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Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction

Kent McNeil*

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Delgamuukw v. British Columbia*\(^1\) calls for re-examination of a number of significant Aboriginal rights issues. The crucial role of oral histories in Aboriginal rights litigation was emphasized by the Court, and guidelines were laid down for trial judges to admit and give proper weight to that evidence. For the first time the Court addressed the vital issue of the content of Aboriginal title and provided direction on how that title can be proved.\(^2\) The Court also dealt with the constitutional protection accorded to Aboriginal title by s. 35(1) of the *Constitution Act, 1982*\(^3\) and explained how infringements of that title can be justified. Finally, the Court discussed the issue of the division of powers.
between the Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures in relation to Aboriginal rights. This last issue will be the focus of this article. I will attempt to show that the Court's pronouncements on this issue result in a fundamental realignment of constitutional jurisdiction within the provinces where Aboriginal title can be established.

I. THE DELGAMUUKW DECISION IN THE BRITISH COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEAL

It is worth looking at the treatment of the division of powers issue by the British Columbia Court of Appeal because Macfarlane J.A., in his majority judgment, dealt with the issue in more detail than the Supreme Court of Canada. Moreover, Lamer C.J.C., delivering the leading judgment in the Supreme Court, explicitly adopted some of Macfarlane J.A.'s reasons and reached the same conclusions. Both judges discussed the issue of federal and provincial jurisdiction in the context of extinguishment of Aboriginal title.

4 A further issue, namely whether the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en have a constitutional right of self-government, though dealt with in the lower courts, was not addressed by the Supreme Court. In Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 266, Lamer C.J.C. reasoned:

The errors of fact made by the trial judge, and the resultant need for a new trial, make it impossible for this Court to determine whether the claim to self-government has been made out. Moreover, this is not the right case for the Court to lay down the legal principles to guide future litigation.


6 Taggart J.A. concurred with Macfarlane J.A. Wallace J.A. wrote a concurring judgment, in which he said that he was “in complete agreement with the reasons and conclusions expressed by Mr. Justice Macfarlane in his reasons on this issue” (i.e., the issue of extinguishment, which includes within it the issue of federal and provincial jurisdiction relating thereto): ibid. at 595. Lambert J.A., dissenting in part, came to the same conclusions as Macfarlane J.A. on the issue of post-Confederation jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title: ibid. at 679-81. Hutcheon J.A., also dissenting in part, did not deal with this issue directly, but did agree with at least some of Macfarlane J.A.'s treatment of the subject: ibid. at 753.

7 Cory and Major JJ. concurred with Lamer C.J.C. La Forest J., L'Heureux-Dubé J. concurring, delivered a judgment arriving at the same result as the Chief Justice, but differing somewhat on the issues of content and proof of Aboriginal title. On the issue discussed in this article, La Forest J. said, “I agree with the Chief Justice's conclusion. The respondent province had no authority to extinguish aboriginal rights either under the Constitution Act, 1867 or by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act [R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5]”: Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 284. McLachlin J. concurred with the Chief Justice, and added that she was “also in substantial agreement with the comments of Justice La Forest”: ibid. Gonthier and Iacobucci JJ. did not sit on the case, and Sopinka J. took no part in the judgment.

8 Note that the Court of Appeal unanimously reversed McEachern C.J.'s holding at trial, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) at 462-78, that Aboriginal title in British Columbia was generally extinguished before the province joined Canada in 1871: Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 525-31 per Macfarlane J.A.; ibid. at 595 per Wallace J.A.; ibid. at 673-79 per Lambert J.A. (dissenting on other grounds); and, ibid. at 753-54 per Hutcheon J.A. (dissenting on other grounds). This resolved the uncertainty on this issue left by the split Court in Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313. While the matter was not specifically addressed in Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), it is evident from Lamer C.J.C. and La Forest J.'s judgments that they agreed with the Court of Appeal on this, as
When British Columbia joined Canada in 1871, subject to the Terms of Union, the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, including the division of powers in ss. 91 and 92, became applicable to the new province. Section 91(24) assigns exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” to the Parliament of Canada. So the first issue Macfarlane J.A. faced in this context was whether that conferral of legislative authority includes jurisdiction over lands held by Aboriginal title. He decided that it does, relying on the decision of the Privy Council in St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen, where Lord Watson stated:

[T]he words actually used [in s. 91(24)] are, according to their natural meaning, sufficient to include all lands reserved, upon any terms or conditions, for Indian occupation. It appears to be the plain policy of the Act that, in order to ensure uniformity of administration, all such lands, and Indian affairs generally, shall be under the legislative control of one central authority.

In this regard, Macfarlane J.A.’s decision went a significant step beyond St. Catherine’s, as in that case Lord Watson had based the Indian title of the Saulteaux Tribe on the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which specifically reserved lands for the use of the Indian nations or tribes. After St. Catherine’s, if there they treated Aboriginal title as a property right that exists in British Columbia today where established by the requisite proof.

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10 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.


12 (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 59; as quoted in Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 534 [Macfarlane J.A.’s emphasis]. Macfarlane J.A. also relied on Strong J.’s dissenting judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada in that case, (1886), 13 S.C.R. 577 at 615, which he quoted in part as follows: “Lands reserved for the Indians’ embrace ‘all territorial rights of Indians, as well as those in lands actually appropriated for reserves’” [Macfarlane J.A.’s emphasis]. But note that, while the federal government has jurisdiction over “Lands reserved for the Indians”, Lord Watson decided in St. Catherine’s that the underlying title to those lands (special agreement or constitutional provision apart) is held by the provinces by virtue of s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

were Aboriginal title lands beyond the territorial scope of the *Proclamation* that were not otherwise reserved for the Indians, it could still be argued that those lands were not covered by s. 91(24). When Macfarlane J.A. decided that the *Proclamation* does not apply in British Columbia, but held nonetheless that lands subject to Aboriginal title in the province are "Lands reserved for the Indians", he implicitly rejected that argument.

In addition to the authority of the *St. Catherine's* decision, Macfarlane J.A. relied on a policy argument to conclude that Aboriginal title lands are under federal jurisdiction by virtue of s. 91(24):

Secondly, it is a sensible result which places the power to block improvident dispositions, or outright expropriation, of Indian lands in the hands of the legislature which was made responsible for Indian welfare generally. Indeed, if the division of powers did not remove the power to extinguish aboriginal title from provincial hands, the federal government could find itself unable to protect this crucial native interest and forced to guarantee Indian welfare by other means. It would be an absurd result to find the provinces with the competence to make the federal obligation to Indians more onerous.16

As the federal government has responsibility for Indian welfare,17 it must have the power to protect Aboriginal rights. Those rights include, but are not limited to, Aboriginal title to land (an Aboriginal right to fish, for example,

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15 *Delgamuukw* (C.A.), supra note 5 at 521; see also *ibid.* at 593-95 per Wallace J.A.; compare *ibid.* at 732-36 per Lambert J.A. (dissenting in part) and *ibid.* at 751-52 per Hutcheon J.A. (dissenting in part). Note that, in *Calder, supra* note 8, the Supreme Court split 3:3 on the issue of the application of the *Royal Proclamation* in British Columbia. The issue was not dealt with by the Supreme Court in *Delgamuukw* (S.C.C.).
16 *Delgamuukw* (C.A.), supra note 5 at 534-35.
17 See *Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band*, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 at 123, 126, where La Forest J. referred to "the federal Crown's plenary responsibility respecting 'Indian Lands'" and "its obligations to native peoples, be it pursuant to its treaty commitments, or its responsibilities flowing from s. 91(24)." See also *ibid.* at 105, 108-109, where Dickson C.J.C., concurring, also spoke of "the constitutional responsibility of Parliament for Indians and Indian lands", and added, "since 1867, the Crown's role has been played, as a matter of federal division of powers, by Her Majesty in right of Canada, with the *Indian Act* representing a confirmation of the Crown's historic responsibility for the welfare and interests of these peoples." See also *Roberts v. Canada*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, especially at 337, where Wilson J. for a unanimous Court said, in the context of the Indian right to occupy and use reserve lands, that the provisions of the *Indian Act*, "while not constitutive of the obligations owed to the Indians by the Crown, codify the pre-existing duties of the Crown toward the Indians."
can exist independently of Aboriginal land rights). Macfarlane J.A. clearly recognized the potential breadth of this federal jurisdiction, as he thought "the federal power found in s. 91(24) has several facets and may well embrace jurisdiction over all aboriginal rights." He found support for this in Roberts v. Canada where, in his words, "Wilson J., for a unanimous five-judge bench, held that the common law of aboriginal title underlying the fiduciary obligations of the Crown to Indian Bands comes within the term 'laws of Canada' in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867." Indeed, given the decision in Roberts that the law of Aboriginal title is federal common law because of s. 91(24), Macfarlane J.A.'s conclusion that "[a]t the very least Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over aboriginal rights in land" seems almost inescapable.

Having reached that conclusion, Macfarlane J.A. went on to consider whether "valid provincial legislation [can] extinguish aboriginal rights in land by the incidental effect of a valid grant of an interest in land, including natural resources." He acknowledged that "valid provincial legislation may apply to Indians, so long as it is a law of general application and not one that affects their Indianness, or their status, or their core values." He continued:

The proposition that provincial laws could extinguish Indian title by incidental effect must be examined in light of an appropriate understanding of the federal immunity relating to Indians and of the aboriginal perspective. The traditional homelands of aboriginal people are integral to their traditional way of life and their self-concept. If the effect of provincial land legislation was to strip the aboriginal people of the use and occupation of their traditional homelands, it would be an impermissible intrusion into federal jurisdiction. Any provincial law purporting to extinguish aboriginal

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19 Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 535.
21 Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 535.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. Later in his judgment, Macfarlane J.A. expanded on this by recognizing that provincial laws of general application that do affect “Indianness” or the status or core values of Indians, while they cannot apply to Indians of their own force, can be referentially incorporated into federal law by s. 88 of the Indian Act: ibid. at 538-39. Section 88 will be discussed below in text accompanying notes 30-49, 72-81.
The plaintiffs' willingness to limit their claims to damages where Crown grants had been made thus allowed Macfarlane J.A. to avoid any final determination of the question of the validity of grants. He did, however, suggest a way for them to be effective, namely by relying on s. 88 of the *Indian Act* and the doctrine of referential incorporation. Section 88 provides:

Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation, or by-law made thereunder, and

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25 Ibid. at 536.
26 Ibid. at 537.
27 Ibid. at 535.
28 Ibid. at 537.
29 Ibid.
except to the extent that such laws make provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under this Act.\textsuperscript{30}

Case law has held that the effect of s. 88 is to make provincial laws of general application that would not otherwise apply to Indians because they touch on either their status or capacity, or their "Indianness", apply to them by referentially incorporating those provincial laws into federal law.\textsuperscript{31} However, Macfarlane J.A. was of the view that s. 88 did not authorize the \textit{extinguishment} of Aboriginal rights by provincial legislation, as that would require clear and plain Parliamentary intent, which he found to be lacking.\textsuperscript{32} But he did suggest that s. 88 might authorize the \textit{infringement} of Aboriginal rights. He put it this way:

Aboriginal rights fall within the ambit of the core values of Indians described above, and to which s. 88 has been held to apply. Thus s. 88, while not authorizing extinguishment of aboriginal rights, may authorize provincial interference with aboriginal rights; provincial laws may affect, regulate, diminish, impair or suspend the exercise of an aboriginal right. Of course, the operation of such incorporated laws is subject to s. 35 of the \textit{Constitution Act, 1982}.

In short, provincial land and resource laws affecting aboriginal rights may be given force as federal laws through the operation of s. 88 of the \textit{Indian Act}.\textsuperscript{33}

With all due respect, I think Macfarlane J.A.'s conclusions in this last quotation suffer from two oversights. First of all, if s. 88 does not authorize extinguishment of Aboriginal rights because there is no clear and plain Parliamentary intent to that effect, where is the clear and plain intent that s. 88 was meant to permit provincial laws to "diminish, impair or suspend the exercise" of Aboriginal rights? Or does the clear and plain test not apply to infringements of Aboriginal rights that fall short of extinguishment?

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{30} \textit{Supra} note 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} \textit{Delgamuukw} (C.A.), \textit{supra} note 5 at 539.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid}.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In his discussion of the test, Macfarlane J.A. related it specifically to extinguishment, without limiting its application to that context. He found the test to be rooted in the well-known presumption against interpreting legislation as interfering with property and other vested rights unless the statute is incapable of any other construction. He relied, for example, on *Spooner Oils Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board*, where Duff C.J.C. said:

A legislative enactment is not to be read as prejudicially affecting accrued rights, or “an existing status”..., unless the language in which it is expressed requires such a construction. The rule is described by Coke as a “law of Parliament”..., meaning, no doubt, that it is a rule based on the practice of Parliament; the underlying assumption being that, when Parliament intends prejudicially to affect such rights or such a status, it declares its intention expressly, unless, at all events, that intention is plainly manifested by unavoidable inference.34

Macfarlane J.A. expressed the view that “the clear and plain test should be applied with as much vigour to aboriginal title as it is to traditional property rights.”35 He found support for this approach in “the special relationship between the Crown and aboriginal people which has existed since the assertion of sovereignty” and the need to uphold “the honour of the Crown.”36 He concluded:

The clear and plain test, whether applied to vested rights, property rights, or aboriginal rights, ensures respect for and protection of those special rights. Although aboriginal rights cannot be easily described in terms of English property law, they are to be regarded as unique and important. But, like vested rights and property rights, they may be impaired or extinguished with or without compensation by a clear and plain exercise of competent legislative


35 *Delgamuukw (C.A.)*, *supra* note 5 at 523.

power. However, the legislative intention to do so will be implied only if the interpretation of the statute permits no other result.\(^{37}\)

From this, there appears to be no reason why the clear and plain test should be applied any less rigorously to infringement than it is to extinguishment of Aboriginal title.\(^{38}\)

Second, by saying that "provincial land and resource laws affecting aboriginal rights may be given force as federal laws through the operation of s. 88",\(^{39}\) Macfarlane J.A. inferred that s. 88 referentially incorporates provincial laws of general application that touch on Aboriginal land rights. In fact, in the many cases involving s. 88 that have reached the Supreme Court of Canada, it has never been held that the section has that effect. The Supreme Court specifically avoided the question in *Derrickson v. Derrickson*.\(^{40}\) Moreover, in *Corporation of Surrey v. Peace Arch*\(^{41}\) the British Columbia Court of Appeal unanimously held that provincial laws relating to use of lands do not apply on Indian reserves, as the use of reserve lands is within exclusive federal jurisdiction over "Lands reserved for the Indians". Section 88 was not even mentioned in the *Peace Arch* decision, presumably because it was not considered to be relevant. It was, however, referred to in *R. v. Isaac*, where MacKeigan C.J.N.S., after relying on *Peace Arch* to conclude that reserve land use comes within exclusive federal jurisdiction, said this:

Section 88 merely declares that valid provincial laws of general application to residents of a province apply also to Indians in the province. It does not make applicable to Indian reserve land a provincial game law which would have the effect of regulating use of that land by Indians. It does not enlarge the constitutional

\(^{37}\) Ibid. at 524-25 [emphasis added].

\(^{38}\) Note that in leading Supreme Court of Canada decisions on s. 88 of the *Indian Act*, such as *Kruger v. The Queen*, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 and *Dick*, supra note 31 at 315, neither Aboriginal title nor other Aboriginal rights were in issue. Consequently, the Court has not yet dealt with the question of whether s. 88 clearly and plainly authorizes infringements of Aboriginal rights falling short of extinguishment.

\(^{39}\) *Delgamuukw (C.A.)*, supra note 5 at 539 [emphasis added].

\(^{40}\) [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285 [hereinafter *Derrickson (S.C.C.).*]. Notably, in the British Columbia Court of Appeal's unanimous decision that was affirmed by the Supreme Court, it was held that s. 88 is inapplicable to Indian lands: *Derrickson v. Derrickson*, [1984] 3 C.N.L.R. 58 at 61 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter *Derrickson (C.A.)*]. Also, in *Cardinal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1974] S.C.R. 695 at 727, Laskin J. (as he then was), dissenting on other grounds, said that s. 88 "deals only with Indians, not with Reserves."

\(^{41}\) (1970), 74 W.W.R. 380, cited with apparent approval in *Cardinal*, ibid. at 704-705 per Martland J. (for the majority) and ibid. at 718-19 per Laskin J. (dissenting on other grounds).
The scope of the provincial law which is limited by the federal exclusivity of power respecting such land.\textsuperscript{42}

The reason why s. 88 is not generally regarded as including provincial laws relating to land is that the section refers only to the application of provincial laws to Indians, not to Indian lands. When this omission is coupled with the fact that s. 91(24) of the \textit{Constitution Act, 1867} contains not one but two heads of power—"Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians"\textsuperscript{43}—the legislative intent seems to have been to limit referential incorporation to provincial laws affecting Indians and to exclude provincial laws touching on Indian lands. This interpretation of s. 88 is supported by the well-established rule that statutes affecting Aboriginal peoples should be generously and liberally construed, and any ambiguities resolved in their favour.\textsuperscript{44} If it contains ambiguity, s. 88 should therefore be interpreted so that referential incorporation extends only to provincial laws of general application that affect Indians, not Indian lands.\textsuperscript{45}

There is a further reason why the scope of s. 88 should be limited as much as possible. As Macfarlane J.A. said, the honour of the Crown is at stake in its dealings with the Aboriginal peoples.\textsuperscript{46} How would that honour be upheld by Parliamentary delegation of authority to the provinces to infringe Aboriginal rights through the mechanism of referential incorporation?


\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America}, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031 at 1049-50 \textit{per} Beetz J. [emphasis in original].


Would this not be a dishonourable abdication of the responsibility that was placed primarily on the federal government by s. 91(24) of the _Constitution Act, 1867_? To avoid this result, a generous and liberal interpretation of s. 88, in favour of Aboriginal peoples, would limit referential incorporation to provincial laws that touch on Indianness without infringing Aboriginal rights.  

To sum up, Macfarlane J.A. held that s. 91(24) gives Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over Aboriginal title lands. This led him to conclude that, since Confederation, the provincial legislatures have had no power to extinguish Aboriginal land rights. Moreover, s. 88 of the _Indian Act_ did not confer authority on the provinces to extinguish those rights, as that would require

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47 For judicial confirmation of this responsibility, see _supra_ note 17. Apparently, a major reason why jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” was assigned to Parliament in the first place was that the federal government would be further from local interests, and so was thought to be more likely to protect and deal fairly with the Aboriginal peoples (in other words, more likely to uphold the honour of the Crown); see D. Sanders, “Prior Claims: Aboriginal People in the Constitution of Canada” in S.M. Beck & I. Bernier, eds., _Canada and the New Constitution: The Unfinished Agenda_, vol. 1 (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983) 225 at 238; F.W. Hogg, _Constitutional Law of Canada_, 4th ed., vol. 1 (Toronto: Carswell, 1997-) para. 27-2. Also, empowering the provinces to infringe Aboriginal rights would allow them “to make the federal obligation to Indians more onerous” by diminishing those rights, avoidance of which was one of the reasons Macfarlane J.A. gave for concluding that, at the very least, s. 91(24) gives Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over Aboriginal land rights: _Delgamuukw (C.A.)_, _supra_ note 5 at 535; see text accompanying notes 16-22.

48 This is consistent with Supreme Court decisions in _Kruger_, _supra_ note 38, and _Dick_, _supra_ note 31, which involved provincial laws that were _not_ alleged to infringe Aboriginal rights. See especially _Dick_, _supra_ note 31 at 315. See also _Van der Peet_, _supra_ note 46 at 536-37, where Lamer C.J.C. related the interpretive principle in favour of Aboriginal peoples directly to the honour of the Crown. For an argument that, as a consequence of s. 35(1) of the _Constitution Act, 1982_, s. 88 is constitutionally invalid, see B. Slattery, “First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust” (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 261 at 284-86. Compare _R. v. Alphonse_, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 19 (B.C.C.A.), where Macfarlane J.A. held that s. 88 is not inconsistent with s. 35(1).

In a judgment concurred in by Taggart, Hutcheon, and Wallace J.J.A., Macfarlane J.A. decided that provincial laws infringing Aboriginal rights (in this case, a game law) can be referentially incorporated by s. 88, but only if the infringement is shown to be justified under the _Sparrow_ test (which the Crown in that case failed to do). Lambert J.A., concurring, did not address the issue of the constitutional validity of s. 88, as he held that a provincial law that infringes Aboriginal hunting rights is not referentially incorporated by s. 88 in any case because the infringement prevents it, in effect, from being a law of general application. Significantly, in his view, the intent of s. 88 was not to authorize infringements of Aboriginal rights, but to extend the benefits of provincial legislation to Indians on reserves, which was thought at the time to be prevented by the theory that reserves were enclaves where provincial laws could not apply of their own force. Lambert J.A., _ibid_. at 55, stated:

> It seems to me that the legislative purpose of s. 88, when it was enacted [in 1951, as s. 87], was to overcome the enclave theory with respect to laws that were broadly general in their application and so to extend to Indians the benefits of social and commercial legislation which were being extended to all other people in the province in enactments dealing with such things as credit, insurance, the family, and the acquisition of goods.

a clear and plain intention which is not revealed by s. 88. However, Macfarlane J.A. seems to have thought that, at least prior to the enactment of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, provincial laws of general application, either of their own force or by referential incorporation into federal law by s. 88, could infringe Aboriginal land rights without actually extinguishing them. For reasons elaborated above, this appears to be inconsistent with his views on extinguishment. In any event, he did not reach a final conclusion on the matter of infringement, as, in his words, "[t]he record in this case and the submissions which have been made are not sufficiently specific to permit the detailed and complex analysis which is required. I think the parties are correct in saying that these issues are ripe for negotiation and reconciliation." 49

II. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

As mentioned earlier, Lamer C.J.C., in the leading Supreme Court judgment in Delgamuukw, came to virtually the same conclusions as Macfarlane J.A. on the issue of federal and provincial jurisdiction. He discussed this issue in the context of the following question: "Did the province [of British Columbia] have the power to extinguish aboriginal rights after 1871, either under its own jurisdiction or through the operation of s. 88 of the Indian Act?" 50 To answer this question, he first looked at federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 which, as we have seen, assigned exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" to the Parliament of Canada.

Separating that assignment of jurisdiction into its two constituent parts, Lamer C.J.C. examined first the meaning of "Lands reserved for the Indians". Like Macfarlane J.A., he found the issue of whether those words include lands held by Aboriginal title as well as Indian reserves to have been settled by the Privy Council in the St. Catherine's case. Having reached the conclusion that s. 91(24) "carries with it the jurisdiction to legislate in relation to aboriginal title," the Chief Justice said, "[i]t follows, by implication, that it also confers the jurisdiction to extinguish that title." 51 Since that jurisdiction is exclusive, the provinces have no power to extinguish Aboriginal title directly.

The government of British Columbia tried to avoid this result by arguing that, by virtue of s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Crown in right of

49 Delgamuukw (C.A.), supra note 5 at 533. To this, Macfarlane J.A. added that, where there are competing interests, the various parties whose rights might be affected should be represented.
50 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 267.
51 Ibid. at 268.
the province has the underlying title to lands held by Aboriginal title, and that "this right of ownership carried with it the right to grant fee simples which, by implication, extinguish aboriginal title, and so by negative implication excludes aboriginal title from the scope of s. 91(24)."52 Lamer C.J.C. rejected this convoluted argument because it failed to take account of the language of s. 109, which he quoted as follows:

All Lands, Mines, Minerals and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces of Canada...at the Union...shall belong to the several Provinces...subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the Province in the same.53

Commenting on this section, the Chief Justice said:

Although that provision vests underlying title in provincial Crowns, it qualifies provincial ownership by making it subject to "any Interest other than that of the Province in the same". In St. Catherine's Milling, the Privy Council held that aboriginal title was such an interest, and rejected the argument that provincial ownership operated as a limit on federal jurisdiction. The net effect of that decision, therefore, was to separate the ownership of lands held pursuant to aboriginal title from jurisdiction over those lands. Thus, although on surrender of aboriginal title the province would take absolute title, jurisdiction to accept surrenders lies with the federal government. The same can be said of extinguishment—although on extinguishment of aboriginal title, the province would take complete title to the land, the jurisdiction to extinguish lies with the federal government.54

The significance of this last passage from Lamer C.J.C.'s judgment goes well beyond the issue of jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title. By affirming that Aboriginal title is an interest in land within the meaning of s. 109, the Chief Justice made clear that it is a legally protected property right.55 So even if the provinces had jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title prior to the enactment of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, exercise

52 Ibid.
53 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 10; as quoted in Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), ibid. at 268.
54 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), ibid. at 268-69.
55 Other passages from his judgment confirm this. See, e.g., ibid. at 252: "What aboriginal title confers is the right to the land itself."
of that jurisdiction would be a violation of the proprietary rights of the holders of that title. In the absence of clear and plain statutory authority, that could not be done by issuance of a Crown grant, as the Crown generally does not have prerogative power to abrogate or derogate from property or other legal rights. Taken to its logical conclusion, the argument of the British Columbia government would mean that the province could extinguish the real property rights of anyone in British Columbia simply by granting their lands to someone else. Not since Magna Carta has the Crown had that kind of power.


57 In its Supreme Court of Canada Factum, 30 March 1997 at 12-17, cross-appealing on the issue of the province’s jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title, British Columbia supported its remarkable claim of power to extinguish that title by grant by reference to United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Ry. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 (Aust. H.C.); and Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996), 141 A.L.R. 129 (Aust. H.C.). However, examination of American case law, including the Santa Fe Pacific case, reveals that, ever since the decision of Marshall C.J. in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), the position in the United States has been that grants of land held by Aboriginal title do not extinguish that title; rather, they take effect subject to it: see F.S. Cohen, “Original Indian Title” (1947) 32 Minnesota L. Rev. 28; K. McNeil, “Extinguishment of Native Title: The High Court and American Law” (1997) 2 A.I.L.R. 365. As for the Mabo and Wik decisions, they do support British Columbia’s claim, but only by treating Native title in a racially discriminatory way that does not accord it the same common law protection as non-Indigenous land rights in Australia: see McNeil, “Racial Discrimination”, supra note 34. (Of course, the Delgamuukw decision makes the extinguishment aspect of those Australian decisions inapplicable in Canada for division of powers reasons as well, as provincial statutes containing authority to extinguish Aboriginal title by grant would encroach on exclusive federal jurisdiction: see infra notes 59-81 and accompanying text.) Moreover, in its Cross-Appeal Factum the province did not support its claim of power to extinguish Aboriginal title by grant by any post-Confederation statutory authority (I suspect that one would search in vain for legislation in any province that would authorize such arbitrary and unprecedented violations of property rights).

58 Magna Carta, 1215 (Eng.), 17 John, c. 29, provided that “[n]o Freeman shall...be disseised of his Freehold...but by lawful Judgement of his Peers, or by the law of the Land.” As Lord Parmoor stated in Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508 at 569 (H.L.), “[s]ince Magna Carta the estate of a subject in lands or buildings has been protected against the prerogative of the Crown.”
But as we have seen, Lamer C.J.C. held in *Delgamuukw* that, since Confederation, the provinces have lacked even the *legislative* authority to extinguish Aboriginal title. In addition to the authority of the *St. Catherine's* decision, the Chief Justice used the same policy argument as Macfarlane J.A., namely that

separating federal jurisdiction over Indians from jurisdiction over their lands would have a most unfortunate result—the government vested with primary constitutional responsibility for securing the welfare of Canada's aboriginal peoples would find itself unable to safeguard one of the most central of native interests—their interest in their lands.59

Lamer C.J.C. then went on to extend federal jurisdiction over “Lands reserved for the Indians” not just to Aboriginal title, but also to Aboriginal rights in relation to land that fall short of title. An Aboriginal right to fish in a particular location, for example, may be just as fundamental to Aboriginal peoples as title to the land itself, so exclusive federal jurisdiction must include power to legislate in relation to that kind of right as well.60

Having found “Lands reserved for the Indians” to include all Aboriginal land rights, Lamer C.J.C. turned to the meaning of “Indians” in s. 91(24). While acknowledging that the Court has not had occasion in the past to define the extent of federal jurisdiction over Indians, he said that “at the very least,” it includes a “core of Indianness” which is protected “from provincial intrusion, through the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.”61 That core of Indianness, he explained,

encompasses the whole range of aboriginal rights that are protected by s. 35(1). Those rights include rights in relation to land; that part of the core derives from s. 91(24)'s reference to “Lands reserved for the Indians”. But those rights also encompass practices, customs and traditions which are not tied to land as well; that part of the core can be traced to federal jurisdiction over “Indians”. Provincial governments are prevented from legislating in relation to both types of aboriginal rights.62

59 *Delgamuukw* (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 269.
60 Ibid.; referring to *Adams*, supra note 18.
61 *Delgamuukw* (S.C.C.), *ibid.* at 269.
Because "[l]aws which purport to extinguish those rights...touch the core of
Indianness which lies at the heart of s. 91(24)," such laws "are beyond the
legislative competence of the provinces to enact."63

Up to this point, we have been examining the portions of Lamer C.J.C.'s
judgment that deal with provincial inability to legislate directly in relation to
Indians or Indian lands, or, to put it another way, to single them out for
special treatment. He went on to acknowledge, however, that "notwithstanding
s. 91(24), provincial laws of general application apply proprio vigore to Indians
and Indian lands."64 For example, provincial labour relations laws and traffic
laws have been held to apply of their own force on Indian reserves.65 But the
question the Chief Justice said must be answered for the purposes of
Delgamuukw "is whether the same principle allows provincial laws of general
application to extinguish aboriginal rights."66 His answer to this was no, for
two reasons.

First, Lamer C.J.C. said that it takes "clear and plain" legislative intent to
eextinguish Aboriginal rights,67 and no provincial law could meet that test for
extinguishment without crossing the line into federal jurisdiction. He put it
this way:

My concern is that the only laws with the sufficiently clear and
plain intention to extinguish aboriginal rights would be laws in
relation to Indians and Indian lands. As a result, a provincial law
could never, proprio vigore, extinguish aboriginal rights, because
the intention to do so would take the law outside provincial
jurisdiction.68

Second, the Chief Justice said that "s.91(24) protects a core of federal
jurisdiction even from provincial laws of general application, through the
operation of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity."69 Aboriginal
rights, he said, "are part of the core of Indianness at the heart of s. 91(24)."70

63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
66 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 270 [emphasis added].
67 For discussion of this test, see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
68 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 271.
69 Ibid. [emphasis added].
70 Ibid. Lamer C.J.C. found support for this in his decision in Van der Peet, supra note 46, in
reference to which he said that the Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982, were described "as protecting the occupation of land and the
activities which are integral to the distinctive aboriginal culture of the group claiming the
right", ibid.
So even prior to the enactment of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, those rights “could not be extinguished by provincial laws of general application.”71

Lamer C.J.C. then turned to s. 88 of the Indian Act to see whether it authorizes extinguishment of Aboriginal rights by provincial laws of general application through referential incorporation of those laws into federal law. He pointed out that “s.88 does not ‘invigorate’ provincial laws which are invalid because they are in relation to Indians and Indian lands.”72 What s. 88 does, he explained, is extend “the effect of provincial laws of general application which cannot apply to Indians and Indian lands because they touch on the Indianness at the core of s. 91(24).”73 While the reference to Indian lands in these passages might be taken to imply that s. 88 makes the included provincial laws applicable to Indian lands as well as to Indians, I think that would be reading too much into Lamer C.J.C.’s words. We have seen that, although the Court in Derrickson left open the question of whether s. 88 makes provincial laws applicable to Indian lands, numerous court decisions, including decisions of at least three provincial courts of appeal, have held that the section does not have that effect.74 It is inconceivable that the Chief Justice intended to overrule those decisions with such vague language, without reference to them and without any discussion of the compelling arguments against such an interpretation.75

To the question of whether s. 88 authorizes extinguishment of Aboriginal rights by provincial laws of general application, Lamer C.J.C. answered in the negative because the section “does not evince the requisite clear and plain intent” to do that.76 He concluded his short discussion of this

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. at 272 [emphasis added].
73 Ibid. [emphasis added]; relying on Dick, supra note 31.
74 Supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
75 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. Also, Lamer C.J.C.’s decision in Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1, that Indian lands are not limited to reserves for the purposes of s. 91(24) in fact weighs against an interpretation of s. 88 that would make provincial laws of general application applicable to those lands. The provisions of the Indian Act relating to lands generally apply only to Indian reserves, not to Aboriginal title lands. Moreover, in its application to “Indians”, the Act, and hence s. 88, applies only to those persons who are within the definition of that term in the Act itself (usually referred to as status Indians); it does not apply to the whole category of “Indians” in s. 91(24), which includes non-status Indians, Inuit, and arguably Métis: see Hogg, supra note 47, paras. 27-3 to 27-4 and at note 64, para. 27-13; Alphonse, supra note 48 at 37-38 per Macfarlane J.A.; and ibid. at 61 per Lambert J.A. Section 88 cannot be interpreted to make provincial laws apply to Indian lands, including Aboriginal title lands, without excluding lands held by Aboriginal peoples like the Inuit who are outside the scope of the Act. This might lead to anomalous and discriminatory results, which could be avoided by excluding all Aboriginal lands (including reserves) from the reach of s. 88, an interpretation which is fully justified by the omission of any mention of Indian lands in the section.
76 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), ibid. at 272.
issue by adding: "I see nothing in the language of the provision which even suggests the intention to extinguish aboriginal rights. Indeed, the explicit reference to treaty rights in s. 88 suggests that the provision was clearly not intended to undermine aboriginal rights."\(^7\) This passage suggests not only that s. 88 does not authorize extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, but that it does not authorize infringement of those rights either, as that too would "undermine" those rights. As discussed above, this interpretation upholds the honour of the Crown,\(^7\) is consistent with the Court's jurisprudence on the section,\(^7\) and accords with both the general principle that legislative provisions are to be interpreted to preserve vested rights\(^8\) and the more specific principle that statutes relating to Aboriginal peoples are to be construed generously and liberally, and any ambiguities resolved in their favour.\(^8\)

To sum up, on my reading of Lamer C.J.C.'s discussion of federal and provincial jurisdiction over Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title and other rights in relation to land, ever since Confederation the provinces have lacked the power not only to extinguish, but also to infringe, those rights. Moreover, s. 88 of the Indian Act, while making provincial laws of general application apply to Indians by referential incorporation, does not authorize extinguishment of Aboriginal rights. Further, it has been held in numerous cases that s. 88 does not make any provincial laws apply to Indian lands, but even if the section did have that effect, it reveals no clear and plain intention to authorize infringement of Aboriginal title, or indeed of any Aboriginal rights, whether in relation to land or not.

However, when Lamer C.J.C.'s discussion of federal and provincial jurisdiction is compared with his discussion of infringement of Aboriginal rights and the test of justification for infringement in the context of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, I think that certain inconsistencies emerge. The Chief Justice began his discussion of infringement as follows: "The aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), including aboriginal title, are not absolute. Those rights may be infringed, both by the federal (e.g., Sparrow) and provincial (e.g., Côté) governments. However, s. 35(1) requires that those infringements satisfy the test of justification."\(^8\)

\(^{77}\) Ibid.
\(^{78}\) See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
\(^{79}\) See supra note 48.
\(^{80}\) See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
\(^{81}\) See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
\(^{82}\) Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 260.
Both Sparrow\textsuperscript{83} and Côte\textsuperscript{84} involved Aboriginal fishing rights, not Aboriginal title to land. In Côté, the accused Algonquins were charged, inter alia, with entering a controlled harvest zone without paying the fee required for motor vehicle access by Quebec's Regulation respecting controlled zones.\textsuperscript{85} Lamer C.J.C., writing the main judgment, found that the accused had established that they had an existing, site-specific Aboriginal right to fish for food within the controlled zone. Turning to the question of infringement, he decided that the provision in question did not infringe that right, as what it imposed was a user fee, applied to maintain the roads and facilities in the controlled zone, rather than a revenue-generating tax. As the fee actually improved transportation within the zone, he found that it "effectively facilitates rather than restricts the constitutional rights of the appellants."\textsuperscript{86}

For our purposes, what is interesting—and in my view disturbing—about the Côté decision is the ease with which the Chief Justice concluded that the justification test applies to provincial infringements of Aboriginal rights. He dealt with this in the following paragraph:

In Sparrow, the Court set out the applicable framework for identifying the infringement of an aboriginal right or treaty right under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. It should be noted that the test in Sparrow was originally elucidated in the context of a federal regulation which allegedly infringed an aboriginal right. The majority of recent cases which have subsequently invoked the Sparrow framework have similarly done so against the backdrop of a federal statute or regulation. See, e.g., Gladstone.\textsuperscript{87} But it is quite clear that the Sparrow test applies where a provincial law is alleged to have infringed an aboriginal or treaty right in a manner which cannot be justified: Badger,\textsuperscript{88} supra at para. 85 (application of Sparrow test to provincial statute which violated a treaty right). The text and purpose of s. 35(1) do not distinguish between federal and provincial laws which restrict aboriginal or treaty rights, and they should both be subject to the same standard of constitutional scrutiny.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{83} Supra note 44.
\textsuperscript{84} Supra note 18.
\textsuperscript{86} Côté, supra note 18 at 189.
\textsuperscript{88} Supra note 46.
\textsuperscript{89} Côté, supra note 18 at 185 [footnotes added].
What is missing here is any mention of the question of whether the provinces have constitutional authority to infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights, given exclusive federal jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians".\textsuperscript{90} This division of powers question logically precedes the issue of the applicability of the \textit{Sparrow} test, as that test obviously is not available to justify infringements by provincial laws that encroach on federal jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{91}

This takes us back to the \textit{Badger} decision, which Lamer C.J.C. relied on for his conclusion in \textit{Côté} that the \textit{Sparrow} test applies to provincial legislation. In \textit{Badger}, three Treaty 8 Cree Indians were tried on various charges of hunting moose out of season and without licences, contrary to provisions of the \textit{Alberta Wildlife Act}.\textsuperscript{92} They relied on their treaty right to hunt, para. 12 of the Alberta \textit{Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA)},\textsuperscript{93} and the constitutional protection accorded to their treaty rights by s. 35(1) of the \textit{Constitution Act, 1982}. A major issue in the case was whether their treaty right to hunt had been extinguished and replaced by para. 12 of the \textit{NRTA}, which provides:

\begin{quote}
In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the supply of game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that the laws respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the Indians within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that the said Indians shall have the right, which the Province hereby assures to them, of hunting, trapping and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons of the year on all unoccupied Crown lands and on any other lands to which the said Indians may have a right of access.
\end{quote}

Cory J., writing the principal judgment, decided that the treaty right had been modified, but not extinguished, by para. 12 of the \textit{NRTA}, and so was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{90} Note that Lamer C.J.C. did not even mention s. 88 of the \textit{Indian Act}, let alone rely on it, in the portion of his judgment dealing with provincial infringement of Aboriginal rights. He did, however, refer to s. 88 when he dealt with the issue of a possible treaty right to fish and the protection treaty rights are accorded by the section: see, \textit{infra} notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{91} See Slattery, \textit{supra} note 48 at 284-85. In \textit{Alphonse}, \textit{supra} note 48 at 37, Macfarlane J.A. stated that s. 35(1) analysis "stands as a separate and subsequent review, which is properly done after division of powers issues have been resolved" [emphasis added].
\item \textsuperscript{92} S.A. 1984, c. W-9.1.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Schedule (2) to the \textit{Constitution Act, 1930} (U.K.), 20-21 Geo. 5, c. 26, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 26. Note that the main purpose of this agreement, like equivalent agreements with Manitoba and Saskatchewan that were also given constitutional status by the \textit{Constitution Act, 1930}, was to transfer Crown lands and resources from the federal to the provincial governments, thereby putting the three prairie provinces in the same position as the other provinces in this respect.
\end{itemize}
recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) of the *Constitution Act, 1982*. After finding that this modified treaty right was infringed by the licensing provision of the *Wildlife Act*, he turned to the issue of justification:

> In my view justification of provincial regulations enacted pursuant to the *NRTA* should meet the same test for justification of treaty rights that was set out in *Sparrow*. The reason for this is obvious. The effect of para. 12 of the *NRTA* is to place the Provincial government in exactly the same position which the Federal Crown formerly occupied. Thus the Provincial government has the same duty not to infringe unjustifiably the hunting right provided by Treaty No. 8 as modified by the *NRTA*.

From this, it is apparent that the reason why Cory J. thought Alberta could avail itself of the *Sparrow* test of justification (unsuccessfully, as it turned out) was that the province had been given specific constitutional authority, by virtue of the *NRTA*, to legislate with respect to Indian hunting. Absent that...

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94 *Badger*, *supra* note 46 at 820. For commentary, particularly on the applicability of the justification test to infringements of treaty rights, see L.I. Rotman, "Defining Parameters: Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, and the *Sparrow* Justificatory Test" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 149.

95 Note, however, that although the *NRTA* has been in force since 1930 and numerous Supreme Court decisions involving the application of para. 12 have been decided, to my knowledge it had never been suggested by the Court prior to *Badger* that provincial infringements of the rights that are constitutionally guaranteed by that section could be justified: see discussion of the case law in K. McNeil, *Indian Hunting, Trapping and Fishing Rights in the Prairie Provinces of Canada* (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983) at 20-45. On the contrary, in *R. v. Strongquill* (1953), 8 W.W.R. (N.S.) 247 at 260 (Sask. C.A.), Gordon J.A. said in relation to para. 12 of the Saskatchewan *NRTA* (which is the same as para. 12 of the Alberta *NRTA*) that "Indians should be preserved before moose." This passage was cited with approval by Dickson J. (as he then was) in the unanimous judgment in *Kruger, supra* note 38 at 112: see *infra* note 97. See also *Prince and Myron v. R.*, [1964] S.C.R. 81, where the Supreme Court disregarded the conservation concerns expressed by the majority in the Manitoba Court of Appeal (1962), 40 W.W.R. 234. Compare *R. v. Horseman*, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, where Cory J. referred to conservation in reaching his conclusion that the words "for food" in para. 12 exclude commercial hunting. He did not, however, suggest that conservation could be used to justify infringements of Indian hunting that was for the purpose of obtaining food. On the contrary, *ibid.* at 934 he approvingly quoted and emphasized a statement by Laskin J. (as he then was) in *Cardinal, supra* note 40 at 722, regarding the "true effect" of para. 12: "Although inelegantly expressed s. 12 does not expand provincial legislative power but contracts it" (query how Cory J. was able to reconcile with this statement his decision in *Badger* that provincial infringements of para. 12 rights can be justified).

The irony of *Badger* is that constitutional *entrenchment* of Aboriginal and treaty rights by s. 35(1) of the *Constitution Act, 1982* has actually resulted in a *reduction* of the protection accorded to Indian hunting, trapping, and fishing rights by para. 12 of the *NRTA*. This has happened because the enactment of s. 35(1) led to creation by the Supreme Court in *Sparrow*, *supra* note 44, of a test to justify infringements of s. 35(1) rights. Prior to that, no one seems to have imagined that infringements of the constitutional rights guaranteed by para. 12 could be justified. But the creation of the justification test in *Sparrow* provided the Court in *Badger*
kind of authority, it is difficult to understand how the provinces could have any power to infringe Aboriginal or treaty rights, given exclusive federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*. If constitutional authority to infringe those rights is lacking, no justification is possible.

In *Côté*, Lamer C.J.C. pointed out that, in making provincial laws of general application apply to Indians subject, *inter alia*, to the terms of any treaty, s. 88 of the *Indian Act* does not expressly allow for justification of provincial infringements of treaty rights.96 Ironically, given the Chief Justice's view that the *Sparrow* test is available to justify provincial infringements of Aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35(1) of the *Constitution Act, 1982*, it may be that treaty rights are more fully protected under federal legislation than under the Constitution. But instead of leading Lamer C.J.C. to question the applicability of the justification test to provincial infringements in the context of s. 35(1), that anomalous result made him ponder whether an equivalent test should also be made available under s. 88.97 While leaving the matter open, he suggested that a legislative solution might be appropriate.

By taking the decision in *Badger* that the *Sparrow* test is available to justify provincial infringements of treaty rights out of the context of para. 12 of the *NRTA* and extending its availability to provincial legislation generally,

96 with an opportunity to apply the same test to para. 12, thereby diluting the constitutional protection of the *NRTA*. For more detailed discussion of the pre-*Badger* case law in relation to this issue, see K. McNeil, "Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 95 at 126-29.

97 If made available by the Court, that would involve rejecting the view expressed by Dickson J. in *Kruger*, supra note 38 at 112, in relation to s. 88, that if it could be shown that the Province has acted in such a way as to oppose conservation and Indian claims to the detriment of the latter—to 'preserve moose before Indians' in the words of Gordon J.A. in *R. v. Strongquill* [supra note 95]—it might very well be concluded that the effect of the legislation is to cross the line demarking laws of general application from other enactments.

See also *Alphonse*, supra note 48 at 60 per Lambert J.A.

Moreover, in *Simon v. The Queen*, supra note 44 at 413, Dickson C.J.C., for a unanimous Court, explicitly rejected that provincial game laws for the purpose of conservation applied to an Indian who was exercising his treaty right to hunt in Nova Scotia, as "it is clear that under s. 88 of the *Indian Act* provincial legislation cannot restrict native treaty rights. If conflict arises, the terms of the treaty prevail."

In *Badger*, supra note 46 at 818-19, Cory J. quoted this passage and then distinguished *Simon*:

The *Simon* case dealt with Provincial regulations which the government attempted to justify under s. 88 of the *Indian Act*. By contrast, in this case, para. 12 of the *NRTA* specifically provides that the provincial government may make regulations for conservation purposes, which affect the Treaty rights to hunt.

So while Cory J. was willing to extend the application of the justification test to provincial laws in the context of the *NRTA*, he acknowledged its inapplicability in the context of s. 88.
Lamer C.J.C. in Côté ignored the rationale Cory J. gave for making the test available in Badger. Without the kind of specific constitutional authority provided by para. 12, provincial infringements of Aboriginal and treaty rights should be *ultra vires*. This conclusion seems even more evident since Lamer C.J.C. decided in *Delgamuukw* that “aboriginal rights are part of the core of Indianness at the heart of s. 91(24)” of the *Constitution Act, 1867*. As he concluded from this that, even prior to 1982, “they could not be extinguished by provincial laws of general application,” they should not be infringeable by provincial legislation either, because that too would encroach on exclusive federal jurisdiction.

With all due respect, it seems to me that in *Delgamuukw*, Lamer C.J.C. did not really have his own views on exclusive federal jurisdiction in mind when he wrote the part of his judgment dealing with infringement of Aboriginal title. After making the general statement quoted above on infringement by federal and provincial governments, he looked at the components of the justification test itself. The test has two parts. First, the government attempting to justify the infringement must show it to be “in furtherance of a legislative objective that is compelling and substantial.” Second, the infringement must be “consistent with the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples.”

The Chief Justice discussed both parts of the test in a general way in the context of the *Sparrow* and *Gladstone* decisions, both of which involved infringement of Aboriginal fishing rights by federal legislation. He then said that “[t]he general principles governing...
justification laid down in *Sparrow*, and embellished by *Gladstone*, operate with respect to infringements of aboriginal title.*\(^{105}\)

Regarding the application of the first part of the test to infringements of Aboriginal title, Lamer C.J.C. stated:

In the wake of *Gladstone*, the range of legislative objectives that can justify the infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad. Most of these objectives can be traced to the *reconciliation* of the prior occupation of North America by aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty, which entails the recognition that "distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader social, political and economic community" ([*Gladstone*, supra note 87] at para. 73). In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of aboriginal title. Whether a particular measure or government act can be explained by reference to one of those objectives, however, is ultimately a question of fact that will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis.\(^{106}\)

For the purposes of this article, what is remarkable about this passage is that most of the activities mentioned—things like agriculture, forestry, and mining—are primarily within provincial jurisdiction by virtue of the constitutional division of powers. With respect, the Chief Justice seems to have assumed that British Columbia (and seemingly the other provinces as well) has constitutional authority to infringe Aboriginal title for these kinds of purposes, without considering whether that authority is consistent with the conclusion reached elsewhere in his judgment that the Canadian Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over Aboriginal title.

This discrepancy is all the more glaring when account is taken of Lamer C.J.C.'s description of Aboriginal title in *Delgamuukw*. He began his discussion of this by affirming that Aboriginal title is *sui generis*, in the sense that it is

\(^{105}\) *Delgamuukw* (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 263.

\(^{106}\) *Ibid.* at 263-64 [emphasis in original].
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unlike other interests in land recognized by the common law. Its uniqueness stems in part from its dual source in occupation of land prior to assertion of British sovereignty and in pre-existing systems of Aboriginal law. As a result, "its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it must be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal perspectives." 107

Two sui generis features of Aboriginal title mentioned by the Chief Justice are its inalienability, other than by surrender to the Crown, 108 and its communal nature. Regarding the latter, he said: "Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons; it is a collective right to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to that land are also made by that community." 109

Turning to the actual content of Aboriginal title, the Chief Justice said that it can be summarized by two propositions. First, "aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures." 110 Where Aboriginal title is concerned, Lamer C.J.C. thus modified the test he laid out in Van der Peet, by which other Aboriginal rights are limited to practices, customs, and traditions integral to the distinctive Aboriginal culture in question. 111 Second, there is an inherent limit on Aboriginal title that prohibits use of the land "in a manner that is irreconcilable with the nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis of the group's claim to aboriginal title." 112 This restriction is designed to maintain

107 Ibid. at 241.
108 Ibid. As we have seen, Lamer C.J.C. made clear that jurisdiction to accept surrenders lies with the federal government: see text accompanying note 54.
110 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), ibid. at 243.
112 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 246 [emphasis in original].
the continuity of an Aboriginal community's relationship with its lands in the future. In Lamer C.J.C.'s words, "uses of the lands that would threaten that future relationship are, by their very nature, excluded from the content of aboriginal title."113 However, he emphasized that this is not a limitation that restricts the use of the land to those activities that have traditionally been carried out on it. That would amount to a legal strait-jacket on aboriginal peoples who have a legitimate legal claim to the land. The approach I have outlined above allows for a full range of uses of the land, subject only to an overarching limit, defined by the special nature of the aboriginal title in that land.114

It is not my intention in this article to analyze the Chief Justice's general description of Aboriginal title.115 Instead, I want to focus on his conclusion that “aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land.”116 The inherent limit described above may place some restrictions on the range of uses the holders of Aboriginal title may make of their lands, but it does not diminish the exclusivity of their right to use and occupation.117 As Lamer C.J.C. said, “[e]xclusivity, as an aspect of aboriginal title, vests in the aboriginal community which holds the ability to exclude others from the lands held pursuant to that title.”118 So any intrusion on their lands, unless authorized by law, would be a violation of these rights and an actionable trespass.

The Chief Justice nonetheless said that this right to exclusive use and occupation can be intruded on by governments, as long as the action can be justified under the Sparrow test. It needs to be kept in mind that what he is envisaging here is infringement, not just of property rights, but of property rights that are constitutionally protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. He nonetheless suggested that “conferral of fee simples for agriculture, and of leases and licences for forestry and mining” may be justifiable infringements of Aboriginal title if they “reflect the prior occupation of aboriginal title lands.”119 This implies that governments can justifiably infringe

113 Ibid. at 247.
114 Ibid. at 249.
115 For a preliminary look at this, see McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights in Canada”, supra note 2.
116 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 243. See text accompanying note 110.
117 To give an analogy, nuisance and zoning laws restrict the uses that fee simple landholders may make of their lands but do not affect the exclusivity of their right to use and occupation.
118 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 258. See also ibid. at 259: “Exclusive possession is the right to exclude others.”
119 Ibid. at 264.
Aboriginal title by creating private interests in land that are inconsistent with Aboriginal titleholders' rights to exclusive use and occupation. With all due respect, this flies in the face of the protection the common law has always accorded to property rights, and makes the constitutionalization of Aboriginal title by s. 35(1) virtually meaningless.\textsuperscript{120}

When exclusive federal jurisdiction in relation to Aboriginal title is combined with Lamer C.J.C.'s description of the content of that title as the right to exclusive use and occupation, provincial authority to infringe Aboriginal title seems to be excluded. In \textit{Derrickson}, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the provisions of Part 3 of the British Columbia \textit{Family Relations Act}\textsuperscript{121} relating to division of family assets applied to lands on an Indian reserve. The appellant argued that "the pith and substance of the \textit{Family Relations Act} is the division of matrimonial property, not the use of Indian lands" and that the Act "in no way encroaches on the exclusive federal jurisdiction as to the use of Indian lands."\textsuperscript{122} Chouinard J., for the Court, rejected this argument. He expressly agreed with the following statement which he quoted from the Attorney General of Canada's factum:

\begin{quote}
In essence, Part 3 of the \textit{Family Relations Act} is legislation which regulates who may own or possess land and other property. Its true nature and character is to regulate the right to the beneficial use of property and its revenues and the disposition thereof.\textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

He accordingly held that the provisions of that Part, though of general application, could not apply of their own force to reserve lands, as the "right to possession of lands on an Indian reserve is manifestly of the very essence

\textsuperscript{120} Aboriginal title has constitutional protection that is not enjoyed by non-Aboriginal property rights in Canada, and so it should be much more secure against government interference. But even apart from its constitutional status, Aboriginal title is entitled to the legal protection against infringement accorded to all property rights by the common law: see McNeil, "Racial Discrimination", \textit{supra} note 34, especially at 182-90. Indeed, at least since \textit{Magna Carta}, property has been a fundamental common law right: see \textit{supra} notes 56, 58. Undoubtedly, there would be a public outcry in British Columbia if the legislature attempted to make a law authorizing the taking of privately-owned lands by conferral of fee simple interests on other individuals or of forestry or mining leases on private corporations (this would require clear and plain legislation: see text accompanying notes 34-38). Yet Lamer C.J.C. seems to think this would be acceptable where Aboriginal title is concerned, despite the fact that it has constitutional protection not enjoyed by other property rights. For further discussion, see K. McNeil, \textit{Defining Aboriginal Title in the 90's: Has the Supreme Court Finally Got It Right?} (Toronto: Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, York University), forthcoming.

\textsuperscript{121} R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121.
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Derrickson} (S.C.C.), \textit{supra} note 40 at 294.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Ibid.} at 295 [emphasis added].
of the federal exclusive legislative power under s. 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867."\textsuperscript{124}

By holding that Aboriginal title amounts to a right of exclusive use and
occupation and that Aboriginal title lands are "Lands reserved for the
Indians" for the purposes of s. 91(24), the Delgamuukw decision has extended
the application of Derrickson to those lands. So any provincial legislation
which regulates "the right to the beneficial use of property" or "who may
own or possess land"\textsuperscript{125} cannot apply of its own force to Aboriginal title
lands. Moreover, provincial laws that do not purport to transfer rights of use
or occupation, but do limit the ways property owners can use their lands,
have to be read down so that they do not apply to Aboriginal title lands. In
the Peace Arch decision, referred to earlier, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal held that zoning bylaws and building codes made by a municipality
under provincial statutory authority, and certain regulations made under the
provincial Health Act,\textsuperscript{126} "are directed to the use of land."\textsuperscript{127} MacLean J.A.,
for the Court, said that it follows from this:

[I]f these lands are "lands reserved for the Indians" within the
meaning of that expression as found in sec. 91(24) of the B.N.A.
Act, 1867 [now the Constitution Act, 1867], that provincial or
municipal legislation purporting to regulate the use of these
"lands reserved for the Indians" is an unwarranted invasion of the

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid. at 296. Chouinard J. went on to consider whether s. 88 of the Indian Act referentially
incorporated the provisions, and held that it did not, as they conflicted with provisions of the
Indian Act relating to possession of reserve lands (as we have seen, he did not decide whether
s. 88 even extends to provincial laws relating to land: see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying
R.H. Bartlett, "Indian Self-Government, the Equality of the Sexes, and Application of
Provincial Matrimonial Property Laws" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 188; M.E. Turpel,

\textsuperscript{125} Derrickson (S.C.C.), supra note 40 at 295: see text accompanying note 124.

\textsuperscript{126} R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 170.

\textsuperscript{127} Peace Arch, supra note 41 at 383. Compare Brantford (Township) v. Doctor, [1996] 1 C.N.L.R. 49
at 53 (Ont. Gen. Div.), where Kent J. distinguished Peace Arch, and applied provisions of the
Building Code Act, S.O. 1992, c. 23, and regulations thereunder, requiring building permits and
regulating swimming pools, to Indian lands. Under the heading "Public Policy", he said:

The societal interest sought to be protected by the provincial legislation is the
safety and health of all inhabitants of the province.... There should be no enclave
where some persons are left unprotected because others are not required to
comply with codified safe and healthy building and construction practices. The
legislation applies directly and specifically to conduct. It only incidentally relates to
land [emphasis added].

This decision is justifiable if the legislation, in pith and substance, is in relation to safety and
health rather than use of land: see, infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text. However, Kent
J.'s decision to that effect is debatable and seems to me to be inconsistent with Peace Arch.
exclusive legislative jurisdiction of Parliament to legislate with respect to "lands reserved for the Indians".128

Peace Arch was cited with apparent approval by the Supreme Court in Cardinal,129 and was applied by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in its decision in Derrickson.130

Other cases since Peace Arch have affirmed that provincial laws of general application relating to use of land cannot apply to lands that are under exclusive federal jurisdiction by virtue of s. 91(24).131 For instance, in Isaac the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appeal Division, relied on Peace Arch to conclude that the Canadian Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over Indian

128 Peace Arch, supra note 41 at 383.
129 See supra note 41. See also Smith (S.C.C.), supra note 42 at 565-67.
130 Derrickson (C.A.), supra note 40, affirmed Derrickson (S.C.C.), supra note 40.
131 Western Industrial Contractors Ltd. v. Sarcee Developments Ltd. (1979), 98 D.L.R. (3d) 424, might appear to be an exception. In that case, a two-to-one majority of the Alberta Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that provincial builders’ lien legislation applied to a leasehold held by an Indian-owned corporation on a reserve, permitting a contractor to file a lien against the leasehold. The majority decided that, as the corporation was not an “Indian” within the meaning of the Indian Act, the provincial legislation applied to the leasehold interest, which was held not to be Indian land within the scope of s. 91(24). However, the legislation could not apply to the Indian band’s reversionary interest, as that was still Indian land under exclusive federal jurisdiction. While Peace Arch was cited and lamely distinguished because the legislation in question there related to land use, the two decisions do seem to be inconsistent with one another, as Peace Arch also involved a leasehold interest in reserve lands, held by two non-Indian corporations. The Sarcee decision has been described as “controversial” and “legally very doubtful”: Sanders, supra note 45 at 157. Moreover, it also appears to conflict with Palm Dairies, supra note 42. But in any case, the application of Sarcee is limited in two important respects: (1) it only applies where a non-Indian holds an interest in Indian land; and (2) given that Peace Arch was distinguished because it involved land use, apparently Sarcee is inapplicable where the provincial legislation relates to use of Indian land, even by a non-Indian leaseholder.

Compare Re Stony Plain Indian Reserve No. 135, [1982] 1 C.N.L.R. 133 at 149-50, where the Alberta Court of Appeal considered both Peace Arch and Sarcee, and, while expressing “some difficulty” with the conclusion in the former case regarding the inapplicability of provincial laws to the leasehold, said that “[i]nsofar as the Peace Arch decision recognized that provincial legislation relating to use could be inapplicable as inconsistent with the reversionary interest [held by the Indian band], we express no disagreement.” The Court added, ibid. at 151, that “[w]e accept the general proposition that provincial legislation relating to use of reserve lands is inapplicable to lands that are found to be reserved for Indians.” As authority, the Court cited Cardinal, supra note 40 at 705, where Martland J., referring to Peace Arch with apparent approval, said that “[o]nce it was determined that the lands remained lands reserved for the Indians, provincial legislation relating to their use was not applicable.” See also Paul v. Paul, [1985] 2 C.N.L.R. 93 at 97 (B.C.C.A.), affirmed Paul (S.C.C.), supra note 124, where Seaton J.A. used this same quotation from Cardinal to support his decision that s. 77 of the Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, whereby an interim order can be made for exclusive occupation of a matrimonial home, does not apply on an Indian reserve because such an order gives “a right of occupancy” and “deals with the use of the land,” which are matters of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
hunting on reserves because hunting is a use of the land. MacKeigan C.J.N.S. elaborated as follows on the meaning of use of land:

To shoot a rabbit, deer or grouse on land especially Indian reserve land, is as much a use of that land as to cut a tree on that land, or to mine minerals, extract oil from the ground, or farm that land, or, as in the Peace Arch case, supra, erect a building on that land—all of which are activities unquestionably exclusively for the federal government to regulate.\(^{132}\)

However, not every activity conducted on reserve land is a use of the land that will attract exclusive federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24). For example, in *Four B Manufacturing*\(^{133}\) a majority of the Supreme Court held that a business which made shoes, although conducted in a building on a reserve, was subject to the Ontario *Labour Relations Act*.\(^{134}\) This is because the making of shoes is not a use of land as such, nor are provincial laws governing employer-employee relations generally directed at land use.\(^{135}\) So provincial laws can apply on Indian lands, as long as they are not in pith and substance in relation to land.\(^{136}\) Thus, in *R. v. Francis*, La Forest J., for a unanimous Court,

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\(^{132}\) *Supra* note 42 at 469. For commentary on *Isaac*, see McNeil, *Indian Hunting, Trapping and Fishing Rights*, *supra* note 95 at 14-17. Compare *Francis*, *supra* note 65 at 1028, where La Forest J. said that “[i]n *Kruger v. The Queen*...this Court held that general provincial legislation relating to hunting applies on reserves, a matter which is obviously far more closely related to the Indian way of life than driving motor vehicles” [emphasis added]. This is a puzzling statement, as in *Kruger* the accused were in fact hunting off their reserve (see *supra* note 38 at 106, 111, from which it appears that the fact they were hunting off their reserve was relevant to the decision), and the provincial game law in question was held to apply to them as a result of s. 88 of the *Indian Act*. Moreover, La Forest J.’s *obiter* statement is hard to reconcile with *Cardinal*, *supra* note 40, on which he also relied. In *Cardinal* at 708, Martland J. held that, as provincial game laws that did not relate to Indians qua Indians would have applied of their own force to Indians off reserves prior to the enactment of para. 12 of the *NRTA* in 1930, in order to achieve the paragraph’s purpose of securing the continuance of the supply of game for the Indians’ support and subsistence the federal government “agreed to the imposition of Provincial controls over hunting and fishing, which, previously, the Province might not have had the power to impose.” He accordingly decided that para. 12 had the effect of making provincial game laws apply to Indians on reserves in Alberta, subject to the proviso that the province cannot interfere with their right to hunt and fish for food on reserve lands, as those are lands to which they have a right of access within the meaning of para. 12.

\(^{133}\) *Supra* note 43.

\(^{134}\) R.S.O. 1970, c. 232.

\(^{135}\) This meant that the provincial legislation did not encroach on federal jurisdiction over “Lands reserved for the Indians”. But the majority held as well that there was no encroachment either on federal jurisdiction over the other subject matter in s. 91(24), namely “Indians”, as the legislation did not touch on “Indianness” or Indian status.

And as long as they are not in relation to Indians: see text accompanying notes 24, 61-62, 68-72; *Cardinal*, *supra* note 40 at 703 per Martland J.; and *Four B Manufacturing*, *supra* note 43 at 1048-49 per Beetz J.
held that, "in the absence of conflicting federal legislation, provincial motor vehicle laws of general application apply *ex proprio vigore* on Indian reserves." Obviously, in pith and substance, such laws relate to the safe operation of motor vehicles, not to land use. The main issue to be resolved, therefore, in determining the applicability of provincial laws of general application on Indian reserves is whether or not those laws are in relation to land or land use. If not (and as long as they do not touch on "Indianness"), these laws will apply there of their own force. But, if they are in relation to land—especially if they relate to use or occupation of land—they will not apply to reserve lands. On this, the cases examined

137 Francis, supra note 65 at 1028.
138 See text accompanying notes 31, 70-73.
139 See *Rempel Brothers Concrete Ltd. v. Chilliwack (District)* (1994), 88 B.C.L.R. (2d) 209 at 214 (B.C.C.A.), where Hinkson J.A., for the Court, held that a municipal by-law regulating soil removal and deposit in order to pay for damage to roads caused by trucks moving the soil applies on an Indian reserve because it "has only an incidental effect, if any, on Indian lands" and does not "regulate use of land". In *Fiddler*, supra note 42, Noble J. held that starting a fire on an Indian reserve does not affect Indianness or amount to a use of the land. Accordingly, he held at 127 that the *Prairie and Forest Fires Act*, S.S. 1982-83, c. P-22.1, applies *ex proprio vigore* to an Indian who starts a fire on a reserve in contravention of the Act, which "is clearly a safety law". Compare *R. v. Sinclair*, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 37 (Man. Prov. Ct.), where the opposite conclusion was reached with respect to equivalent Manitoba fire prevention legislation.

140 *Derrickson* (S.C.C.), supra note 40; *Paul* (S.C.C.), supra note 124; *Peace Arch*, supra note 41; *Isaac*, supra note 42; *Palm Dairies*, supra note 42; *Re Stony Plain*, supra note 131. See also *Millbrook Indian Band* (S.C.), supra note 42 (affirmed in *Millbrook Indian Band* (A.D.), supra note 42, without dealing with the constitutional issue), where Morrison J., relying on *Peace Arch* and *Isaac*, held that the *Residential Tenancies Act*, 1970 (N.S.), c. 13, is in relation to use of land, and so does not apply on Indian reserves. Compare *Park Mobile Homes*, supra note 42, where Farris C.J.B.C., for the Court, held that a provision of the *Landlord and Tenant Act*, S.B.C. 1974, c. 45, restricting the right of a landlord to raise rent for residential premises, applies to rental of a mobile home pad on an Indian reserve. The Chief Justice distinguished *Peace Arch* because the legislation in question in that case related to use of land, whereas he found that the specific provision in question in the case before him did not. For informative discussion of what use of land means in this context, see Hughes, supra note 45 at 97-103.

Obviously, provincial laws that are specifically directed at Indian lands, and so not of general application, will not just be *read down* to make them inapplicable to those lands (which is what the courts did in the above case where provincial laws of general application were found to relate to use or occupation of lands), but will be *struck down as ultra vires*. In *Hopton v. Pamajewon*, [1994] 2 C.N.L.R. 61 at 70, leave to appeal refused (*sub nom. Attorney General for the Province of Ontario v. Pamajewon*), [1994] 2 S.C.R. v, the Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously held that s. 257 of the *Municipal Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302, providing *inter alia* that "all roads passing through Indian lands...are common and public highways," cannot mean that roads on or passing through Indian lands become public highways by the simple operation of that section. This would be legislation in relation to a matter coming within the exclusive legislative authority of Parliament and, as such, would be *ultra vires*. Section 257 of the *Municipal Act* can do no more than declare public highways for valid provincial purposes roads that have become public highways pursuant to the provisions of the *Indian Act* by surrender to the Crown and transfer of administration and control of the land to the province.
above are all in agreement.\footnote{The only discrepancies I have found in the case law are over whether a leasehold interest held by a non-Indian on a reserve is to be classified as “Land reserved for the Indians” (see \textit{supra} note 131) and whether a provincial law is to be characterized as a law in relation to land or in relation to some other matter, such as safety or health (see \textit{supra} notes 127, 139-40). But once land is classified as reserve land, and a provincial law is characterized as a law in relation to land, the law undoubtedly cannot apply to that land. Moreover, in no case that I am aware of has s. 88 of the \textit{Indian Act} been used to make such a law apply to Indian land: for discussion of s. 88, see \textit{supra} notes 30-48, 72-81 and accompanying text.}

Since the decision of the Supreme Court in \textit{Delgamuukw}, the case law involving the applicability of provincial laws on reserves relates equally to Aboriginal title lands. In \textit{Delgamuukw}, Lamer C.J.C. agreed with Dickson J.’s holding in \textit{Guerin} that the same legal principles govern the Aboriginal interest in reserve lands and Aboriginal title lands, as that interest “is the same in both cases.”\footnote{\textit{Delgamuukw} (S.C.C.), \textit{supra} note 1 at 244; quoting from \textit{Guerin}, \textit{supra} note 102 at 379 [Lamer C.J.C.’s emphasis].} As we have seen, that interest is “the right to the land itself”, which “encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land.”\footnote{\textit{Delgamuukw} (S.C.C.), \textit{ibid.} at 252, 243: see, \textit{supra} notes 55, 110, and accompanying text.} Moreover, the federal parliament has the same exclusive jurisdiction over both Indian reserves and Aboriginal title lands.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.} at 267-69: see text accompanying notes 50-60.} As Lamer C.J.C. said in \textit{Delgamuukw}, the “vesting of exclusive jurisdiction with the federal government over Indians and Indian lands under s. 91(24), operates to preclude provincial laws in relation to those matters.”\footnote{\textit{Ibid.} at 270.} This is precisely what was said in \textit{Derrickson, Peace Arch,} and \textit{Isaac} about the applicability of provincial laws on reserves.\footnote{It accords as well with the other cases cited, \textit{supra} notes 131, 139-40.} So with respect to the application of provincial laws, as with the nature of the Aboriginal interest, reserve lands and Aboriginal title lands are in the same position—they both enjoy identical constitutional division of powers protection against provincial legislation.\footnote{Due to the doctrine of paramountcy, however, provisions of the \textit{Indian Act} may provide additional statutory protections to reserve lands that are not enjoyed by Aboriginal title lands.}

\section{III. CONCLUSIONS}

The \textit{Delgamuukw} decision clarified that federal jurisdiction over “Lands reserved for the Indians” extends to Aboriginal title lands. Moreover, Lamer C.J.C. held that this jurisdiction, because it is exclusive, prevents provincial laws from extinguishing Aboriginal title, either directly or indirectly. This is because s. 91(24) of the \textit{Constitution Act, 1867} “protects a core of federal jurisdiction even from provincial laws of general application, through the operation of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.”\footnote{\textit{Delgamuukw} (S.C.C.), \textit{supra} note 1 at 271: see text accompanying notes 61-71.} As Aboriginal
rights, including Aboriginal title, are "part of the core of Indianness at the heart of s. 91(24)," even prior to their recognition and affirmation by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 "they could not be extinguished by provincial laws of general application." 149

But given that Aboriginal title is at the heart of federal jurisdiction along with other Aboriginal rights, and so is inextinguishable by provincial legislation, it should be uninfringeable by provincial legislation as well. Provincial laws infringing Aboriginal title might encroach less upon federal jurisdiction than laws resulting in extinguishment, but they would encroach nonetheless because the infringement would touch upon the core of Indianness at the heart of s. 91(24). 150 They should therefore be inapplicable to Aboriginal title lands. This conclusion is solidly supported by Derrickson and numerous other cases that have held that provincial laws in relation to land do not apply to "Lands reserved for the Indians", even if those laws are of general application. So provincial laws do not have to be directed at those lands to be inapplicable to them—as long as they are in relation to land, and particularly if they affect use or occupation of it, they cannot apply to "Lands reserved for Indians" without encroaching on exclusive federal jurisdiction. Moreover, this conclusion was reached in Derrickson and other cases where no infringement of Aboriginal title or other Aboriginal rights was even alleged. So if a provincial law is in relation to land and infringes Aboriginal title, there is a two-fold reason for excluding the application of that law. As a result, in areas of the provinces where Aboriginal title can be proven to exist today, provincial laws in relation to land are inapplicable, especially to the extent that they infringe Aboriginal title.

Logically, this division of powers analysis precedes consideration of the issue of whether infringements of Aboriginal title can be justified. If the provinces have no jurisdiction to infringe Aboriginal title, they obviously cannot justify infringements by resorting to the Sparrow test. In other words, that test is simply not available to justify provincial infringements of Aboriginal title that are unconstitutional because they offend the division of powers by encroaching on exclusive federal jurisdiction. So the part of Lamer C.J.C.'s judgment in Delgamuukw relating to justification of infringements of Aboriginal title cannot apply to provincial legislation. Justification is only available to a legislature having constitutional authority over Aboriginal title,

149 Ibid.
150 Even provincial laws that have not been shown to infringe an Aboriginal right cannot apply of their own force to regulate Indian hunting if that would impair Indianness: see Dick, supra note 31.
and under our Constitution the only legislature with that authority is the Parliament of Canada.

The implications of these conclusions for the distribution of federal-provincial powers in provinces like British Columbia with large, unsettled Aboriginal land claims are obviously enormous. Exclusive federal jurisdiction over Aboriginal title lands means that provincial jurisdiction in areas that are subject to that title is severely limited. The provinces are barred not only from infringing and extinguishing Aboriginal title, but also from regulating the use of those lands by laws of general application. In concrete terms, this means that the provinces cannot derogate from Aboriginal title by granting interests in land, or even licences for resource extraction, to third parties. Nor can the provinces undertake developments of their own, such as hydroelectric projects, on Aboriginal title lands. Those kinds of activities would clearly violate the Aboriginal titleholders' right of exclusive use and occupation. Even laws like zoning regulations, which place restrictions on the uses that can be made of land, or building codes, which regulate the manner in which particular uses are carried out, appear to be inapplicable. The only provincial laws that could touch on Aboriginal title lands without violating federal jurisdiction would be laws that, in pith and substance, were in relation to a provincial area of jurisdiction other than land and did not otherwise impair the status and capacity of Aboriginal peoples.

While these conclusions may appear startling, they are the logical result of a string of judicial decisions, culminating in Delgamuukw. Moreover, they are consistent with the original scheme of Confederation, which placed jurisdiction over and responsibility for "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" in the hands of Parliament. As Lord Watson pointed out in the St. Catherine's case, the plain policy of the Constitution Act, 1867 was to place all lands reserved for Indian occupation, and Indian affairs generally, under the legislative control of one central authority so that uniformity of administration would be ensured.151 As a corollary to this, Lamer C.J.C. recognized in Delgamuukw that "the government vested with primary constitutional responsibility for securing the welfare of Canada's aboriginal peoples" needed to be able to "safeguard one of the most central of native interests—their interest in their lands."152 Barring the provinces from extinguishing, infringing, and regulating Aboriginal title is thus not just consistent with, but also essential to, the fulfillment of Parliament's jurisdiction and responsibility. Provincial access to the lands and resources accorded to them

151 Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
152 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 269: see supra notes 16-17, 59 and accompanying text.
by s. 109 of the *Constitution Act, 1867* has therefore always been subject to settlement of unextinguished Aboriginal title claims by the federal government. Seen in this light, provincial opposition to the settlement of Aboriginal land claims in the past was clearly a policy blunder of major proportions. In British Columbia, at least, that blunder could have been avoided if the province had listened to Aboriginal demands for treaties. That may be the ultimate irony of the situation that the province finds itself in today.

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153 See text accompanying notes 53-54.
154 In the *St. Catherine's* case, supra note 12 at 59, Lord Watson said that the provinces' beneficial interest in Indian lands becomes "available to them as a source of revenue whenever the estate of the Crown is disencumbered of the Indian title": for discussion, see H. Foster, "Aboriginal Title and the Provincial Obligation to Respect It: Is Delgamuukw v. British Columbia 'Invented Law'?" (1998) 56 The Advocate 221. Moreover, in the case of the territories out of which the three prairie provinces were formed, settlement of Aboriginal title claims by the federal government was expressly mandated by the Rupert's Land and North-Western Territory Order of June 23, 1870, in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 9: see K. McNeil, *Native Claims in Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory: Canada's Constitutional Obligations* (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1982).