Federal Jurisdiction -- Pendent Parties -- Aboriginal Title and Federal Common Law -- Charter Challenges -- Reform Proposals: Roberts v. Canada

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within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in section 91 shall be
deemed not to come within section 92.

In the result, Dickson C.J.C. upheld section 31.1 on the basis that
it was sufficiently integrated into the valid Combines Investigation Act
scheme and did not overly intrude into provincial spheres. He held that
(1) remedial provisions like section 31.1 are typically less intrusive in
relation to provincial powers, (2) the section 31.1 action has a limited
scope, being confined to the four corners of the Act, and (3) Parliament
is not precluded from creating civil causes of action in any event.

Conclusion

City National Leasing is a foundation case in Canadian constitu-
tional law. It reinvigorates a central federal power and implicitly over-
rules a major relic from Privy Council days.

My major criticism is that Dickson C.J.C.'s "provincial encroach-
ment" test as a criterion of validity of federal legislation should be
reconsidered. At best, it simply adds a new verbal test to the myriad of
old ones. At worst, it reflects an attitude that federal power exists in
some cases only where it is unobtrusive. That is not true to the scheme
of sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 or even to the
central thrust of City National Leasing itself.

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FEDERAL JURISDICTION—PENDENT PARTIES—
ABORIGINAL TITLE AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW—
CHARTER CHALLENGES—REFORM PROPOSALS:
Roberts v. Canada.

J.M. Evans and Brian Slattery*

Introduction

Nearly twenty years after its foundation, the Federal Court of
Canada is still struggling for acceptance by the legal profession. Some
critics attribute this to the disappointing quality of the court's jurispru-
dence and the dubious nature of certain appointments to its bench. What-
ever merits these criticisms may have—and they can be overstated—they
do not go to the heart of the problem. The fundamental reason for the
court's difficulties is that its existence challenges the pre-eminent position
long enjoyed by superior courts in the essentially unitary judicial

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system established by the Constitution Act, 1867.1 As La Forest J. has recently noted in a different context: "They may not, in strictness, be national courts, but they are the ordinary courts of the land to which the citizen customarily turns when he has need to resort to the administration of justice."2

The Federal Court's apparently endless jurisdictional difficulties are both a symptom and a cause of the problem. The most important difficulties stem from the widely held judicial view that the constitutional status of superior courts should be protected, and that Parliament's power to create courts of federal jurisdiction under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 accordingly ought to be narrowly construed. This approach is equally evident in the strict interpretation placed by the courts on various provisions of the Federal Court Act3 itself.

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1 Ss. 96-100.
3 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7. See, for example, Northern Pipeline Agency v. Perehinec, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 513, where the issue was whether the Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction in s. 17(2)(b) over cases in which "the claim arises out of a contract entered into by or on behalf of the Crown" applied to proceedings for breach of contract instituted against a Crown corporation, an agency of the Crown. The court held that it did not. The approach to the interpretation of the Act was formulated by Estey J. as follows (at pp. 521-522):

The transfer of jurisdiction to the Federal Court of Canada, inter alia, in all cases where relief is claimed against the Crown, signifies an exception to the general rule [that the superior courts of the provinces have general jurisdiction over federal and provincial matters]. There remains, however, as a fundamental principle of the court system as structured by the Constitution Act, 1867, a presumption of jurisdiction in the provincial courts. (Emphasis added).

See also, Law Society of B.C. v. A.-G. Can. (1980), 108 D.L.R. (3d) 753 (B.C.C.A.) (Federal Court's power to grant a declaration as "relief" against the Crown and the Attorney-General pursuant to ss. 17(1), 18(b)) does not include a declaration of invalidity: this point of statutory interpretation was left open in the Supreme Court of Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, at p. 326; Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development v. Ranville, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 518 (s. 96 judges always act as such for the purpose of s. 2(g) of the Federal Court Act, and are therefore unreviewable by the Federal Court); R. v. Miller, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 613 (Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction under s. 18(a) to issue certiorari against "a federal board, commission or other tribunal" does not include certiorari when used in aid of habeas corpus); see, infra, footnote 95.

The courts' generous approach to the constitutional and statutory scope of the Federal Court's jurisdiction in respect of Canadian maritime law provides a sharp contrast: see, for example, ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752; for a comment on this decision, see H.P. Glenn (1987), 66 Can. Bar Rev. 360; earlier cases are reviewed by J.M. Evans (1981), 59 Can. Bar Rev. 124, esp. at pp. 148-150. See also infra, footnotes 9 and 16.

The jurisdictional problems afflicting the Federal Court became apparent in three decisions handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada in the late 1970s: *Quebec North Shore*,4 *McNamara Construction*,5 and *Thomas Fuller Construction*.6 These decisions held that two requirements must be met before the Federal Court may assume jurisdiction in a case. The first stems from the fact that, unlike the superior courts, the Federal Court is a statutory court and has no inherent jurisdiction. So, the court may only entertain a matter if the Federal Court Act or some other federal statute gives it jurisdiction. We may call this the statutory requirement. However, Parliament does not have an unlimited power to confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court. Its power is strictly confined by the wording of section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which authorizes Parliament to create "additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada". The Supreme Court focused on the phrase, "Laws of Canada", and held that it referred only to federal laws, to the exclusion, in particular, of provincial laws.7 Thus, even where the statutory requirement is satisfied, it must further be shown that a proceeding is squarely grounded on "applicable and existing federal law"8 before the Federal Court can entertain it. We may call this second hurdle the constitutional requirement.

The next question is what sort of law can be said to constitute "federal law". Acts of Parliament and federal subordinate legislation obviously qualify. The court also held that the common law relating to matters within federal jurisdiction may in some cases constitute federal law, and it cited as an example the common law rules governing the liability of the federal Crown. However, the court rejected the broader proposition that a law was federal merely because Parliament had the constitutional power to amend or replace it. In other words, the constitutional reach of federal judicial power was not coterminous with federal legislative competence.9 Thus, a party suing the federal Crown could be required by statute to resort to the Federal Court, because the common

7 In contrast, provincial legislatures are empowered by section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to confer jurisdiction upon inferior provincial courts over matters falling within federal legislative competence: *Pembina Exploration Can. Ltd.*, supra, footnote 2.
8 *Quebec North Shore Paper Co.*, supra, footnote 4, at pp. 1065-1066 (per Laskin C.J.C.).
9 Maritime law is something of an exception: see footnotes 3 and 16. The court has interpreted both the statutory grant of jurisdiction and the federal nature of the law that nourishes it as co-extensive with Parliament’s power to legislate in matters of navigation and shipping, conferred by s. 91(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
law respecting Crown liability qualified as federal law. However, the Federal Court would not generally have jurisdiction over a suit by the federal Crown against another party, as for breach of contract or in tort, because its rights would not normally depend upon a law of Canada, but upon provincial law.\(^\text{10}\)

The Supreme Court further ruled that these strict constitutional limitations would not be relaxed to enable the Federal Court to decide the legal rights and duties of a third party or a co-defendant in a proceeding otherwise governed by federal law and within the court’s jurisdiction.\(^\text{11}\) If the legal rights and duties of the added party are not “based” on federal law, but are only “affected” by it, then a separate proceeding must be instituted in a provincial court, even though the claim against the party defendant or third party arises from essentially the same facts as the main action.

These constitutional restrictions on federal jurisdiction have caused litigants serious inconvenience, expense and delay. The most egregious problems have arisen in multi-party litigation involving the federal Crown, due largely to section 17(1) of the Federal Court Act, which gives the court exclusive jurisdiction in all cases where relief is claimed against the federal Crown.\(^\text{12}\) A plaintiff who is suing the federal Crown in the Federal Court, as section 17(1) requires, will normally be unable to join another party, such as a Crown servant, as a co-defendant unless the co-defendant’s liability also depends on federal law. For the same reason, the Crown as defendant cannot serve a third party notice because claims to contribution or indemnity do not rest on federal law. Separate proceedings must be instituted for this purpose in provincial courts, which, of course, will not be bound by the findings or result of the main action. Moreover, the federal Crown cannot be made a party defendant, served with a third party notice, or subjected to a counterclaim in proceedings for relief instituted by a private litigant in a provincial court. This is because claims against the Crown must be brought in the Federal Court under section 17(1).

Two Supreme Court decisions released in 1980 suggested that some relief from this jurisdictional nightmare might be on its way. In *Rhine*\(^\text{13}\)*

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\(^{10}\) If the Crown’s claim is so closely regulated and defined by a federal statute that its rights can be said to be “based” on federal law, the action will be within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court: see the contract cases of *Rhine* and *Prytula*, infra, footnotes 13 and 14, and the tort cases cited infra, footnote 53.

\(^{11}\) *Thomas Fuller Const.*, supra, footnote 6.

\(^{12}\) The court is also given concurrent jurisdiction in civil proceedings in which either the Crown or the Attorney General of Canada claims relief (section 17(5)(a)), or relief is sought against Crown officers or servants for anything done or omitted in the performance of their duties (section 17(5)(b)).

\(^{13}\) *Rhine v. The Queen*. [1980] 2 S.C.R. 442 (Can.).
and Prytula\textsuperscript{14} the court upheld federal jurisdiction over cases where the Crown was claiming as the guarantor of contractual debts incurred pursuant to federal statutory schemes providing financial assistance to wheat farmers and students respectively. The court stated that, even though the Crown's claim was contractual in nature, the transaction from which it arose was so extensively regulated by federal legislation that the legal rights and liabilities in question could be said to be based on applicable and existing federal law.

Additional evidence that the court might be relaxing its rigid stance was provided in 1986 by the judgment in \textit{ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc.}\textsuperscript{15} In this case the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to entertain an action for damages brought by the owner of goods against terminal operators in Montreal for loss of its goods, which were stored with the defendants after being unloaded from the carrying vessel. This was not the first case in which the court had taken a generous view of the Federal Court's statutory jurisdiction in matters of Canadian maritime law, and of the federal character of that law.\textsuperscript{16} However, two points made by McIntyre J. seemed potentially relevant to other aspects of federal jurisdiction on which the court previously had been distinctly parsimonious.

First, he stated that, while maritime law might not historically have included an action in tort for the loss of goods on land,\textsuperscript{17}

\ldots\ cargo handling and incidental storage before delivery and before the goods pass from the custody of a terminal operator within the port is \textit{sufficiently linked} to the contract of carriage by sea to constitute a maritime matter within the ambit of Canadian maritime law as defined by section 2 of the \textit{Federal Court Act}.

The idea that a statutory grant of jurisdiction could be interpreted to include matters "integrally connected"\textsuperscript{18} might well be extended to other provisions of the Federal Court Act.

Second, McIntyre J. stated that, if a case is in "pith and substance" within the Federal Court's statutory jurisdiction, the court may determine a question of provincial law arising incidentally in a dispute otherwise governed by federal law.\textsuperscript{19} Taken together with Rhine and Prytula, this holding suggested that the Federal Court could constitutionally entertain cases where the rights of the parties were neither so exclusively, nor

\textsuperscript{14} Prytula v. The Queen, ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Supra, footnote 3.
\textsuperscript{17} Supra, footnote 3, at p. 775. (Emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., at p. 774.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., at p. 781.
so closely regulated by a law of Canada as earlier jurisprudence seemed to require.  

Despite these decisions, the law of federal jurisdiction has remained basically a shambles. For instance, a municipality seeking to recover monies paid to Ontario under an unconstitutional provision of a federal statute was recently obliged to institute two separate sets of proceedings, one against the federal Crown in the Federal Court and the other against Ontario in the provincial courts. Not surprisingly, the consequent waste of resources attracted judicial criticism.

Several current developments, however, offer some small hope of respite. We begin with an analysis of the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Roberts v. Canada which continues the trend toward greater flexibility in applying the jurisdictional requirements. We then examine the new phenomenon of Charter challenges to the exclusive character of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction in certain areas, which, as we have seen, is at the root of many difficulties. Finally, we offer some brief comments on reforms to the Federal Court Act contained in the recently introduced Bill C-38.

Roberts v. Canada

This case arose from a dispute between two Indian bands over title to a certain Indian reserve. The plaintiff band sought a declaration from the Federal Court that the reserve belonged to it, alleging that the Federal Crown had unlawfully awarded the reserve to the second band, and thus breached its fiduciary duty to hold the reserve for the plaintiff band. There was an ancillary claim against the second band for a permanent injunction restraining it from trespassing on the reserve. The defendant band applied to have the action against it struck, arguing that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction over this branch of the proceeding. The case, then, presented the problem seen earlier, where a party that is required to pursue its claim against the Crown in the Federal Court

20 See especially Thomas Fuller Const., supra, footnote 6.
22 Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (1988), 55 D.L.R. (4th) 618 (F.C.A.), where the claim failed because the payment to the province did not discharge a legal obligation of the federal Crown to maintain juvenile delinquents.
23 Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario (1988), 49 D.L.R. (4th) 759 (Ont. H.C.), where the claim succeeded.
24 See especially, ibid., at p. 769. In the event, it has not proved necessary for a separate claim to be made for contribution between the two levels of government, because the federal Crown was held not liable to make restitution to the municipality.
26 This summary of the facts is based on the account given in the judgment of the trial court: [1987] 1 F.C. 155, at pp. 159-160.
under section 17(1) of the Federal Court Act is faced with the argument that a closely-related claim against a private party cannot be resolved at the same time.

In a judgment written for a four-judge panel of the Supreme Court, Wilson J. rejected the defendant band’s argument and dismissed its motion, effectively holding that the Federal Court had jurisdiction over the entire claim. She found that section 17(3)(c) of the Federal Court Act supplied the statutory basis of the court’s jurisdiction, following here the reasoning of the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal. With respect to the constitutional requirement flowing from section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, she held that the case was sufficiently founded on federal law to enable the Federal Court to exercise its statutory jurisdiction. This was because the action depended upon a federal statute (the Indian Act), a federal Order in Council setting aside the reserve for one of the bands, and "the common law of aboriginal title which underlies the fiduciary obligations of the Crown to both Bands". We shall examine these holdings more closely in short order. But first, the court’s general approach to the jurisdictional question demands some attention.

(1) The Jurisdictional Test

When can the Federal Court properly assume jurisdiction in a case? On this point, Wilson J. reiterated the test formulated by McIntyre J. in the ITO case. This postulates three criteria:

1. There must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the federal Parliament.
2. There must be an existing body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes the statutory grant of jurisdiction.
3. The law on which the case is based must be "a law of Canada" as the phrase is used in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

This formula is rather puzzling, for, as Wilson J. herself noted, the third element appears to overlap substantially with the second. That is, the section 101 requirement, which is the subject of the third branch, is the direct source of the requirement of "an existing body of federal law", addressed in the second branch. Nevertheless, Wilson J. suggested a way of differentiating them:

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27 Dickson C.J.C., Beetz, Lamer and Wilson JJ.; Le Dain J. heard the appeal, but took no part in the judgment.
29 [1987] 2 F.C. 535, Hugessen and Urie JJ.; MacGuigan J. agreed, but also thought that there was an alternative source of jurisdiction.
The second element, as I understand it, requires a *general body of federal law* covering the area of the dispute, i.e., in this case the law relating to Indians and Indian interests in reserve lands, and the third element requires that the *specific law* which will be resolutive of the dispute be "a law of Canada" within the meaning of s. 101 of the *Constitution Act, 1867*.

With respect, this suggestion merely compounds the original confusion. There seems to be no constitutional or logical rationale for requiring both a general body of federal law covering the area of the dispute, and a particular federal law dispositive of the dispute. This emerges clearly later in the decision, where Wilson J. is obliged to merge the two branches of the test in applying them to the facts of the case.

In reality, the *ITO* formula is flawed and potentially misleading. It was originally presented by McIntyre J. as a summary of the criteria laid down in the *Quebec North Shore* and *McNamara Construction* cases. However, as already noted, these decisions support only two general requirements: (1) there must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the federal Parliament; and (2) the action must be founded on existing federal law, whether statute, regulation, or common law.

Of course, each branch of this two-fold test has sub-elements which may require separate treatment in particular instances. For example, the second requirement demands not only the presence of federal law but also a strong link between that law and the issues to be decided in the case. This may, indeed, have been the point that McIntyre J. intended to make. But to elevate these sub-elements into distinct requirements, as the *ITO* formula apparently tries to do, overlooks their essential integrity and introduces a superfluous and misleading dimension into an area of the law that has already attracted more than its fair share of confusion.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court seems unduly drawn to tripartite versions of the jurisdictional test. We see further evidence of this tendency in the recent case of *Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pembina Exploration Canada Ltd.* There La Forest J. stated that the following three conditions must be satisfied:

(a) Parliament has legislative authority over the subject matter of the case;
(b) the empowering statute confers jurisdiction over the case; and
(c) the case is governed by "existing and applicable federal law".

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33 *Supra*, footnote 4.
34 *Supra*, footnote 5.
35 *Quebec North Shore*, *supra*, footnote 4, at p. 1066; *McNamara Const.*, *supra*, footnote 5, at p. 659.
37 *Ibid.*, at p. 219. Perhaps Wilson J. had in mind the need for federal legislative authority over an area when she referred in *Roberts* to "a general body of federal law".
Here, it is the first branch of the test that appears superfluous, merely spelling out a requirement implicit in the third branch. The latter, which stipulates that the case must be governed by existing federal law, tacitly requires that the federal law in question be validly enacted by Parliament or its delegate, or, in the case of federal common law, that it operate within the federal legislative sphere. In either case, Parliament must have authority over the subject matter of the action.

(2) The Statutory Requirement: Interpreting Section 17

As seen earlier, the court in *Roberts* held that a statutory basis for jurisdiction could be found in section 17(3)(c) of the Federal Court Act. This states that the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction over “proceedings to determine disputes where the Crown is or may be under an obligation, in respect of which there are or may be conflicting claims”. Wilson J. reasoned that the Crown had the obligation to hold the reserve for the use of one of the two Indian bands advancing conflicting claims to it, and that these facts brought the case squarely within the wording used in the section. So doing, she rejected the argument that the section applied only to interpleader proceedings.

Unfortunately, this generous interpretation by the court may not be of assistance to most litigants seeking to join a co-defendant with the federal Crown before the Federal Court. For it can be argued that section 17(3)(c) only applies where there are two or more parties, each claiming to be the sole beneficiary of the same obligation owed by the Crown. This limitation could prevent the section from applying to any but the rarest of cases beyond interpleader proceedings.

Consider a situation which bears some similarity to the case at hand. An aboriginal nation claims that it has unextinguished aboriginal rights to lands located within a province, and further, that the federal Crown has breached its fiduciary duty to ensure that the lands are held for the benefit of the aboriginal group. The provincial Crown does not acknowledge this claim, and continues to grant rights over the lands to lumbering and mining interests. The federal Crown, which has jurisdiction over lands reserved for the Indians under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, denies that the lands in question fall under its authority, or that it has any fiduciary responsibilities relating to them. The aboriginal nation’s claim to the land thus has two prongs, directed respectively at the provincial Crown and the federal Crown. Since most of the evidence relevant to one prong of the claim will apply to the other, the entire claim obviously should be heard in a single proceeding. But which court has jurisdiction?

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38 *Supra*, footnote 28.
The claim that the federal Crown has breached its fiduciary obligations must apparently be pursued in the Federal Court, which by virtue of section 17(1) has exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the federal Crown. But under current case law the plaintiff will be unable to join the provincial Crown as a co-defendant because section 17 does not enable the Federal Court to grant relief against a province. Worse, insofar as the action against the federal Crown requires the court to determine whether land claimed by the provincial Crown is subject to aboriginal rights, there is authority for the proposition that, since the main burden of such a ruling will fall on the province, the Federal Court cannot even hear the action against the federal Crown.

The plaintiff may, of course, seek recourse against the province in a provincial court, but there it will have to meet the argument that the federal Crown cannot be joined to the action because of the Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the federal Crown. The upshot of this argument would seem to be that the federal Crown cannot be brought before any court to respond to the substantive claim.

This remarkable result may perhaps be avoided by arguing that, if the action is not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, the reason must be that the action is not, in substance, one in which relief is claimed against the federal Crown. It follows that, even though the federal Crown is named as a co-defendant, the provincial court has a residual jurisdiction which has not in this instance been displaced by the Federal Court Act.


40 Joe v. Canada, ibid.


42 Compare Joe v. Findlay (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 239 (B.C.S.C.), where Berger J. in obiter dicta stated (at p. 243) that, if it became necessary, the federal Crown could be joined as a party to litigation in a British Columbia court between a member and an Indian band:

Such joinder would simply be for the purpose of having all parties before this court and avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings. It would not constitute a claim against the Crown within the meaning of section 17(1) of the Federal Court Act.

See also Uukw v. The Queen (B.C.S.C., February 24, 1986; aff'd B.C.C.A., April 26, 1986), where the federal Crown was added as a co-defendant at the instance of the province of British Columbia, against which the plaintiffs sought declarations of their ownership of and jurisdiction over certain lands, and an injunction to restrain further interference with their rights. The courts were obviously impressed by the desirability of the federal Crown's being bound by the judgment, because the province might later wish to claim contribution or indemnity from the federal Government. However, it is difficult to determine the precise basis for the conclusion that section 17(1) did not exclude the British Columbia courts' jurisdiction to add the federal Crown as a defendant. The explanation may be that the Crown was added because the case raised constitutional ques-
Does section 17(3)(c), as interpreted in Roberts, provide an alternative escape route from this maze? It could be argued that our example involves conflicting claims with respect to an obligation owed by the Crown within the section’s meaning. That is, the aboriginal nation claims that the federal Crown has breached its fiduciary obligations regarding the land, while the provincial Crown effectively denies this, claiming that the land belongs to it alone. The difficulty with this argument, however, is that the provincial government clearly does not assert that the federal Crown owes it a fiduciary obligation in respect of the land. By contrast, in Roberts both plaintiff and defendant bands claimed to be the true beneficiary of the Crown’s fiduciary obligation. That is they both claimed the benefit of the same obligation. So, if section 17(3)(c) only applies where there are multiple parties each claiming sole benefit of a federal obligation, the section cannot help resolve the puzzle posed by our example.

More promising is the approach to section 17(1) taken by Reed J. in Marshall v. The Queen, which in Roberts won the acceptance of Joyal J. at first instance and also of MacGuigan J. in the Court of Appeal. This permits a co-defendant to be joined to proceedings in the Federal Court against the federal Crown when the two claims are “so intertwined that findings of fact with respect to one defendant are intimately bound up with those that would have to be made with respect to the other”. This approach to the statutory grant of jurisdiction is, of course, similar to that rejected in earlier jurisprudence in respect of the constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction. The rationale in both contexts is the obvious efficiency and fairness of deciding in one proceeding all the claims arising from a common factual matrix.

This broader interpretation of section 17(1) finds support in the provision’s wording. As Reed J. pointed out, the section gives the
Federal Court jurisdiction in all cases where relief is claimed against the federal Crown, rather than simply over all claims against the federal Crown. In other words, the statute is construed as providing that, when a claim is made against the federal Crown, the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the whole case, including claims against other co-defendants that are so closely related that, as a matter of justice and convenience, they should be decided in a single proceeding.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Roberts represents an important advance toward the acceptance of the Marshall doctrine. While Wilson J. stopped short of basing her judgment on the doctrine, she apparently gave it her blessing. After quoting at some length from the judgment of Reed J., she stated:

There is clearly a substantial policy component involved in the resolution of this jurisdictional problem. Practical considerations enter in and concern over the undue extension of federal court jurisdiction where the federal Crown is not the sole defendant has to be balanced against the need for the expeditious resolution of litigation at reasonable cost. Marshall seems to strike an appropriate balance by requiring the claim or claims against the private litigant to be inextricably linked with those against the Crown. In addition, where such link exists serious problems of res judicata which could arise in subsequent litigation in the provincial courts are avoided.

In the event, she found it unnecessary to resolve the issue definitively, and upheld the Federal Court’s jurisdiction solely under section 17(3)(c).

It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court was not prepared to settle a matter of such practical importance, which has divided the judges of the Federal Court. Indeed, only four months before the Supreme Court heard Roberts, the Federal Court of Appeal in Varnam v. Canada decisively, but “not without regret”, brought down the kitethat Reed, Joyal and MacGuigan JJ. had been bravely flying. The court found that the weight of previous authority was against the broader approach to section 17(1), and that the concept of “intertwining” was too vague a basis upon which to build a jurisdiction that was not clearly conferred by the wording of the statute. Varnam was not mentioned in the Roberts judgment.

Reed J.’s construction of s. 17(1) echoes the interpretation of the constitutional scope of federal jurisdiction in the United States:

It has long been held, however, that the Article III grant is broader than merely a grant over federal “claims” but encompasses all claims in “cases” arising under federal law.

(Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, at p. 478 (3d Cir. 1979)).


Ibid., at p. 461 (per Hugessen J.).

The other objection raised in Varnam to the Federal Court’s jurisdiction was that the tort allegedly committed by the co-defendant, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, was not sufficiently related to a breach of a federal statutory
It will presumably only be a matter of time before the issue returns to the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{54}

When a serious jurisdictional doubt is raised in the course of litigation, it is generally better for the court to clarify the law then and there, rather than postpone deciding the question until some future case. Moreover, the jurisdictional point at stake here is relatively self-contained, and has been adequately defined in litigation over several years. In this respect, \textit{Roberts} recalls the older style of Supreme Court judgment which generally sought to avoid deciding anything but the narrowest point needed to dispose of a case. Ironically, Wilson J. often seems to go out of her way, especially in Charter cases, to address a wide range of issues, sometimes in very expansive terms.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{(3) The Constitutional Requirement}

Wilson J. affirmed the doctrine that the Federal Court may only exercise jurisdiction over a dispute if the parties' rights are squarely founded on existing federal law. She rejected the test formulated by Le Dain J. in the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in \textit{Bensol Customs Brokers Ltd. v. Air Canada},\textsuperscript{56} where he said:\textsuperscript{57}

It should be sufficient in my opinion if the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined to some material extent by federal law. It should not be necessary that the cause of action be one that is \textit{created} by federal law so long as it is one \textit{affected} by it.

Wilson J. likened this approach to that adopted in the United States, where federal courts have been held to possess jurisdiction over questions and parties not otherwise within federal jurisdiction, because they are pendent or ancillary to a claim that clearly is within federal jurisdiction. While conceding that this was in some ways an attractive concept,
she concluded that it "does not appear to find support in the existing jurisprudence of this Court, nor indeed in the wording of s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867".  

Nevertheless, Wilson J. went on to find that in the case at hand the plaintiffs' claim was based exclusively on existing federal law. She identified three sources of law governing the right to possess the reserve: (1) the salient provisions of the Indian Act; (2) the federal executive act setting aside the reserve for one of the bands; and (3) the common law relating to aboriginal title which underlies the Crown's fiduciary obligations. While the first two sources of law were clearly federal, the third required closer consideration.

Wilson J. began by considering the argument, accepted by Hugessen J. in the Court of Appeal, that the law of aboriginal title qualified as federal law because Parliament had exclusive authority over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians". In reaching this conclusion, Hugessen J. had invoked the Supreme Court's decision in Derrickson v. Derrickson, where Chouinard J. held that the right to possess Indian reserve lands fell solely within federal legislative competence, and further was immune from the application of provincial law, by way of exception to the general constitutional doctrine that there are no exclusive federal "enclaves".

However, in Wilson J.'s opinion, the Derrickson ruling did not lead necessarily to the conclusion that the law governing Indian lands was "federal law". She stated:

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58 Supra, footnote 25, at pp. 334 (S.C.R.), 205 (D.L.R.). We are puzzled by Wilson J.'s statement at the conclusion of her discussion of Marshall and Bensol that "[w]hether the Federal Court could, in this case, entertain the claim of the Plaintiff Band pursuant to s. 17(1) without at least implicitly adopting a pendent and ancillary jurisdiction approach is a question which need not be answered in this case" (at pp. 334 (S.C.R.), 206 (D.L.R.). The difficulty is that Wilson J. described, and rejected, the American pendent and ancillary jurisdiction doctrine as a method of expanding the constitutional requirement that cases in the Federal Court must be founded on federal law. However, Wilson J. also held that, in the present case, federal law provided the sole basis for the plaintiffs' rights; therefore, adopting the Marshall approach to s. 17(1) could not require accepting the pendent and ancillary approach to the constitutional limitations on the Federal Court's jurisdiction. Nor does it follow that the adoption of Marshall logically, or as a matter of policy, necessarily requires the approval of Bensol.

59 Supra, footnote 45, at pp. 539-540.

60 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24).


While I do not question the soundness of Chouinard J.'s conclusion that provincial legislation cannot apply to Indian lands because of the exclusive federal legislative power . . . , it does not, in my view, address the issue before us which is: is the law of aboriginal title a "law of Canada" within the meaning of s. 101?

Taking up that issue, Wilson J. observed that federal law was not confined to federal legislation, but also included federal common law. The precise question to be resolved, then, was "whether the law of aboriginal title is federal common law". Her answer is worth quoting in full:

I believe that it is. In Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, this Court recognized aboriginal title as a legal right derived from the Indians' historic occupation and possession of their tribal lands. As Dickson J. (as he then was) pointed out in Guerin, aboriginal title pre-dated colonization by the British and survived British claims of sovereignty. The Indians' right of occupation and possession continued as a "burden on the radical or final title of the Sovereign": per Viscount Haldane in Amudu Tijani v. Southern Nigeria (Secretary). While, as was made clear in Guerin, s. 18(1) of the Indian Act did not create the unique relationship between the Crown and the Indians, it certainly incorporated it into federal law by affirming that "reserves are held by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of the respective bands for which they were set apart".

The passage, at first sight, seems to attempt the tricky manoeuvre of changing horses in mid-stream, seizing the tail of a passing statutory pony from a perch in a common law saddle. Closer examination suggests, however, that Wilson J. is really making two distinct points: first, the common law of aboriginal title qualifies as federal common law in its own right because of its particular nature and origins; and second, in any case, the special fiduciary relationship flowing from aboriginal title has been incorporated into federal statute law by the Indian Act. On either count, then, the law can be considered federal.

This interpretation is supported by Wilson J.'s final summary:

I would conclude therefore that "laws of Canada" are exclusively required for the disposition of this appeal, namely the relevant provisions of the Indian Act, the act of the federal executive pursuant to the Indian Act in setting aside the reserve in issue for the use and occupancy of one or other of the two claimant Bands, and the common law of aboriginal title which underlies the fiduciary obligations of the Crown to both Bands.

This passage clearly identifies the common law of aboriginal title as federal law in its own right, quite apart from the provisions of the Indian Act.

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64 Ibid., at pp. 340 (S.C.R.), 210 (D.L.R.).
65 Ibid.
68 [1921] 2 A.C. 399, at p. 403 (P.C.).
What is the precise basis of this holding? The judgment is far from being explicit on this point. But the rationale appears to be as follows. As Wilson J. noted, the common law of aboriginal title arose from the very process whereby the Crown assumed sovereignty over Canada. As a result, it took force uniformly throughout the various colonial territories that now make up Canada, applying alike in jurisdictions otherwise based on English and French law. Upon Confederation, this body of common law passed into the federal sphere of authority by virtue of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In this manner, the common law of aboriginal title—and indeed the common law governing aboriginal and treaty rights generally—became federal common law. To put the point precisely, it became a body of basic public law operating uniformly across the country within the federal sphere of competence. In this respect, then, the law of aboriginal rights resembles the law of Crown liability, which Laskin C.J.C. earlier singled out as a prime example of federal common law.

Federal Jurisdiction And The Charter

As a result of the Supreme Court's previous assaults on federal jurisdiction, the most troublesome feature of the Federal Court Act has been the exclusiveness of much of the jurisdiction granted to the Federal Court. In two distinct lines of cases, the Charter has become the focus of attempts to restore a concurrent jurisdiction to provincial courts.

(1) Crown Litigation

Dywidag Systems International Canada Ltd. v. Zutphen Brothers Construction Ltd., a case currently under appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, is representative of the first line of authorities. The litigation arose from a dispute among the federal Crown, its contractor, Zutphen, and a sub-contractor, Dywidag, about the respective liability of the parties for loss suffered by Dywidag in performing its sub-contract. Dywidag brought an action in the Federal Court against the Crown, and a separate

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70 For fuller development of these points, see B. Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights (1987), 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727, especially at pp. 736-741.

71 See Quebec North Shore, supra, footnote 4, at p. 1063, where Laskin C.J.C. stated:

It should be recalled that the law respecting the Crown came into Canada as part of the public or constitutional law of Great Britain, and there can be no pretence that that law is provincial law. In so far as there is a common law associated with the Crown's position as a litigant it is federal law in relation to the Crown in right of Canada, just as it is provincial law in relation to the Crown in right of a Province, and is subject to modification in each case by the competent Parliament or Legislature.

See, further, McNamara Construction, supra, footnote 5, at p. 662.
proceeding in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia against Zutphen. Zutphen and the Crown each took the position that, if it were held liable to Dywidag, it would claim an indemnity from the other. Since the Crown was unable to issue a third party notice against Zutphen in the Federal Court proceeding, Zutphen sought to add the Crown as a third party to the provincial court action, in an effort to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings. Zutphen argued that the Federal Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the Crown infringed the subject’s rights under the Charter.

The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal granted Zutphen leave to add the Crown as a third party. It held that a statutory scheme under which the Crown could sue a subject in a provincial court but could not itself be sued by a subject was a denial of equality contrary to section 15 of the Charter, which could not be justified under section 1.

It is certainly easy to sympathize with the sense of frustration provoked in lower courts by the injustices and inefficiencies resulting from the Supreme Court’s narrow view of federal jurisdiction. However, it would be rash to predict that the Supreme Court will uphold the reasoning in Zutphen Brothers. Courts in other jurisdictions have generally held that the Crown and its subjects are not comparable for the purpose of section 15. Indeed, in two cases, the broad immunity of the federal Crown from suit outside the Federal Court has been specifically upheld.

Nonetheless, this particular difficulty can be surmounted by reformulating the argument. The contention would be that, by barring proceedings against the federal Crown in provincial courts, Parliament has meted out unequal and prejudicial treatment to plaintiffs suing the federal Crown, in the specific case where their claim involves multiple defendants. They alone, among plaintiffs with claims against multiple defendants, cannot have their case heard in a single court proceeding, but are obliged to resort to complex and costly litigation before a variety of courts.

72 See, Thomas Fuller Const., supra, footnote 6.
76 Indeed, counsel for Zutphen seems also to have put the argument in this way: supra, footnote 73, at p. 444. See also, Colangelo v. Mississauga (City) (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 283, at pp. 296-297 (Ont. C.A.); Peaker v. Canada Post Corp. (1989), 68 O.R. (2d) 8, at pp. 14-17 (H.C.J.); cf., Suche v. The Queen (1987), 37 D.L.R. (4th) 474, at p. 484, where this argument was applied to s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.
Even in this form, however, the argument may be problematical in the particular circumstances of the Zutphen Brothers case. The difficulty arises from the decision in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, where the Supreme Court suggested that the main thrust of section 15 was to protect the politically, socially and economically disadvantaged from discrimination by virtue of their personal characteristics. The question, then, is whether persons who have been wronged by the federal Crown, and are required to pursue their claims in potentially costly and cumbersome proceedings, meet this description. On the one hand, it can be argued that individuals with grievances against the Crown have historically been placed in a position of disadvantage relative to other litigants, and that section 17(1) perpetuates and reinforces that position of disadvantage. The argument may be particularly strong where the plaintiffs belong to a group which has suffered discrimination on other grounds, such as aboriginal peoples. On the other hand, it may be said that the fact that the federal Crown is a potential defendant cannot be a personal characteristic of the plaintiffs who allege that section 17(1) of the Federal Court Act discriminates against them. In addition, the procedural difficulties and inconveniences associated with suits against the Crown are arguably not the kinds of historical disadvantage contemplated by section 15, especially since there is no reason to believe that the otherwise socially vulnerable are disproportionately represented in this class of litigants.

Nonetheless, the disposition of the appeal in Zutphen Brothers should not necessarily be regarded as a foregone conclusion. The court’s previous eagerness to take the constitutional knife to pare the scope of federal jurisdiction suggests that it may be willing to use the Charter to remove what is arguably the most immediate cause of litigants’ problems with the Federal Court: the exclusiveness of its jurisdiction. However, the problem may be better framed as one of procedural fairness rather than of equality. The essence of the complaint in Zutphen is surely that Parliament has denied litigants a fair hearing by preventing them from bringing their case before a court with jurisdiction to dispose of all related claims arising out of it.

Section 7 of the Charter is not of assistance in Zutphen Brothers because the plaintiff had not been deprived of life, liberty and security of the person. However, section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights

appears more promising. It seems plausible to argue that, by preventing the joinder of all defendants and the resolution of all relevant claims between the parties, section 17(1) of the Federal Court Act deprives a party "of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations".

It is, of course, true that "a fair hearing" normally connotes a procedure that affords to those affected the essential participatory rights of parties at a trial or, where appropriate, an appeal before a court of law. It could hardly be said that section 17(1) deprived the plaintiff in Zutphen of a fair hearing in this sense. However, the fair hearing guaranteed by section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights is one that accords with "the principles of fundamental justice". This latter phrase has been given an expansive meaning in the context of section 7 of the Charter, where, admittedly, it appears in its own right, and not as a modifier of a requirement of a fair hearing.

There is already some evidence to suggest that the introduction of the Charter has sparked a judicial revival of the Bill of Rights. It seems arguable that, where appropriate, the interpretation given to words in the Charter should shape the meaning that the same words have in the Bill of Rights. For present purposes, the most relevant decision may be Morgentaler v. The Queen, where it was said that, under section 7 of the Charter, the procedural arrangements in the Criminal Code for the approval of abortions had to meet minimal standards of efficiency, expeditiousness and functional aptness. If this reasoning can be extended to other decision-making contexts, it seems plausible to argue that, by preventing the disposition of related claims in a single proceeding, section 17(1) results in the denial of a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, contrary to section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights.

This argument was rejected summarily by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Danard v. The Queen, essentially on the ground that the Federal Court Act and the Crown Liability Act actually created the right to sue the Crown. The statutory limitations upon the forum for its enforcement

79 See, however, Beauvais v. The Queen, [1982] 1 F.C. 171, at p. 179 (T.D.), where it was said that to conclude that neither the provincial court nor the Federal Court could enjoin an Indian Band Council was "manifestly contrary to natural justice".


82 Ibid., esp. at pp. 61-63, 121-122.

thus *regulated* its exercise, rather than *deprived* the plaintiff of a hearing. A similar argument can be found in American constitutional law in the context of the Due Process clause. The doctrine is described as requiring claimants "to take the bitter with the sweet." The standard riposte is that, while the constitution may not require the legislature to create a right, if one is created, the statutory procedure for resolving disputes must meet the standards of procedural fairness required by the constitution.

The Supreme Court of Canada has been prepared to give section 7 of the Charter an expansive interpretation in connection with the administration of justice, as an area for which the courts have particular responsibility. Given the judicial role in creating the imbroglio surrounding the law of federal jurisdiction, section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights may suggest itself to the court as an appropriate means of restoring a little sanity and order.

(2) Charter Challenges to Federal Administrative Action

A successful use of the Charter or the Bill of Rights to remove the exclusiveness of the Federal Court's jurisdiction under section 17(1) may thus enable all the related claims arising from a common set of facts to be decided in a single piece of litigation. However, the Charter may have a much less beneficial effect upon the Court's virtually exclusive jurisdiction to subject federal administrative agencies to judicial review.

As matters stand, this area of federal jurisdiction possesses a rare degree of coherence. The Supreme Court has accepted that, under section 101, Parliament may withdraw the function of reviewing federal administrative bodies from the superior courts of the provinces, at least when review is not sought on constitutional grounds. And, generally speaking, defining the jurisdictional boundaries between the two branches of our court system has proved far less troublesome in administrative law than in civil litigation involving the federal Crown. It is interesting to note, however, that the fact that Indian band councils may derive their authority from customary law, as well as from federal statute, has raised doubts about the reviewability of their decisions under section 18 of the Federal Court Act.
This state of relative harmony may be short-lived. Looming on the horizon is the question whether Charter challenges to federal administrative action enjoy the same exemption from exclusive federal jurisdiction as challenges based on the constitutional division of powers. The point has arisen in a number of cases, but the courts have not yet provided a clear answer.\(^90\)

The background to the issue lies in two earlier Supreme Court decisions. In *Attorney General for Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia\(^{91}\)* and its sequel, *Canada Labour Relations Board v. Paul L'Anglais Inc.,\(^{92}\)* the Supreme Court held that Parliament could not give the Federal Court exclusive jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity or applicability of federal legislation under the division of powers.\(^93\) Thus, a party to a certification proceeding before the Canada Labour Relations Board

Indian Act was a ""federal board, commission or other tribunal"" for the purpose of s. 18 of the Federal Court Act on the ground that it ""has some resemblance to the board of directors of a corporation"" (at p. 1379); despite the width of the definition of federal tribunals contained in s. 2(g), non-governmental bodies were not included in s. 18, even though they may possess powers conferred by federal legislation. In the alternative, he held, the band simply assumed jurisdiction over Mrs. Bédard by virtue of customary law; it did not purport to exercise any statutory power.

Nonetheless, it has since been held in the Federal Court, and provincial courts, that band councils (but not bands) fall within s. 18: see, for example, *Sabattis v. Oromocto Indian Band* (1986), 32 D.L.R. (4th) 680 (N.B.C.A.); *Beauvais v. The Queen, supra*, footnote 79; *Trotchie v. The Queen*, [1981] 2 C.N.L.R. 147 (F.C.T.D.). Indeed, in affirming the Trial Division's judgment in *Gabriel v. Canatonquin*, [1978] 1 F.C. 124, Pratte J. said there was no merit in the appellants' contention that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction because the subject-matter of the dispute, the validity of an election of the band council, was governed by customary law, not federal statute: [1980] 2 F.C. 792, at p. 793.


\(^92\) *Supra*, footnote 88.

\(^93\) Even though the Constitution is not a ""law of Canada"" for the purposes of s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Federal Court may decide constitutional questions relating to the administration of an otherwise valid federal statute which arise in proceedings to review a federal agency. However, since only valid federal laws count as ""laws of Canada,"" the Federal Court paradoxically may not have jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the validity of the statute in its entirety. See further, *Northern Telecom Canada Ltd. v. Communications Workers of Canada*, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 733.
may go to a provincial court to challenge the Board’s jurisdiction on the
ground that the employees in question are engaged in an entirely provin-
cial work or undertaking.

Questions about the constitutional division of powers arise compar-
atively rarely in connection with the operation of federal regulatory schemes
or the authority of federal tribunals. The decisions in *British Columbia
Law Society* and *Paul L'Anglais* seem therefore to have made relatively
few inroads into the Federal Court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review
most federal administrative action. However, the Court’s role would be
seriously eroded if its jurisdiction over Charter challenges to federal
administration were also held to be concurrent with that of provincial
courts.

This could mean, for instance, that inmates of federal penitentiaries
could elect between the Federal Court and a provincial court when invok-
ing the Charter to challenge decisions of either prison disciplinary tribu-
nals or the National Parole Board. A similar choice would be available
to unsuccessful claimants for refugee status, or other persons refused
entry into Canada or subject to deportation under the Immigration Act.
The loss of exclusive federal jurisdiction in the areas of immigration and
refugee law would enable litigants to avoid the cleverly drafted limita-
tions on judicial review contained in the new amendments to the Immi-
gration Act.94

It is fair to point out that the Supreme Court’s recent expansion of
the scope of *habeas corpus* has already made important inroads into the
Federal Court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review federal tribunals with
power over personal liberty, even on non-constitutional grounds.95 How-
ever, Charter-protected rights that potentially may be affected by a regu-
latory scheme or administrative action obviously extend well beyond the
interest in personal liberty that is protected by *habeas corpus*. Examples
might include claims that a social benefit limited to particular groups
violates section 15, or that a site inspection or a demand for information
by administrative officers is an unreasonable search contrary to section
8. Also affected would be claims that the principles of fundamental
justice are breached by a federal tribunal that is insufficiently indepen-

could, perhaps, be argued that these provisions so restrict a litigant’s access to the
Federal Court to vindicate a Charter right that they are in themselves unconstitutional.
See also, *Peirroo, infra*, footnote 95.

SHU Review Committee*, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 662, and *Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institu-
tion*, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643, are discussed by J.M. Evans, Developments in Administra-
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 595. The Federal Court has no general statutory jurisdiction to issue the
writ of *habeas corpus*. See, however, *Peirroo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
dent of the interested department, or is saddled with an institutional design or procedure hopelessly inappropriate to its functions.  

There is an attractive simplicity in the view that the Constitution is the Constitution, and that if the Federal Court cannot be given exclusive jurisdiction over division of powers questions, the same holds for the Charter. However, there are substantial arguments on the other side.

First, when federal legislation is challenged on division of powers grounds, it is clearly desirable that there should be an opportunity for disputes to be filtered through courts composed of judges appointed from the Bar of the province, for this gives some assurance that the strength of the provincial interest will be fully appreciated. This kind of consideration is irrelevant in Charter cases, where the appropriate level of government is not in issue.

Second, the Charter grounds invoked in attacking the proceedings of a federal tribunal will often be closely related to standard administrative law arguments. Consider, for example, the double-barrelled argument that a federal agency failed to comply with the common law duty of fairness or, in the alternative, violated the principles of fundamental justice enshrined in section 7 of the Charter. If litigants were allowed to pursue the Charter argument in a provincial superior court, when the administrative law issue could normally only be decided in the Federal Court, a serious dilemma would arise. Should the provincial court decide the Charter issue, simply because everyone has the constitutional right to raise such issues in provincial courts? Or should it stay the proceeding pending the Federal Court’s disposition of an application for review, on the ground that, since only the Federal Court can dispose of both Charter and non-Charter issues, it is the more appropriate forum? Or should the provincial court assert a pendent jurisdiction to decide both issues itself, since they are intertwined and arise from a common core of fact?

Experience to date with fragmented jurisdiction makes it easy to imagine the tangle into which the law would be drawn if Paul L’Anglais were extended to Charter issues. Only the most compelling reasons of constitutional policy should induce the courts to subvert the legislative
to refuse a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that, despite the need for leave, an application under s. 18 of the Federal Court Act provided an equally effective remedy; moreover, the review provisions of the Immigration Act constituted a complete code, which the courts should not permit to be by-passed lightly by applications to the provincial court for habeas corpus.

96 Supra, footnotes 81 and 82.

97 An important example is Howard v. Stony Mountain Institution Inmate Disciplinary Court, [1984] 2 F.C. 642 (C.A.); appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed for mootness, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 687
decision to give the Federal Court exclusive jurisdiction over broad areas of federal public law.

Reform

If the Supreme Court of Canada is not yet prepared to hoist the Federal Court out of the jurisdictional pit in which it now finds itself, are the prospects of a legislative rescue any brighter? In fact, reforming the Federal Court Act has been on the agenda of the Justice Department for some years, but more pressing issues of constitutional law and policy always seem to have taken precedence. However, on September 28, 1989 the House of Commons gave first reading to Bill C-38, an Act to amend the Federal Court Act, the Crown Liability Act, the Supreme Court Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

The Bill rejects the suggestion emanating from some quarters that the Federal Court should be abolished. Instead, it removes many of the troubling jurisdictional problems that have plagued the Court, without abandoning the essentials of the original scheme: a federal court with jurisdiction over broad areas of federal public law and other matters within Parliamentary competence. Of immediate relevance is clause 3, which amends section 17(1) and (2) so as to make the jurisdiction of the Federal Court concurrent in all cases where relief is claimed against the federal Crown, except where otherwise expressly provided.

The effect of this amendment is to enable plaintiffs with a claim against the federal Crown to proceed against all possible defendants in a provincial court, where the federal Crown, as defendant, will be able to counter-claim or issue a third-party notice. The fact that one court in a single proceeding will be able to dispose of all claims arising from the same transaction will be of great value to both Crown and subject. The potential advantages to the Crown are specifically protected by clause 16. This provides that, in proceedings in the Federal Court against the federal Crown, the court, on the application of the Attorney General of Canada, shall stay the matter if the Crown wishes to make either a counter-claim or a third party claim that is outside the court’s jurisdiction. If Bill C-38 is enacted before the Supreme Court of Canada decides *Zutphen Brothers* and *Rudolph Wolff*, these appeals will presumably become moot.

Welcome as it is, Bill C-38 is not a panacea. Private litigants suing the federal Crown may still be faced with a difficult choice. On the one hand, they may be tempted to institute their claim in the Federal Court

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98 See, for example, the speech of the Attorney General of British Columbia, Mr. Bud Smith, reported in Lawyers Weekly, September 1, 1989.
99 *Supra*, footnote 73.
100 *Supra*, footnote 75.
because, for instance, they can get a much earlier date for trial than in a provincial court. On the other hand, the possibility that the Crown may apply for a stay to enable it to pursue a counter-claim or a claim against a third party may make this course of action risky, given the additional delays and costs entailed. Note that it will not be possible to hedge one’s bets by instituting a claim against the Crown in a provincial court while proceedings in respect of the same cause of action are pending in the Federal Court.

It is beyond the scope of this comment to discuss the Bill’s important reforms to the exclusive administrative law jurisdiction of the Federal Court. Suffice it to say that significant improvements in the operation of the court should result from the introduction of a statutory remedy of judicial review at both levels of the Federal Court, with its own statutory grounds and standing requirement. Other welcome changes include the power to grant interim relief, the slightly expanded definition of “federal board, commission or other tribunal”, and the assignment to the Trial Division of the task of reviewing at first instance most federal administrative bodies. The responsibility for ensuring that the Charter does not further fragment the Federal Court’s jurisdiction in this area will now rest squarely with the courts.

Finally, the Bill has not resolved the question left open in Roberts of whether the Federal Court has a statutory jurisdiction over parties joined as co-defendants with the federal Crown, where their liability is founded in federal law and arises out of essentially the same facts. However, if a plaintiff is always free to take proceedings against all co-defendants in a provincial court, the practical significance of the question is greatly reduced.

101 However, a plaintiff whose proceeding in the Federal Court is stayed need not suffer the further prejudice of the continued running of the limitation period if either proceeding is recommenced in the appropriate provincial court within one hundred days after the stay. See clause 16, adding a new s. 50.1(3) to the Federal Court Act.

102 Clause 28, amending and renumbering as s. 21(2) what is currently s. 21(3) of the Crown Liability Act. On the propriety in other contexts of the grant of a stay because proceedings are pending in the Federal Court, see, for example, Shell Canada Ltd. v. St. Lawrence Seaway Authority (1987), 58 O.R. (2d) 437 (H.C.J.); cf. Reference re Constitution Act, 1987, s. 92(10)(a) (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 393 (C.A.).

103 See clauses 4-8 in particular. However, if “relief” against the Crown in s. 17(1) includes Dyson-type declaratory relief, then Bill C-38 reduces the Federal Court’s area of exclusive jurisdiction in federal administrative law by authorizing the institution in a provincial court of an action directly challenging the validity of a federal regulation or order in council, for example. See supra, footnote 3.

104 Supra, footnote 25.
Conclusion

The Federal Court Act, 1971 was an extraordinarily poorly designed piece of legislation, especially since many of its defects were anticipated by commentators and brought to the attention of the Minister of Justice of the day, Mr. John Turner. It was less easy to predict, however, that the Supreme Court of Canada would, until recently, take nearly every opportunity to reduce the Federal Court’s jurisdiction through a narrow interpretation of both the Constitution and the Federal Court Act itself.

It will take a concerted effort by the judiciary, the Justice Department, and Parliament if the Federal Court is to realize its potential to be a valuable institution within the Canadian court system: in other words, to be a part of the solution, not part of the problem.