Ontario Civil Justice Reform in the Wake of COVID-19: Inspired or Institutionalized?

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Abstract
On 17 March 2020, Ontario's courthouses shut their doors as the civil justice system locked down with the rest of the province. Regular court operations were suspended due to the state of emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This was followed by a flurry of activity as courts drew up plans to resume operations as soon as possible. The “new normal” became virtual hearings, either by video conference, in writing, or by telephone. As Attorney General Douglas Downey said, “We've modernized the legal system by about 25 years in 25 days.” Has the revolution arrived? Will the changes made in response to the pandemic become permanent? Will they be sufficient to address the problems of cost and delay that plague the civil justice system? This article will posit that many of these changes are likely to become permanent. However, the extent and effectiveness of change will depend on the ability of “policy entrepreneurs” to use this moment of crisis to overcome institutional inertia in the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) and professional resistance in the Bar. This is not the first time that “dramatic innovation[s]” have been made in response to a crisis in the civil justice system, as evidenced by the history of reform in that area. Lasting change will not come easily. Furthermore, while these changes are welcome, they are insufficient to address the crippling backlog facing the courts. A functioning civil justice system is essential to a functioning democracy, and Ontario's civil justice system is fundamentally broken. The “paradigm shift” needs to go further. We need to entirely change our conception of how courts work, the nature of procedural justice, and our understanding of access to justice and how to facilitate it. The answer I propose, as Richard Susskind and others have, is a system of online courts, where human judges hear evidence and arguments and render decisions by way of an online platform, all within a public dispute resolution (court or tribunal) system. British Columbia's Civil Resolution Tribunal (BC CRT) is an excellent example. I argue that, as in BC, online courts could be initiated incrementally, alongside the current system, and thereby bypass and address many of the issues facing the current court system. I conclude with some thoughts for the future. Much has been written on the subject of online courts, and the COVID-19 crisis in Ontario has precipitated numerous blogs and online articles. However, no-one has yet conducted a deep analysis of the changes in Ontario and what they mean for our court system. More importantly, my article fills a gap in the literature on online courts in general, none of which has considered the history of civil justice reform and the nature of institutional change.

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SUZANNE E CHIODO*

On 17 March 2020, Ontario’s courthouses shut their doors as the civil justice system locked down with the rest of the province. Regular court operations were suspended due to the state of emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This was followed by a flurry of activity as courts drew up plans to resume operations as soon as possible. The “new normal” became virtual hearings, either by video conference, in writing, or by telephone. As Attorney General Douglas Downey said, “We’ve modernized the legal system by about 25 years in 25 days.” Has the revolution arrived? Will the changes made in response to the pandemic become permanent? Will they be sufficient to address the problems of cost and delay that plague the civil justice system?

This article will posit that many of these changes are likely to become permanent. However, the extent and effectiveness of change will depend on the ability of “policy entrepreneurs” to use this moment of crisis to overcome institutional inertia in the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) and professional resistance in the Bar. This is not the first time that “dramatic innovation[s]” have been made in response to a crisis in the civil justice system, as evidenced by the history of reform in that area. Lasting change will not come easily.

Furthermore, while these changes are welcome, they are insufficient to address the crippling backlog facing the courts. A functioning civil justice system is essential to a functioning democracy, and Ontario’s civil justice system is fundamentally broken. The “paradigm shift” needs to go further. We need to entirely change our conception of how courts work, the nature of procedural justice, and our understanding of access to justice and how to facilitate it.

* Assistant Professor, Western Law, London, Ontario. I thank Michael Lesage and Charles Feldman for their comments on drafts of this paper, as well as Justice David M Brown for his time and insights. All errors are the author’s own.
The answer I propose, as Richard Susskind and others have, is a system of online courts, where human judges hear evidence and arguments and render decisions by way of an online platform, all within a public dispute resolution (court or tribunal) system. British Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal (BC CRT) is an excellent example. I argue that, as in BC, online courts could be initiated incrementally, alongside the current system, and thereby bypass and address many of the issues facing the current court system. I conclude with some thoughts for the future.

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What if some extra-ordinary event occurred, and one day we woke up to find that all our courthouses had crumbled to the ground and we had to replace every courthouse in this province? What would we re-build in their place?1

THOSE PRESCIENT REMARKS by The Honourable Justice David Brown of the Court of Appeal for Ontario came to fruition on 17 March 2020. The courthouses of the province continued to stand, but their doors were shut by the state of emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the suspension of all regular operations in mid-March, a flurry of activity ensued as courts drew up

plans to resume operations as soon as possible. The “new normal” became virtual hearings, either by video conference, in writing, or by telephone.

As Attorney General Douglas Downey said, “We’ve modernized the legal system by about 25 years in 25 days.” Has the revolution arrived? Will the changes made as a response to the pandemic become permanent? Will they be sufficient to address the problems of cost and delay that plague the civil justice system?

This article will address those questions and posit that many of the changes made are likely to become permanent, but that the extent and effectiveness of change will depend on a number of factors. I will also argue that the changes are insufficient to address the crippling backlog facing the courts, and that a more transformational response is required in order to ensure a functioning civil justice system, which is essential to a functioning democracy.

I will begin with an overview of Ontario’s civil justice system prior to the pandemic. This reveals a system that is fundamentally broken due to cost, delay, and inaccessibility. I will then review the changes that have been wrought by the pandemic, such as virtual hearings. The next section of the article will consider whether those changes will become permanent, as well as some of the arguments for and against procedural change. I go on to look at the roadblocks and facilitators of modernization. Roadblocks include institutional inertia in the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) and professional resistance in the Bar, both of which have hampered so-called “dramatic innovation[s]” that have been attempted in decades past. Facilitators include “policy entrepreneurs” that may be able to use this moment of crisis to effect lasting change.

The next section of the article posits that digitizing existing processes will not be enough to address the cost, delay, and inaccessibility endemic to our civil justice system. The “paradigm shift” needs to go further. We need to entirely change our conception of how courts work, the nature of procedural justice, and our understanding of access to justice and how to facilitate it. The answer I propose, as Richard Susskind and others have, is a system of online courts, where human judges hear evidence and arguments and render decisions by way of an online platform, all within a public dispute resolution (court or tribunal)

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I. THE BEFORE TIMES – THE STATE OF CIVIL JUSTICE PRE-COVID

Civil justice was in crisis in Ontario long before COVID-19 arrived. The *Rules of Civil Procedure* have not changed significantly since at least the 1980s, and the system is poorly structured and chronically underfunded. Because funding decisions and structural reorganization are the purview of the MAG, it is this Ministry that holds the key to any significant change.

In 1976, the *White Paper on Courts Administration* spoke of “the caseload crisis facing the courts of this province [which] has the potential to seriously undermine the quality of justice in Ontario.” Despite subsequent changes which will be discussed further below, delays and issues of access to justice have only increased. Canada ranks 100 out of 189 countries that are part of the World Bank’s Enforcing Contracts indicator, and its civil justice system scored just 0.47

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4. Richard Susskind, *Online Courts and the Future of Justice* (Oxford University Press, 2019) at 6, 60-61. Much of the literature considers technical issues of architecture and design of online courts, as well as the implementation of artificial intelligence. These issues, while crucial, are beyond the scope of this article.


6. Changes to the Rules are made by the Civil Rules Committee, which is made up of judges, lawyers, and court services representatives. The Committee is independent of the MAG and is authorized by statute to make new rules of procedure, but these rules cannot change the substantive law.


out of 1.0 for speed (and 0.57 for accessibility and affordability) in the 2019 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index.9

In the past four years, the average time it takes to dispose of a civil case in Ontario has gone up by 37 per cent, to an average of 904 days in 2018/2019. For small claims, the average time for disposition has more than doubled in the past four years, to an average of 435 days in 2018/2019.10 The backlog in Ontario’s courts increases by an average of 23 per cent every year.11 This phenomenon is partly a result of focusing court resources on the criminal justice system, in order to comply with constitutional time limits post-\textit{Jordan}.12

The civil case backlog will only get worse as a result of COVID-19. In the six weeks following the suspension of the courts in mid-March, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (ONCA) was down to about 36 per cent of its usual output,13 although matters have improved since then.14 The output of the Superior Court of Justice (ONS) was down much less, although trial activity seemed to have been put entirely on hold. The courts face a crippling backlog as they resume in-person proceedings.15

The civil justice system is also extremely hard to navigate for non-lawyers. In family law proceedings in Ontario, approximately 64 per cent of litigants are self-represented. In civil claims in the ONS, self-represented litigants

11. Ibid, Appendix 13 at 138-140.
12. \textit{R v Jordan}, 2016 SCC 27. In \textit{Jordan}, the Supreme Court of Canada laid down a new framework for compliance with s 11(b) of the \textit{Charter} (right to be tried within a reasonable time) in criminal cases. There is now a presumptive ceiling of eighteen months between the charges and the trial in a provincial court without preliminary inquiry, or thirty months in other cases (ibid).
13. Interview of Justice David M Brown by Suzanne Chiodo (7 May 2020) [Brown interview]. On 13 May 2020, Justice Roberts of the ONCA reported that more than 100 scheduled appeals had to be adjourned due to the pandemic. See \textit{4352238 Canada Inc v SNC-Lavalin Group Inc}, 2020 ONCA 303 at para 6 [SNC Lavalin].
15. The courts began resuming in-person proceedings at the beginning of July 2020. See John Schofield, “‘Everything is on the table’ as Ontario eyes a return to courts, says attorney general” (9 June 2020), online: \textit{The Lawyers Daily} <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/19445>.
outnumber represented litigants by 1.6 to 1. They report feeling overwhelmed, struggling to navigate court forms, inability to determine which resources are useful out of the volume of information available online, and feeling alienated from court processes and anxious about court appearances.16 Many litigants represent themselves because of the cost of legal services. The average fees for a two-day trial in Canada were $31,330 in 2015 (they would undoubtedly be higher today).17 The median after-tax income of Canadian households in 2019 was $61,400.18 A household must risk half of its annual income just to proceed to trial in a legal matter.19 It is therefore not surprising that, of the 12 million adult Canadians that will have a legal problem they consider serious in a given three-year period, many of them will not rely on the courts to provide a resolution.20

These chronic issues of delay, accessibility, and cost had plagued Ontario’s civil justice system for decades before the COVID-19 pandemic arrived. What changes has the pandemic wrought?

II. SUSPENDED COURTS, VIRTUAL HEARINGS – CHANGES NECESSITATED BY THE PANDEMIC

Effective 17 March 2020, as a result of the state of emergency declared by the Government of Ontario due to COVID-19, the ONSC and other Ontario courts

19. Salter & Thompson 2017, supra note 17 at 118.
suspended their regular courthouse operations.\textsuperscript{21} The ONSC and the ONCA stated that they would use virtual methods to hear urgent matters only.\textsuperscript{22} In the ONSC, civil matters scheduled for the immediate future\textsuperscript{23} were adjourned \textit{sine die}, to be rescheduled after 1 June 2020. On 2 April 2020, the ONSC issued further Notices to the Profession, expanding the scope of matters that would be heard in each region.

The courts suspended operations, but they did not close.\textsuperscript{24} The ONSC and the ONCA continued to hear matters in writing, by telephone, and by video conference, without the need to obtain consent or a court order.\textsuperscript{25} Electronic filing became more widely available,\textsuperscript{26} and service by email is now permitted without the need for the other party’s consent. Facta can be hyperlinked to cases,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} The ONCA stated it would also hear non-urgent appeals in writing: “COVID-19: Notice to the Profession and the Public” (17 March 2020). The ONSC issued notices to the Profession on 15 March 2020 identifying the types of matters that were considered “urgent.”
\item \textsuperscript{23} From 17 March 2020 to 31 May 2020.
\item \textsuperscript{24} The Ontario Small Claims Court was only hearing urgent matters by telephone or videoconference during the suspension of operations, but subsequently began scheduling settlement conferences in non-urgent matters. In-court matters for all courts were suspended up until 6 July 2020.
\item \textsuperscript{25} The ONCA continued to hear matters via the CourtCall service. See The Court of Appeal for Ontario, “Notice Regarding Videoconference and Teleconference Appearance Technology (CourtCall)” (27 March 2020), online: <www.ontariocourts.ca/coa/en/notices/tele-video.htm>. The Divisional Court of the ONSC operated on a limited docket but heard cases virtually at the discretion of the judges. See Superior Court of Justice, “Notice to the Profession: Divisional Court” (2 April 2020).
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ministry of the Attorney General, “Notice to the Legal Profession regarding the Civil Claims Online service” (23 March 2020). However, other than the documents that could be filed through the CCO or the Small Claims Court online filing services, the courts only accepted electronic filing of documents for urgent matters. Counsel and parties also had to file the same materials in paper format, with the requisite filing fee, following the resumption of regular court operations (the same applied to the Small Claims Court). The ONCA accepted filings by email.
\end{itemize}
without having to file Books of Authorities. Affidavits can be sworn remotely.\textsuperscript{27} Judgments, endorsements, and orders of the court became effective the date they were made, without the requirement to issue and enter formal orders. Following the implementation of virtual hearings in the ONSC and the ONCA, the Honourable Geoffrey B Morawetz, ONSC Chief Justice, declared that “we cannot go back”.\textsuperscript{28}

The Ontario E-Hearings Task Force\textsuperscript{29} subsequently released its Best Practices for Remote Hearings, which provides guidance for lawyers about the preparation and conduct of a virtual hearing.\textsuperscript{30} The Attorney General also announced that the Ontario government would not proceed with the Halton Region Consolidated Courthouse construction project, and would instead use those funds “to invest in technology, modernize processes and expand access to justice across the province” based on the “[e]xperience gained during COVID-19… there is broad consensus we cannot go back to the way things were done before the public health emergency.”\textsuperscript{31} Given that the estimated total capital cost of the project was expected to be in the range of $200-$499 million, that is a significant investment, although it is doubtful the entire amount will be put towards modernization.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{27} This was later confirmed by Schedule 4 (amending the \textit{Commissioners for Taking Affidavits Act}) of the \textit{COVID-19 Response and Reforms to Modernize Ontario Act, 2020}, SO 2020, c 7 (assented to 12 May 2020).
\textsuperscript{28} The Advocates’ Society, “Virtual Fireside Chat with Chief Justice Geoffrey B Morawetz” (6 April 2020).
\textsuperscript{29} The E-Hearings Task Force was a collaboration of The Advocates’ Society (TAS), the OBA, the Federation of Ontario Law Associations, and the Ontario Trial Lawyers Association. TAS has since launched a Modern Advocacy Task Force to look at longer-term changes in the wake of COVID-19; it will report in April 2021.
\textsuperscript{32} The funds will also be used for immediate infrastructure needs at the Milton and Burlington courthouses: \textit{ibid.}
III. THE AFTER TIMES: ARE THE CHANGES HERE TO STAY?

Given the projected financial investment in the modernization of Ontario’s justice system, there is hope for the time after COVID-19. The experience with virtual hearings also indicates that the After Times are here to stay.

Lawyers and judges who have participated in virtual hearings have reported positive results. Participants have experienced occasional technological disruptions, and counsel report that they have had to change their way of presenting because judges receive and hear submissions differently in a virtual hearing. Overall, however, “it’s just like whenever you appear at a different court for the first time.” Counsel have also reported that virtual hearings are much more focused than their in-person equivalents.

Courts are also adapting to the “new normal”. The Ontario Commercial List had 181 audio hearings, 41 video hearings, and 131 hearings in writing between 17 March 2020 and 28 April 2020. During the suspension of court operations, the ONCA heard appeals in writing as much as possible, with a short video conference in the minority of cases if judges had questions about the materials. Judges were unsympathetic to arguments that matters could not proceed by videoconference on the basis that parties needed to be with their counsel to assist with documents, or that lack of physical presence “deprives the occasion of solemnity and a morally persuasive environment”. In answer to such arguments, Justice Myers of the ONSC famously retorted, “[i]t’s 2020.” He went on to say that becoming proficient with virtual hearings and other technology is a basic requirement of civil litigators and courts.

34. Ibid.
39. Ibid at para 19. Justice Myers noted that for more than twenty years, r 1.08 has provided for the option of videoconferencing in motions, applications, and trials (ibid at para 20).
40. Ibid at para 33.
Justice Myers has reviewed the Rules to determine which might require revision to facilitate potential reforms to Ontario’s civil justice system, as part of a Judicial Working Group of the ONSC. The recommendations are indicative of a “paradigm shift” away from in-person oral hearings and towards written advocacy and virtual hearings, using videoconferences and teleconferences. In addition to recommending changes to facilitate the implementation of electronic filing and hearings, they state that “presentation of evidence and argument orally in open court will no longer be considered the default or even a superior mode”; instead, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, “[t]he default should be the mode that is most expeditious and affordable, having regard to the nature of the case.” For all steps except trial, parties would have to seek leave for an in-person hearing. Applications and summary trials could become the default, with parties required to show why a trial is necessary for the fair, expeditious and affordable adjudication of their dispute. Since then, the Superior Court of Justice has indicated that motions on consent, and contested short motions, are to be heard in writing as the default.

As discussed further below, this “paradigm shift” away from oral argument has drawn particular ire from the Bar, partly on procedural justice grounds. While a hearing by videoconference may serve as an acceptable substitute for an in-person hearing, telephone or written hearings give rise to objections that


42. The Working Group is co-chaired by Regional Senior Justices Firestone and MacLeod, and includes judges from various regions, members of the Bar, and representatives from the MAG and Court Services Division. See Ontario Bar Association, “Fireside Chat with Superior Court of Justice” (28 May 2020) [Morawetz Fireside Chat].

43. Myers, supra note 41 at 1.

44. Rules, supra note 5, r 1.04(1.1) states that, “[i]n applying these rules, the court shall make orders and give directions that are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues, and to the amount involved, in the proceeding” (ibid).

45. Myers, supra note 41 at 3-4; Rules, supra note 5, r 1.08(5)(a). This relates to the “general principle” in r 1.08(5)(a) (regarding teleconference and videoconference hearings) “that evidence and argument should be presented orally in open court” (ibid).

46. Myers, supra note 41 at 3.

47. Ibid at 8-9, 19.

litigants are losing their “day in court”.49 Others have stated that any curtailment of the adversarial hearing impinges on the accuracy of the result.50 Critics have claimed that the move away from traditional oral hearings will result in “second tier justice.”51

However, according to the proportionality principle,52 which has been part of the Rules since 2010, not every litigant will be entitled to every procedural step. Procedures must be tailored to the nature of the dispute. If the proportionality principle is to address the issues of cost and delay in the civil justice system, then a paradigm shift—or, as the Supreme Court of Canada called it in Hryniak v Mauldin, a “culture shift”—is indispensable:53

A fair and just process must permit a judge to find the facts necessary to resolve the dispute and to apply the relevant legal principles to the facts as found. However, that process is illusory unless it is also accessible — proportionate, timely and affordable. The proportionality principle means that the best forum for resolving a dispute is not always that with the most painstaking procedure. The objection that removing key procedural steps somehow renders a process unfair can be addressed by changing our view of procedural justice. Adrian Zuckerman and Rabeea Assy have both argued in favour of this paradigm shift, whereby cost and time are also seen as elements of justice.54 Justice is not done where it can only be provided to the wealthiest in society, and “justice delayed is justice denied.”55 If the time and cost of litigation (to all parties) are included in the definition of procedural justice, then using technology to make litigation

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49. For a summary of these arguments, see Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Courts Structure Review: Final Report (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 2016) at paras 6.77 to 6.84. See also Susskind, supra note 4 at 206.
51. See Susskind, supra note 4 at 187-91 (Susskind refers to “economy-class justice”).
52. Rules, supra note 5, r 1.04(1.1).
55. Zuckerman 1995, supra note 54 at 162.
speedier and more affordable actually promotes justice.\textsuperscript{56} This is true even if some procedural steps must be sacrificed. Proportionality balances the goals of accuracy and efficiency, and thereby enables more justice and more court resources to be dispensed to a wider segment of society.\textsuperscript{57}

It is the principle of proportionality, then, that militates most in favour of the shift to virtual hearings. How far will these changes go, and how effective will they be? The answers to these questions depend on several factors, some of which will facilitate civil justice reform, and some of which will stand in its way.

IV. HIGHWAYS AND ROADBLOCKS ON THE PATH TO MODERNIZATION

A. ROADBLOCKS: INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND PROFESSIONAL RESISTANCE

The history of change in the Ontario civil justice system is not encouraging. Numerous proposals for reform have been produced over the years, yet these have been largely ineffectual. None has led to a reduction in the cost and delay that plague the justice system, because none has facilitated a fundamental paradigm shift in the province’s approach to civil justice.

For example, the Rules of Civil Procedure have been modified on several occasions. The Williston Committee’s \textit{Report of the Civil Procedure Revision Committee}\textsuperscript{58} had the mandate of simplifying the language of the Rules and reducing their number, as well as “developing innovative measures to ensure that the procedure in civil litigation is understandable by members of the public, the steps necessary to finalize a dispute are minimal and the cost of such procedure is reasonable.”\textsuperscript{59} While subsequent reform in 1985 changed or clarified the Rules on

\textsuperscript{56}. Similar sentiments were expressed by Allison Speigel, “How courts can step up to save drowning civil justice system” (23 April 2020), online: \textit{Canadian Lawyer} <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/opinion/how-courts-can-step-up-to-save-drowning-civil-justice-system/328967>; and by OBA President Colin Stevenson on CHCH-TV, “Inside the Story: Part 1” (29 May 2020), online: \textit{CHCH} <https://www.chch.com/shows/inside-the-story/>.


\textsuperscript{58}. \textit{Civil Procedure Revision}, \textit{supra} note 3.

\textsuperscript{59}. \textit{Ibid} at 2.
several points, the nearly 300 pages of revisions failed to make any fundamental changes to the overall process of civil litigation. The MAG’s Civil Justice Review in 1996 recommended reducing cost and delay through case management, mandatory mediation, and trial as a last resort, yet civil actions take almost as long today as they did then. The 2010 changes to the Rules were the result of the Civil Justice Reform Project completed in November 2007. They included a general principle of proportionality, as well as expanded summary judgment procedures, reforms to reduce costs and delay associated with discovery, and mandatory pre-trial conferences. Again, no fundamental changes were made to the process of civil litigation in Ontario, and the expanded summary judgment procedures did not bring about the timely and affordable access to justice that the SCC called for in Hryniak.

These efforts have largely failed due to institutional governance and professional resistance, each of which will be addressed below. Without institutional support and stakeholder buy-in, change is usually limited to “tinkering at the edges” of reform. The danger is that the recent changes, incremental as they are, will suffer the same fate and for the same reasons.

1. INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES

The responsibility for the transformation of Ontario’s civil justice system lies with the MAG. Unfortunately, as far as the civil justice system is concerned,

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60. For a summary of the changes, see ibid at 15-33; Rules, supra note 5, r 1.03(2). These include the introduction of the requirement that “[t]hese rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, least expensive and most expeditious determination of every civil proceeding on its merits” (ibid).
62. Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Civil Justice Review, Final Report (Queen’s Printer, 1996). The average duration of a civil action was thirty-two months at that time, compared to thirty months today (or 904 days – see above).
63. Honourable Coulter A Osborne, QC, Civil Justice Reform Project (Ministry of the Attorney General, 2007).
64. Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, “Backgrounder: Civil Justice Reform in Ontario” (Ministry of the Attorney General, 2011) [Backgrounder].
65. Hryniak, supra note 53. Justice David M Brown has noted that, in the wake of Hryniak, it still takes more than three years for a case to proceed through the ONSC, and it takes an average of 2.5 years for a case to be disposed of by way of summary judgment. See Justice David M Brown, “Red block, yellow block, orange block, blue. With so much competition, what do we do?” (2019) 38 Adv J 14 at paras 10, 15.
the MAG has shown a consistent track record of institutional malaise and resistance to change.

This can partly be explained by the failure of previous reform projects, such as the Integrated Justice Project (IJP).\textsuperscript{66} This launched in 1996 with the aim of creating a centralized online system to coordinate electronic filing, case management, and courtroom services. The project experienced significant cost increases and delays, with projected costs almost doubling between March 1998 ($180 million) and March 2001 ($359 million).\textsuperscript{67} There were also significant concerns regarding internal audit controls and data privacy.\textsuperscript{68} The IJP was eventually shelved in October 2002, at a cost of $265 million. Its collapse “has cast a long shadow of fear of failure, paralyzing initiatives to modernize Ontario’s courts.”\textsuperscript{69}

The lessons that can be learned from the failure of the IJP will be covered later in this article. However, the reason the IJP failed was because, like similar projects in other provinces, it was too ambitious.\textsuperscript{70} The project was huge in its scale and scope, spanning three Ministries (Attorney General, Solicitor General, and Correctional Services), and affecting approximately twenty-two thousand employees at 825 different locations across Ontario, as well as municipal police forces, judges, private lawyers, and the general public.\textsuperscript{71} It attempted to link up disparate parts of the justice system that had never been integrated either organizationally or technologically, and relied for most of its funding and implementation on a partnership with private industry, a form of partnership that itself was relatively untested.\textsuperscript{72} Proponents of the IJP described it as “the largest justice technology project under way in the world today.”\textsuperscript{73}

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{66} Interview of Justice David M Brown by Suzanne Chiodo (23 May 2020) [Brown interview 2].
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Ibid} at 70.
\textsuperscript{69} Brown interview 2, supra note 66; Kirk Makin, “Computer lawsuit costs Ontario $63-million”, \textit{The Globe and Mail} (1 June 2005), online: <www.tgam.ca/398GIBK> [Computer lawsuit].
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Auditor General’s Report 2001, supra note 67 at 67}.
\textsuperscript{72} Baar, supra note 70 at 55; Michael Jordan, “Ontario’s Integrated Justice Project: profile of a complex partnership agreement” (1999) 42:1 Canadian Public Administration 26 at 29 [Jordan].
\textsuperscript{73} Jordan, \textit{ibid}, at 27; \textit{Auditor General’s Report 2001, supra note 67 at 71-72}.
\end{quotation}
Even with this acknowledgement, it appears that those responsible for managing the IJP significantly underestimated its complexity and the magnitude of the change it would bring about, and therefore the time, cost, and consultation it would require.74 This was particularly true with regard to the court system, which “had been operating with largely paper-based information- and document-management systems. The original plan to implement [the IJP] in [an] eighteen-month period incurred a measure of resistance from court staff and the Judiciary.”75 This resistance, as well as the ballooning of time and cost involved in the project, meant that it was eventually more cost-effective to shelve it entirely.

The current-day institutional malaise in the MAG can also be explained by the division of responsibilities between the judiciary and the Ministry. The executive model of courts administration76 means that the staff who provide administrative services to the courts and the judiciary (such as court filing, scheduling, and information technology, as well as services in the courtroom itself) answer to the Attorney General.77 As a result, most court functions are beyond judicial control.78 The judiciary is largely unable to set goals to keep court administrators accountable, and it lacks discretion over spending. This has led to a lack of measurable goals and objectives and a lack of appropriate infrastructure for data collection and analysis.79 Judges therefore find it very difficult to schedule and manage cases, because these require that court administrators maintain materials in a consistent and organized fashion and keep a reliable and accessible inventory of cases. This stymies one of the key efficiencies of the civil litigation process: judicial case management.80

These governance issues have also affected the pace of modernization in the Ontario court system. The Ministry has been subject to “ongoing, consistent criticism from [justice] sector stakeholders regarding the pace of

75. Ibid at 76.
77. Auditor General’s Report, supra note 10 at 88.
79. See Susskind, supra note 4 at 79. This in turn has an impact on the principle of open justice, which “demands a clear window on the court system” (ibid).
modernization,” yet the court system is still heavily paper-based. There is no up-to-date information technology system in the Ontario courts for the filing and management of court documents, and to track and schedule court cases. FRANK is a system that tracks criminal, civil, and small claims cases received by the ONSC, but it has not been updated since 2014. It is unable to facilitate accurate entry of data or generate user-friendly reports. Because judges and court staff cannot rely on it, they are still dependent on physical files. This affects the efficient scheduling and management of cases. The poor state of the FRANK

81. Auditor General’s Report, supra note 10 at 104.
82. Ibid at 7 (paper made up more than 96 per cent of the 2.5 million documents filed in the Ontario court system in 2018-2019). Limited steps towards digitization in Ontario have included electronic filing of pleadings (and a limited number of other documents) which was introduced in November 2017. See “File civil case documents online” (last modified 10 July 2020), online: Government of Ontario <www.ontario.ca/page/file-civil-claim-online>. Small claims may also be filed online, see “File small claims online” (last modified 10 July 2020), online: Government of Ontario <www.ontario.ca/page/file-small-claims-online>. Once the court receives the documents via these portals, they are simply printed out and put in the paper file (they are not placed in dedicated electronic files). The portals are therefore not part of an end-to-end digitized system. The ONCA is currently undergoing a digitization project by an outside provider; this is predicted to be completed in 2022 (email correspondence to Suzanne Chiodo from Justice David M Brown, 31 May and 18 June 2020). With regard to tribunals, the Condominium Authority Tribunal allows for the online filing of applications, but its jurisdiction is very narrow. Self-funding tribunals such as the Ontario Energy Board and the Ontario Securities Commission have digitized processes such as electronic filing.
83. Auditor General’s Report, ibid, at 92.
84. Ibid at 85-86, 107-108.
system has been confirmed by the Auditor General of Ontario, the Law Commission of Ontario, and judges that have attempted to use the system.

Civil servants and institutions play a major role in change processes, and their resistance can prove fatal to fundamental reform efforts. Just as the “capture” of intangible resources such as access to empirical data and knowledge of organizational culture can assist civil servants in their campaigns for reform, it can also assist them in their attempts to block it. Overcoming such resistance within the MAG will be essential in the enactment of any lasting civil justice reform.

2. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Another roadblock to reform is resistance to change in the legal profession. As Darin Thompson has observed, “the change-resistant culture of most justice systems is especially pronounced when it comes to new technology. This observation is true for justice system providers such as lawyers, judges and many alternative dispute resolution providers.”

85. The MAG took up to two months to provide the Auditor General with several key documents, a delay the latter had encountered on previous audits in 2003 and 2008. The Auditor General concluded that it was “concerned that these delays are part of a recurring pattern at the Ministry of the Attorney General” (ibid at 98).

86. See Class Actions, Objectives, Experiences and Reforms (Law Commission of Ontario, 2019) [LCO Report]. In preparing its report on class actions, the LCO found that the lists of class action files taken from the FRANK database (and provided by the MAG) “were inconsistent, incomplete and contained many inaccuracies and duplications” (ibid at 104). The MAG could not provide even a basic record of important milestones in each action, and could not identify whether a particular case was ongoing, completed, or dormant (ibid at 104). The LCO concluded that the Ministry did not have a robust court information system that could collect and aggregate a broad range of class actions statistics, and that such a system was not likely to be available in the near future (ibid at 68).

87. Some judicial frustrations have been noted, see Bon Hillier v Milojevic, 2010 ONSC 435 at para 37; Charles Estate (Re), 2009 CanLII 57448 (ONSC) at paras 12-13; Pershadingsh v Thompson (Trustee of), 2010 ONSC 4943 at paras 55-60; see Brown 2011, supra note 61 at para 66.


89. Quaglia, ibid, at 546-47.

90. Darin Thompson, “Creating New Pathways to Justice Using Simple Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute Resolution” (2015) 1 Intl J Online Disp Resol 4 at 44.
In Ontario, for example, lawyers have shown a great deal of resistance to the imposition of written hearings at the appellate level. Following the ONCA’s decision in *SNC Lavalin*, the appellant has moved to have the decision set aside by a panel of the Court, on the basis that the Rules and the *Courts of Justice Act* mandate an oral hearing of a civil appeal unless the parties consent to an appeal in writing. This resistance has also manifested itself in the Bar generally. The tradition of oral advocacy is strongly ingrained in lawyers, and some commentators have noted that the pull of the majesty and collegiality of the courtroom is also strong. This may be why, until the pandemic, so few lawyers used the ONCA’s teleconference and videoconference service (CourtCall).

While such resistance is by no means universal, it could ultimately harm the legal profession, however, and “[t]he law … risks losing influence over citizens by not recognizing how much the online environment needs new justice models.”

Even worse, any reforms that are implemented may be co-opted by the very system whose complexities and delays they were introduced to counteract. A major driver for civil justice reforms such as class proceedings “was the search for a remedy for an expensive, slow, complex, inaccessible, and overburdened court system.” However, as with ADR, lawyers have used these procedures “not for

92. *SNC Lavalin*, supra note 13. See also *Carleton Condominium Corporation No 476 v Wong*, 2020 ONCA 244.
94. Schmitz, “Wagner,” supra note 93 (per Federal Court Justice James O’Reilly); Curry, supra note 93; Brown interview 2, supra note 66.
95. Curry, supra note 93; Brown interview 2, supra note 66. However, this may also be because CourtCall has experienced numerous technical issues and does not work as well as more up-to-date technologies such as Zoom.
96. See the motion to the Law Society of Ontario, asking it to lobby the provincial government, the Civil Rules Committee, and courts administration to adopt innovations such as electronic filing and remote hearings. Law Society of Ontario, “Notice to the Professions” (20 March 2020), online: *LSO*<bit.ly/3hFW6JS>.
98. Ibid at 178.
the accomplishment of a ‘better’ result, but as another weapon in the adversarial arsenal to manipulate time, methods of discovery, and rules of procedure for perceived client advantage.”99 As Carrie Menkel Meadow has pointed out, this is a result of “resolv[ing] disputes using new forms within old structures.”100 Lawyers “infect” new processes with adversarial formalisms such as evidentiary objections,101 and so the new wine suffers from being put into old wineskins.102

For example, when class proceedings were enacted in the early 1990s, they were hailed as a panacea to the access to justice problems that were endemic in Ontario’s justice system,103 including the delays and inconvenience associated with bringing individual actions for small claims.104 In the nearly three decades since the CPA was enacted, however, class proceedings have become mired in delays caused by multi-jurisdictional issues, skirmishes between competing law firms, and interlocutory appeals. As the Law Commission of Ontario noted in its recent report, “[m]any of the usual obstacles to access to a judicial determination in a reasonably timely manner are compounded in the class action setting. Virtually everyone consulted by the LCO cited delay as a significant issue in class action litigation.”105

This phenomenon is also exemplified by the suspension of the courts during the pandemic. Lawyers created a new battle-front out of the ONSC’s statement that it would initially only hear urgent matters, thereby commanding even more of the court’s limited resources. In Wang v 2426483 Ontario Limited, Justice Myers observed that “[t]he court is now routinely receiving submissions on the merits and ostensibly on the issue of “urgency” both before and even after the court has scheduled a matter for hearing.”106 This is one of the reasons why the BC

99. Ibid at 3; see also ibid at 17.
101. Ibid at 35 and 38.
102. When the BC Civil Resolution Tribunal Act, SBC 2012, c 25, s 20 [CRT Act] was being debated, it was pointed out that there had previously been a presumption that the Small Claims Court would only be used by self-represented parties, but that lawyers had become more ubiquitous over time: BC Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 39-4, p 1738 (8 May 2012) (Leonard Krog).
104. Ibid at 48, 76.
105. LCO Report, supra note 86 at 5-6, 18, 23, 30, 92.
106. 2020 ONSC 2040, at para 7; see also Haaksma v Taylor, 2020 ONSC 2656.
CRT does not generally permit users of the system to be represented by a lawyer, other than in motor vehicle accident cases,\(^\text{107}\) a decision that was vehemently opposed by members of the BC Bar.\(^\text{108}\)

Nevertheless, the unique nature of this moment of crisis may mean that such institutional and professional resistance is overcome. This will depend on a number of facilitators of change.

**B. HIGHWAYS – INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACILITATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE**

One of the greatest facilitators of change is crisis. As Richard Susskind has said, “[a]nyone who reads about change theory knows that the first step to change is creating a sense of urgency—and this is what the pandemic has done”.\(^\text{109}\) It was crisis that precipitated the creation of online courts in British Columbia. The *CRT Act*\(^\text{110}\) was passed when a number of other matters, including traffic violations and civil forfeiture, were shifted out of the court system and into administrative tribunals. This shift occurred in order to relieve pressure on the court system.\(^\text{111}\) For some years previously, delays in the criminal justice system had led to the stay of proceedings against numerous accused persons, leading to a public outcry.\(^\text{112}\) Several reports commented on the “culture of delay”\(^\text{113}\) that pervaded the BC justice system generally.\(^\text{114}\) The movement of matters from the

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107. *CRT Act*, *supra* note 102, s 20.
110. *CRT Act*, *supra* note 102.
111. BC Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 39-4 (8 May 2012) at 1449 (Kathy Corrigan) and 1820 (Jagrup Brar).
courts to tribunals was an effort “to obtain greater process efficiencies and better outcomes” in both.\footnote{115}

The history of change in the Ontario court system, as well as the literature on institutional change generally, provide useful insights into the factors that will encourage change now. The literature on institutional change discusses endogenous (internal) and exogenous (external) explanations for the timing of change.\footnote{116} A key exogenous factor is financial crisis.\footnote{117} The current COVID-19 crisis has not yet led to financial crisis, but that may not be far off.\footnote{118} Ontario’s under-resourced justice system is already facing an overwhelming backlog, and the courts’ inability to function at full capacity—combined with the spike in litigation that is sure to follow the pandemic—could lead to a breakdown of the system altogether, leaving it no choice but to modernize.\footnote{119} As with the BC CRT, this may open up “a rare window of opportunity” for leaders “to pursue reform measures that may have been impossible in the absence of crisis”.\footnote{120}

Another exogenous factor is the existence of reform in other influential jurisdictions. Institutions operate within the “logic of organizational mimicry” and reform is “determined by a social process of crossnational institutional diffusion.”\footnote{121} Through norm internalization, ideas filter down from supranational institutions and across from comparable jurisdictions.\footnote{122} This was certainly true for class actions reform in Ontario in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

\footnote{115}{Cowper Report, supranote 113 at 166; see also ibid at 163-66. Although the Cowper Report focused on the criminal justice system, it also reviewed the “Policy Context” of the movement towards tribunals, including the CRT (ibid at 164-65).}


\footnote{118}{The International Monetary Fund predicts that the world economy will shrink by 3 per cent in 2020, compared to a 0.1 per cent dip in the 2008 recession. See United States, World Economic Outlook, April 2020: The Great Lockdown (International Monetary Fund, 2020), online (pdf): IMF <www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/World-Economic-Outlook-April-2020-The-Great-Lockdown-49306>.}

\footnote{119}{King, supranote 88 at 99.}

\footnote{120}{Joo-Youn Jung, “Reinventing the interventionist state: The Korean economic bureaucracy reform under the economic crisis” (2008) 23 Pacific Focus 121 at 132-33.}

\footnote{121}{McNamara, supranote 88 at 48-49.}

The existence of class proceedings legislation in the US and Quebec exerted a profound influence on the reform movement in Ontario.\(^{123}\) Similarly, the existence of a developed online tribunal in British Columbia, as well as a push towards online courts around the world,\(^ {124}\) could prove influential in Ontario today.\(^ {125}\) Developments in other jurisdictions provide a “laboratory” for Ontario to see if online courts are sufficiently effective, and Ontario can then implement those policies.\(^ {126}\) However, although much of the international and academic discussion has looked to the online processes of BC and England & Wales in particular, the debates in the Ontario Bar have been fairly insular\(^ {127}\) and have generally not considered developments in other jurisdictions.

Endogenous facilitators of change include political will and “policy entrepreneurs” who shape the nature and direction of reform.\(^{128}\) Policy entrepreneurs are able to steer change at all levels of public policy, playing the role of politician, bureaucrat, academic, spin-doctor, and mediator between interest groups. They “build broad coalitions supporting their entrepreneurship activity in the domestic political economy.”\(^ {129}\) The policy entrepreneur at the helm of class action reform in Ontario was Attorney General Ian Scott, who filled each of the aforementioned roles in his efforts to bring about reform.\(^ {130}\)

With a background in environmental law, Scott was passionate about access to

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125. An influential supranational institution is the United Nations. See the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Ensuring Access to Justice in the Context of COVID-19* (May 2020), online (pdf): UNODC <www.unodc.org/documents/Advocacy-Section/Ensuring_Access_to_Justice_in_the_Context_of_COVID-191.pdf>. The recent report of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime emphasized the importance of addressing the backlog of cases (including in civil proceedings), understanding the need for people-centred justice, and providing legal empowerment strategies (at 36-38). The report stated that this could be done by “building on some of the ICT [information, communication, and technology] gains that may have been achieved during the crisis and continuing with remote court hearings and other judicial proceedings” (*ibid* at 36).
129. Bakir *supra* note 116 at 489.
justice and the funding of public interest litigation.\textsuperscript{131} The subject of class action reform had languished at the MAG for at least a decade before Scott took up the subject.\textsuperscript{132} It was his determination to mediate a consensus between warring interest groups, and to fight resistance in his own Ministry, that finally led to the enactment of the \textit{Class Proceedings Act, 1992}.\textsuperscript{133}

Does the same political will and leadership exist in the current climate? Perhaps. The Attorney General has stated on several occasions that he wishes to use the current crisis as an opportunity to modernize Ontario’s justice system, and has spoken of “hav[ing] the system deal with the reality” of self-represented litigants.\textsuperscript{134} Chief Justice Morawetz has reported that Downey is lending full support to the process of modernization, and ensuring that his Ministry’s bureaucracy does so too.\textsuperscript{135} The specifics are somewhat lacking, however, and appear to be limited to digitizing existing processes and expanding the use of hearings by videoconference.\textsuperscript{136} Nevertheless, Downey could play the role of a “policy entrepreneur”. His experience as a real estate lawyer, court clerk and court registrar,\textsuperscript{137} as well as his Master’s degree in judicial administration, would give him a good knowledge of the workings of the court system, as well as the potential for reform. He has drawn upon the example of Teranet, Ontario’s online real estate search and registration system, which brought about a radical


\textsuperscript{132} In November 1976, Attorney General Roy McMurtry wrote to Allan Leal, Chairman of the Ontario Law Reform Commission, asking the OLRC to research the advisability of enacting class actions legislation in Ontario. Scott first conducted consultations on reform in December 1988: Chiodo, \textit{supra} note 103 at 54-55, 174.

\textsuperscript{133} Chiodo, \textit{ibid}, at 142-46, 159-60, 174-78, 180-82.

\textsuperscript{134} See, for example, Marg Bruineman, “Justice system is in flux; ‘we’re not going back to normal,’ says Downey” (22 May 2020), online: \textit{Orillia Matters} <www.orilliamatters.com/coronavirus-covid-19-local-news/justice-system-is-in-flux-were-not-going-back-to-normal-says-downey-2368811>.

\textsuperscript{135} Morawetz Fireside Chat, \textit{supra} note 42.


\textsuperscript{137} Bruineman, \textit{ibid}.
transformation in the practice of real estate law in the province. He therefore understands that law is a service, not just a profession, and that most clients do not want lawyers—they want a solution to their legal problem.

Chief Justice Morawetz has also noted the need for a “full end-to-end electronic filing system” with e-filing available to the profession and e-document delivery for the judiciary, and is leading the ONSC in this regard. He reports that such a system could be up and running within a year (at least on an interim basis), with e-scheduling available in the medium- to long-term. The implementation of e-scheduling alone would save thousands of hours that are currently wasted in scheduling court (where the numerous individuals that are required to wait around also constitute a health hazard).

Other “policy entrepreneurs” are also calling for fundamental reform, although their power to effect change in Ontario is limited. Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice Richard Wagner has supported the move towards written advocacy and virtual hearings, and is also open to the solutions proposed by Susskind, involving “online judging that leans on paper-based adjudication and asynchronous means to communicate with parties.” Chief Justice Wagner leads the Action Committee on Court Operations in Response to COVID-19 with Federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada David Lametti, and the Action Committee has emphasized that “decisions around resumption of court operations [should be] framed within a wider vision of courts modernization.” Similarly, former Chief Justice of Canada Beverley McLachlin

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139. This outcome-based approach is endorsed elsewhere, see Brown interview 2, supra note 66; Susskind, supra note 4 at 47-53; Roadmap, supra note 17 at 9.

140. Amanda Jerome, “‘Paper-based system is not going to exist anymore,’ Chief Justice Morawetz says of post-COVID-19 court” (15 April 2020), online: The Lawyer’s Daily <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/18576>; Brown interview 2, supra note 66.

141. Morawetz Fireside Chat, supra note 42.


has invoked Susskind’s work in calling for a “vision-based” transformation of the justice system.  

The prospects for virtual hearings and electronic processes are promising and they are likely to remain post-pandemic. However, more fundamental transformation is needed in order to address the ills of cost, delay, and access that have plagued the civil justice system.

V. BEYOND TINKERING – ONLINE COURTS

A. ZOOM AND GLOOM – THE PROBLEM WITH DIGITIZING EXISTING PROCESSES

While the recent changes are a move in the right direction, they have raised questions about how innovative and effective they are. Civil procedure remains largely unchanged except for the fact that some steps are now online. The path currently being pursued by Ontario’s justice stakeholders would seem very familiar to earlier developers of online dispute resolution systems. These developers did not attempt to disrupt or transform existing processes, but simply mimicked existing processes and offered online equivalents. As Ethan Katsh and Orna Rabinovich-Einy have observed:

> [T]he initial impulse is to create online mirror images of the ‘live’ or offline process. In such instances, some agencies aim to replicate exactly their current processes online. Public agency staff may have been using the existing system for so long that it may be difficult for them to envision the new system as something other than an online replica of their offline process.

Replace “public agency staff” with “lawyers”, and this observation applies to the situation in Ontario. Lawyers report that virtual hearings are just like attending


145. Richard Susskind describes this phenomenon as automation (using technology to deliver old services) as opposed to transformation (using technology to deliver services that would have been unthinkable without technology). See Susskind, supra note 4 at 34. See also James Allsop, “Technology and the Future of the Courts” (2019) 38 UQLJ 1 at 10.

146. Digital Justice, supra note 97 at 33.

147. See also Anuj Moudgil et al, “Virtual hearings: are they really the answer?”, Lexology (17 April 2020), online: Lexology <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1f282802-621f-4cc6-890a-6a5a8ee5ecee> [Moudgil].
a different court for the first time. The “Best Practices for Remote Hearings”\textsuperscript{148} is regarded as the new companion to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and it is likely to be formally incorporated into the Rules in the near future. Colin Stevenson, President of the OBA, has stated that, in the wake of COVID-19, “we were able to launch virtual courtrooms and to train judges to manage hearings in a way that approximated a real court as closely as possible.”\textsuperscript{149} Our court system has simply moved online, replacing physical courtrooms with virtual ones.\textsuperscript{150}

This is reminiscent of the early days of the automobile. Early vehicle prototypes were simply horseless carriages, with a small combustion engine replacing the horse. While this removed the inconvenience of feeding, stabling, and cleaning up after horses, the new mode of transport was just as slow, reaching speeds of up to 16 km/h—about the same as a trotting horse.

This is why the recent changes will not be very effective in solving the problems that have plagued the civil justice system for decades. Expecting hearings by Zoom to address issues of cost, delay, and accessibility is like expecting a Benz Patent-Motorwagen to outrun a horse and buggy. This is because the use of virtual courts, while removing the cost and inconvenience of travel to court, does not result in the removal of any procedural steps. The cost and time savings will therefore be relatively modest.\textsuperscript{151} The scheduling of hearings will still depend on the availability of judges and counsel, as well as the availability of the technology in the courts concerned. The volume of materials will continue to grow. Self-represented litigants will still struggle to navigate the system.\textsuperscript{152}

The experience of hearings by videoconference and teleconference

\textsuperscript{148} Best Practices, supra note 30.

\textsuperscript{149} Colin Stevenson, “Leading the way forward: Modernizing access to justice” (25 May 2020), online: The Lawyer’s Daily <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/19190>.

\textsuperscript{150} Even the technology is not particularly new. Although the functionality of videoconferencing has improved in recent years, it has been around since the early 2000s; Skype was established in 2003. Electronic filing has been widely available in British Columbia since December 2008.

\textsuperscript{151} Dr. Natalie Byrom’s Rapid Review of the civil justice system in England & Wales following COVID-19 suggests that remote hearings are not necessarily cheaper, and that savings relate mostly to elimination of travel and accommodation costs. See UK Civil Justice Council, The Impact of COVID-19 on the Civil Justice System (CJC, 2020) at paras 5.1, 5.89-5.92 [CJC Report]; Moudgil, supra note 147.

\textsuperscript{152} For example, the Best Practices is 42 pages long. See Best Practices, supra note 30. It refers repeatedly to the numerous practice directions issued by the various levels of court in Ontario in the wake of COVID-19, which some lawyers have called “almost impenetrable” (although some have since been consolidated); Paul-Erik Veel and Chantelle Cseh, “Practicing Litigation Remotely” (7 April 2020), Ontario Bar Association Webinar Series, “Maintaining Your Litigation Practice in a Remote Work Environment”.
in other jurisdictions has raised serious concerns about accessibility and other issues. If we simply “graft a digital layer onto the existing procedural systems”, then “they can generate compounding negative externalities at a systemic level”, including procedural unfairness. Richard Susskind confirmed this when giving evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee on the implications of COVID-19, stating that the aim of reform should not be to “take the English justice system and drop it into Zoom” but to “radically redesign the system” to improve access to justice.

The legal system in Ontario has been modernized by twenty-five years in twenty-five days, as the Attorney General said, but this has simply brought the legal system from the age of the fax machine to the age of the Internet. Our courts are still twenty years behind. The risk of “tinkering at the edges” of civil procedure “is that the wholesale introduction of virtual hearings could lull parties and [courts] into thinking that they have been innovative enough in moving to a virtual environment.” The somewhat self-congratulatory tone surrounding many of the recent reforms indicates that that risk is alive and well in Ontario.

Simply moving hearings online is a missed opportunity to take a more sophisticated approach to the civil litigation process, and cure many of its ills along the way. Jurisdictions such as British Columbia and England & Wales have taken an innovative approach to the resolution of certain disputes, and Ontario would do well to learn from them.

B. ONLINE COURTS – A TRUE TRANSFORMATION FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE

153. Amy Salyzyn, “Trial by Zoom’: What Virtual Hearings Might Mean for Open Courts, Participant Privacy and the Integrity of Court Proceedings” (17 April 2020), online: Slaw <www.slaw.ca/2020/04/17/trial-by-zoom-what-virtual-hearings-might-mean-for-open-courts-participant-privacy-and-the-integrity-of-court-proceedings>; CJC Report, supra note 151; Nuffield Family Justice Observatory, Remote hearings in the family justice system: a rapid consultation (NFJO, 2020). These publications raised concerns about virtual hearings involving self-represented litigants, as well as the “open court” principle, issues regarding the “digital divide” (access for those without the resources to purchase required technology), and privacy. Salyzyn notes that videoconferencing can have potentially adverse impacts on credibility assessments and emotional connections between courtroom participants.


156. Moudgil, supra note 147.
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ontario’s civil justice system moved from physical courtrooms to virtual hearings. This is one small step in the right direction. A giant leap, however, would be the use of online courts. Richard Susskind defines online courts as “an online service to which appropriate cases will be allocated; a court with a simplified body of rules; constructed from the ground up on the back of technology rather [than] grafting technology onto existing court processes; and designed to be accessible to non-lawyers.”

The simplification of processes and the use of technology to transform civil justice, instead of simply facilitating existing processes, is the key to addressing issues of cost, delay, and accessibility. This is exemplified in the BC CRT, which has four stages to its process:

**Stage one – Exploration:** The Solution Explorer is a web-based system that guides parties as to the nature of their legal problem and potential solutions. This provides self-help tools that may help solve the problem before it becomes a fully-fledged dispute. If further help from the CRT is required, then a case will formally be started.

**Stage two – Negotiation:** The opportunity to negotiate directly with the other party in order to resolve the matter, with little intervention from the CRT.

**Stage three – Facilitation:** A CRT facilitator helps the parties come to a consensual agreement.

**Stage four – Adjudication:** A CRT member adjudicates the dispute and reaches a binding decision.

Each of these stages is remote (so that parties are not required to attend a physical courthouse) and asynchronous (so that parties can make submissions and deal with their disputes at times that are convenient to them). They increase accessibility, because they are designed to simplify the process and guide self-represented litigants with plain language and pre-populated forms. They also reduce cost, because they “triage” disputes such that dispute resolution by an adjudicator is the step of last resort. Finally, they reduce delay, because, if the

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157. Susskind, supra note 4 at 63.
158. Salter & Thompson 2017, supra note 17 at 128-34. These cover three areas of Susskind’s four-stage process: dispute avoidance, dispute containment, and dispute resolution. See Susskind, supra note 4 at 114. The Solution Explorer also touches on Susskind’s fourth stage: legal health promotion (helping people know about the benefits and remedies to which the law entitles them).
159. Stages 1 and 2 help users understand the relevant law and the options available to them, and also offer negotiation and early neutral evaluation. In this sense, the CRT fits within Susskind’s definition of an extended court. See Susskind, supra note 4 at 6, 61.
dispute is not resolved early on in the process, then the issues are sufficiently narrowed by the last stage that a determination can be arrived at relatively quickly.

The CRT recently reached its first decision on liability and damages in a motor vehicle accident (MVA) dispute, with the decision being released just ten months after the MVA itself:160 three times faster than an almost identical case that had previously been decided by the Supreme Court of British Columbia,161 and three times faster than the resolution of the average civil claim in the ONSC.162 Simpler claims before the CRT are resolved in an average time of 3.5 months:163 four times faster than the resolution of a claim in Ontario’s Small Claims Court.164 This is justice at light speed.165 Those who argue that it is too fast must contend with the proportionality principle: that the amount of time and money spent on a dispute must be proportionate to the amount involved and the importance and complexity of the issues. As noted above, cost and time are also elements of justice.

C. AN ONLINE COURT FOR ONTARIO

Ontario should address the cost and delay endemic to its civil justice system by adopting British Columbia’s approach. In doing so, the MAG should be guided by lessons from the failure of the IJP and similar projects,166 as well as the success of the CRT. These lessons can be summarized as follows:

First, start small. Grandiose projects like the IJP leave a lot of room for failure, and are much more prone to unrealistic timelines and costs projections.167

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165. Since the CRT began operations, notices of objection have been filed in 2.5 per cent of all small claims disputes, and appeals have been filed in 2.5 per cent of all strata disputes. See “CRT Statistics Snapshot – November 2019,” online: CRT <civilresolutionbc.ca/crt-statistics-snapshot-november-2019> [perma.cc/3DMY-R4WP].
166. As noted above, British Columbia and New Brunswick also failed in their attempts to integrate their justice systems, around the time of the failure of the IJP: Baar, supra note 70 at 45-46, 49-52, 54. Richard Susskind describes the failure of similar projects in England & Wales: supra note 4 at 243-44.
167. The MAG seems to have implicitly acknowledged this, as changes in the last fifteen years or so have been incremental and largely restricted to certain sectors of the civil justice system: for example, the Digital Hearing Workspace for the Commercial List in the Toronto Region (introduced in March 2019), and the Online System for Court Attendance Reservations (OSCAR) piloted on the Estates List in October 2007 and expanded to the Commercial List by early 2009.
The MAG would be wise to heed Richard Susskind’s “call for realism and humility” and focus on a small, manageable area in which to pilot an online court. Piloting allows new systems to be tested and then refined with feedback from users, which is what the CRT has done and continues to do.

Second, start with low-value claims. The jurisdiction of the CRT includes small claims up to $5,000 and strata (condominium) disputes. Now the tribunal has been operating effectively for several years, its jurisdiction has expanded to include motor vehicle accidents (MVAs) up to a value of fifty-thousand dollars, and it will soon cover almost all MVA personal injury claims. As Susskind has noted, “so-called ‘disruptive technologies’ … are most successful when they start experimentally and modestly at the lower end of any given market,” so that the impact of any errors or issues is minimized. As the systems become refined and enhanced, they can take on more complex work, and “[i]n time, they become the standard way of working.”

Third, start new. While I conclude in this article that, for the time being, modernization is likely to stop at the digitization of current court processes, there is no reason why a fully online tribunal for certain claims could not be established at the same time. In fact, this is almost exactly what Susskind recommends. That would avoid many of the problems with “tinkering” and institutional malaise described above, and would enable the capture of data (so that the system could be tested and refined) in a way that is not possible in the current system.

Disseminating data about the tribunal’s work would also promote the open court system.
principle. The exclusion of lawyers (as in the CRT’s small claims and strata disputes) would avoid the problems with professional capture of new processes.

Fourth, start nimble. Bespoke IT solutions generally prove cumbersome and expensive. The CRT is proof that the risk of government technology failure, as well as the glacial pace of traditional procurement processes, can be minimized by using an off-the-shelf platform and then customizing it. In the CRT’s case, its case management system is powered by Salesforce, which was customized by local software design and development companies to create the Solution Explorer and the CRT’s communications portal. In Ontario in the wake of COVID-19, courts have begun to abandon older technology such as CourtCall in favour of newer, widely available, and enormously popular solutions like Zoom. Any off-the-shelf platform must also take into account privacy concerns. While the use of Zoom initially raised such concerns, password protection and the introduction of end-to-end encryption seem to have alleviated them.

Based on these lessons, the MAG would be well advised to circumvent the court system altogether and create an entirely new tribunal to handle certain types of claims, as happened in BC. Such a tribunal could be established relatively quickly, using customized off-the-shelf software, and rely on filing fees for a good part of its revenue. It would also be self-contained and restricted in scope, thereby reducing its potential for failure.

Participation in the tribunal would be voluntary, so that litigants concerned about procedural fairness can still utilize the traditional courts system. Concerns with procedural fairness could also be addressed by way of iterative user feedback. For example, through user satisfaction surveys, the CRT discovered that users find the Solution Explorer much more useful when they had someone to help them (a lawyer, friend, or family member). The CRT is now looking at the possibility

176. This is one of the reasons the CRT makes monthly “Statistics Snapshots” and annual reports available on its website.

177. See also Susskind, supra note 4 at 249. However, the example of the IJP again serves as a warning: in that case, most of the software for the new systems also consisted of “off-the-shelf” applications, but project management underestimated the time it would take to customize those applications and integrate them with other systems. In addition, four Ontario courts were already using one of the applications and had found it to be deficient; IJP project management knew the application was inadequate for use in the courts, yet inexplicably selected it anyway. See Auditor General’s Report 2001, supra note 67 at 76-77.

of making low-cost legal helpers available for users struggling with the process.\footnote{179} The CRT also makes an offline process available for those who have difficulties accessing the Internet,\footnote{180} and this should also be available in any online tribunal in Ontario in order to address concerns about the “digital divide”.\footnote{181}

I would suggest that, as in BC, the new tribunal should be focused entirely on small claims up to a certain figure. The thirty-five thousand dollar limit in Ontario’s small claims court would probably be too high—something closer to the CRT’s limit of five thousand dollars would be a better start—but the amount could be increased if the tribunal is a success (\textit{i.e.} if it attracts a significant number of litigants that would otherwise have gone to small claims court, and they are satisfied with the tribunal’s performance based on certain indicators). The new tribunal would be almost entirely online, and able to function without the need for in-person hearings. This would differentiate it from Ontario’s small claims court, which has suspended operations for non-urgent matters until 2 November 2020\footnote{182}—thereby barring access to justice for small claims for more than half a year.

VI. CONCLUSION – LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Given the limited prospects for fundamental reform in Ontario’s civil justice system, then, what hope is there for online courts in the province? If the backlog becomes as overwhelming as it did in British Columbia, the Attorney General may, as I have recommended in this article, choose to outsource smaller value civil claims to a separate online tribunal. It is unlikely that this will happen in the near future, however.\footnote{183} Justice priorities in the immediate future will almost certainly be focused on addressing the backlog by modernizing the existing court system.

\footnote{179} BC Civil Resolution Tribunal, “Study Update” (25 May 2020), online: CRT <https://civilresolution.trubox.ca/2020/05/25/study-update/>. The CRT states that the cost of lawyers means they are not a realistic solution.
\footnote{180} Salter, \textit{supra} note 171 at 114.
\footnote{181} This concept is defined \textit{supra} note 153.
\footnote{183} \textit{Contra} Jordan Furlong, “Pandemic III: Justice Reconstructed” (2 April 2020), online: Law21 <www.law21.ca/2020/04/pandemic-iii-justice-reconstructed>. Furlong predicts that, “by the end of this year, most Canadian provinces will have their own CRTs either in rapid development or up and running” (\textit{ibid}).
It therefore seems that reform will stop at the digitization of the existing system. That is a good start, but it is not sufficient. As Jordan Furlong has stated, “[y]ou can’t apply a Band-aid when you need a DNA replacement.” There is general agreement that the court system in Ontario has been too slow, too costly, and inaccessible for too long, and that the current crisis will only exacerbate the backlog. Moving current procedures online will not reduce this backlog and will only replicate the errors of the past. We need to do better and begin to fundamentally transform our justice system in the interests of those who come to it for the resolution of their disputes. It would do little good to modernize our courts, only to be left with a system that is as slow, expensive, and inaccessible as the old one.
