In this paper the author discusses the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in the jury vetting cases of R. v. Yumnu, R. v. Emms and R. v. Davey. The author suggests that while the Supreme Court’s ruling goes a long way toward eliminating the concerns associated with jury vetting, there is a disconnect between the Court’s description of the jury selection process and how counsel tend to think about jury selection in criminal trials. While counsel are limited in their ability to influence the jury selection process, the Court might nevertheless have considered whether a full ban on jury vetting was needed to combat the risk — both real and perceived — that the Crown might act unethically during the jury selection process. The paper also examines whether the Court’s comments about the essential and inalienable features of the jury contribute to our understanding of the right to trial by jury enshrined in section 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
"The Jury Vetting Cases: New Insights on Jury Trials in Criminal Cases?."
The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference
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