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Critical Copyright Law & the Politics of ‘IP’

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Critical Copyright Law & the Politics of ‘IP’

[Carys J. Craig*]

I. INTRODUCTION: MAKING ‘THINGS’

The conceptual task of intellectual property law is to construct commercially valuable intangibles into property-like ‘things’ that can be legally recognized as the proper subject-matter of private rights, commodification, and commercial exchange. If the law always depends on the functional embrace of legal fictions for its operation and legitimacy,¹ perhaps nowhere is this more obvious than in the realm of intellectual property law, which thrives on a combination of metaphor, analogy, abstraction, and universalization in the invention of its subjects and objects. The shifting and ephemeral nature of intellectual property law’s object—‘IP’—is under ever more strain to sustain its façade of ‘thingness’ as it becomes a central focus of our technological age, and a prime locus of wealth creation in our information economy. Regarded critically, the law is irretrievably wedded to power. When the law ascribes rights and protects privileges in relation to valuable resources, it plays a key role in both allocating power and controlling its flow. IP law performs this role by granting rights and regulating behaviour in relation to what many consider to be today’s most valuable resource—information itself—whether residing in technological innovations (the subject of patent law), trade-source signifiers (the subject of trademark law), or original authored expression (the subject of copyright law). IP law writes

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¹ As Lon Fuller wrote, there is “scarcely a field of the law in which one does not encounter” legal fictions. Lon L Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford University Press 1967) 1; cited by Craig Allen Nard, ‘Legal Fictions and the Role of Information in Patent Law’ (2016) 69 Vand L Rev1517, 1521. Nard demonstrates that patent law is no exception, with fictions being used to “express preferences relating to the administrability of patentability requirements…or [to] make normative choices pertaining to claim scope….”

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legal fictions that naturalize the private capture and control of information, communication, and culture. Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that it has emerged as a vibrant site for critical legal theorizing. Indeed, some have even suggested that IP scholarship effectively generated a resurgence or ‘second wave’ of critical legal studies (CLS) critique and activism, at least in substance if not in name.\(^2\)

From today’s vantage point, it seems clear that the field of IP scholarship, as it now exists, was born out of a sudden need in the latter decades of the twentieth century for a radical critique of the rapidly expanding protections offered to commercially valuable intangibles. And so, it might reasonably be claimed, the field blossomed from the beginning on a foundation of critical legal realism and rights scepticism. While the CLS intervention in the late 1970s and 80s had been directed mostly at the United States’ stalled civil rights movement, from the mid-90s onwards, the CLS position was channelled, perhaps most effectively, towards IP law and the new realm of internet regulation.\(^3\) Many of the most prominent IP scholars in US legal scholarship during this period were either critical legal scholars or were clearly influenced by CLS methodologies.\(^4\) Moreover, many leading IP scholars became remarkably active participants in the public debate around IP through their writing and teaching, but also through participation in test cases, advocacy, public education, and political engagement.\(^5\) For critical legal theorists, the partition between law and politics is falsely erected—axiomatically, law is politics. In the field of IP, the partition between legal scholarship and political action has always been porous, to good effect. IP scholars bringing a critical lens to the law have been instrumental in giving voice to public concerns in the political arena.

The aim of this chapter is to give the reader a sense of how the field of IP law scholarship has been influenced and shaped, over four decades or so, by the currents of critical legal theory,

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\(^4\) While by no means a comprehensive list (and no doubt a contestable one), I am thinking here of figures such as Jack Balkin, James Boyle, Yochai Benkler, Margaret Chon, Julie Cohen, Rosemary Coombe, Peter Drahos, Niva Elkin-Koren, Peter Jaszi, David Lange, Lawrence Lessig, and Carol Rose.

\(^5\) Prominent examples include, e.g., Michael Carrol, Michael Geist, Peter Jaszi, Lawrence Lessig, and Pamela Samuelson.
while also pointing to what particular critical approaches—from deconstructionism and CLS to feminism and critical race theory—can reveal about the nature (and ongoing nurture) of modern IP systems. There is no attempt made here to offer either a unifying definition of critical legal theory or critical perspectives, and nor is there any pretense at offering a comprehensive account of the myriad critical contributions to legal scholarship in the vast field of IP law. I am not approaching the task of writing about critical approaches to IP law as an exercise in mapping a body of scholarship (though others have made important efforts to do so), or even an exercise in identifying familial resemblances between various critical strands of IP scholarship. Rather, I approach it as an opportunity to probe particular dimensions of the critical IP project to demonstrate ways in which some of the basic insights of critical legal theory have been brought to bear to radically upset some of the core assumptions—and to reveal some of the central contradictions—upon which this body of law is built.

Part II will offer a brief account of some of these basic insights and their evolution within the dynamic school of critical legal thought, identifying particular themes that resurface throughout the chapter as the focus shifts to IP scholarship. Then, as a point of entry for thinking specifically about critical theories of IP, I will take up what is perhaps the most obvious, but also the most foundational, abstract legal concept at play in the field: the idea of ‘intellectual property’ as such, around which all concepts of ownership, rights and exploitation necessarily gravitate. Part III begins this process with a backward glance to legal realism and the use of legal categories to naturalize intellectual propertization. Pointing to the property metaphor, it shows how the law works to reify intellectual property, presenting as essential and necessary something that is inherently contingent and arbitrary. Focusing on copyright law, where the force of IP law in (re)producing socio-cultural hierarchies is perhaps most pronounced, Part IV then pivots to explore the political construction of the public domain—copyright’s ‘other’—in the production and perpetuation of value, privilege, and subordination amongst particular actors and expressive

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7 See Brenna Bhandar, ‘Critical Legal Studies and the Politics of Property’ (2014) 3 Prop L Rev 186, 188.
activities as seen through the critical lenses of race and colonialism, sex and gender. The chapter concludes by identifying the many other points of entry at which critical legal perspectives have made inroads into copyright structures, breaking down false binaries, and creating space for radical reimaginings. Ultimately, it is suggested that only critical legal theories have the transformative and emancipatory potential required to effectively resist the power-legitimizing logic of IP law.

II. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY

While there is no single encompassing definition that can embrace the many versions and variations of critical legal theory, there are certain common characteristics that, alone or in some combination, can serve to help identify and distinguish critical approaches to law. This chapter proceeds with four broadly defined characteristics in view, drawn loosely from Jack Balkin’s essay ‘Critical Legal Theory Today.’ First, a critical theory of law recognizes and resists law’s *reification*, by which is meant not only the ‘making real’ of law, but law’s power to reify its constructions, its fictions and presumptions. As Balkin observes, “[l]aw proliferates power by making itself true in the world.” Secondly, a related critique targets legal *rhetoric*, with its capacity (by design) to both mystify and legitimize the operation of law. Connected to this is a third common theme in critical theorizing: an insistence upon law’s inherent *indeterminacy*, or at least its open texture and inevitable plasticity, which allow for it to be molded in service of powerful interests while legal conclusions are nonetheless presented as necessary or ‘correct.’ Fourth, an overarching and arguably defining characteristic of critical legal theories is the claim that law is therefore *political* and so complicit in the perpetuation of privilege, subordination and injustice. Law is an instrument wielded in service of power, albeit concealed behind legal processes, claimed impartiality, and perceived neutrality.

In combination, these characteristics of critical legal theory can produce what Balkin calls a ‘prejorative’ conception of law. It is this vision of law as fundamentally and irrevocably defective that is commonly associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement as such. And it

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8 Jack Balkin, ‘Critical Legal Theory Today’, in Francis J. Mootz III (ed), *On Philosophy in American Law* (Cambridge UP, 2009), 64-72. (The enumeration of these characteristics is my own and does a disservice to Balkin’s more eloquent description of these complex themes.)
10 Balkin, ‘Critical Legal Theory Today’, *supra* note 8 at 68.
is this CLS version of critical theory that many, particularly in North America, seem now to regard as a failed intellectual movement—a radical, nihilistic effort to deconstruct legal institutions and legal rationality, which ultimately had no compelling alternative to offer. Balkin reminds us, however, that the CLS conception of law was not purely prejorative; in some iterations, at least, the law was viewed more ambivalently. If law is a method for legitimating the exercise of power in society, then it must pose—simultaneously and inseparably—both threat and promise: ‘Even if law is a supple tool of power, law also serves as a discourse of ideas and ideals that can limit, channel, and transform the interests of the powerful….’

For some critical theorists—critical race and feminists theorists, in particular—legal discourse was therefore recognized as both oppressive and potentially emancipatory, enabling people to speak out against and ‘hold off the worst excesses of power.’ When it is understood that law is not autonomous from politics, and that legal culture, institutions and discourse serve political values, law is revealed to be a way of ‘doing politics’—a way of exercising, shaping, and restraining power.

Balkin’s insights paint a picture of the evolution of CLS rather than a story of its demise. Critical movements are necessarily products of their time, he reminds us, and their targets and emphases will change over time as different or de-emphasized elements of law become newly salient. This, in itself, reflects a critical process of deconstruction and reconstruction. Along similar lines, Peter Goodrich muses that, if CLS was killed, it was thereby immortalized; if it failed, its failure was a productive one that sowed the seeds for other political, theoretical and social justice movements to carry forward its methodological DNA, so to speak. (CLS is dead! Long live CLS!) This acknowledgement is important for our purposes, because it allows us to perceive the pervasive influence of critical theorizing, over the course of its evolution, in the IP scholarship that emerged and blossomed over the same place and time. What we see in that body of scholarship, I suggest, is the foundational CLS-infused critique of IP law that took root in the 1980s and ‘90s (targeting IP law’s reification, indeterminacy, mystification and legitimation); which sowed the seeds, in this century, for a flourishing body of feminist, critical race and post-

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11 Ibid. at 67.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. at 71.
14 Ibid.
15 Peter Goodrich in Goodrich, Katyal, and Tushnet, supra note 3 at 601-602.
colonial critique (emphasizing IP law’s complicity in social inequality and injustice, as well as exploring its potential promise as a tool of agency and a source of empowerment).

IP scholarship has long been a field rich with critical theoretical insights. Critical legal theory has consistently offered an essential counter-balance and alternative (some might say, antidote) to rights- and utility-based critiques of IP law; and it appears once again to be resurgent in the literature and politics of IP. What follows, I hope, offers a sense of why this should be—and why it matters.

III. (DE)CONSTRUCTING ‘INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’

A. Legal Realism and Transcendental Nonsense

Building on the intellectual legacy of legal realism, a core premise of critical legal studies is the constitutive and inherently political nature of legal categories, with their capacity to import unexamined values and to provoke precipitous conclusions—a capacity on full display in the realm of IP law. In his foundational attack on legal formalism as ‘transcendental nonsense,’ Felix Cohen, a central figure in the American legal realist movement of the interwar period, identified this phenomenon at work in respect of the ever-expanding protections offered to trade names.16 Exposing the logical fallacy inherent in the justifications offered for these expanding powers to control meaning, Cohen described a ‘vicious circle, which accepts the fact that courts do protect private exploitation of a given word as a reason why private exploitation of that word should be protected.’17 He continued:

The circularity of legal reasoning…is veiled by the “thingification” of property. Legal language portrays courts as examining commercial words and finding, somewhere inhering in them, property rights. According to the recognized authorities…courts are not creating property, but are merely recognizing a pre-existent Something.

16 In particular, these included anti-dilution protection against the blurring or tarnishment of famous marks, as rationalized in Frank I. Schechter, ‘The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection’ (1926) 40 Harv. L Rev 813. It is interesting to note that Schechter himself was a legal realist, whose rationalizations for anti-dilution rights have arguably been mischaracterized as property formalism. See Robert G Bone, ‘Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road’ (2012) 24 Santa Clara High Tech LJ 469.
...[L]egal reasoning on the subject of trade names is simply economic prejudice masquerading in the cloak of legal logic....It will not be recognized or formulated so long as the hypostatization of "property rights" conceals the circularity of legal reasoning.\textsuperscript{18}

The legal construct is reified and the rationalizations uncritically accepted because the nature of the thing designated ‘property,’ and the rights and duties thus attached to it, are presented—and widely perceived—as pre-existent and self-evident. The realist critique of propertization is thus directed at the capacity of the law to conceal underlying motivations, to disguise loaded assertions as mere truisms, and so to foreclose the kinds of questions and deliberations that ought to be brought to bear when such rights are created and allocated. When one scrapes away the façade, a newly political picture emerges in which inequalities loom large and the role of law in the distribution of wealth and power becomes readily apparent. In Cohen’s terms:

Courts, then, in \textit{establishing inequality} in the commercial exploitation of language are creating economic wealth and property...not, of course, ex nihilo, but out of the materials of social fact, commercial custom, and popular moral faiths or prejudices. It does not follow, except by the fallacy of composition, that in creating new private property courts are benefiting society. Whether they are benefiting society depends upon a series of questions which courts and scholars dealing with this field of law have not seriously considered.\textsuperscript{19}

Whether, how, and to what extent the creation of private rights over the intangible products of human creativity actually benefits society are fundamental questions that now pervade IP scholarship, and feature (increasingly, but not sufficiently) in government policy-making and judicial decision-making. Such questions are brought into sharp relief by the US Constitution, which explicitly ties Congress’ power to create copyright and patent rights to the advancement of ‘progress of science and the useful arts,’\textsuperscript{20} explaining at least in part why US scholars have largely led the way in both making and challenging the utilitarian claims and economic rationality of the IP system.\textsuperscript{21} The social goals of encouraging learning and innovation in the name of the public good have, however, been at the heart of the justifications offered for

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid} at 816-17.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{20} US Const art.1, §8.
copyright and patent laws since their inception.\textsuperscript{22} Such teleology would seem to demand empirically-informed consideration of the social benefits and costs of private ownership over particular kinds of subject matter in specific contexts—but the legal category of ‘property,’ with its presuppositions and deontological ethics, has impeded critical engagement with the logic of the law and the consequentialist claims that are made on its behalf. If it is true that ‘we are all legal realists now,’\textsuperscript{23} then we should agree that legal rules cannot be adequately understood or justified simply by appealing to the abstract concept of property. And so the first point of entrance for a critical approach to copyright law must be the deconstruction of the reifying and mystifying legal category of ‘intellectual property’ to which it belongs.

B. Mesmerizing Metaphors and IP Rhetoric

‘Intellectual property’ is now the umbrella term commonly used to capture a variety of different but somewhat related and sometimes overlapping protections granted by the laws of copyright, patent, trademark, industrial design or design patent, trade secret and unfair competition. The very idea of intellectual property as such is, of course, a metaphorical construct—and a relatively recent one at that. Emerging in Europe in the late nineteenth century,\textsuperscript{24} this terminology was taken up most notably by defenders of the patent system in response to a growing patent-abolitionist movement, with the political aim of equating the inventor’s right over his inventions with the author’s entitlement to his writings as protected by the (less controversial) law of copyright. The label ‘intellectual property’ was strategically employed in this context to unite, in the public imagination, the results of intellectual creativity, whether literary or scientific, into a single conceptual category containing analogous things over


\textsuperscript{24} The term was first adopted by the North German Confederation in Article 4(6) of its 1867 (‘der Schutz des geistigen Eigenthums’) and was later embraced in 1893 with the naming of the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, which subsequently became the World Intellectual Property Organization. But see also Thomas Dreier, ‘How Much “Property” is there in Intellectual Property? The German Civil Law Perspective’ in Helena R. Howe and Jonathan Griffiths, \textit{Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property Law} (Cambridge UP, 2013), 116-136.
which natural rights of ownership could be claimed.\textsuperscript{25} Analogizing across categories of human creativity through the lens of intellectual property continued, over the following century, to offer ready-made rationalizations for the expansion of the IP system and the development of new property-like controls over valuable intangibles, from software code to trade secrets, and from public personalities to private databases.\textsuperscript{26} Lamenting the rapid rise of ‘intellectual property’ terminology in the latter decades of the twentieth century, Richard Stallman, a prominent ‘Copyleft’ activist and founder of the Free Software Movement, explained: ‘It leads people to focus on the meager commonality in form that these disparate laws have—that they create artificial privileges for certain parties—and to disregard the details which form their substance: the specific restrictions each law places on the public, and the consequences that result.’\textsuperscript{27} The seeming immutability of IP-structured relationships of exclusion facilitates their continual creep, unchallenged, into new spheres of human activity.

Not only has the legal category of ‘intellectual property’ performed the political function of uniting a variety of essentially different intangible outputs of human creativity under a single rationalizing roof, but it has also succeeded in conceptually conjoining that category of intangibles with the physical world of real property. This, too, is strategic. As Howe and Griffiths remark, ‘[i]t is unsurprising that, in seeking to legitimate intellectual property and to stabilise the notion of rights in intangibles, reference has been made to the well-established category of property in “things.”’ Just as Britain’s eighteenth century literary property debates were fought through analogies to real property, today’s proponents of strong IP rights frequently present IP as ‘analogous to the home or the castle of the landowner, and thus…present the IP owner as the legitimate recipient of far-reaching rights to control the use of their property.’\textsuperscript{28} This is the legitimizing function of legal rhetoric at work. The intellectual property metaphor informs our intuitions and colours our perceptions around entitlement, exclusion, and infringement (commonly referred to as ‘theft,’ ‘piracy,’ or ‘misappropriation’ in testament to the traction of the metaphor) in a way that quite fundamentally misrecognizes both the nature of the


\textsuperscript{26} See Siva Vaidhyanathan, \textit{Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise Of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens Creativity} (NYU Press 2003), [x].


\textsuperscript{28} Howe and Griffiths, \textit{supra} note 24 at 2.
subject matter at play and the public interest at stake. Mark Rose, a literature and critical copyright scholar who has written extensively on IP’s metaphors, reminds us that ‘[m]etaphors are not just ornamental; they structure the way we think about matters and they have consequences.’

William St. Clair, whose legal historical work charts the subtle shifting of IP’s property metaphors over time, from piracy to landed property to moveable property, captures their epistemological power:

Metaphors have been intrinsic to the way in which intellectual property has historically been analysed, understood, presented, and enforced, not only by authors, publishers,… and other participants in the book industry, but by governments, parliaments, lawyers, judges, and courts…. They are part of the history of the nexus of ideas that have historically surrounded and shaped both law and practice through to the present day….30

Many IP scholars writing from a variety of different theoretical perspectives have decried the prevalence of the property metaphor, pointing to the problematic infusion of real property reasoning into intellectual property rules notwithstanding critical differences between the physical and intellectual realm.31 As Mark Lemley warned, however, reliance on the shorthand of property has made ‘the move from rhetoric to rationale…almost irresistible,’32 and IP protection has increasingly expanded to exhibit, in effect, many of the characteristics of the real property to which it is inaptly compared.33

It might reasonably be contested, at this point, that ‘property’ itself is merely a legal construct—a metaphor that similarly inscribes an inevitable but false ‘thingness’ to what is better understood as a manufactured relationship of occupation and exclusion, advantage and

32 See Lemley, supra note 31 at 1032 (arguing that the ‘fundamentally misguided’ shift to property rights is creating a legal regime that ‘increasingly looks like the law of real property, or more properly an idealized construct of that law, one in which courts seek out and punish virtually any use of an intellectual property right by another.’)
33 Howe and Griffiths, supra note 24 at 2.
disadvantage, established and enforced by law. Indeed it is. A critical view reveals that, ‘when all is said and done…property is a social construction and a product of law, a way to get at some larger social goals, of which, of course, redistribution may be one.’34 But the problem with the intellectual property conceit as such is that it relies on ‘heuristics derived in relation to physical property, which is rivalrous and excludable.’35 While the property metaphor naturalizes rules that that could be said (if only for the sake of argument) to be efficient or necessary (if not necessarily fair) in relation to scarce, depletable, and rivalrous physical property, it mobilizes the same intuitions within the realm of IP, where the public goods in question are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. The problem is not that intellectual property is a metaphor, then, but that the metaphor is inappropriate. Regarded evenly through a critical realist lens, it becomes clear that property and copyright law are fundamentally different in both their social and political ends and the means by which they purport to achieve them.36 The nature of intellectual property alters the practical and economic equation, as well as the distributional impact and experienced effects, of granting exclusivity through law.37 As St Clair writes, ‘[w]hat none of the property metaphors has been able to accommodate is the fact that the differences between “property” and “intellectual property” are not contingent or superficial but essential, inescapable, and unignorable.’38 So too, then, are the implications for our understanding of the legal structures that define and regulate them. Even if we resist the reification of property and employ Carol Rose’s elegant conception of property as story-telling, and possession as an expressive exercise, we can see that the possession of intellectual property tells a very different story.39 In the absence of any natural scarcity in the realm of knowledge and ideas, IP laws manufacture artificial scarcity—and they make that scarcity real in the world. In respect of a subject matter

that could be shared infinitely without depletion, the law intervenes precisely to restrict its free flow.

Baseline assumptions inform how we perceive the law and the demands that should be made of it in the name of fairness or equality. If one begins with the premise that information, ideas and expression are, but for law’s intervention, part of a shared public domain, then the state’s creation of private, proprietary rights demands justification—a normative rationalization grounded not in the protection of the owner’s property as a matter of private right, but in service of society’s interests. Without the veil of property, as Felix Cohen suggested, our focus can shift to the social benefits that the system should bring, and to its success (or lack thereof) in doing so. Of course, how we might understand and pursue those social benefits opens up yet more ground for debate: whether we are committed to a certain vision of economic efficiency, social progress, or democratic participation, for example, or the extent to which we are convinced by the role of the market, economic incentives, financial or other rewards in the attainment of that vision. But again, this is precisely the point: to reject IP law’s property metaphor is to open the doors to what is necessarily a political debate, allowing light to be shed on the economic and social realities of intellectual and cultural production, consumption and exchange, and demanding greater accountability in respect of the law and its consequences. Here, critical theorists would insist that the key to generating consensus is not reliance upon metaphors and legal formulae, but normative argument that ‘encompass[es] the creation and elaboration both of competing social visions and forms of moral persuasion,’ with people who hold different views engaging in honest dialogue and recognizing competing perspectives.40

If, as it is widely claimed, IP law grants private rights of exclusive control over non-rivalrous intangibles ‘with the aim of achieving certain beneficial consequences and outcomes’ for society as a whole, property rhetoric has made us complacent about evaluating copyright’s practical effects and guarding against the obvious risks of a system that permits the ‘monopolisation of knowledge, ideas, education and the ways the means by which they are made available.’41 In any attempt to justify the copyright system teleologically, the legitimizing label of ‘intellectual property’ obscures more than it illuminates. As we will see, in doing so it also supports a variety of assumptions about what and who should reap the benefits of the rights that

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40 Singer, supra note 23 at 533.
41 Ibid.
it accords. Alert to the politics of the law, a critical theory of copyright law aims to scrape away IP’s property façade in order to reveal the interests that it privileges, and the power structures that it perpetuates, when it chooses private property over the public domain—and, as we will see, *vice versa*.

**IV. THE POLITICS OF THE ‘PUBLIC DOMAIN’**

The real property analogy and the impression of solidity that it conveys can be sustained only by virtue of accompanying metaphors such as the ‘public domain,’ and gatekeeping fictions such as copyright law’s ‘originality’ threshold and ‘the idea-expression dichotomy.’ Taken together, these constructs reify the boundaries of the ‘work’—the thing over which ownership is claimed—giving its ephemeral essence sufficient shape, substance, and stability that it can perform its assigned role as the object of ownership. At the same time, through these conceptual mechanisms, the law limits the scope of the owner’s claim ‘by erecting presumptively omniscient sentries around the [public] domain’s perimeter.’ 42 Jessica Litman’s ground-breaking article, ‘The Public Domain,’ was part of a wave of critical copyright scholarship in North America that built rapidly over the final decades of the twentieth century, challenging the perceived inevitability of copyright law’s core constructs. Litman compellingly argued that the idea of the public domain—the unowned intellectual commons on which all are free to draw—is essential to the operation of the copyright system, and to sustaining the myth of original, creative authorship on which it depends:

> The public domain should be understood not as the realm of material that is undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use.  
> …The public domain…makes it possible to tolerate the imprecision of these property grants.43

The public domain is perceived not just as the legal term of art for unowned intangibles, but as a legal *device* employed to sustain the legitimacy of the law in the face of its disconnect with reality. This bold assertion bears the hallmarks of critical legal thinking. The gulf between the actual processes of authorship and the law’s construction of human creativity, Litman argued, would render the copyright system unworkable were it not for the construct of the public domain,

42 Nard, *supra* note 1 at 1521.  
which ‘protects the copyright system by freeing it from the burden of deciding questions of ownership that it has no capacity to answer.’

A. The Politics of Doctrinal Line-drawing

The inherent imprecision of copyright law’s grant of exclusivity reflects both the malleable nature of its subject and the messy realities of the human creative process. Copyright protects only ‘original expression’ that results from an author exercising her skill, labour, judgment, and/or creative capacities. Ideas, facts and information are not protected, nor are systems, methods or principles, or unoriginal (copied) or common stock elements. The legal definition of originality and the delineation of protectable from unprotectable elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction—and indeed from case to case—depending largely on the underlying philosophy or politics of IP ownership that are brought to bear by lawmakers and courts. But in any copyright case, the line between public and private traverses the protected work, separating it into pieces that are privately owned, and pieces that belong in public domain. This line is always shifting and subjective, dependent on a decision-maker’s interpretation of doctrine, of course, but also on her impression of the equities at play, the scope of the author’s rightful claim, and the degree of moral dis/approbation evoked by the defendant’s use. In a moment striking for its ostensible legal realism, Justice Learned Hand famously proclaimed, when finding that a defendant’s movie copied only unprotected ideas from the plaintiff’s play:

[T]he whole matter is necessarily at large…. We have to decide how much [of the play’s content went into the public domain], and while we are as aware as any one that the line, wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary, that is no excuse for not drawing it; it is a question such as courts must answer in nearly all cases.

The seemingly arbitrary lines that courts and the law must draw, in copyright as elsewhere, are certainly not dictated or even determined by the simple application of legal doctrine to specific circumstances. There is no legal formula that can produce a definitively ‘right’ answer to the question of how much of a plaintiff’s work constitutes protectable ‘original’ ‘expression,’ or how ‘substantially similar’ a defendant’s work must be in order to ‘reproduce’ it. Most courts are less transparent in their deliberations and conclusions, however, presenting the lines they draw—between abstract idea and detailed expression, creative original and copied non-original,

44 Ibid at 969.
45 Nichols v Universal Pictures Corporation et al. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
protectable and non-protectable elements—as somehow predetermined or self-evident. They purport to discover, rather than to draw, the lines.

The reality, of course, is that these lines do not exist until they are drawn. Even the most detailed expression resides in the realm of ideas, and even the most original expression borrows and builds on what has gone before. Nothing is created out of a vacuum, Litman reminded us, and no one can see inside the human mind (even the human whose mind it is!) to parse the original and generative from the copied, derived, or inspired. Yet the law requires the results of creativity to be sorted into these legal categories in order to arrive at a legal conclusion. It is by virtue of the impossible nature of this challenge that copyright law provides an unusually transparent window onto the internal operations of legal logic. It does not take the critical eye of a radical deconstructionist to see that, whatever conclusion a court reaches regarding copyrightability or infringement, whatever side of the public/private binary is ultimately privileged, an alternative (suppressed) conclusion was available to it. Any semblance of determinacy in a court’s application of these abstract legal concepts to a particular work of creative expressive in fact depends on a slew of structural factors and subjective impressions, value-laden commitments, and contentious beliefs. Whatever meaning is privileged, whatever outcome favoured, depends less on the internal logic of the law than on the inescapable politics of legal reasoning.

Critical race and critical feminist theories, building on the insights of Critical Legal Studies, take aim at the law’s claimed neutrality and objectivity, not only for masking its politics, but specifically for its complicity in the construction and ongoing legitimation of racial and gender hierarchies. Adding a feminist frame to the critique would highlight that such seemingly ‘arbitrary’ line-drawing exercises predictably produce gendered results. Certainly, it is striking that many of the landmark copyright rulings that initially defined the limits of copyright and the importance of the public domain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involved the relatively unusual scenario of female plaintiffs seeking to enforce rights against male alleged infringers. While hardly a systematic study, it might reasonably be contended that courts were uncharacteristically keen, in such cases, to earn their pedigree as resolute defenders of the public domain. In Nichols, it was the female playwright who sought protection against the male movie producers. In the landmark Privy Council case of Deeks v Wells (ruling that information belongs
in the public domain and no one can own the facts of history or their chronological order) it was a female ‘spinster’ historian who sought protection against copying by the venerated author, H. G. Wells.\(^{46}\) Even in *Baker v Selden*, which established copyright’s merger doctrine and its rule against monopolizing systems or methods, the litigation was pursued by the widow of the deceased accountant against his (male) competitor.\(^{47}\) Such patterns come as no surprise to critical theorists of copyright law. As Ann Bartow writes, ‘Men have defined key copyright concepts such as “authorship,” “protectability,” “infringement,” and all of the other precepts, terms, and conditions of copyright law. It is highly probable that there are gendered differences in the ways that copyright laws benefit and burden everyone affected by copyright laws and practices.’\(^{48}\)

Similar observations have been made about the gendered nature of decisions regarding ‘fair use’—the doctrine that permits otherwise infringing uses for purposes such as criticism and review. Because our focus here is on the public domain, it is worth noting that fair and unauthorized uses of protected works are perhaps best understood as ‘outside the public domain in theory, but…inside in effect.’\(^{49}\) Requiring an inherently flexible and contextual analysis of the fairness of the use made by a defendant of the plaintiff’s work, courts have been more inclined, it seems, to favour fairness and to carefully circumscribe copyright control in cases where the works feature women used in sexualized way (such that criticism of women’s bodies has been said to be practically ‘the prototypical fair use’).\(^{50}\) Based on a comprehensive review of the relevant case law, critical IP scholar Andrew Gilden concludes that US courts are most comfortable relegating the plaintiff’s work to ‘raw materials’ freely available for the defendant’s fair use in cases where those ‘raw materials’ consist of, for example, visual representations of ““anonymous” women’s body parts, “generic” black men, and Jamaican men in their “natural habitat.”’\(^{51}\) Whether someone is in the privileged position of lawfully mining culture for ‘raw


materials,’ as opposed to the position of producing or even becoming those ‘raw materials,’ is a
determination that quite consistently turns on social status, race and gender.

To be clear, the point of such observations is not to baldly assert that ‘win’ rates in
copyright cases are irrationally determined by the gender, race or sexual orientation of litigants.
The point, rather, is that the stories we tell about the logic and limits of IP are essentially
narratives about entitlement and exclusion—and so by retelling the stories from different
perspectives, we can exercise our imagination to see more clearly what alternative endings were
available, which characters were pushed to the margins, what other tales might have been told.
This critical approach insists that seemingly basic legal conclusions about what is in—and what
is out—of copyright’s protective sphere in any particular case are neither pre-determined nor
arbitrary, but are constructed around gendered and racialized assumptions about entitlement and
value, and so function to perpetuate existing social hierarchies. The socially constructed and
malleable nature of IP allows it to be identified and allocated in service of power. If we follow
this reasoning, of course, it should be clear that a decision to privilege the public side of the
public/private binary and so to allow free use of a work is no less political than a decision to
stringently enforce copyright and so to protect the private rights of IP ‘owners.’

B. The Making (and Unmaking) of the Public Domain

We considered, in Part III, the political power of ‘intellectual property’ as a metaphorical
construct that reifies and legitimizes the private capture of the intangible commons. Let us turn,
then, to consider the politics of its opposite, the ‘public domain,’ as a metaphorical construct in
its own right. In this respect, IP scholars have been particularly deliberate in their politicization
of public domain discourse, with important implications. Like ‘intellectual property,’ the term
‘public domain’ dates back to the late nineteenth century;52 but the ‘affirmative discourse’ of a
public domain—the deliberate ‘construction of a legal language to talk about public rights’53 and
to so to conceptually conjure up ‘copyright’s constraining counterpart’54—is a more recent
development, coming about a century later. In 1981, David Lange wrote an essay critical of the
emergence of publicity rights that is comparable, in interesting ways, to Cohen’s earlier

52 Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Une “Chose Publique”’? The Author's Domain and the Public Domain in Early British, French
53 Mark Rose, ‘Nine-Tenths of the Law Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of
54 Ginsburg, supra note 52 at 636.
condemnation of emerging trademark anti-dilution rights.\textsuperscript{55} Lange urged that proprietary claims for new IP interests should be offset by an ‘equally deliberate recognition of individual rights in the public domain.’\textsuperscript{56} Over the next twenty years, a body of scholarship developed that sought to define, map, conceptualize and deploy the concept of the public domain as a positive entity with normative capacity to confine the reach of copyright’s private domain. Joseph Singer’s insight seems particularly apt here: whereas liberal theorists purport to ‘find’ metaphors, critical theorists hope to rely more on ‘making’ them.\textsuperscript{57} Playing off of the same landed property metaphor as its opposite—‘IP’—James Boyle called for the strategic reimagination of the public domain as an ‘environment,’ with the express aspiration of mobilizing an ‘environmental movement’ in its name.\textsuperscript{58} Public domain activists’ efforts to protect—and even to contractually construct—an intellectual and cultural commons did indeed take root and bear fruit over the course of the following decades.\textsuperscript{59}

As Boyle explained, how we define the substance and scope of the public domain depends on why we care about the public domain, on what vision of freedom or creativity we think the public domain stands for, and what danger it protects against. The public domain will change its shape according to the hopes it embodies, the fears it tries to lay to rest, and the implicit vision of creativity on which it rests. There is not one public domain, but many.\textsuperscript{60} This is legal realism for the public domain,\textsuperscript{61} which is overtly claimed as ‘a social-legal construct,’\textsuperscript{62} imagined to assist us ‘in thinking of a complex issue, to organize our thoughts, to serve as a “short cut” to denote a mindset, a view, a perception.’\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, because ‘the private domain of copyright and copyright’s public domain necessarily share the same boundary,’\textsuperscript{64} this effort underscores the indeterminacy of copyright itself, and the risks of its reification. Energies to resist the expansion of IP are better spent, it became clear, not debating doctrinal niceties at its

\begin{footnotes}
\item[56] Ibid at 147.
\item[57] Singer, supra note 23 at 533.
\item[59] See Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (Penguin 2004); and see http://creativecommons.org.
\item[61] Ibid at 67.
\item[63] E-mail from Michael Birnhack to Pamela Samuelson (October 28, 2005), quoted ibid at 145.
\item[64] Ronan Deazley, Rethinking Copyright (Edward Elgar Published Limited 2006) 131.
\end{footnotes}
borders, but articulating political goals and exploring the legal and practical tools with which to achieve them.65

As for those political goals, however, critical legal perspectives have not been uniformly brought to bear in service of the unquestioned maintenance or expansion of the public domain. In a powerful intervention in the scholarly conversation, Madhavi Sunder and Anupam Chander66 drew attention to the manner in which the escalating ‘romance of the public domain’ amongst progressive IP scholars had itself privileged one position (free) over another (owned) thereby embracing a kind of libertarianism that elided equality concerns and perpetuated global hierarchies of dominance and subordination. Regarded through a critical post-colonial lens, the public domain was increasingly performing as a discursive vehicle capable of justifying the continued devaluation of knowledge and cultural outputs of the global south, indigenous populations and other racialized and culturally marginalized ‘Others.’ Masquerading as the romantic realm of free, equal, and unrestrained access, the public domain was simultaneously a metaphor employed to exclude—as though inevitably and necessarily—certain products, people and voices from the value and power that intellectual propertization confers.

One component of a Critical Legal Studies methodology is to identify the binary oppositions at work in the law as sites of fundamental contradiction, and by uncovering the previously invisible or suppressed sides of such binaries, unveil the myths of legal determinacy and law’s neutrality.67 If we take copyright’s binaries—owned/unowned, created/discovered, authored/unauthored, private/public—and regard them through a critical lens, we can perceive the politics behind the choice to legally designate something as owned, created, authored, and private. By the same token, however, a critical legal perspective reveals as political any choice to privilege the category of unowned, discovered, unauthored, and public. As with any legal concept—and just like ‘intellectual property’—the ‘public domain’ can work to suppress and to oppress, rationalizing as legal necessity outcomes that in fact reflect established patterns of domination and inequality on a global scale.

65 I have written more fully elsewhere about the various versions of the public domain that have emerged from this literature. See Carys Craig, ‘The Canadian Public Domain: What, Where and to What End?’ (2010) 7 CJLT 221.  
In Sunder and Chander’s words:

[T]he increasingly binary tenor of current intellectual property debates—in which we must choose either intellectual property or the public domain—obscures other important interests, options, critiques, and claims for justice that are embedded in many new claims for property rights. By presuming that leaving information and ideas in the public domain enhances "semiotic democracy"—a world in which all people, not just the powerful, have the ability to make cultural meanings, law turns a blind eye to the fact that for centuries the public domain has been a source for exploiting the labor and bodies of the disempowered—namely, people of color, the poor, women, and people from the global South.68

C. Race, Gender and IP’s Public/Private Divide

A significant and growing body of critical race and feminist scholarship in the IP field has now developed that explores, not only how IP’s protections exclude people from monopolized cultural resources, but also how IP’s exclusions preclude people (and peoples) from enjoying equal access to the power of IP. Critical race and IP scholar Boatema Boetang has been a powerful voice calling out the global politics of intellectual property and the public domain. Cultural products flow freely from the global South to the global North courtesy of the ‘public domain,’ she observes, while cultural products flow from North to South pre-packaged in the trappings of intellectual property.69 As a result, ‘the law has different consequences for groups that vary not only in the nature of their cultural production, but also in their race, ethnicity, nationality, and class. It also affects groups and people within them differently on the basis of gender.’70 Through her work on the gendered nature of cloth production in Ghana, for example, Boeteng weaves a complex picture of the ways in which gender interacts with race and class through state, institutional and legal structures to produce sites of domination, victimization and, potentially, empowerment. The treatment of indigenous cultural production as ‘traditional,’ she argues, renders it ‘feminized’ in its encounter with ‘masculinized modernity, including IP law.’71 Western IP laws, built on patriarchal knowledge systems and imposed through colonial regimes,

68 Chander and Sunder, supra note 66, at 1334-35.
70 Ibid at 345.
71 Ibid at 349.
reproduce gender biases and operate as a space of continued subordination and exploitation. Prominent international IP scholar and activist Ruth Okediji has also been vocal in her criticism of the public domain as ‘a rhetorical tool used by transnational actors’ to justify what she regards as misappropriation of traditional knowledge and cultural resources of the Global South ‘under the guise of the public domain.’\[72\] Pointing to the plasticity of the public domain as political construct, Okediji caustically concludes: ‘asserting the public domain appears to be principally about protecting *existing* beneficiaries of the IP system.’\[73\]

The racialization of particular kinds of cultural production—coded public, unowned, and free for the taking—has also been the subject of critical inquiry in a body of IP scholarship focused on the unequal treatment of African American music in the development of the modern US music industry. K.J. Greene, a lawyer and scholar working at the intersection of racial equality and IP, describes how the early music industry was ‘built of the back of black cultural production from the era of slave songs and spirituals to the period of black-face minstrelsy’ through to ragtime and blues.\[74\] Repeated patterns of black innovation followed by white imitation demonstrate how deeply and racially coded are the concepts of authorship and appropriation. Poking at the interstices of IP, race and gender in American society, Greene invokes the idea of intersectionality to emphasize the extent to which black women’s contributions to the nascent music industry were both vital and invisibilized. Pointing to commonalities between the treatment of early blues artists and native peoples in the United States—and noting, specifically, the similarly group-focused, collective and often oral nature of Indigenous and African-American creative and cultural practices—Greene condemns IP law for its failure (indeed, refusal) to adequately capture the cultural and economic significance of their works. The potent combination of colonial power asymmetries and colonizing discourses of possessive individualism have consistently ensured that works of the colonized and subordinated have been deemed to be freely appropriable resources residing in the public domain.\[75\] This is no accident of oversight, or necessary outcome of neutral legal rules—from a critical perspective, it is plainly and simply the exercise of power to secure privilege and domination through law.

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\[72\] Ruth L Okediji, ‘Traditional Knowledge and the Public Domain’, *CIGI Papers* No. 176 (June 2018) at 3-4.
\[73\] Ibid. at 15.
\[74\] Greene, supra note 6 at 372.
Racialized binaries of owned/unowned (authored/unauthored) have been the target of similarly blistering critique in the context of choreographic copyright, with works by Caroline Picart and Andrea Kraut charting the vagaries of propertization as applied to traditional European ballet (with its whitened aesthetic)\textsuperscript{76} and the jazz, tap and other improvised dance forms performed by racialized black bodies. Picart insists, ‘[i]t is not surprising that intellectual property law, in general, tends to privilege “whitened” dance forms, such as ballet, because there are clear choreographers who author…using the bodies of dancers…as “raw material.”’\textsuperscript{77} Charting the ebbs and flows, successes and failures, of copyright claims in choreographic works, Kraut demonstrates that the recognition or denial of copyright has always depended on the dancer or choreographer’s ‘position in a raced, gendered and classed hierarchy, and on the historical conditions in which they made, and made claims on, their dances.’\textsuperscript{78} She argues that choreographic copyright emerged out of, and so retains, the same ‘racialized logic of property that has persistently treated some bodies as fungible commodities and others as possessive individuals.’\textsuperscript{79} 

Feminist IP scholars have worked to make visible, particularly over the last ten to fifteen years, the ‘underlying masculine assumptions existing in our construction of intellectual property as well as highlight[ing] a political economy of intellectual property that has historically benefited men more than women.’\textsuperscript{80} Keeping with the theme of IP’s exclusions, Rebecca Tushnet has pointedly observed that ‘when we compare fields that get intellectual property protection (software, sculpture) with fields that do not (fashion, cooking, sewing) it becomes uncomfortably obvious that our cultural policy has expected women’s endeavors to generate surplus creativity but has assumed that men’s endeavors require compensation.’\textsuperscript{81} Malla Pollack is even more frank is her assessment that ‘[t]he choice not to protect food and clothing under

\textsuperscript{76} Caroline Joan S Picart, \textit{Critical Race Theory and Copyright in American Dance: Whiteness as Status Property} (Palgrave Macmillan 2013)

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Ibid.} at 64.

\textsuperscript{78} Anthea Kraut, \textit{Choreographing Copyright: Race, Gender, and Intellectual Property Rights in American Dance} (Oxford University Press 2016), xiii.

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Ibid} at xviii.


\textsuperscript{81} Tushnet, ‘My Fair Ladies,’ \textit{supra} note 50 at 557 (quoted in KJ Greene, \textit{supra} note 6 at 379).
copyright law is gendered and anti-feminine.\(^{82}\) Collaborative and collective projects, whether based on relationships of care or born of functional necessity, have been marginalized or problematized by the defining model of individual, commodified intellectual production at the core of copyright law—usually with both gendered and racialized implications.\(^{83}\)

Without a critical lens, it might be argued that such exclusions simply reflect the appropriate boundaries of copyright as a system that protects original expression—works that appeal to the aesthetic senses—rather than functional creations that fulfil practical human needs. A more critical perspective reveals that copyright’s distinctions turn on established knowledge and cultural hierarchies that purport to distinguish between ‘high’ and ‘low’ art.\(^{84}\) Copyright law is, of course, widely claimed to be aesthetically neutral. Alfred Yen has argued, with a distinctly critical bent, that the judicial insistence upon expressly avoiding aesthetic judgment seeks to sustain a distinction between aesthetic reasoning (presumed to be subjective and indeterminate) and legal reasoning (purported to be objective and rigorous). Not only is this distinction entirely illusory, but in copyright cases in particular, Yen argues, ‘judges necessarily show a preference for certain aesthetic perspectives when they decide cases.’\(^{85}\) I have argued elsewhere that, underlying copyright law and guiding judicial decision-making about what deserves copyright protection, is a Romantic aesthetic that invokes a strongly gendered vision of the autonomous self and the author ‘genius.’\(^{86}\) Building on Yen’s observations, John Tehranian explains that copyright’s aesthetic adjudications:

Inextricably affect the type of works we, as a society, receive from our artists. . . .

Even more fundamentally, however, aesthetic judgments can serve to both maintain and preserve existing power structures. The seemingly neutral laws of

\(^{82}\) Pollack, supra note 80, at 608.


copyright, therefore, have the potential to create a hierarchy of culture that serves hegemonic interests.\textsuperscript{87}

In doing so, these laws create and maintain the obvious inequalities of property and wealth, but also inequalities in social, cultural, and communicative power. The last few decades have, of course, seen the astounding advances in information and communication technologies, bringing new possibilities for collaboration and dissent, knowledge-sharing and social transformation across geographical and cultural divides. The relative ‘freedom of cyberspace,’ as Sonia Katyal has argued, ‘has particular significant for “outsider” groups, particularly women and minorities’ shedding new light on the ‘relationship between gender, sexuality and intellectual property.’ \textsuperscript{88}

The emancipatory promise of digital technologies has, however, been compromised by an architecture of control justified by the protection and enforcement of IP. Given the escalating significance of copyright’s regulatory mechanisms in our daily activities and interactions, copyright laws are equipped to produce enormous economic (dis)advantage but also, and more insidiously, to thwart social participation, control cultural protest, limit knowledge flows, and punish expressive disobedience.

A critical approach to IP law offers a means or methodology by which to examine IP law, but it also reflects a shared commitment to a political end goal: resisting exploitative power structures that are reinforced by IP law.\textsuperscript{89} It might seem, from this survey of copyright’s private/public contradictions that we are therefore faced with the political choice of either adopting or rejecting IP structures: seeking either to expand IP to include that which it has wrongfully excluded; or to eradicate it in order to free that which it has wrongfully enclosed. But a critical eye tells us that even this is a false binary. Because critical theories perceive law’s embeddedness in (and as) culture,\textsuperscript{90} strategies of resistance to exploitative power structures can productively include the adaptation of prevailing legal and cultural categories. It is sometimes suggested that critical theories run themselves aground on the shores of their own critique: if the law is irretrievably crippled by fundamental contradictions, inescapably political, and therefore

\textsuperscript{87} Tehranian, \textit{supra} note 6 at 1280. See also Arewa, \textit{supra} note 75 at 585 (arguing that ‘what is characterized as unacceptable copying within copyright law can play a critical role in determining what types of cultural production may occur.’)
\textsuperscript{89} See Katyal and Goodrich, \textit{supra} note 2, at 599.
always subject to the whims and predilections of those in power, can critical theories promise any truly emancipatory effect within the legal system and society in which they are advanced? Indeed they can. Feminist and critical race theorists, in particular, have shown that it is possible to disrupt the hegemony of the law from within its contradictions, formulating normative arguments that use its tools while knowingly inhabiting its tensions.91

This brings us full circle to Balkin’s insights on critical theory today. The law, we know, is not autonomous from politics; but appreciating its relative autonomy permits us to be strategically ambivalent about its institutions and arguments. It becomes possible to see, in the politics of IP, the capacity to harness IP discourse and the rhetoric of rights in order to advance social justice and equality. Drawing lessons from feminist and critical race scholarship, I have argued, for example, in favour of embracing the discourse of ‘user rights’ as a political tool to restrain copyright and advance the public interest, while also cautioning against the blind embrace of individual rights-based arguments that might inadvertently solidify private power.92 Séverine Dusollier, drawing on the law and economics of property and the commons, has sought to formulate a new ‘inclusive’ right with which to protect spaces of ‘non-exclusivity’ in the IP regime, while working from within a property-based model that has traditionally privileged exclusivity.93 Further examples can be found in scholarship emerging around the racialized dynamics of musical borrowing, which acknowledge the inadequacy of copyright’s boundary-drawing doctrines while applauding cases that recognize the marginalized contributions of musicians of color, and thereby shift the benefits that flow through the flawed copyright system.94 Ongoing efforts to protect and preserve traditional knowledge and cultural heritage have walked similarly delicate lines between the rejection and redirection of modern IP/Public Domain discourse.95 As Lateef Mtima explains, by turning to extrinsic disciplines such as critical

legal theory, the growing IP and Social Justice movement aims to ‘socially rehabilitate’ IP norms and to ‘infuse the IP system with a progressive social consciousness,’ such that, though ‘IP Empowerment,’ historically marginalized communities can ‘recoup the…social losses and maximize the…productive impact/output of the [IP] system.’ Such strategies are also being employed in efforts to reorient the international IP regime away from trade and towards international development goals. IP talk, for all its frailties and falsities, carries important symbolic freight in the redistribution and equality projects with which critical theorists are engaged.

Recognizing the dynamic circulation of power through law illuminates the counter-hegemonic potential of both claiming and contesting the law’s symbolic forms, inviting activities that both resist and rework the meanings that accrue to them. The accusations commonly levelled against critical legal theory’s deconstructive appetite too readily overlook this reconstructive enterprise. As Deborah Halbert writes, ‘the language of resistance to intellectual property…can and should be the generating discourse behind a transformation of the Western intellectual property system….’ As much of the IP scholarship over the past decades has demonstrated, critical theories illuminate not only channels of critique but also a multiplicity of avenues for generative action through dialogic engagement with the law, its structures, and its normative discourses.

V. CONCLUSION: CRITICAL RESISTANCE

‘Indigenous knowledge issues invite further discussions about history, politics, the role of cultural authorities and the power relationships inherent in conceptions of “the public,” “common heritage,” “sharing” and “freedom.”’


98 Cp. Rose, ‘Blackstones’ Anxiety’ supra note 34 at 630.


100 Halbert, Resisting Intellectual Property (Routledge, 2005), 162.
This Chapter has offered just a small sample of the many ways in which a critical legal lens can be brought to bear in the field of intellectual property law to question and challenge core assumptions about the nature of IP, what it protects and excludes, why and to what end. I have taken, as a point of entry, the metaphor of IP as ‘intellectual property,’ and the politics at play in the construction of its opposite, ‘the public domain.’ Lurking underneath these ideas are many other features of our IP system that, when probed, open doors to similar insights about the power dynamics, knowledge hierarchies, and patterns of subordination that pervade the system.

Within the field of copyright scholarship alone, critical perspectives have been productively employed to challenge and reimagine all of copyright’s core constructs, from its object (the ‘work’) to its subjects (the ‘author’ and its opposite, the ‘user’/’pirate’) and the nature of the ‘rights’ that they (respectively) claim. Thus, for example, copyright’s concept of the ‘work’ as a reproducible, independent, and stable text has been critically examined by scholars drawing on structuralist and post-structuralist ideas about language and text, as well as insights from continental aesthetics and literary theory, invoking notions of dialogism and intertextuality that reveal fundamental contradictions within the copyright scheme. The work of feminist literary theorists has been brought to bear to recast and reclaim the authorial contributions of women writers and artists, as well as to reimagine the empowering potential of authorship construed as dialogic, relational and community-oriented, rather than monologic, original and independent. Drawing on some of the same strands of thought, the idea of the original ‘author’ has been critically examined as a relic of romanticism and a mythic ideal, belying the collaborative processes of creativity and celebrating a patriarchal, westernized conception of selfhood. Critical feminist conceptions of the self as, at once, socially constituted and creative,


103 See e.g. Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Harvard UP 1993); James Boyle, ‘A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading’ (1992) 80 Calif L. Rev 1413; Martha Woodmansee, ‘The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the
interdependent and autonomous, have been advanced to break down the self/other and agent/dependent dichotomies, injecting into copyright discourse an enriched vision of the author-self. Post-colonial perspectives and indigenous ways of knowing have challenged copyright’s individual/community dichotomy as well as the past/present temporal linearity in which it situates its subjects and objects. Critical rights-sceptics have contested the rhetoric of authorial rights within the copyright scheme, and the individuated (male) subject that it assumes. By problematizing copyright’s construction of its subjects, and its inherited enlightenment legacies, these critical perspectives create space for new voices and new creative forms. At the same time, these perspectives break down the dichotomy between author/audience, owner/user, and so open up new versions of the user who has resided, until now, on the wrong side of copyright’s false creator/copier binary.

As I claimed at the outset, a vast swath of the intellectual property scholarship that has bloomed over the past few decades, as IP itself has expanded in its reach and relevance, builds implicitly or explicitly on insights gleaned from legal realism, critical legal studies, and their political and intellectual progeny. IP scholarship has, for decades, been preoccupied with exposing the reification of IP law’s constructs, its mystifying rhetoric, its inherent indeterminacy, and its inescapably political nature. There are, of course, significant exceptions to be noted.

Scholarship rooted in law and economics is still dominant in the US literature and thriving around the world, buoyed by the linkages between IP, trade and the modern economy, and the ascendancy of neo-liberal economics. Critical theorists take issue with the utilitarian rationale and its common presupposition that the promise of proprietary control induces labour,


106 See e.g. Julie Cohen, ‘Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory’ (2007) 40 UC Davis L Rev 1151; Craig, Copyright, Communication and Culture, supra note 102; Haochen Sun, ‘Copyright and Responsibility’ (2013) 4 Harv J Sports & Ent L 263.
which in turn produces social welfare. If the argument that IP incentivizes creative labour is not supported by empirical evidence, and if the assumption of rational wealth-maximizing self-interest misrepresents the lived experiences of socially-situated actors, then the ‘utilitarian privileging’ of proprietary control ‘represents not a logical conclusion but a political choice, an ideology that favors the status quo.’ (Such an assertion might find support—if not explicit endorsement—in a growing body of empirical IP scholarship that employs behavioural economics in search of individuals’ creative motivations and the elusive ‘nudging’ role of IP.)

There also remains a strong current of traditional liberal rights theorizing in the field, which finds its roots in continental and enlightenment philosophies of natural justice and deontological ethics. Critical legal theory, of course, takes issue with ‘the fetishization of rights generally—and property rights in particular—[for] divid[ing] people from community and entrench[ing] patterns of domination and subordination.

Theoretical perspectives informed by liberal conceptions of equality and progress can effectively challenge some disparities in the allocation and enforcement of rights, no doubt; but critical perspectives perceive the ways in which the inequalities flow through the inherited legal constructs, and so demand a more fundamental reimagination of legal norms and institutions, always with a view to disrupting prevailing power structures. To my mind, then, it is these

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113 Both modern rights theory and law and economics can be understood as heirs to legal realism, but they part company with critical theories in their continued embrace of elements of formalism or formalistic reasoning. See Singer, supra note 23. See also Cohen, ‘Creativity and Culture’, supra note 106, 155-162 (critiquing the implicit ‘rights-economics binary’ in copyright theory and noting their shared commitment to first order principles of neutrality and abstraction, and premises of individual autonomy); Rosemary J. Coombe, ‘Challenging Paternity:
critical approaches—with the new voices that they empower and the political activism that they propel—that offer the most challenging and promising route by which to understand, situate, and re-shape modern IP structures (and so to resist their rapid and seemingly irrepressible growth). Both law and economics and liberal rights-based theorizing can offer routes by which to formulate effective internal critiques of IP and its logic—but the intellectual property law system requires an immanent critique that transcends its disturbed framework, its contradictions and injustices, rather than couching critique within its terms.114 Regarded through the lens of critical theory, it is clear to see that IP law now resides ‘in a cultural battleground of hegemony, social dominance, and resistance.’115 Resistance, by definition, must be capable of registering ‘without being absorbed, integrated or co-opted into the system against which it stands.’116

Histories of Copyright’ (1994) 6 Yale J L & Humanities 397, 397-98 (distinguishing between liberal philosophy and law and economics scholarship on IP laws and the recent work of ‘scholars concerned by the social context of [the] emergence [of IP laws] and the contemporary fields in which they function’).

116 Christodoulidis, supra note 114, at 5.