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INDIGENOUS RIGHTS BEFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A CALL FOR A PRO INDIVIDUAL INTERPRETATION

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In its traditional conception, international law regulates relations between sovereign states. This definition is challenged by current developments of international law, especially in the area of human rights. The human person is arguably a bearer of rights and duties under international law. However, recognizing this individual legal personality is not enough. International bodies and treaties need to acknowledge that individuals are subjects of international law within a pluralistic world. In other words, the law of nations must crystalize the idea that individuals are, with all their cultural differences, subjects of international law. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognizes this view through its pro homine principle, which informs that human rights instruments must seek the best possible protection for the human person. In this interpretative framework, the Inter-American Court crystalized a body of norms protecting indigenous rights and their cultural and historical backgrounds within the general protection system of the American Convention. The extensive interpretation of rights articulates a new view on the individual legal personality. Accordingly, this article seeks to understand this approach based on key decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on indigenous cases.

I. THE RECOGNITION OF MULTICULTURALISM is unquestionably one of the most significant post-Second World War movements stemmed from the notion of individual personality and human centrality. It is intrinsically linked to the conception of the human person as a bearer of cultural characteristics that are indispensable to a full and useful existence and that, consequently, must always be observed and respected. Political philosophy, especially after the 1980s, made room for debate and the development of multiple conceptions of multiculturalism. This debate, which soon later became a concern of law and for lawyers, was

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strongly rooted in a divergence between communitarians and liberals, and many questions and different philosophical theories and perspectives still surround this discussion.\(^1\)

In the area of public policy, this topic bears considerable importance. States and the international community as a whole look to better accommodate national minorities and foreign individuals. Yet, they face a modern world where technology facilitates immigration and with territories that are occupied, peacefully or not, by peoples with diverse cultural characteristics. These characteristics go beyond the territorial boundaries where these individuals reside and include a mosaic of features, such as language, religion, philosophical views, and social conditions that constitute an intrinsic part of these individuals. Accordingly, this reality generates heated public debates that are part of states’ political agenda, especially after the Second World War.\(^2\)

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Due to its practical, political, legal and philosophical relevance, multiculturalism is in a central stage in many different areas of study, such as education, philosophy and political science. Furthermore, it is a key aspect in debates concerning minorities, foreign population, immigration and diversity in general. But paradoxically, multiculturalism is not a central aspect of the literature of public international law, especially in the area of international human rights. This does not mean that international courts do not seriously discuss the accommodation of foreign population and the respect of minority rights, such as indigenous rights. This also does not mean that human rights scholars have not written on the importance to legally uphold cultural diversity and the recognition of the human person as a central aspect of international human rights law.

There is, however, a lack of writing on how international human rights courts accommodate minorities. More specifically, there is no or limited literature on how the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the principal judicial human rights body of the Organization of American States, accommodates minorities within the scope of the American Convention, the Court’s main treaty that almost exclusively establishes civil and political rights. This lack of existing literature weakens the legal debate and impedes an effective argument in favor of


recognizing minority and vulnerable groups’ rights, which could ground future decisions of domestic and international courts. Consequently, academic writings could work as subsidiary references that help judges accommodate individuals’ rights within the international legal system.⁶

This article thus seeks to understand the approach of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and how judges, by applying an extensive interpretation of its treaty, further recognized the individual legal personality under international law. The article also seeks to review how judges crystalized the view that individuals not only are bearers of rights and duties, but can also have different cultural and historical backgrounds from one another, which requires international courts to acknowledge this idea when interpreting and applying treaties. This reasoning, the pro homine principle, is the key pillar in truly recognizing the human person as a subject of international law.

II. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD

International law traditionally refers to a group of norms and principles created by states in order to regulate their relations with one another.⁷ However, this traditional approach has met some practical and theoretical problems, especially in international human rights law. This article argues that human rights, as a particular system that is part of the broader realm of international law, differs from the latter in one central aspect: it recognizes the human person as a central element and acknowledges its international personality. This particularity forces judges and the international community as a whole to consider the interests and rights of individuals when interpreting and applying human rights norms. In accepting individuals as

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Indigenous rights bearers of rights and duties distinct from those of states, the international sphere not only recognizes the individual’s legal personality at the international level, but also acknowledges more extensively that all the particularities of the “human family” need to be important elements in the evolution and application of international law of human rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights seeks to recognize this multiculturalist and pluralist approach through the pro homine or pro individual interpretation. Accordingly, there is an intrinsic connection between the individual legal personality and an interpretation of human rights treaties that takes into consideration the wide variety of cultures of its individual subjects.

States, as the traditional subjects of the law of nations, occupy a dominant position among the actors on the international level. Notwithstanding states’ dominant position, human rights instruments arguably confer rights and interests to individuals and change the hermeneutics of international law in order to accommodate the human person and acknowledge her status as the weak link in a state/individual dichotomy.

International human rights law instruments arguably seek to reconcile natural law concepts with legal positivism: they attempt to acknowledge in treaties and declarations the centrality of the individual in human rights. The American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, following the precepts of legal positivism, acknowledges in its preamble the importance of domestic legislation and the necessity for more cooperation between the American states to protect human rights. At the same time, this regional declaration takes a natural law

9. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, Chapter VIII.
11. Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, preamble, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992) (American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man) (stating that the “affirmation of essential human rights by the American States together with the guarantees given by the internal regimes of the states establish the initial system of protection considered by the American States as being suited to the present social and juridical conditions, not without a recognition on their part that they should increasingly strengthen that system in the international field as conditions become more favorable ….”).
perspective by acknowledging that states recognize that “the essential rights of man are not derived from the fact that he is a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of his human personality.” This is a shift from the predominant positivist view that rights only stem from state agreements. Accordingly, members of the Organization of American States codify through the Declaration that states do not simply grant, but rather recognize, international human rights. This acknowledgement is based on the idea that human rights stem from the individual legal personality.

As a human rights declaration, the American Declaration was not initially envisaged to be a legally binding instrument. However, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights faced the question of whether this declaration had normative force when Colombia requested an advisory opinion on this issue. The Court found that to determine the legal status of the American Declaration, it is necessary to examine the evolution that the Inter-American System has undergone since the adoption of this regional instrument. The Court set out its basic argument that:

[T]o determine the legal status of the American Declaration it is appropriate to look to the inter-American system of today in the light of the evolution it has undergone since the adoption of the Declaration, rather than to examine the normative value and significance which that instrument was believed to have had in 1948. … The evolution of the here relevant “inter-American law” mirrors on the regional level the developments in contemporary international law and especially in human rights law, which distinguished that law from classical international law to a significant extent.

In this advisory opinion, the Inter-American Court pointed out that the regional development of international law, especially of human rights, differs from the classical view

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12. Ibid.
15. Ibid at para 37.
16. Ibid at paras 37-38 (emphasis added).
of international law. Although the Court did not explicitly discuss the basis of this difference, the recent evolution of international human rights law – especially after the Second World War\textsuperscript{17} – and the nature of the American Declaration, which combines natural law and legal positivism, suggest that a significant change in contemporary international human rights law is precisely the codification of the individual legal personality and its centrality in the legal system. This view departs from the “classical” international law system grounded in the Westphalian paradigm, which placed complete power into the hands of states as the only subjects of international law.\textsuperscript{18} In other words, the main aspect of international human rights law is the protection of individuals as bearers of rights and duties and not the protection of mutual state interests.

Thus, this regional instrument was created as a list of fundamental interests of individuals that flow from their legal personality and that the American states should take into consideration on the international and domestic levels. These “interests” could later become legally binding norms if domestic legislation or international treaties codified them. Moreover, this Declaration became even more important as these “interests,” or “soft” rights and duties, changed status and acquired a normative character.\textsuperscript{19} This normativity can be divided into broad and specific. Rights crystallized in the American Declaration acquired specific normative status either by way of custom or general principles of law, or due to the interpretation of the Charter of American States.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, the American Declaration acquired broad normative status because it recognizes that individuals have interests at the

\textsuperscript{17} With the creation of the United Nations, the “international bill of rights” and the regional human rights treaties established a human rights system part of general international law, which seeks to protect individuals. See John P. Humphrey, “The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation”, (1976)17 Wm &Mary L Rev 527; see also Thomas Buergenthal, “International Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments and Prospects”, (1988) 63 Wash L Rev 1.

\textsuperscript{18} For a Westphalian view of international law see Oppenheim, supra note 7 at 362-369.

\textsuperscript{19} Thomas Buergenthal et al, International Human Rights in a Nutshell 4\textsuperscript{th} edn, (United States: Thomson Reuters, 2009) 262-263.

\textsuperscript{20} Malcolm Shaw, International Law 5th edn, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 260 (arguing, in the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that a non-binding declaration may come to acquire normative force in these ways).
international level, that is, they have rights and duties under international law that need the international community’s consideration.

In considering whether the American Declaration possessed normative force, the Inter-American Court stated that the OAS Charter refers to fundamental rights in its preamble and a number of provisions, but the Court did not list or define them. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights protects rights “enunciated and defined in the American Declaration” based on Article 1 of the Inter-American Commission’s Statute. Moreover, it acknowledged that the OAS General Assembly has “repeatedly recognized that the American Declaration is a source of international obligations for the member States of the OAS.”

Based on these arguments, the Inter-American Court held that “the member states of the Organization have signaled their agreement that the Declaration contains and defines the fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter.” The Court thus unanimously decided that although the Declaration is not a treaty, and the American Convention remains the first source of obligations to its members:

For the member States of the Organization, the Declaration is the text that defines the human rights referred to in the Charter. Moreover, Articles 1(2) (b) and 20 of the Commission’s Statute define the competence of that body with respect to the human rights enunciated in the Declaration, with the result that to this extent the American Declaration is for these States a source of international obligations related to the Charter of the Organization.

Accordingly, the Inter-American Court recognized that international human rights law needed to be interpreted in light of subsequent developments, without necessarily referencing

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23. Interpretation of the American Declaration, supra note 14 at para 41.
25. Interpretation of the American Declaration, supra note 14 at para 42.
26. Ibid at para 43.
27. Ibid at paras 46-47.
28. Ibid at para 45.
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to the authors of an international instrument. Based on this theoretical foundation, the Court acknowledged the binding status of the American Declaration as the authoritative definition of the expression “human rights” in the OAS Charter. The Court thus recognized the normative status of the American Declaration based on reasoning similar to that commonly accepted for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is generally considered to hold the authoritative interpretation and definition of the references to human rights and fundamental freedoms contained in the Charter of the United Nations. However, the Court did not elaborate on the differences between human rights declarations with normative force and human rights treaties.

As previously explained, human rights declarations can have a broad or specific normativity. Specific normativity occurs when a right enshrined in the declaration becomes a general principle of law or a customary norm of international law. The normativity is broad when the instrument expresses the intrinsic elements of human rights: it establishes rights, rights holders and duty bearers. The broad or general normativity of declarations is not the same as that of treaties. In declarations, the right establishes that individuals are, generally speaking, right holders and addressees of rights, while states have the duty to acknowledge these individuals’ status.

In general terms, human rights have three intrinsic elements: a right, a right holder and a right to a claim. When “A has a right to x with respect to B,” one can point out the existence of a right holder (A) and a duty bearer (B). Consequently, A’s entitlement to x in relation to B indicates that B has a correlative obligation to A, and thus, A can make “special claims upon B

29. See Humphrey, supra note 17 at 529 (stating that the Universal Declaration “provides the framework for the international recognition of those human rights and fundamental freedoms that were left undefined by the Charter”); Shaw, supra note 20 at 260 (discussing the influence and significance of the Universal Declaration, including as an interpretation of the UN Charter); Buergenthal, supra note 19 at 41–46 (discussing different bases for the Universal Declaration’s binding force); Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, “The Interdependence of All Human Rights – Obstacles and Challenges to Their Implementation”, (1998) 50 INT’L J SOC SCI 513 at 513 (Cançado Trindade, Interdependence) (stating that “the Universal Declaration is widely recognized today as an authoritative interpretation of human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter.”).
to discharge these obligations. Thus, a right holder, that is, an individual, has a human right against states, quasi-state entities or even against other individuals. If this right is breached, the right holder possesses a right of claim against the violator of his fundamental right. Accordingly, the sentence “A has a right to x with respect to B” captures the basic intrinsic elements of human rights: right holders, claims, and duty bearers.

In international law, this philosophical theory of human rights encompassing the existence of right holders, claims, and duty bearers applies to human rights treaties. Unlike treaties, declarations do not establish specific binding obligations but only propositions that states must follow when conducting their domestic and international affairs. However, they can crystallize general normative obligations, especially through the codification of customary international law, that grant the obligations mandatory force. In certain cases they can even acquire jus cogens status. However, the American Declaration was not envisaged as an instrument crystallizing specific obligations whereby a breach of right can lead to a claim against the party that violated the right holder’s fundamental right. Nonetheless, the Declaration establishes a general normativity, that is, the view that individuals possess a general right to be right holders of human rights and states have the duty to acknowledge this characteristic as part of the international human rights system. The American Declaration upholds that individuals are the bearers of rights and duties at the international level and have interests different from those of states. Furthermore, states have the duty to acknowledge this status.

The *American Declaration* thus sets the parameters of a human-centered or a *pro homine* interpretation of international law. The regional instruments of human rights of the Organization of American States must be interpreted and applied taking into consideration that individuals are the bearers of rights and duties at the international level and have interests of their own without the tutelage of states. The *American Convention on Human Rights* supplemented this reasoning by specifying the rights and claims of individuals. This crystalized an effective dichotomous relation between states and individuals, whereby the violation of a right can lead to a right to claim before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Moreover, regarding the interpretation of the *Convention*, Article 29 precluded restrictive interpretation of rights and consequently set in motion the extensive interpretative approach of the Inter-American Court.

This position diverges from the classical view of international law centered on the interests of states. As the Inter-American Court pointed out in its advisory opinion on the Interpretation of the *American Declaration*, international human rights differs from classical international law to a significant extent. The main divergence concerns the centrality of individual humans in international human rights, as reflected through the *pro individual or pro homine* system in the *American Declaration*. Article 29 of the *American Convention* further develops this premise in the scope of legal interpretation. In a *pro homine* system, rights recognized in human rights instruments flow from the human person and therefore cannot be

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32. *American Convention on Human Rights*, supra note 5, ch VII.
limited by states “to a greater extent than is provided for” in the instrument itself.36 Accordingly, judges must apply the *American Convention* based on a *pro individual* system with the possibility of extensive application of rights.

States themselves designed an inter-American human rights system grounded on the human person as a subject of rights and duties stemming from their legal personality. Thus, international human rights law is based on an individual-centered or *pro homine* system. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights extensively discussed and applied this notion of an individual-centered or *pro individual* interpretation arguably because of two main practical considerations. First, international human rights law concerns the well being of the human person either on the individual or collective level. Second, the American continent comprises a diverse group of individuals with different social, political, historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, all of them equally entitled to international protection.

Accordingly, the *pro homine* system accommodates the diversity of the American continent based on an extensive application of rights focusing on and flowing from the human person. The Inter-American Court is often called to settle disputes that require an extensive, individual-centric interpretation. Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez asserted that:

> When exercising its contentious jurisdiction, the Inter-American Court is duty-bound to observe the provisions of the *American Convention*, to interpret them in accordance with the rules that the *Convention* itself sets forth . . . . It must also heed the principle of interpretation that requires that the object and purpose of the treaties be considered (article 31(1) of the *Vienna Convention*), referenced below, and the principle *pro homine* of the international law of human rights - frequently cited in this Court's case-law - which requires the interpretation that is conducive to the *fullest protection of persons, all for the ultimate purpose of preserving human dignity, ensuring fundamental rights and encouraging their advancement*.37


Following this line of thought, Henderson also asserts that the *pro homine* framework, which he calls “principle,” is a logical element of international human rights law. He argues that international human rights norms must always be in favor of individuals: the hermeneutical criterion informing that the interpretation of protected rights must always be extensive is an essential part of international human rights law. This is the position of the Inter-American Court itself. For instance, the Court stated that it could compare the *American Convention* with other international instruments in order “to stress certain aspects concerning the manner in which a certain right has been formulated.” Moreover, the Court found that this approach to legal interpretation cannot be used restrictively to limit rights enshrined in the *Convention*. Consequently, grounding its view on Article 29 of the *American Convention* that forbids restrictive interpretation, the Court held that:

[I]f in the same situation both the *American Convention* and another international treaty are applicable, the rule most favorable to the individual must prevail. Considering that the *Convention* itself establishes that its provisions should not have a restrictive effect on the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed in other international instruments, it makes even less sense to invoke restrictions contained in those other international instruments, but which are not found in the *Convention*, to limit the exercise of the rights and freedoms that the latter recognizes.

This approach intends to advance human protection beyond the initial set of rights spelled out by the *American Convention* in order to meet social needs and aspirations. The approach also seeks to better protect human dignity by taking into account natural law and legal positivism, two parts of a system that recognizes the individual legal personality in a pluralistic world. By adopting an expansive interpretation in favor of individuals, the Inter-American Court is thus able to refer to different human rights instruments and render decisions that extend

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41. *Ibid*.
42. *Ibid* at para 52.
beyond the traditional scope of the American Convention and that pertain to other areas of international law, such as international humanitarian law, environmental law and indigenous rights.  

III. The Application of a Multicultural and Individual-Centered Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

Based on Article 29 of the American Convention, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the human-centralization of human rights, the Inter-American Court, can constantly refer to different treaties or instruments in general in order to render decisions that escape the traditional scope of the provisions of the American Convention. However, the American Convention contains no specific provision enshrining indigenous rights. The Court has advanced the protection of indigenous rights in a series of cases by applying this pro-individual principle that recognizes individual beings as international legal subjects endowed with diverse cultural backgrounds.

Indeed, the application of this pro homine approach has substantially increased the protection of indigenous rights in the American continent. For instance, the notion of communal lands is vital for the protection of indigenous rights. In Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court protected this notion by holding that Nicaragua had neither demarcated the communal lands of the Awas Tingni Community,

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45. Lixinski, supra note 43 at 603.
46. The following states have ratified the American Convention and accepted the Court’s jurisdiction: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. However, Trinidad and Tobago denounced the American Convention on Human Rights and Venezuela denounced the American Convention. See I/A Court History, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/historia-de-la-corteidh (last visited April, 9, 2013); see also Press Release, Organization of American States, IACHR Regrets Decision of Venezuela to Denounce the American Convention on Human Rights (Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2012/117.asp.
nor adopted effective measures to ensure the Community’s property rights to its ancestral lands and natural resources.\textsuperscript{48} The Inter-American Court stated that indigenous peoples’ customary law must be especially taken under consideration.\textsuperscript{49} It concluded that due to customary practices, land possession “should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title to property of the land to obtain official recognition of that property, and for consequent registration.”\textsuperscript{50} Based on the teleological \textit{pro homine} principle enshrined in Article 29 of the \textit{American Convention}, the Inter-American Court extensively interpreted the application of the right to property enshrined in this regional treaty\textsuperscript{51} to cover the protection of communal property and the recognition of indigenous communities’ close ties with the land. The protection of communal lands flows from the \textit{pro homine} interpretation, which on its turn is possible due to a mix of positivism – state agreement – with the natural law view that rights and duties stem from the human personality and not solely from state creation.

The Court used this individual-based approach to decide that the right to property enshrined in Article 21 also includes the rights of members of the indigenous communities to communal property.\textsuperscript{52} The Court reached this decision taking into account that indigenous peoples have a communitarian tradition, in which land ownership is not focused on an individual person but on the group and its community.\textsuperscript{53} This connection to the land, according to the Court, is material and spiritual in a way that it is part of “the fundamental basis of their


\textsuperscript{49} Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, \textit{supra} note 48 at para 151.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{See American Convention on Human Rights, supra} note 5, art. 21. This provision establishes that: “1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. 3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law.” \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{52} Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, \textit{supra} note 48 at para 148.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid} paras 148-149.
cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival.”

Although there is no explicit provision regulating the relationship of indigenous communities with their land, the Court adopted a pro individual interpretation of the American Convention and decided that Nicaragua must adopt the measures necessary to establish “an effective mechanism for delimitation, demarcation and titling of the property of indigenous communities, in accordance with their customary law, values [and] customs.”

The Court confirmed the right to communal property as a group right – which embodies the right of claim and natural resources – in subsequent cases. The following paradigmatic case was Yakye Indigenous Community v. Paraguay in which the Court applied an extensive interpretation of Article 21 of the American Convention with the aid of exogenous legal instruments. In this case, the Inter-American Commission affirmed that Paraguay did not adequately ensure the enjoyment of the ancestral property rights of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community and that this situation made it impossible for the Community to own and possess its territory, placing the Community in a vulnerable situation in terms of food, medical and public health care. In light of the particularities of the case, Paraguay asserted that its “[d]omestic legislation does not encompass a means to acquire the right to property based on a historical right.” Furthermore, Paraguay added that “while there is a generic recognition of the traditional ownership right of indigenous peoples to their land[,] [for them to enjoy the right to such property,] it is necessary for them to actually possess it and live as a community on that land.”

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54. Ibid.
55. Ibid at para 164.
58. Ibid at 94.
59. Ibid.
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In response, the Inter-American Court applied a pro individual interpretation. It mentioned Article 14(3) of ILO Convention No. 169, incorporated into Paraguayan domestic legislation by Law No. 234/93, which spells out that “[a]dequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.” The Court used this provision to extend the scope of the American Convention: it reasoned that Article 14 of the ILO Convention, in combination with Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, obligated Paraguay to provide effective means of making such claims – with due process guarantees – to the members of the indigenous communities, as part of their right to communal property.

Again, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights analyzed the American Convention and acknowledged that indigenous communities have a special relation, which states must respect and effectively protect, to acknowledge the right of claim to communal lands. The Inter-American Court, mentioning the European Court of Human Rights, held that human rights treaties are living instruments, and that their interpretation must go hand in hand with the evolution of international law and current living conditions. This evolutionary interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation embodied in Article 29 of the American Convention, as well as those set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In other words, in adopting its pro-individual approach, the Inter-American Court expressly acknowledges that treaty interpretation should take into account instruments directly

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61. Yakye Indigenous Community, supra note 56 at para 95.
62. Ibid at para 96.
63. Ibid at paras 96, 124 and 126.
64. Ibid at paras 125.
65. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 29.
66. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, art 31(1) provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 44, art. 31.
related to it (paragraph two of Article 31 of the *Vienna Convention*) and the system of which it is a part (paragraph three of Article 31 of said *Convention*)\(^67\).

The Court thus takes the position that “in its analysis of the scope of Article 21 of the *Convention*, mentioned above, the Court deems it useful and appropriate to resort to other international treaties, aside from the *American Convention*, such as *ILO Convention No. 169*, to interpret its provisions in accordance with the evolution of the inter-American system, taking into account related developments in International Human Rights Law.”\(^68\) By referring to the need to interpret and apply the *American Convention* in the context of evolving human rights in contemporary international law, the Court argued that the indigenous provisions of the *ILO Convention No. 169* could “shed light on the content and scope of Article 21 of the *American Convention*.\(^69\) Applying this criterion, the Court found that “the close relationship of indigenous peoples with the land must be acknowledged and understood as the fundamental basis for their culture, spiritual life, wholeness, economic survival, and preservation and transmission to future generations."\(^70\)

The Court also mentioned Article 13 of *ILO Convention No. 169*, which establishes that states must respect “the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship."\(^71\) Consequently, the Court concluded that Article 21 of the *American Convention* safeguards the close ties of indigenous peoples with their traditional lands and the natural resources associated with the indigenous culture, including the components derived from them.\(^72\)

\(^67\) Yakye Indigenous Community, *supra* note 56 at para 126.
\(^68\) *Ibid* at para 127.
\(^69\) *Ibid* at para 130.
\(^70\) *Ibid* at para 131.
\(^71\) *ILO Convention No. 169, supra* note 60 at art 13. *See also* Yakye Indigenous Community, *supra* note 56 at para 136.
\(^72\) Yakye Indigenous Community, *supra* note 56 at paras 136–37.
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Ultimately, the Inter-American Court recognized that there is a dual right embodied in Article 21. First, there is the traditional (more Western) view of the right to private property. Second, this Article comprises the right of indigenous communities to their territory and natural resources in accordance with their indigenous culture, customs and spiritual life. These two views, however, are interpreted as not being in conflict with another. As the Inter-American Court pointed out, this teleological interpretation of the American Convention does not entail that every time a conflict emerges between the territorial interests of private individuals (or of a state) and those of indigenous communities, the latter necessarily prevail over the former.\footnote{Ibid at para 149.} Nevertheless, when states are justifiably unable to adopt measures to return the traditional territory and communal resources to indigenous communities, the state must not only grant compensation based on a discretionary criteria, but there must be a consensus with the indigenous peoples involved, in accordance with the peoples’ own mechanisms of consultation, values, customs and customary laws.\footnote{Ibid at paras 149, 151.} This reasoning uses a \textit{pro homine} or \textit{pro individual} interpretation of the American Convention assisted by Convention No. 169 of the ILO, and takes into consideration the existence of a pluralistic world comprising of different peoples with different cultures, backgrounds and views.\footnote{Ibid at paras 149–151.}

Analyzing whether Paraguay breached the American Convention’s Article 4,\footnote{American Convention, supra note 5, art 4(1) spells out that “[e]very person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”} which grants people the right to life, the Inter-American Court sought to apply an extensive \textit{pro individual} interpretation. It referred to views of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in General Comment 14 on the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health,\footnote{Yakye Indigenous Community, supra note 56 at para 166.} to decide that indigenous peoples can be placed in a situation of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{73} Ibid at para 149.} \textsuperscript{74} Ibid at paras 149, 151. \textsuperscript{75} Ibid at paras 149–151. \textsuperscript{76} American Convention, \textit{supra} note 5, art 4(1) spells out that “[e]very person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” \textsuperscript{77} Yakye Indigenous Community, \textit{supra} note 56 at para 166.}
vulnerability if access to their ancestral lands, and consequently, access to food and clean water, are at stake. Based on a *pro individual* interpretation of the *American Convention*, the Court established that the state concerned breached Article 4(1) and Article 1(1) to the detriment of the Yakye Axa Community. Among other orders, the Court decided that Paraguay must take the necessary steps to guarantee the property rights of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community and must publicly acknowledge its responsibility.

Similarly, in *Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay*, the Court followed the *pro homine* approach established in previous cases and advanced the understanding that communal property is attached to the indigenous community’s worldview and cultural identity as subjects of law. In this case, the Inter-American Commission filed a complaint that Paraguay did not ensure the ancestral property rights of the Sawhoyamaxa Community and its members. The Inter-American Court applied an extensive *pro individual* interpretation of the case by analyzing the content and scope of Article 21 along with *Convention No. 169 of the ILO*, and this was appropriate since Paraguay had previously ratified the *ILO Convention* and incorporated its provisions into domestic legislation. The Inter-American Court followed the precedent set by previous cases on the evolutionary individual-centered legal reasoning extending the scope of Article 21 of the *American Convention* in the light of exogenous treaties. Based on this interpretation, the Court decided that the close ties indigenous communities have to their traditional lands, including their natural resources and incorporeal

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78. *Ibid* at paras 167.
80. *Ibid* at paras 225–26. The Court decided that Paraguay must identify the traditional territory of the members of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community and grant it to them free of cost and must pay pecuniary damages and costs and expenses, *Ibid* at para 233.
82. *Ibid* at para 2. See also Cançado Trindade, *Multiculturalism*, *supra* note 48 at 490.
83. *Ibid* at para 117.
84. *Ibid*. 
elements, “must be secured” under the *American Convention*. The Court added that this close relation with their traditional lands and natural resources exists not only because the resources are the Community’s main means of survival, but also because they “form part of [the Community’s] worldview, of their religiousness, and consequently, of their cultural identity.”

The Inter-American Court hence affirmed that it must interpret and apply international human rights law while considering the “evolution of the Inter-American system.” The Court did not define nor give the general characteristics of this evolution, but as its body of case law suggests, this system encompasses an amalgamation of both a natural law approach and legal positivism within a *pro individual* framework. In other words, individuals are subjects of international law and have interests that the Inter-American human rights bodies need to take into account. These interests do not form a unified group of rights and duties granted to individuals as the American continent includes a diverse group of individuals with different cultural, political and historical backgrounds, and the Inter-American Court needs to acknowledge this pluralistic system. This general rule is crystallized by the preambles and normative characters of the human rights instruments of the inter-American system as a whole and, specifically, by Article 29 of the *American Convention*.

In *Saramaka People v. Suriname*, the Court held that indigenous communities have the right of participation in the exploration of natural resources as part of the communal right to property. Again, analyzing questions out of scope of the literal meaning of the *Convention*, the Court extended the interpretation of the *Convention*’s provisions favoring the human person with the aid of previous cases and external legal instruments and reference to other tribunals.

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85. *Ibid* at para 118.
86. *Ibid*.
87. The preambles of the *American Declaration and Convention* arguably acknowledge the individual legal personality. Article 29, providing the possibility of an extensive individual-centered interpretation complement the recognition of this legal personality and allow for a *pro homine* interpretation and application of rights leading to the recognition of indigenous rights even though there is no provision in both instruments making explicit reference to indigenous peoples. See *American Declaration, supra* note 11, preamble; and *American Convention of Human Rights,* *supra* note 5, preamble.
In this case, the Inter-American Court adopted a similar tone as in other cases and affirmed that Suriname failed to recognize the Saramaka People’s right to use and enjoy their territory; that the State allegedly violated the right to judicial protection by failing to provide an effective access to justice, particularly the right to property in accordance with communal traditions; and that Suriname allegedly failed to adopt the necessary domestic provisions to provide such rights to the Saramakas.\(^{89}\) To reach these conclusions, the Inter-American Court analyzed possible restrictions on the right to property regarding concessions for the exploration and extraction of certain natural resources, and informed that Suriname needed to follow three safeguards in order to protect indigenous rights.\(^{90}\) First, states need to guarantee an effective participation of the members of the indigenous community, in conformity with their customs and traditions. Secondly, states need to ensure the indigenous community’s right to receive a reasonable benefit from the exploration and extraction of natural resources within their territory. Finally, independent and technically capable entities, with the state’s supervision, must perform a prior environmental and social impact assessment of the indigenous community’s territory.\(^{91}\)

To find that Suriname had indeed breached Article 21 of the *American Convention*,\(^ {92}\) the Court mentioned foreign instruments and decisions/views. Referring to the Human Rights Committee’s views in *Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand*, the Court decided that the right to culture of an indigenous community under Article 27 of the ICCPR could be restricted if that community had been able to partake in the decision to restrict such right.\(^ {93}\) Moreover, the Court mentioned Article 32 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was approved by the UN General Assembly with the support of Suriname.\(^ {94}\)

\(^{89}\) *Ibid* at para 2.

\(^{90}\) *Ibid* at para 129.

\(^{91}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{92}\) *Ibid* at paras 60-61.

\(^{93}\) *Ibid* at para 130.

\(^{94}\) *Ibid* at para 131.
Accordingly, the Inter-American Court acknowledged the necessity to “ensure an effective participation of members of the Saramaka people in development or investment plans within their territory.” Moreover, the Court mentioned the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people reaching a similar decision by affirming that “[f]ree, prior and informed consent is essential for the [protection of] human rights of indigenous peoples in relation to major development projects.”

Furthermore, the Inter-American Court, besides referring to Article 15(2) of the ILO Convention No. 169, informed that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has stressed the necessity of prior informed consent of indigenous communities when major exploitation activities are planned in their territories and “that the equitable sharing of benefits to be derived from such exploitation be ensured.” Thus, the Court concluded that Suriname breached, to the detriment of the members of the Saramaka people, the right to property crystalized in Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights and the right to judicial protection under Article 25.

In the case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname, the Court dealt with displaced indigenous communities, the protection of refugees within the scope of indigenous rights and the special relation that indigenous groups have with the dead in the light of the cultural and spiritual particularities. Again, seeking to ensure an effective protection of indigenous rights even without explicit treaty provisions, the Court applies the pro homine principle to interpret its Convention in the light of previous cases, exogenous treaties, and decisions/views from other tribunals and bodies. In this case, the Inter-American Commission found that members of the Surinamese armed forces attacked the N’djuka Maroon village of Moiwana and

95. Ibid at para 133.
96. Ibid at para 135.
97. Ibid at para 140.
98. Ibid at paras 60-61.
murdered over 40 men, women and children, and destroyed their village. Moreover, those who were able to escape the attack allegedly fled into exile or internal displacement. The Commission pointed out that there was no adequate investigation of the situation, nobody was prosecuted or punished and the survivors remained displaced from their lands. Consequently, the indigenous peoples were allegedly “unable to return to their lands and to their traditional way of life.” The Commission thus argued that although the attack itself occurred before Suriname's ratification of the American Convention and its recognition of the Court's jurisdiction, the denial of justice and the displacement of the Moiwana community fall under the subject to the Court's jurisdiction.

The Inter-American Court reminded that Suriname’s duties to investigate, prosecute and punish the responsible individuals are not restricted to the calendar year of 1986. Accordingly, the Court can assess Suriname’s obligations from the date when it recognized the Court’s competence. Moreover, it acknowledged the lack of effort from Suriname to provide effective remedies and its disregard for the communities' traditions. The Court pointed out that the long-standing lack of effective remedies is normally a source of suffering and anguish for victims and their family members. Moreover, the Court found that:

[T]he ongoing impunity has a particularly severe impact upon the Moiwana villagers, as a N’djuka people. As indicated in the proven facts (supra paragraph 86(10)), justice and collective responsibility are central precepts within traditional N’djuka society. If a community member is wronged, the next of kin – which includes all members of his or her matrilineage – are obligated to avenge the offense committed. If that relative has been killed, the N’djuka believe that his or her spirit will not be able to rest until justice has been accomplished. While the offense goes unpunished, the affronted spirit – and perhaps other ancestral spirits – may torment their living next of kin.
The Court found that due to the impunity of the 1986 attack, community members were deeply concerned that they could once again face grave hostilities if they were to return to their traditional lands.\(^\text{108}\) Furthermore, they were unaware of what has happened to the remains of their loved ones,\(^\text{109}\) a cause of great suffering since it is deeply important under their tradition to possess “the physical remains of the deceased, as the corpse must be treated in a particular manner during the N’djuka death ceremonies and must be placed in the burial ground of the appropriate descent group.”\(^\text{110}\) Moreover, the abandonment of the Moiwana community’s traditional lands disrupted the especial relationship they have with their ancestral territory.\(^\text{111}\) Taking into account these facts, the Court affirmed that Suriname breached Article 5 of the American Convention.\(^\text{112}\) Evaluating whether Suriname breached Article 22 of the American Convention, the Court referred to the UN Human Rights Committee:

> [T]he Tribunal shares the views of the United Nations Human Rights Committee as set out in its General Comment nº 27, which States that the right to freedom of movement and residence consists, *inter alia*, in the following: a) the right of all those lawfully within a State to move freely in that State, and to choose his or her place of residence; and b) the right of a person to enter his or her country and the right to remain in one’s country. In addition, the enjoyment of this right must not be made dependent on any particular purpose or reason for the person wanting to move or to stay in a place.\(^\text{113}\)

In order to extend the scope of Article 22(1) of the American Convention\(^\text{114}\) to account for the situation of refugees and displaced individuals, the Court mentioned the guiding

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\(^{108}\) *Ibid* at para 97.
\(^{109}\) *Ibid* at para 100.
\(^{110}\) *Ibid* at para 98.
\(^{111}\) *Ibid* at para 102.
\(^{112}\) *Ibid* at para 103. Article 5 of the American Convention spells out that: “1. every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected; 2. no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person; 3. punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal; 4. accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons; 5. minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from adults and brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they may be treated in accordance with their status as minors; 6. punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social readaptation of the prisoners.” See American Convention on Human Rights, *supra* note 5 at art 5.
\(^{114}\) This provision provides that “[e]very person lawfully in the territory of a State Party has the right to move about in it, and to reside in it subject to the provisions of the law.” See American Convention on Human Rights, *supra* note 5 at art 22(1).
principles of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons.\textsuperscript{115} As for the question of Article 22 of the \textit{Convention}, the Court referred again to the UN Human Rights Committee and cited the case of a Colombian civil rights attorney who, after receiving death threats and suffering an attempt against his life, was forced into exile in the United Kingdom, which, according to the Committee, breached his right of movement and residence.\textsuperscript{116} Accordingly, the Inter-American Court concluded that Suriname breached Article 22(1) of the \textit{American Convention} by failing to establish conditions and “provide the means that would allow the Moiwana community members to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their traditional lands.”\textsuperscript{117}

Furthermore, the Court asserted that although the Moiwana community members are not indigenous to the region,\textsuperscript{118} they “lived in the area in strict adherence to N’djuka custom and they are inextricably tied to these lands and the sacred sites.”\textsuperscript{119} In the light of these considerations, the Court concluded that Suriname breached Article 21 of the \textit{American Convention}.\textsuperscript{120} Moreover, the Court sustained that Suriname’s “manifest inactivity” clearly failed to follow the principle of due diligence.\textsuperscript{121} It affirmed that it shares the same view of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which pointed out the lack of effective remedies

\textsuperscript{115} The Tribunal stresses the following principles: “1(1). Internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality, the same rights and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in their country. They shall not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of any rights and freedoms on the ground that they are internally displaced. 5. All authorities and international actors shall respect and ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, in all circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons. 8. Displacement shall not be carried out in a manner that violates the rights to life, dignity, liberty and security of those affected. 9. States are under a particular obligation to protect against the displacement of indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other groups with a special dependency on and attachment to their lands. 14(1). Every internally displaced person has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his or her residence. 28(1). Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such authorities shall endeavour to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons.” Moiwana Community v. Suriname, \textit{supra} note 99 at para 111.


\textsuperscript{117} Moiwana Community v. Suriname, \textit{supra} note 99 at para 120.

\textsuperscript{118} The Moiwana Village was settled by N’djuka clans in the 19th century. \textit{Ibid} at para 132.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Ibid} at paras 132, 133.

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Ibid} at para 135.

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Ibid} at para 156.
available for victims of human rights violations in Suriname. The Court thus held the State breached Articles 8 (right to a fair trial) and 25 (right to judicial protection) of the American Convention.

In this case, the Inter-American Court thus followed previous decisions and strengthened the protection of human rights in four different areas. First, following the reasoning of previous cases, it acknowledged the status of individuals – including indigenous peoples – as subjects of international law. Second, the Court recognized that the individual legal personality includes an interpretation that takes into account the fact that the world comprises different individuals with diverse cultural, historical and religious backgrounds. Third, the Court broadened the scope of the American Convention to cover situations specifically affecting indigenous communities by referring to previous judgments and other human rights instruments or global instruments of protection. Fourth, the Court kept the tradition of advancing the reparations system of the American Convention by adding to the mere recognition of three kinds of rights (civil and political; economic, social and cultural; and environmental and collective rights) the other rights of access to international justice and the right of memory.

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123. Article 8(1) spells out that: “Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature” (American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, at art 8 (1)).
124. Article 25 (1) establishes that: “Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties (Ibid at art 25(1)).
125. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, supra note 99 at para 164. The Inter-American Court also pointed out that in 1992, the President of Suriname promulgated the “Amnesty Act 1989”, which grants amnesty to individuals who have committed certain criminal acts from January of 1985 to August of 1992, with the exception of crimes against humanity. The Court mentioned its own jurisprudence and declared that no domestic law or regulation can be used to evade compliance with the Court’s orders mandating the investigation and punishment of those who committed human rights violations (Ibid at paras 165, 167); see also “Amnesty Act 1989”, August 19, 1992, Statutes of the Republic of Suriname No. 68 (exhibits to the application, vol. II, exhibit 28 at 476-483).
126. The Inter-American Court can determine that states must build a monument or make some kind of statement in memory of the victims of human rights violations. For more on reparations, see Bridget Mayeux and Justin Mirabal, Collective and Moral Reparations in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Human Rights Clinic,
The Court ordered Suriname to issue an apology to its citizens and, moreover, to build a monument in the name of those who lost their lives.\footnote{127} These actions aim to preserve an idea of justice and to give hope to a population that suffered and almost lost all hope that a judicial system would ever hear its claims for help. Furthermore, the ruling is a message to future generations that justice can be reached on domestic and international levels. Public apologies or monuments have symbolic importance. They arguably convey the idea that if domestic courts or policy makers are unable or unwilling to establish an effective system to protect minority rights, the victims or alleged victims know that there is the possibility of recourse to international law in order to finally have their claims heard.

This \textit{pro individual} interpretation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is also found in Article 29 of the \textit{American Convention} and takes into account a teleological view of human rights that is based on the current evolution of international law. However, the Court does not define or detail what this “current evolution” means. The Inter-American Court’s approach thus has deeper roots than Article 29. It is based on the whole inter-American human rights system established by the \textit{American Declaration and Convention}, which seek to bring together natural law and legal positivism in a framework that recognizes the individual legal personality in a pluralistic world. In other words, individuals are subjects of international law beyond the traditional sense of possessing rights and duties on the international level.\footnote{128}

Human rights bodies of the Organization of American States must recognize that individuals, who bear rights and duties on the international plane, are not identical but rather have different historical, religious, philosophical and cultural backgrounds. Individuals have the right to be acknowledged as different and as possessing their own views and particularities.

\footnote{127} Ibid at para 83.
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In acknowledging this system, the Inter-American Court furthers the paradigm of the human rights instruments of the OAS itself and crystalizes the position that individuals are subjects of international law endowed with diverse cultural backgrounds.

Cançado Trindade pointed out the special nature of human rights treaties, which do not solely regulate state interests.\textsuperscript{129} Indeed, human rights treaties are \textit{sui generis}, or with unique characteristics, because they set \textit{erga omnes} obligations to the whole international community and not only to states. Consequently, human rights treaties cannot be developed, interpreted, or applied without taking into consideration their special nature, which protects individuals by accounting for their multicultural backgrounds.

IV. CONCLUSION

Different individuals with different cultural, ethnic, and philosophical backgrounds share the same physical space. Some of these individuals are part of a state’s social or political majority while others invariably fall in the minority. Multiculturalism, as part of a human rights idea, acknowledges this diversity, and states must also recognize all individuals as bearers of a legal personality, regardless of whether they belong – individually or collectively – to a social majority or minority.

The universal system of international human rights law can accommodate this cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity: human rights treaties can be interpreted taking into account the diversity that is intrinsically part of the individual legal personality. There is thus no conflict between the recognition of a multicultural society and the generally vague provisions of the \textit{American Convention}. As Cançado Trindade pointed out, “[a]ll cultures and religions are to foster respect for others, are open to \textit{minimum} universal standards of respectful behavior, and to human solidarity, and acknowledge the human dignity of the human person.”\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{129} \textsc{Cançado Trindade}, \textit{International Law for Humankind}, \textit{supra} note 13.
\textsuperscript{130} \textsc{Cançado Trindade}, \textit{Multiculturalism}, \textit{supra} note 48 at 498 (emphasis added).
This plurality of cultures, which states need to acknowledge, impacts international human rights law in two different ways. First, it reaffirms that individuals, who are subjects of international law, possess particularities and cultural diversities. Second, international human rights courts have to ensure that states are indeed accommodating the cultural and ethnic groups within their territory.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, based on the pro homine principle, acknowledged this multicultural approach that requires states to uphold individuals’ cultural particularities. Based on a legal hermeneutical tool, the Court accepted, at least to some extent, the pluralistic concept of the individual legal personality, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. Although the Inter-American Court avoids mentioning the specific terms of “multiculturalism” or “pluralistic personality,” it acknowledged that indigenous peoples have a different culture that states need to consider. The Court thus moved away from international law’s solely liberal – focusing only on individual rights – or restrictive approaches – focusing only on state consent– to treaty interpretation and application to extend the American Convention’s framework of protection to cultural and ethnic minorities. This move represents an acceptance of the individual legal personality within a new multicultural framework.

The Inter-American Court aims to accommodate different views within a framework of protection that is increasingly human-centered. Liberal or individualistic approaches to human rights, such as the “traditional” right to property, stand with equal weight as the communal or collective right to property. The Court interprets the provisions of the American Convention in the light of both the traditional or liberal understanding of rights enshrined in human rights declarations and treaties and the collective, cultural, and sociological views of rights. These

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interpretations are focused on the human person as a subject of rights and duties, that is, as an international actor different than states.