south into Montana and North Dakota.


Paul Joffe and Mary Ellen Turpel critique the doctrine on numerous grounds. For example, they note its apparent double standard, given that Canadian law has no doctrine of extinguishment for non-Aboriginal rights and the fact that Aboriginal rights understood as human rights “are the only human rights in Canada that are subjected to extinguishment.” They highlight the lack of capacity of non-Aboriginal governments to extinguish Aboriginal rights, given the contending sovereignties within Canada, which includes the sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples. And they point out that the Crown owes a fiduciary duty to Aboriginal peoples, which constrains its capacity to extinguish their rights. Paul Joffe and Mary Ellen Turpel, Extinguishment of the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples: Problems and Alternatives, a Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1995), i–ii, http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.829901/publication.html.

The section reads, “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982].


Sparrow, supra note 8 at 1099; Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 180, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw].
11 **Sparrow, supra** note 8 at 1099.


13 **Sparrow, supra** note 8 at para 37, rejecting *Calder, supra* note 12 at 333, Judson J.

14 *Calder, supra* note 12 at 402, Hall J. For an explanation as to why only legislation, and not executive acts, could extinguish Aboriginal title, see McNeil, “Extinguishment,” *supra* note 3 at 311–16.

15 See *Delgamuukw, supra* note 10 at para 180.

16 For an instance of a successful extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, see *R v Horseman*, [1990] 1 SCR 901 at para 72, 73 Alta LR (2d) 193 [*Horseman*]. For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying note 108, below.

17 For a discussion of the Imperial Parliament’s authority to extinguish Aboriginal rights, see McNeil, “Extinguishment,” *supra* note 3 at 317–18, 322.

18 *Delgamuukw, supra* note 10 at paras 173–74.

19 Constitution Act, 1867, (UK), 30 and 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(24).

20 *Daniels v Canada* (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12 at para 57, [2016] 1 SCR 99 [*Daniels*].


22 *Tsilhqot’iin, supra* note 5 at paras 140, 151.

23 *Delgamuukw, supra* note 10 at para 181.


26 For a discussion of the significance of Imperial authority delegated to colonial bodies, see McNeil, “Extinguishment,” *supra* note 3 at 318–22.


28 *Manitoba Act, 1870*, 33 Vict, c 3 (Canada) [*Manitoba Act*]; *Dominion Lands Act, 1872*, 35 Vict, c 23 [*Dominion Lands Act*]. See Joffe and Turpel, *supra* note 6 at 93–94, who argue that “until 1977, it would appear that only the Canadian legislative provisions expressly contemplating (though not actually legislating) ‘extinguishment’ of ‘Indian title’ were found in the *Manitoba Act, 1870* and the *Dominion Lands Act* in regard to the Métis.” For a discussion of the significance of limitation statutes with respect to Aboriginal title, see McNeil, “Extinguishment,” *supra* note 3 at 325–27.

29 *Manitoba Act, supra* note 28 at s 31. Nineteenth-century legislation typically used the term “half-breed” in the English version of official documents and “Métis” in the French version. When conducting analysis, we reproduce the terminology in the legislation but otherwise use the term “Métis,” which is preferred among most Métis.

30 *Dominion Lands Act, supra* note 28 at s 12(e).

Horseman, supra note 16, provides an instance of an extinguishment by means of constitutional amendment. Horseman was decided before Sparrow, so the court did not refer to its clear and plain intention test. That being said, the majority in Gladstone, which followed Sparrow, explains that an extinguishment was found in Horseman because the constitutional document in question – the Alberta Natural Resources Transfer Agreement – evinced “the necessary clear and plain intention to extinguish aboriginal rights to hunt commercially.” R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 38, 137 DLR (4th) 648 [Gladstone].

Gladstone, supra note 32 at para 34; Delgamuukw, supra note 10 at para 180.

Joffe and Turpel, supra note 6 at 93–94, 107. See also Magnet, supra note 3 at 73.

Dominion Lands Act, supra note 28 at s 12(e).


Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14 at para 37, [2013] 1 SCR 623 [Manitoba Metis Federation], explaining that scrip was issued to those who were inadvertently left out of the allotment of land under section 31.

Jean Teillet, Métis Law in Canada, looseleaf 2016 supplement (Vancouver: Pape Salter Teillet, 2016), 3–11.

Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 MBCA 71 at paras 188, 238, 242, 255 Man R (2d) 167.

This does not mean that Métis title was the only form of Aboriginal title in the region. Indeed, land use among prairie Indigenous peoples was complex and often shared between different nations, who formed larger alliance groupings: see Robert Alexander Innes, “Multicultural Bands on the Northern Plains and the Notion of ‘Tribal Histories’” in Robin Jarvis Brownlie and Valerie J. Korinek, eds., Finding a Way to the Heart: Feminist Writings on Aboriginal and Women’s History in Canada (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2012), 122–45. Since Saulteaux, Cree, and Nakota people lived alongside Métis in many areas, it is important to note that during the 1870s and 1880s it was common to speak of the Métis “share of Indian title” in recognition that Métis claims should not disrupt the claims of other Indigenous peoples, usually relations, friends, allies, or kin. It was a regular occurrence, in fact, that different Indigenous peoples advocated for the inclusion of their allies in treaty negotiations, adhesions, or subsequent treaties. In 1869–70, for instance, Métis included in their Lists of Rights, their negotiation position with the Government of Canada, that “treaties be concluded and ratified between the Government and the several tribes of Indians of this Territory”; see Alexander Begg, Creation of Manitoba or a History of the Red River Troubles (Toronto: Hunter, Rose, 1871), 110. This was a public acknowledgment of the complexity of Indian title in the region.

Supra note 39 at paras 188, 242.

Ibid at para 505.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada concluded – in the course of holding that the Métis had not established the communal interest in land necessary to ground a fiduciary duty – that the Métis plaintiffs failed to establish that the Métis held Aboriginal title to their lands. Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 37 at para 59.

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For a critique of the majority’s reasoning on this point and a defence of the argument in support of Métis title, see Drake and Gaudry, *supra* note 4.

44 *Morin and Daigneault*, *supra* note 36 at 12.

45 *Ibid* at 11–12.

46 *Ibid* at 11.


48 Teillet, *supra* note 38.

49 *Ibid*.

50 *Delgamuukw*, *supra* note 10 at para 175.


52 *Ibid*.


55 For example, the text of Treaty 3 states that the Indigenous signatories “do hereby cede, release, surrender and yield up to the Government of the Dominion of Canada for Her Majesty the Queen and Her successors forever, all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever, to the lands included within the [limits specified in the treaty].” *Supra* note 53.


59 See Venne, supra note 57 at 173. See Borrows, supra note 57 at 163–64.


61 For a recent collection of essays examining this topic, see John Borrows and Michael Coyle, eds., The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historical Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017).


63 TRC, Reconciliation, supra note 58 at 33–38, especially Call to Action 45 at 37–38.

64 For a discussion of modern Métis land agreements, see Teillet, supra note 38 at 3–14 to 3–17. For modern Métis self-government agreements, see ibid at 10–2 to 10–5.


66 Ibid at 27.

67 Ibid at 28.

68 Ibid.


70 George-Étienne Cartier, quoted in “Extracts,” ibid at 176.

71 Manitoba Act, supra note 28 at s 31.


73 See Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 37 at para 68, explaining that the honour of the Crown is engaged “in situations involving reconciliation of Aboriginal rights with Crown sovereignty.” See TRC, Reconciliation, supra note 58 at 17, explaining that reconciliation refers to “establishing and maintaining respectful relationships.” Analyzing section 31 as a unilateral constitutional amendment would not accord due respect to the relationship between the parties.

74 Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 37 at para 93.

75 Ibid at paras 64, 75, 91, 128.

76 Ibid at paras 71, 92.

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Temagami: A Debate on Wilderness, ed. Matt Bray and Ashley Thomson (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1990), 185.

78 Bear Island, supra note 77 at 575.

79 See Magnet, supra note 3 at 70, arguing that in the context of a surrender, “if the quid pro quo of a treaty or agreement is not forthcoming, then the agreement is void.”

80 See also ibid at 70–71. Even if section 31 had extinguished Métis title, that extinguishment would be effective only within the original tiny province of Manitoba, as created by the Manitoba Act. R v Goodon, 2008 MBPC 59 at para 77, 234 Man R (2d) 278.


82 The trial in the Manitoba Metis Federation case concluded that Parliament assigned the power to distribute lands to the governor general of Canada and that “Canada never agreed to place any of the lands in the new province under the jurisdiction, authority or control of the local Legislature,” largely by privileging the Parliament speeches of Canadian politicians on the topic. Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 MBQB 293 at paras 491–97, 223 Man R (2d) 42. But, as the trial judge also acknowledged, the representatives of the Métis provisional government were told by Macdonald and Cartier that the original agreement was to be respected and that any change in language was used purposefully to get the bill through Parliament. Being told this by presumably honourable agents of the Crown, the representatives probably assumed that the federal authorities would simply authorize the new provincial government to enact their own land distribution policy, as this was essentially what Canadian leaders told them.


84 See Gaudry, supra note 72 at 336–37.


86 Ibid at 147.


89 See Flanagan, supra note 83 at 323.

90 Taylor, supra note 88 at 166–67.

91 O’Toole, supra note 81 at 242.

92 Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 37 at para 9.

93 Flanagan, supra note 83 at 157.

94 See Joffe and Turpel, supra note 6 at 124–28; Magnet, supra note 3 at 69–86; Chartrand, supra note 65 at 30–34.

95 As stated above, although Métis individuals were admitted into treaty, the Canadian government typically did not enter into treaties with Métis collectives. When scrip
was offered, some Métis withdrew from treaty to take it. Gerhard Ens and Joe Sawchuck describe some instances in which almost an entire band withdrew from treaty to take scrip, such as the Sandy Bay band, the Bobtail band, and the Papaschase band. Gerhard J. Ens and Joe Sawchuck, *From New Peoples to New Nations: Aspects of Métis History and Identity from the Eighteenth to Twenty-First Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 205–15. It might be tempting to conclude that these are examples of the federal government accepting collective surrenders from Métis. However, even in these instances, scrip was issued on an individual basis. It was not issued to a band as a whole; each individual had to decide whether to withdraw from treaty and accept it. See *ibid* at 203, 207, 212, 215.

96 *Contra* Joffe and Turpel, *supra* note 6 at 125, arguing that the Métis had “no choice but to accept scrip.”


98 *Morin and Daigneault, supra* note 36 at 14.

99 See Ens and Sawchuck, *supra* note 95 at 132.

100 See Joffe and Turpel, *supra* note 6 at 133.


102 *Tsilhqot’in, supra* note 5 at para 74.

103 *Powley, supra* note 51 at para 35.

104 *R v Blais,* 2003 SCC 44 at para 34, [2003] 2 SCR 236 [*Blais*].

105 *Morin and Daigneault, supra* note 36 at 12, 13.

106 *Constitution Act, 1930,* 20–21 Geo V, c 26 (UK).

107 *Ibid* at s 13 in Schedule 1 (Manitoba) and s 12 in Schedules 2 (Alberta) and 3 (Saskatchewan).


109 *Blais, supra* note 104 at para 1.

110 *Daniels, supra* note 20 at paras 44–45, distinguishing the conclusion in *Daniels* from *Blais*.


113 *Ibid* at s 4(d) at 255.
